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Abstract 
The following is an interpretation of Aquinas’ agent intellect focusing on Summa Theologiae 
I, qq. 75-89, and proposing that the agent intellect is a metaphysical rather than a formal a 
priori of human understanding. A formal a priori is responsible for the intelligibility as 
content of the object of human understanding and is related to Kant’s epistemological 
views; whereas a metaphysical a priori is responsible for intelligibility as mode of being of 
this same object. We can find in Aquinas’ text many indications that the agent intellect is 
not productive of the universal as content but is, rather, productive of the abstracted or 
intelligible mode of being of the universal nature. This is because for Aquinas the universal 
nature, which is the object of human understanding, is present in the things themselves but 
with a different mode of being. 
 Chapter 1 is intended to establish the fact which requires for Aquinas an agent intellect, 
and provides two very important principles: one is that the object of human understanding 
(the universal nature) is present in the things themselves and, the other, that it is not in the 
 iii 
things themselves with a mode of being which makes it available to the intellectual eye. 
These two principles lead us to the main point of Chapter 2, namely the distinction between 
the intelligible object and its intelligible mode of being. Now, because knowing is receptive 
of the intelligible object (Chapter 3), which is present in the things themselves (Chapter 1), 
the agent intellect is productive not of the object’s intelligible content, but of its abstracted 
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The agent intellect is a seal of the Divinity in us. 
It is proof of a beatifying truth, 
the truth that although we ourselves understand, understanding is a gift 
and even if the origin of the gift is in the Other, 
this Other does not diminish us by the gift, but raises us up to Himself. 
The light of understanding is a participation of the Uncreated Light, 
and human beings are living images of this Light by an act of God’s love. 
God is love, human being is loved. 
God is Creator, human being is gifted. 
God is rich, human being is poor no longer  
because God has looked with favour on the nothingness of His servant. 
How rich is human being? 
To what extent do we resemble God? 
What independence, what subjectivity bestowed on us this Subsistent Freedom? 
 
The answer to these questions is of the greatest relevance. 
Only by knowing ourselves can we achieve the meaning of our existence. 
But we move between independence and limitation,  
between an unlimited horizon and a no less unlimited thirst.  
Where does our perfection come from?  
Where is God? 
Is God to be found in the intimate recesses of the soul, or above the Heavens? 
Both! But, the radical question is different: is God my water, or my thirst? 
But if God is my water, what is the way to the wellspring of salvation? 
If God is my thirst, what is the meaning of all of this? 
It is not easy to see the way 
but the modern human being should not despair. 
Is not the agent intellect “like the light”2 
a gift which helps us to see the way? 
 
As in the original chaos, 
the darkness is dispelled by God’s command: 
“Let there be light!” 
  
                                                     





The doctrine of the agent intellect in Aquinas is related to the problem of the 
universals. 3 From a gnoseological point of view, the answer to this problem can take two 
forms. One is historically represented by Plato and Kant, the other by St. Thomas Aquinas. 
The problem of the universals is that human understanding is universal and 
necessary, yet reality—because it is particular and contingent—does not seem to match the 
object of our understanding. What is the value of the universal concept, then? Does the 
universal concept correspond to anything in reality? Or, is it a subjective event—a 
subjective modification—related somehow to what is particular? 
A superficial approach may give the impression that, actually, Kant and Plato are the 
mutually opposing alternatives. For Plato, in fact, the universal corresponds to something in 
reality, which is the idea in-itself whereas, for Kant, the universal is a subjective event 
                                                     
3 Quotations will be referenced in brief form, those forms provided in the index called 
“Abbreviated References.” For Aquinas’ works: Aquinas’ name is always omitted, an abbreviated 
form of the title begins the quotation and a simple indication of the place follows, in letters and 
numbers of evident meaning. An exception to this are the quotations from the Summa Theologiae I, 
qq. 75-89, the main source of this dissertation: they always begin directly with the number of 
question. Another exception is the Commentary to Aristotle’s De Anima: I have used the Leonine 
edition, therefore, I quote the book, the chapter and the lines by number. The works of other 
authors are quoted in this way: last name, one word or a few letters indicating the title of the work 
(only when more than one work of the same author is quoted in this dissertation) and the page 
number. Other more particular indications will be given as needed. 
Emphasis in Latin texts is always mine, unless otherwise indicated. 
Translations: Aquinas’ text is translated using the translation by the Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province, available at http://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/index.html, unless otherwise 
indicated. My editing of this translation is made evident with square brackets. When the translation 
is mine, this is indicated immediately after the translated text. The Latin text of Aquinas is always 
provided in the footnotes. Authors other than Aquinas are offered in English (my translations, unless 
an English edition is quoted in Bibliography). 
See Appendix (p. 309) for 24 important notes allowing more precise and/or expanded 
reference on particular points; this Appendix contains some Latin texts, their translations and 




which—precisely because of its characteristic as universal—cannot correspond formally to 
the particular reality of experience. 
In both cases, however, the universal does not correspond to the particular. And in 
both cases, I submit, it is for the same reason: because the universal is taken as an event of 
consciousness, as an idea which, exactly because of its abstracted condition, can have 
nothing to do with the raw material of experience. For both, Plato and Kant, universality is a 
subjective characteristic of ideas or thoughts, a characteristic not found in the particular 
reality. Now, for Plato, because our thoughts must correspond to reality, the solution was to 
duplicate our ideas in a world of ideas. For Kant, instead, because our ideas relate to the 
particular reality, and granted that their universality cannot come from experience, the 
solution is to make universality the result of a subjective function. Universality and necessity 
are, for Kant, the result of the subject's activity on the raw material of experience. Whereas, 
for Plato, the universal is the result of a participation from the idea, for Kant the universal is 
the result of a subjective activity on the material of experience. In both Plato and Kant, the 
fact needing explanation is the idea as it is in the mind. 
Is this what Aquinas thought? In this thesis, it will be suggested that, for Aquinas, 
because there is a distinction between the universal as content and as the abstracted mode 
of being of that content, there is one sense in which intelligibility is the result of a subjective 
function, and another sense in which intelligibility and universality belong to the things 
themselves. 
When we say that the agent intellect is a metaphysical a priori, we mean that the 




content; we distinguish this metaphysical a priori from the Kantian formal a priori, which is 
source of intelligibility as content of an otherwise raw material of experience. That is, a 
formal a priori is the subjective function by which intelligibility is “produced” in the sensible 
material. In other words, a formal a priori is the source of intelligible content, whereas a 
metaphysical a priori is the source of the abstracted mode of being of the content. On the 
one hand, a doctrine of the agent intellect as a metaphysical a priori presupposes that the 
intelligible content belongs to the things themselves; a formal a priori, on the other hand, 
presupposes that the intelligible content is the result of the activity of the subject on an 
otherwise non-intelligible material of experience. 
The reason for bringing Kant and Plato together is to better understand the radical 
difference between Aquinas and Kant. In other words, what St. Thomas says of Plato, in this 
respect, applies to Kant. And the reason for showing the difference between St. Thomas and 
Kant is to make our interpretation of St. Thomas more meaningful for today’s reflection. In 
my view, if St. Thomas is confused with Kant, the contribution of St. Thomas is lost. Such 
confusion is made possible by the fact that both the Thomistic agent intellect and the 
Kantian formal a priori can be said to provide intelligibility, or to make intelligible the object 
of experience. What is suggested in this dissertation is that “intelligible” is used in each case 
in a different sense. In order to avoid this confusion, two essentially related elements are 
suggested: first, the Thomistic distinction between res intellecta and modus rei intellectae, 
and secondly the Thomistic doctrine of the presence of the universal in the things 
themselves. As we will see, these two elements—as well as other related elements—are not 




What is proposed in this thesis is the interpretation of Aquinas’ agent intellect as a 
“metaphysical” a priori, insofar as it produces not the intelligible content, but the intelligible 
mode of being of the content. This claim implies many assumptions which will need to be 
discussed in their proper places, in the body of this dissertation. 
My goal in this introduction is, firstly, to outline the main concepts, method and 
procedure in what will follow; secondly, to refer briefly to the medieval controversy with 
Averroes regarding the agent intellect; thirdly, to examine the work of some renowned 
scholars in order to frame the thesis position in a more understandable fashion; fourthly, to 
briefly introduce Cornelio Fabro (in whom we first found this idea of the agent intellect as a 
metaphysical rather than a formal a priori),4 in order to show how and to what extent his 
work is the source of inspiration for this thesis; fifthly and finally, to report some pertinent 
findings from other authors.  
1) Main Concepts, Method and Procedure  
Because of the importance and systematic character of the Summa Theologiae,5 this 
work will be the focus. Other Thomistic works will be brought into play in order to confirm 
the interpretation proposed, to show Aquinas’ consistency on this topic throughout his 
career, and/or to qualify the findings in some way.6 The concern is not to indicate all of the 
                                                     
4 Cf. Cornelio Fabro, La Svolta Antropologica di Karl Rahner, Opere Complete, volume 25 
(Segni: EDIVI, 2011), 52 and 116. 
5 Cf. Iª Pars, qq. 75-89. 
6 Cf. Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), 1: “Although Aquinas is 
remarkably consistent in his several discussions of the same topic, it is often helpful to examine 
parallel passages in his writings when fully assessing his views on any issue”; Juan Fernando Sellés, El 
intelecto agente y los filósofos: Venturas y desventuras del supremo hallazgo aristotélico sobre el 





parallel texts for each reference of the Summa. Particularly important will be the reference 
to Aquinas’ Commentary to the Aristotelian De Anima,7 because of Aquinas’ constant 
reference to Aristotle in dealing with the agent intellect.8 
The interpretation being offered is that the agent intellect is a metaphysical a priori 
of human understanding as receptive of objective content. An a priori is a condition of 
possibility. A condition of possibility gives intelligibility to a fact. That is why the starting 
point (Chapter 1) will be to identify the fact that requires an agent intellect as its condition 
                                                     
existence of the agent intellect in this work, the most mature [i.e., the Summa Theologiae], with the 
same argument as in his first writings” and 270: “[Aquinas] maintains until the end of his production 
that the proper function of the agent intellect is to abstract.” 
7 Sellés (cf. EIA, 23) says that the third book of the De Anima is the book most commented 
upon in the history of Philosophy, and that the passage that regards the agent intellect is the most 
discussed. Sellés’ research in El Intelecto Agente y los Filósofos has the merit of including 52 pages of 
essential bibliography, although the author’s interpretation of the agent intellect in Aristotle is 
grounded in questionable principles. Still, even if he disagrees with almost all interpretations of 
Aristotle in history, including Aquinas’, his presentation of the various authors is fair and well 
documented. 
8 Schmidt (cf. Ciro E. Schmidt Andrade, “Santo Tomás y el De Anima: Comentario a los Caps. 
4 y 5 del Libro III del De Anima de Aristóteles,” Analogía Filosófica: Revista De Filosofía 8, no. 1 
[1994]: 124) very insightfully proposes that St. Thomas goes beyond Aristotle but does not 
contradict him (same remark in Cornelio Fabro, La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione secondo San 
Tommaso d’Aquino, Opere Complete, volume 3 [Segni: EDIVI, 2005], 276). It is a most fitting 
comment because it gives an account of Aquinas’ evident intelligence of Aristotle but, at the same 
time, acknowledges that not everything that St. Thomas says is explicit in Aristotle. For the Angelic, I 
submit, the fact that something is not written in the book does not mean that Aristotle did not have 
it in his mind. Still, to make his case, St. Thomas always tries to find textual support for his claims, or 
he refers his interpretation to explicit principles that Aristotle maintains in other places, or he 
stresses the internal coherence of the text. It is not difficult to agree with Stump in this regard: “In a 
recent volume of essays on Aristotle’s De anima, Martha Nussbaum describes Aquinas’s work as 
‘one of the very greatest commentaries on the work’ and ‘very insightful.’ T.H. Irwin, a leading 
interpreter of Aristotle, acknowledges that at one point in the Sententia libri Ethicorum 
(Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics), Aquinas ‘actually explains Aristotle’s intention 
more clearly than Aristotle explains it himself’. Such judgments apply pretty generally to Aquinas’s 
Aristotelian commentaries, all of which are marked by his extraordinary ability as a philosophical 
commentator to discern a logical structure in almost every passage he examines in every sort of 






of possibility.9 Identifying this fact will help to show that the doctrine of the agent intellect 
is related to the problem of the universals, and thus relates to the critical problem.10 The 
fact, for Aquinas (section 1), is that we know the natures of bodies, but those natures are 
not in the bodies with an intelligible mode of being; it is this fact which results in the 
requirement of an agent intellect. The implication is that, for St. Thomas, the object of 
intelligence in its formal aspect (section 2) is the universal, the nature of the corporeal thing 
in its absoluteness, not the material of sensibility. Another important implication (section 3) 
is that the object of intelligence, the universal, subsists in the corporeal thing and belongs to 
it. It is hoped that all of this will allow us to conclude Chapter 1 (section 4) with a better 
understanding of the role of the agent intellect and its necessity in relationship to the 
problem of the universals; that is, the role of the agent intellect is to make intelligible in act 
the universal in re, i.e. the nature of the corporeal things, so that they may be seen by the 
possible intellect. 
The first chapter will open the door to many considerations which will take their 
proper places in the following chapters. In Chapter 2 the essential difference between St. 
Thomas and Kant in their respective approaches to the problem of the universals is studied; 
                                                     
9 Cf. Tsenay Serequeberhan, “Aquinas and Kant: a Comparative Study,” Dialogue: Journal of 
Phi Sigma Tau 26 (1984): 43, “The question of the agent intellect is raised and answered in order to 
satisfy the function by which actual understanding is acquired […] Aquinas moves from what the 
intellect does to what it needs in order to accomplish what it actually does.” 
10 By problem of the universals I understand the answer to the question “What is it that we 
predicate of the many? Is it a name, a concept or a nature?” By critical problem I understand the 
answer to the question, “What is the value of the universal knowledge of reality? Is it entirely given 
a posteriori or is it rather an a priori addition to the data of experience?” The second problem points 
explicitly to the origin of the content of consciousness, the first one points rather to the universal’s 
proper metaphysical “place.” The Thomistic consideration of the universal as nature (and so 
universale in re) leads, in my view, to answer the critical problem in the direction of an a 




namely, St. Thomas makes a distinction (which Kant does not) between the mode of being 
of the (intellectual) object and the object itself, between the res intellecta and the modus 
rei intellectae. In fact, claiming that the agent intellect is a metaphysical a priori is to claim 
that the agent intellect produces not the res intellecta, but the mode of being of the same. 
In other words, to “produce the intelligible” (referred to the agent intellect) does not mean 
to produce the content of intellectual knowing, but to produce the mode of being of that 
content. The content is not produced. The content is already in the things themselves, 
although with a different mode of being (which is the point of Chapter 1). The content is 
received and this is the point of Chapter 3. Chapter 2 is key to the interpretation of Aquinas’ 
text for the following reason. In order to understand what it means “to make the 
intelligible”, a distinction must be drawn between two ways in which the terms “intelligible” 
and “universal” are used in the Summa. That is, one way is as referred to the object, and the 
other way is as referred to its mode of being in the mind. 
As anticipated, Chapter 3 treats a very important issue which underlies the whole 
doctrine of the agent intellect in Aquinas: intellectual knowing is originally receptive, 
intentional as possession of the other, defined by alterity.11 The intelligible content is 
received. Therefore, the role of the agent intellect in human understanding, active by 
definition, is not productive of content. For Aquinas, if anything comes from the subject, it is 
not the content because the content perfects the subject and is, originally, other than the 
subject. In this Chapter, our designation of human understanding as “receptive of objective 
content” will become more clear. Human understanding implies an intentional reception of 
                                                     




the perfection of other (the content), which is common to both sense and intelligence in 
their first actuations (where to understand is a certain “seeing”). Because, for St. Thomas, 
the content is real (and in that sense “objective”, as belonging to the real object), the 
“mediation” of abstraction does not imply losing any contact with reality.12 
If, for Aquinas, intellectual knowing refers initially to a universal object, and if that 
universal is imbedded in the particular, and if knowing is receiving that universal, the agent 
intellect cannot be a formal a priori, responsible for the intelligible content. This is the 
precise question of Chapter 4, which will have two main sections. The first section will 
include discussion of the texts seeming to suggest that Aquinas admits a formal a priori in 
intellectual knowing, or that the agent intellect is this formal a priori. In the second section, 
evidence will be offered to try to show that, for Aquinas, the agent intellect is not a formal a 
priori, but a metaphysical a priori, productive not of the content but of the intelligible mode 
of being of the universal nature subsisting in reality. 
2) The Controversy with Latin Averroism  
The doctrine of the agent intellect is found many times in the context of the 
controversy with Latin Averroism13 which, according to Sellés, had grown in relevance 
                                                     
12 Cf. In Boet. De Trin. 6, 3, c.: “Thus, the intellect is able to conceive without mediation the 
quiddity of the sensible thing, but not the quiddity of an intelligible thing.” (my trans.) [Et sic 
immediate potest concipere intellectus quiditatem rei sensibilis, non autem alicuius rei intelligibilis.]; 
De Ver 2, 3, ad 3: “… for to be directed to the likeness of a thing is the same as to be directed to the 
thing which is known through this likeness.” [… idem est ei ferri in similitudinem rei, et in rem quae 
per talem similitudinem cognoscitur.]; Summa Theologiae I, 12, 9, c. (Stump’s translation, cf. Stump, 
256 note 50): “… to cognize things by means of their similitudes existing in the cognizer is to cognize 
those things as they are in themselves, or in their own natures…” [… cognoscere res per earum 
similitudines in cognoscente existentes, est cognoscere eas in seipsis, seu in propriis naturis…]” 





during St. Thomas’s career.14 According to Sellés, what St. Thomas criticized in Averroes was 
his claim that both the possible and the agent intellect are respectively one for all human 
beings, in that way denying the immortality of the soul.15 St. Thomas tries to show how 
inconclusive are the arguments taken from Aristotle’s De Anima to support the Averroistic 
claim that the agent intellect does not belong to the soul.16 
Sellés considers Aquinas’ interpretation of Averroes to be basically correct, despite 
the fact of its being said that Averroes would have maintained the immortality of the soul, 
among other religious principles.17 He suggests that the reason for the Arabic tendency to 
consider the intellect as one is a certain search for Aristotle’s compatibility with Islam, 
which could also have accounted for the Neoplatonic reading of the Philosopher.18 In 
Stump’s view, St. Thomas would also admit that human knowing must derive in some sense 
from the Divine intellect; this, however, does not lead him to agree with Averroes, but to 
postulate that the agent intellect exists in each human being as a light participated from 
God.19 
                                                     
14 Cf. Sellés, EIA, 200. He notices that St. Albert the Great’s De unitate intellectus (1256) is 
addressed “against Averroes” whereas the same-titled work of St. Thomas (1270) is addressed 
“against Averroists.” He quotes also Summa I-II, 77, a.3, where the followers of Averroes are said to 
be “many.” 
15 Cf. Juan Fernando Sellés, “La Crítica Tomista a la Interpretación Árabe y Judía del Intelecto 
Agente,” Espíritu: Cuadernos Del Instituto Filosófico De Balmesiana 52, no. 128 (2003): 219; Stump, 
266. 
16 Cf. Hernán Martínez Millán, “Sun and Light, or on the Agent Intellect,” Revista Española 
De Filosofía Medieval 20 (2013): 50. 
17 Cf. Sellés, EIA, 211. 
18 Cf. Sellés, EIA, 181-186. 
19 Cf. Stump, 266: “… [I]n rejecting the Averroistic line that there must be only one agent 
intellect for all human beings, [Aquinas] says it must nonetheless be the case that all our intellects 






Stump says that “[Aquinas’] natural preoccupation during this period with the 
writing of Summa Theologiae Iª may also help to account for the fact that his other work of 
that time20 shows a special interest in the nature and operations of the human soul, the 
subject matter of Questions 75–89 of Iª.”21 It could certainly be suggested that the 
controversy with Latin Averroism would also have been a strong reason for Aquinas’ focus 
on these topics, particularly if we keep in mind that, according to Stump, In De Anima is his 
first Aristotelian Commentary. He probably realized that the best way to face the challenge 
of Averroes’ followers was to offer a better alternative regarding Aristotelian interpretation. 
The controversy with Averroes certainly works as the historical framework for some 
of the texts we will discuss. The focus of this dissertation, however, will be the role of the 
agent intellect regarding the problem of the universals, which was not the controversial 
question then. According to Cory, for example, there is a “growing scholarly appreciation of 
the shared philosophical tradition linking medieval Arabic and Latin philosophers, showing 
that Aquinas’s critique of Averroes’s separate Intellects does not preclude his appropriating 
the conceptual framework of Averroes’s abstraction theory.”22 The role of the agent 
intellect in the abstraction of the universal nature is precisely that which is relevant for the 
present purposes: in this way, the necessity and the nature of an agent intellect in Aquinas 
can be seen from a more systematic point of view. 
                                                     
20 According to her dating of St. Thomas’ works, Q.D. De Anima (1265-1266), In De Anima 
(1267-1268) and Q.D. De Spirit. Creat. (1267-1268) belong to this period (Summa Iª pars, 1266-
1268). Cf. Stump, xvi-xx. 
21 Stump, 10. 
22 Therese S. Cory, “Averroes and Aquinas on the Agent Intellect's Causation of 




3) Some Renowned Scholars 
To clarify and thus to understand this particular systematic view of the agent 
intellect’s role, some important scholars in their diverse accounts of knowing will now be 
studied. This study will be limited to those pertinent issues or points in other scholarly 
works considered helpful, either by similarity or by contrast, in understanding the view 
being proposed here. 
Étienne Gilson 
The work of Étienne Gilson (1884-1978)23 is very much in the same direction being 
proposed here, but he articulates his position with elements that are in tension with the 
proposed interpretation of St. Thomas. The positive elements will be acknowledged and 
then the tensions will be examined. 
For Gilson, the source of universal content is not a priori but a posteriori. This is the 
main difference between Aquinas and Kant.24 For Kant, the act of the subject is required, as 
condition of possibility, for the object of intellectual knowledge to be itself. Universality and 
necessity in the object can have only an a priori source, and the faculties of knowledge are 
considered as a power of unification of the matter of experience.25 
Also in Le Réalisme Méthodique, the intellectual content comes from the things 
themselves and not from the subject.26 Gilson rejects the principle of immanence: the fact 
                                                     
23 Cf. Etienne Gilson, Le réalisme méthodique (Paris: Téqui, 1935), abbreviated RM; Etienne 
Gilson, Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance (Paris: Vrin, 1939), abbreviated RC. 
24 Cf. RC 151. In this section, references to Gilson’s works will not include his name. 
25 Cf. RC 139-141. 





that an intellectual content is given in our knowledge does not mean that knowledge is the 
cause of this content, and the fact that every object is given within our thought does not 
imply that it is reduced to our thought.27 He affirms the original alterity of the object of 
human understanding28 and rejects a notion of epistemology as the study of thinking 
(where thinking is consciousness of a certain knowledge) in favor of a study of knowledge 
itself (as apprehension of an object distinct from the act of knowing).29 
More particularly, regarding our topic, Gilson says that Kant is obliged to locate the 
source of the intelligibility of experience in human knowing itself, because Kant had 
rejected the possibility of an intelligible datum, of something exterior that could fecundate 
rational knowledge.30 In a rather hidden reference to the agent intellect (rarely mentioned 
in the two essays examined), Gilson admits that the light of the intellect plays a role in 
forming the intellectual principles, but not that their content comes from it. The content of 
the first principles has its source in the sensible data, and Gilson is clearly rejecting the 
interpretation of Aquinas that would make of the first principles something like a priori laws 
to be applied to sensibility.31  
Gilson denies the agent intellect the character of an a priori condition of human 
knowing and, thus, may seem to oppose the currently proposed view of the agent intellect 
as a metaphysical a priori. What he actually opposes, however, is the agent intellect as a 
                                                     
27 Cf. RM 97. 
28 Cf. RM 66. 
29 Cf. RM 101- 103. 
30 Cf. RC 168, 173. 





Kantian and formal a priori; he affirms, instead, that the faculties of knowing, in a truly 
Thomistic and Aristotelian prospective, are psychological faculties and therefore beings.32 
Now, in what sense does Gilson admit that the source of intellectual content is in 
experience rather than in the subject itself? For Gilson, the universal is caused by 
experience, but it is not “in” experience, because it is not real. That is to say, Gilson believes 
that there is something in the individual object of experience (its nature) that is the source 
of the intelligible content, not though insofar as it is intuited in some way, but insofar as it is 
the cause of the sensible manifestations, which are in turn the cause of our concept. The 
intelligible content (for Gilson, the quidditas) is related to the nature that is in reality, not 
though as that same nature in a different mode of being, but as an intelligible effect of that 
nature in intelligence.33 This is why Gilson can reject the Kantian approach, saying that the 
source of the universal is a posteriori, and at the same time can deny the universal as 
content any existence in reality. The difference between Gilson’s interpretation and the 
current one proposed here is precisely the fact that he denies an identity between the 
content of our concept and the nature of the thing itself; this denial results, it seems, from 
his overlooking St. Thomas’ insistence that the different mode of being of the same object 
does not change the object itself.34 
                                                     
32 Cf. RC 137-138. 
33 Cf. RC 218-223. 
34 I do not claim that this intentional identity is perfect (it is limited by the precision of the 
phantasm in each subject and by the possibilities of human experience), but I do claim that what is 






In this sense Gilson affirms that the intellect conceives what it does not perceive, 
because “man” and “existence” are merely concepts of the intellect, and not something real 
and concrete.35 Still, he acknowledges with St. Thomas that the intelligible is in the things 
themselves, and that we think it in the phantasm because it is there.36 But in what sense, if 
they are just concepts, and only the singular exists?37 What is there is not what we conceive 
(quidditas) but that from which we conceive, the essence, and that is why we may say that 
we know the quidditas of the sensible natures, and not the nature itself.38 Classic realism, 
he says, rests on the fact that our knowledge truly attains the real, because it is caused in us 
by the real itself, and not by an alleged intuition of the intelligible.39 The reason, for Gilson, 
that the essences of the sensible things cannot be intuited is that their forms are “purely 
intelligible.” This statement is truly surprising given that, for St. Thomas, the reason they 
cannot be seen in their natural mode of being is precisely the opposite. The reason, 
according to St. Thomas, is that they are not intelligible in act, which is precisely why St. 
Thomas introduces, with Aristotle, the agent intellect. 
The very valuable insight in Gilson’s approach is that the intelligible content comes 
from the things themselves. The difficulty, however, is his interpretation with regard to the 
object of intelligence. That is, because Gilson does not differentiate the mode of being the 
object has in reality from the mode of being the object has in the mind, he denies the 
                                                     
35 Cf. RC 204. 
36 Cf. RC 208. 
37 Cf. RC 210, RM 73. 
38 Cf. RC 218-219. 
39 Cf. RC 222-223. He will say that the intellect “sees directly” the concept (cf. RC 215), but 





identity between them, and understands the content of knowing as an effect of the natures 
of things through their sensible effects. In this way, more than an intentional identity, he 
seems to propose an intentional “proportion” between the content of knowing and the 
natures of things, the proportion between cause and effect.40 In the currently proposed 
interpretation of St. Thomas, instead, the agent object is an intelligible in act (not the 
sensible phantasm) which represents the thing itself, only in its nature, abstracted from the 
individual conditions in the matter. 
Joseph Owens 
Joseph Owens (1908-2005), in his Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry41 intuits the 
most important elements of Thomistic Gnoseology, including the two modes of being that 
explain cognition,42 the alterity of the object of knowing,43 the intentional identity between 
object and subject, the origin of the universal content in sensible things.44 Still, when it 
comes to his final synthesis, Owens does not seem to create a convincing system,45 nor does 
he appear to recreate the Thomist one.46 
                                                     
40 In this sense the formal identity or convenientia in forma between subject and object 
which Gilson proposes in RM 56-57 may be understood. I will come back to this in Chapter 3, when 
treating the Aristotelian identity. 
41 Cf. Joseph Owens, Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry (Houston: Center for Thomistic 
Studies, 1992). In this section, I will quote only the page number of this work. 
42 Cf. 38-40; 45 note 22; 351-353; 357-358. 
43 Cf. 3; 33-35; 326-327. 
44 Cf. 70 and note 5; 82 (interpretation does not add any radically new content); 334, cf. also 
343 note 28. 
45 For example, I found particularly challenging his conclusions on the problem of the 
universals, cf. 154-158. 
46 Cf. 140 and note 2, where he implies that the issue of the agent intellect is not a concern 
in Epistemology. Now, Aquinas’ recourse to the agent intellect is crucial to understand his approach 





The main tension between the view being proposed herein and Owens’ view is his 
lack of proper distinction between content and mode of being of the content. He denies the 
common nature–in itself–any reality.47 The aforementioned lack of distinction leads Owens 
to affirm that the abstracted object is identical with the whole individual, but without 
explaining in what sense, then, they are different, or on what grounds there is an identity.48 
In pp. 324-325, Owens initially denies the nature in itself any kind of being, and then says 
that one and the same object has the two kinds of being. Now, if it is nothing in itself, how 
can the nature admit even one kind of being? What he means to say is evident; that is, that 
the nature never exists without one of these two modes of being. However, this means 
precisely that, in both modes of being, the nature itself is present, one and the same. In 
other words, what is common to both modes of being is present in each of them. What is 
this? It is the content, which is one. But, because Owens’ view confuses the numerical unity 
of the concept with the specific unity of the content, he cannot admit that the nature itself 
is one. And, therefore, he says: “any existence whatsoever would tie it [the nature] 
inexorably to either the particular or the universal and would render impossible the 
                                                     
47 Cf. 154ff, where he claims that there is nothing common really existing in the individuals, 
because the nature exists in them individualized only, not as common; 171, “You cannot give a 
universal, or a nature as common, any real existence” and Owens refers here to p. 163 note 19, 
where we find the text of De Ente, 3.85-87 Leonine ed.: “… human nature is not found in 
individuals as one…” (my trans.) [… non invenitur in individuis natura humana secundum unitatem…] 
In that place, however, St. Thomas is clearly referring to the Platonic universal, which is one 
numerically for all of the individuals. The Aristotelian nature is one specifically in all of the 
individuals, and therefore truly common in that sense. The point is that, for St. Thomas, there is a 
real distinction between the essence of a thing and its individuating principles, though not a real 
separation. They are not the same thing (thing = co-principle, as when Aristotle calls matter a certain 
“substance”), despite the fact that they are together in the same thing (thing = substance in its first 
meaning, the real particular thing). This is one of the most important elements in my interpretation. 





thoroughgoing identity of predicate with subject that is required for saying the one is the 
other.”49 This seems precisely the opposite of what St. Thomas says in In Met. 1, lect. 10, 
15850 and Summa I, 84, 1, c.; that is, St. Thomas holds that it is not necessary for the thing 
understood to exist in reality with the same mode of being as it has in the intellect, as Plato 
thought. For Aquinas, the same thing admits two modes of being. In Owens’ interpretation, 
the thing understood cannot be separated from its mode of being, which is the same 
problem found in Plato. 
Another hermeneutic problem apparent in Owens is a certain confusion between 
intentional and real identity in human knowing, that is, between the identity subject-object 
(“anima est quodammodo omnia”), and the identity intellect-species (“intellectum in actu 
est intellectus in actu”, which here will be called the “Aristotelian identity”).51 In Chapter 3 it 
will be shown how, for Aquinas, they are different. The intellect in act and the species by 
which it understands52 are one as subjective potency and its own subjective act, i.e., they 
are one and the same real thing. But the intellect and the thing understood are one in a 
different way, only quodammodo, insofar as the perfection of another thing is present in the 
                                                     
49 350, my emphasis. 
50 The last number in the quotes from the Commentary to the Aristotelian Metaphysics is the 
paragraph number of the edition I used (cf. Bibliography). 
51 Although both “identities” can be referred to Aristotle, we prefer to call after the 
Philosopher the one that is truly an identity (because real), which is also the one that most 
frequently confuses the interpreters of Aquinas. 
52 Clearly, for St. Thomas, it is not the faculty which operates, but the subject through the 
faculty. Cf. De Spirit. Creat., a.10 ad 15: “Now it must not be said that the agent intellect 
understands in isolation from the possible intellect, but that the man understands by means of 
both…” [Non est autem dicendum quod intellectus agens seorsum intelligat ab intellectu possibili: 
sed homo intelligit per utrumque…] Still, to simplify the expression, many times the faculty will be 





knower. In other words, the species is the intellect in act but the object, represented in the 
species, is not the intellect itself. As we will see, this “confusion of identities” is at work in 
other interpretations of St. Thomas as well.53 Connected with this lack of differentiation of 
the identities is that, for Owens, both subject and object are known simultaneously, 
although the knower indirectly.54 This confusion jeopardizes the original alterity of the 
object of knowing. 
It is clear that Owens intends to oppose the view of knowing which attributes to the 
subject all of the responsibility for the intellectual content of human cognition.55 In that 
sense, Owens is very much in line with the currently proposed view of the agent intellect as 
a metaphysical a priori, as cause of an intelligible mode of being, and not of the object itself. 
Owens states, “The percipient gives existence to the activities of sensible cognition and 
perception, in which no new object is produced but new cognitional existence is given to an 
already really existent thing. In intellection the natures of the things are abstracted and 
given cognitional existence by the knower.”56 Still, if the natures of the things are not seen 
as truly distinct from their individual conditions in the matter, the origin of the universal 
                                                     
53 For Owens, cf.41-43; 142-143; 348. An interesting text from Owens quoted by Stump: 
“You are the things perceived or known. Knower and thing known […] become one and the same in 
the actuality of cognition. From the strictly epistemological standpoint, this thoroughgoing identity 
of knower and thing known is the most important and most fundamental tenet in the Aristotelian 
conception of knowledge” (Stump, 274, and in note: “Owens 1992, p. 114.” The quote is not from 
his Cognition, although from the same year). 
54 Cf. 39; 46; 49: both known, the difference being in focus only, which at first is on the 
object; 348: there is a question of which one is epistemologically prior. 






content is at risk of being seen as dependent on the functions of the subject, or perhaps 
merely an effect of the object of perception,57 as in Gilson. 
Eleonore Stump 
Eleonore Stump (1947- )58 offers clear insight into some of the most important 
elements of Thomistic Epistemology, but certain principles, probably coming from her 
philosophical views, can be seen as interfering with an accurate interpretation of St. 
Thomas. 
Let us begin by examining the positive elements of Stump’s interpretation, as 
follows. Knowing is verified by the reception of a species in the faculty, and there is a 
distinction between phantasm and intelligible species.59 The intellect’s proper object is the 
particular thing’s universal nature60 and the act of the intellect is a “discovering” (rather 
than creating or inventing) features of the external world that are independent from the 
operations of the intellect;61 in other words, the source of intelligible content is in the things 
themselves. As she herself says: “Aquinas supposes that the cookie dough of reality comes 
pre-cut into particular kinds of things; and, unlike Kantians, Aquinas assumes that we all 
naturally recognize those very kinds of things with the natures they really have.”62 
                                                     
57 Cf. 40-43. 
58 Cf. Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003). The relevant essays are: 
“Foundations of Knowledge” (pp. 217ff) and “The Mechanisms of Cognition” (pp. 244ff). I will quote 
only the page number. 
59 Cf. 17-18. 
60 Cf. 19. 





A most insightful element in Stump’s work, in terms of Aquinas’ Epistemology, is her 
recognition of the importance of distinguishing the two modes of being of the form of the 
known; that is, respectively, its mode of being in reality and its mode in the knower. That is 
why the one who knows the form of a thing does not become in reality that thing itself, but 
only cognitionally. For her, however, the cognitional reception of a form is still a material 
reception of the form of the known, according to what might be called her “encoded 
information theory.”63 In Stump’s words: 
The reception is “spiritual” or “immaterial” in the sense that, for example, the way in 
which the matter of DNA contains the forms of hemoglobin does not turn the matter 
of the DNA into hemoglobin. Or, as Aquinas would put it, the DNA is assimilated to 
the protein as regards the form but not as regards the matter. Aquinas’s “spiritual” 
reception of forms is thus like the coding of maps or blueprints. This is, of course, 
also the way we ourselves think sensation occurs, encoded information being 
received in virtue of a change in the matter of a corporeal sense organ.64 
After giving, as an example, the presence of the form of the protein in the DNA, and 
speaking about sensible knowing, she says:  
What Aquinas refers to as the spiritual reception of an immaterial form, then, is 
what we are more likely to call encoded information […] Scholars have disputed the 
point, but I think that the texts are decisively in favor of the conclusion that, for the 
senses, the spiritual reception of sensible species is a change in the matter of the 
bodily organ of the sense.65  
A few lines later, she interprets Aquinas’text as if he himself were suggesting that 
the intentional reception is a material reception.66 She claims also that the senses would be 
                                                     
63 Cf. 17; 250-253. 
64 254. 
65 Cf. 253. 
66 She interprets Aquinas’ statement: “And so it must be that a sense receives corporeally 
and materially the similitude of the thing which is sensed.” (In DA II.12.377, cf. Stump, 253), and a 





made into intellect, according to Aquinas, were we to accept an immaterial reception of a 
form in the senses, and adds: “It is therefore clearly possible on his view for the spiritual 
reception of an immaterial form to consist in the alteration of matter.”67 
These concepts are applied to the intellect also since, for her, it is clear that Aquinas 
“turns out to have been wrong in his view that the intellect uses no bodily organ.”68 At the 
conclusion of Chapter 8, she says:  
In the mode in which the form is in the thing cognized, the form makes that thing 
what it is – a wolf, say. But in the mode in which the form is in the thing cognized 
[sic],69 spiritually or intentionally, as encoded information, it does not make the 
cognizer be a wolf. Although when it is in the cognizer, it is the same form as the 
form in the wolf, the difference of mode makes it the case that the cognizer does 
not literally turn into a wolf when cognizing one.70 
Apparently, Stump does not carry all the way to its final consequences the principle 
of intentionality and of the two modes of being; instead, she reduces the Thomistic 
intentional mode of being to the material one (“encoded information theory”), and that is 
why she can wonder whether this Thomistic principle makes any sense in the justification of 
knowing.71 Because she views the presence of the form in the knower as a material copy, 
Stump is not convinced; she knows that for St. Thomas the two modes of being are the 
explanation, and this is her great hermeneutic insight in Aquinas; but because her approach 
does not seem to fully appreciate the meaning and the consequences of such a distinction, 
                                                     
sense, and not “with the material conditions”, which is a qualification of the content, not of the 
mode of being of the content in the knower. 
67 Cf. 254. 
68 Cf. 264. 
69 I think it is clear that she means not “thing cognized” but “cognizer.” 
70 275, my emphasis. 





she cannot see how this can be a plausible explanation of knowing. The suggestion72 can be 
made that, for Aquinas, two modes of being means precisely two modes of being, such that 
the two cannot be reduced to one. The theory of two modes of being presupposes the fact 
of knowing as presence of the object to the subject, as communion of two. The doctrine of 
Aquinas can make sense only from that “Thomistic fact.” Whether or not that fact is granted 
is another story.73 
Finally, as regards Aquinas’ text, Stump appears not to differentiate between what 
we call intentional identity (subject – object, anima est quodammodo omnia) and 
Aristotelian identity (species and faculty of knowing, intellectum in actu est intellectus in 
actu). She says: “We are now in a position to understand Aquinas’s frequently repeated, 
frequently cited notion that ‘all cognition arises from the assimilation of the cognizer to the 
thing cognized’, that ‘the intellect in act is the thing understood in act’, so that ‘the soul is 
all things’.”74 Aquinas makes a distinction between these identities, as we will see in 
Chapter 3. It is to be noted, however, that sometimes the issue may be a matter only of 
                                                     
72 In Chapter 2, I will elaborate upon this theory of the two modes of being in Aquinas. 
73 Regarding other Epistemological matters in general, Stump does not believe that the 
Epistemology of Aquinas can hold itself without recourse to the principle that God created the 
faculties of knowing and therefore they function properly and are reliable (cf. 21, 234, 276). She also 
supposes that, for St. Thomas, the first principles are not indubitable (cf. 231); and that his 
reliabilistic and optimistic theory of knowledge would not be able to overcome skeptical doubts (cf. 
237). 
74 273. Cf. Stump, 17, where Aquinas’ view of knowledge is said to involve “… some sort of 
formal identity between the extramental object (O) and the cognizing faculty (F) in its actually 
cognizing O. However, Aquinas takes that (Aristotelian) identity claim to mean only that the form of 
O is somehow in F [in note: 85, 2 ad 1].” I would suggest that St. Thomas in that text is not applying 
the Aristotelian identity to the intentional, but saying that the former (real identity species - 






textual interpretation because some authors, who misread Aquinas’ text, do understand 
that there is a difference between the species and the object known, and that there is a 
difference between the two ways of “receiving” the form. This seems to be true in the case 
of Stump.75 Still, it is important to notice this textual misinterpretation because it may result 
in ascribing to St. Thomas an identity between subject and object which would be foreign to 
his mind. 
Armand A. Maurer 
The work of Armand Maurer (1915-2008)76 renders a perfect understanding of the 
problem of intellectual knowledge, that is, how it is possible that universal truths come 
from experience. He does not believe that the universal essence has any other kind of 
existence outside the mind and therefore, for Maurer, universality must be a subjective 
aspect of human knowing, depending on the spirituality of the subject, and grounded in 
some way in the reality of experience. Also, because the human subject is historical, and 
reality also is subject to contingency, there is no such thing as created eternal truth. Maurer 
believes that this doctrine could be substantiated on Thomistic principles, although he 
realizes the tensions with the actual doctrine of Aquinas. Here begins a more detailed 
exploration of these issues. 
The problem of knowledge is set up in very clear terms by Maurer. Paraphrasing 
Fackenheim, Maurer writes: “It must be inquired whether, and if so how, the world of 
                                                     
75 Cf. 249-250. 
76 All of the quotes are from Armand A. Maurer, Being and Knowing: Studies in Thomas 
Aquinas and Later Medieval Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990).  
The relevant essays are “St. Thomas and Eternal Truths” (pp. 43ff) and “St. Thomas and Historicity” 




experience, which is historical, can provide a ground for universal and transcendent truth.” 
Maurer’s goal is clear in his statement: “My concern in the present lecture is […] how St. 
Thomas Aquinas accounts for universal and necessary philosophic truths drawn from a 
changing world by temporally situated humans.”77 
The greatest tension between Maurer’s view and the view currently being offered is 
the lack of distinction in Maurer’s view between the universality of the content and 
universality as a mode of being of the content, a distinction which will be shown crucial for 
a more accurate interpretation of Aquinas.78 Due to this lack of distinction, Maurer denies 
the universal any existence outside the mind. An example of this is found in his section “St. 
Thomas and Eternal Truths”,79 the first section we will examine: 
Truth, St. Thomas contends, is one of those notions that have a foundation in reality 
but receive their formal character and completion from an act of the intellect. Time 
and universals are other examples of this type of notion. They do not exist as such 
outside the mind, though they have some basis in reality.80 
Nothing is stable in the changing world. This is why, for Maurer, the eternity of truth 
implies the real immutability of its subject, which is given only in God. Maurer states: “If we 
take truth to be the inherent measure of true things (the truth we find in things and in 
created intellects and their propositions), then truth is not eternal, for neither the things 
themselves nor the intellects in which truth inheres exist for all eternity.”81 And so, in 
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human beings, Maurer transforms the historicity of the subjective intelligible being into the 
historicity of the intelligible content. 
A problem arises from Maurer’s not differentiating sufficiently between what 
Aquinas says about eternal truths (a discussion regarding the subjective being of judgments 
or ideas )82 and the necessity or universality of truth in general, in reference to the content 
of those judgments or ideas. Maurer himself refers the term “eternity” to a “mode of 
duration of being” which, as such, belongs to God alone.83 It is in this sense that Aquinas 
denies the existence of eternal truths outside the divine mind. Does Maurer mean to say 
the same? Maurer’s remarks towards the end of the article indicate that he is going further: 
We have already remarked that [St. Thomas] does not ascribe an essential being to 
essences taken just in themselves. Though he grants that essences may be 
considered in themselves, he does not believe they have a being or entity in 
themselves. The only being they have is that of the subject in which they exist; in 
themselves they are simply nothing […] There is no room in St. Thomas' thought for 
created eternal truths, for this would imply that God could give truths eternal being, 
which is reserved for him alone […]  Only on the supposition that eternal truths have 
a kind of entity in themselves does the late medieval and early modern philosophical 
discussion concerning their possible creation or non-creation, and their possible 
independence of the divine mind and will make sense […]. But at the same time does 
this not eliminate the distinction between necessary and contingent truths? If 
essences perish with the existences of things — if they have no essential being of 
their own distinct from their existential being - so too do necessary propositions, in 
which essential predicates are attributed to a subject. These propositions, then, are 
not eternal or necessary but contingent truths.84 
 
Maurer is no longer speaking merely of the subjective being of the truth, but of the 
necessity of the propositions. Maurer’s conclusion is ascribed to St. Thomas, who says 
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“There is no necessary truth in creatures.”85 Maurer himself, however, had recognized that, 
in the same place, St. Thomas makes an important distinction. That distinction is between 
the two ways of regarding a nature or essence, one way being in itself, the other way being 
either as it exists in reality or as it exists in the mind. Maurer had also granted, with St. 
Thomas, that the nature in itself could be called eternal.86 Thus Maurer appears to suggest 
the following reasoning: the essence in itself does not exist except in one of those two 
modes of being (in reality or in the mind); now, neither of those two modes of being is 
eternal; therefore, no essence is eternal or necessary, and so no truth about essences can 
be necessary. 
This reasoning, however, raises a question: is this not exactly the error made by 
Plato, against which St. Thomas lines up with Aristotle?87 St. Thomas justifies the 
universality and necessity of human knowing by distinguishing between the way natures 
exist in reality and in the mind, and not by denying that those very natures exist in the 
particular, as Plato did. And Aquinas justifies abstraction not by saying that the essences 
need to exist abstracted from the particular determinations, as Plato would, but by saying 
that, in the first operation, we know the essence without considering its particular 
determinations. For Aquinas, the things that exist together can be known separately, 
because one is not the other, even if one cannot exist without the other. For Aquinas, two 
“things” can compose one “thing”, as do essence and esse, act and potency, matter and 
form, substance and accidents, etc.. No creature can be said to be without composition, 
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even if the elements of some of these compositions cannot exist separately in creatures. 
This is the foundation of abstraction. 
For Aquinas, there is no absolute necessity and stability in human knowing as 
subjective characteristic, nor as something coming from the subject: in this sense there are 
no eternal truths. But there is stability and necessity in human knowing on the side of the 
object, because there is stability in the particular reality we know, by reason of its species or 
nature.88 What comes from the subject, namely from the agent intellect, is not this 
objective stability but an intelligible mode of being, which can be as necessary89 or as 
contingent as any other created mode of being.  
The section “St. Thomas and Historicity”,90 can now be examined. Here, Maurer 
recognizes that, for St. Thomas, there is such a thing as a permanent nature or essence in 
things, but Maurer qualifies his own statement: “St. Thomas never doubted that we have a 
permanent nature or essence that specifies us as human beings, but he was equally 
convinced that we do not know this nature in itself.”91 
Understanding clearly what Aquinas means by the temporality of truth, in the sense 
of the subjective temporality of our judgment of truth, Maurer states: “The truth of the 
human mind, on the contrary, is not eternal but temporal. St. Thomas leaves us in no doubt 
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on the matter: ‘Because our mind is not eternal, neither is the truth of propositions which 
are formed by us eternal, but it had a beginning in time.’”92 A few lines later he says, 
Human truth, then, is not eternal, and neither is it unchangeable. Once again St. 
Thomas is explicit: "The truth of the divine mind is unchangeable, but the truth of 
our mind is changeable." He does not mean that a truth, say of metaphysics or 
mathematics, is subject to change, but that the truth of our intellect is.93  
And, even if Maurer does not give to the truth any kind of existence outside the 
mind, he does not confound the subjective eternity with the necessity of the content 
considered just in itself:  
“Are there not in the mind of the mathematician and metaphysician necessary 
truths, i.e. truths that cannot be otherwise? St. Thomas does not deny this, or that 
(as we shall see) the mind can think about these truths just in themselves, quite 
apart from their existence in any mind. What he is denying is that any truth exists 
necessarily in a created mind.”94 
However, this is not the question of historicity of truth. Modern Philosophy is not 
worried about the eternity of truth in this sense, but about the origin of universality and 
necessity in human cognition as an objective characteristic, which is also Maurer’s concern 
in this article.95 For this reason, one may wonder why he does not distinguish between the 
presence of the necessary content in the mind and in the things themselves. One may also 
wonder why he says that we “can think about these truths in themselves, quite apart from 
their existence in any mind,” and does not add “apart from their existence in the things 
themselves.” It seems clear that, for Maurer, the reason is that there are no such things as 
universality or truth in the things themselves, but only in the mind. 








A few pages later he says that we have the “ability to abstract natures from spatial 
and temporal conditions. We can form universal concepts and make universal judgments 
about the things we experience which are true always and everywhere.”96 Regarding 
judgments, he says that we can, 
[T]hink about them just in themselves, or absolutely, abstracting from the existence 
they have in a mind. We can focus our attention on them, without considering 
whether they exist temporally in us or eternally in God. We can do the same thing 
with a nature or essence when we think of it just in itself, or absolutely, without 
considering whether it exists as a universal in the mind or as an individual in 
reality.97  
But do those things exist in reality or not? “Because truths can be considered 
absolutely or in themselves, it is tempting to think that they have a kind of entity in 
themselves, distinct from the being of the mind in which they exist.”98 He ascribes that error 
to the Platonic distinction between the esse essentiae and the esse existentiae, which is 
certainly foreign to the spirit of St. Thomas. But Maurer does not seem to realize that it is 
also Platonic to think that the universal does not have any other being distinct from the 
being it has in the mind, because it is Platonic to not distinguish the mode of being of the 
nature in the mind from the mode of being it has in reality.99  
A few lines later, Maurer applies to the objective content of truth that which Aquinas 
says about the subjective eternity of truth, by saying that we can reach “universal truths 
that transcend the limits of time and matter, while falling short of eternity.”100 What does 









Maurer mean? Universal truths, that is, objective universal truths, are a lesser degree of 
eternity. However, the only eternity being discussed in Aquinas is the subjective eternity of 
truth. In Maurer, therefore, there appears to be an identification between eternity as a 
condition of the object and as a condition of the subject, which goes beyond the intention 
of Aquinas. After having denied any existence of the universal essence outside the mind, 
Maurer is affirming that universality is a state of human knowing dependent on the specific 
spirituality of the human subject, which is not eternal because the human mind is not 
eternal. In other words, that because we human beings subjectively transcend matter and 
time, our universal knowledge can also transcend them;101 therefore, then, that which gives 
an account of the transcendence of the object is the transcendence of the subject. 
Maurer’s understanding of Aquinas’ basic orientation is seen where he says, 
“cognition from the outset opens upon a meaningful world beyond cognition […] one whose 
intelligibility reveals itself to the mind and which we can share with others.”102 These 
remarks do not necessarily imply that he agrees with St. Thomas. He tries to support a 
theory of historicity of truth using Thomistic principles, namely the subjective temporality of 
human truth and the non-existence of essences in a state of abstraction. However, Maurer 
seems to overlook a more fundamental principle, that being the existence of the universal 
as nature in the particular things themselves, the very basis for St. Thomas’ position 
regarding this issue. Maurer, all the same, has the real merit of dealing openly and clearly 
                                                     





with the most important question for Thomism today, that being its answer to Historicism 
and the Kantian turn to the subject. 
W. Norris Clarke 
W. Norris Clarke (1915-2008),103 in his research on the sources and originality of 
Thomism, lines up enthusiastically with Fabro. It is interesting to note how Clarke’s slight 
preference for a view different from the Italian philosopher’s in the first article (for Clarke, 
St. Thomas is an Aristotelianism specified by Neoplatonism rather than vice versa, as Fabro 
would propose),104 becomes an almost complete agreement with Fabro in the second.105 In 
this sense, Clarke’s work can serve as a perfect introduction to Fabro’s overall interpretation 
of Aquinas. 
Aside from this, and for the present study, Clarke’s most important and pertinent 
insight has to do with the role of the metaphysical notion of participation as regards the 
problem of the universals and abstraction. This notion helps Aquinas to explain the 
realization of the one in the many, in such a way that there is a real composition in the 
many between participated perfection and participant (participation always implies a 
composition) and, at the same time, there is an absolute metaphysical distinction between 
the participants and the separate perfection (that is, God). The Thomistic notion of 
participation, understood in this way, implies a double metaphysical distinction: a 
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distinction intrinsic to the participant (between participated form and participant potency) 
and a distinction between the being by participation and the intensive unlimited source, the 
being per essentiam. Crucial to this Thomistic notion is that “participation” is applied 
analogically to the different metaphysical levels (esse – essence, form – matter, substance-
accident, etc.) and that there is also analogy between its metaphysical and logical uses. 
The relevance for our topic comes from the notion of participation as the 
explanation or condition of possibility of the real presence of the one (= the specifically 
common) in the many. The universal nature is present in all of the individuals that 
participate it. And this, in turn, will be the condition of possibility of abstraction, as will be 
seen. Clarke, by interpreting Aquinas’ notion in a metaphysical sense, agrees basically with 
the interpretation of Aquinas being proposed in this thesis. 
Clarke’s reading of Plato is very helpful, where Clarke says: “In addition to the 
obvious defect in the Platonic theory of its confusion between the logical and the 
ontological orders, we would like to call attention to another deficiency too frequently 
overlooked”,106 a deficiency that, in Clarke’s mind, is Plato’s inability to “express the 
participation structure in terms of the limited reception by the participants of a perfection 
that exists in its source in a state of illimitation or infinity.”107 In other words, what is 
“obvious” to Clarke is that Plato wants the ontological order to perfectly parallel the logical 
order (lack of distinction between the two modes of being of the object of knowing) and a 
further defect (consequence of the first one) is Plato’s overlooking the fact that the same 






perfection is realized in two different ways in the participant and in the source. This helps us 
to see that, for Clarke, Thomistic participation implies the presence (though limited) of the 
source’s perfection in the particular. 
Clarke sees similar defects in the theory of participation held by Aquinas’ 
Neoplatonic sources, for example, the theory’s “lack of clear distinction between genuine 
ontological participations and mere logical subordination of abstract concepts.”108 Clarke 
continues: 
St. Thomas’s originality has consisted in the skill with which, guided by his keen 
sense of analogy and of the difference between the ontological and the conceptual 
orders (always so blurred in the Neoplatonists), he has adapted this framework to a 
realistic metaphysics of existence and an epistemology of abstraction.109 
This is a very insightful remark. As Clarke seems to imply, what allows St. Thomas to 
give the world reality is to admit that perfection (and thus being) can be limited (and so in a 
particular individual), thanks to the notion of participation. There is no need to deny or 
diminish the reality of the particular, because the perfection of the universal substances can 
be found in them, although in a limited way. And neither is there a need for Aquinas to 
postulate a separate source of intelligible content that could match the universality of our 
concepts: the content of our concepts is in the things themselves (participated nature). For 
this reason, that which explains knowing is abstraction from the individual, and not an 
illumination from above (in the sense of a participation of the agent object itself110). 
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The doctrine of participation is for Clarke, 
a theory for rendering intelligible a “many” in any order in terms of a higher one, in 
other words, for explaining the common possession in many subjects of a given 
attribute, whether in the logical or the ontological order, by reference to a higher 
source from which all receive or participate in some way the perfection they possess 
in common.111 
Note how Clarke supposes that the perfection is ontologically possessed in common 
by those participating it. The same can be inferred from his consideration of the 
participated being as a composite unity. For Clarke, Aquinas manages to make sense of the 
unity of the participated being by strengthening the Neoplatonic notion of participation 
with the Aristotelian theory of act and potency; this is because, in the end, what required an 
explanation was the unity of the participated being, not its composition. Clearly, Clarke 
considers that, for St. Thomas, there is a composition of perfection and limiting potency, 
which is to say that both are present yet distinct: 
In other words, what St. Thomas has done is to put his finger on what was perhaps 
the greatest single weakness of the Neoplatonic doctrine throughout its whole 
tradition, namely, the lack of any adequate metaphysical explanation to safeguard 
the intrinsic unity of the compositions resulting from participation.112 
For Clarke, what is present in each individual could very well be called a “common 
nature,” present totally and equally in each member of the species: 
Since every member of a species receives its specific form totally and equally in the 
qualitative order, limitation here can mean only restriction in the spatial-
quantitative order by comparison with a source which can exist only intentionally as 
an idea in a mind, where it is endowed with an infinity that is only the negative 
infinity of indetermination of a universal idea as such.113 
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The Thomistic doctrine of participation is “applied with a consummate sense of 
analogy to the different orders both of reality and of ideas.”114 
It is important to have mentioned Clarke at the beginning of this study, not only for 
his close connection with Fabro, but particularly for raising the notion of participation in 
relation to the theory of abstraction.115 Clarke helps us to see that the notion of 
participation, once the limits of Plato have been overcome, and once the notion itself has 
been completed by the Aristotelian framework of act and potency, is able to resolve the 
problem of the one and the many. The many are one, because the one perfection is 
participated (partly realized) in each of them; but they are still many because, together with 
the participated perfection, there is a potency that enters into composition with the 
perfection. The universal and necessary knowledge, then, corresponds to reality because it 
is possible to know separately the things that are really distinct (real composition of the 
participated being), although not really separated (real unity of act and potency).  
In other words, the Thomistic theory of abstraction, as currently being proposed, 
would not make any sense if it were not at least plausible that something like a common 
perfection, specific nature or essence exists in the particular individual. This alone would 
make sense of the current claim that, for Aquinas, the universal content comes from 
outside the mind. Now, the Thomistic notion of participation, because it speaks of a single 
(= one as common) perfection that is realized in different subjects, seems to offer that 
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plausible explanation of the one being present in the many, and of the real distinction of 
the co-principles in the individual substance. 
John F. X. Knasas 
John Knasas (1948- )116 shares the basic interpretation of Aquinas offered in this 
thesis. Knasas considers Aquinas an aposteriorism, holding that the intellectual content 
comes from the sensible things, and that the cognitive powers do not formally constitute 
the object. Further interpretation in common with Knasas includes the alterity in knowing, 
the distinction between two modes of being of the object as the explanation of knowing, 
and the understanding of intentional identity in knowing. 
Knasas gives us, as it were, a definition of a formal a priori as regards intellectual 
knowing. For him, Transcendental Thomism holds “the revisionist claim that Aquinas’ 
understanding of the human intellect includes a crucial a priori dimension functioning as a 
constitutive factor in our consciousness of objects.”117 In fact, Knasas says: 
Maréchal, Rahner, and Lonergan all regard the dynamism of the intellect towards 
Being as a constitutive factor for our consciousness of beings [later, quoting 
Maréchal] ‘for the subject is really knowing as such only to the extent that he 
formally takes part in the edification of the object’.118 
The opposite of this apriorist vision is explained in the following terms:  
By calling Aquinas an aposteriorist I am not denying the elaborate structure of 
knowing powers in the human soul, e.g., external senses, common sense, 
imagination, agent and possible intellects. I simply mean that in relation to actual 
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cognition, these powers are pure conditions for knowledge. The structure of the 
knowing power performs no constitutive role vis-à-vis the known object.119 
That is to say, Knasas does not deny in Aquinas an “activity” of knowing, the evident 
subjective aspect of knowing, but he does not see that activity as constitutive of the object. 
How this active aspect looks in Knasas’ account can be taken from his remarks: “In my 
opinion, the nature-as-finality idea [of Maréchal] as applied to the intellect need mean only 
the intellect’s ordination to abstract intelligible content from the real. By itself the idea fails 
to mean any projection of content upon the data.”120 In other words, for Knasas, the 
opposite of a formal a priori is a subjectivity that takes from reality the intelligible content. 
Such subjectivity is able to take from, not to project upon, nor to produce:  
What the intellect has of itself is not a drive to the notion of being that is then used 
constitutively in regard to sense. Rather, the intellect of itself is inclined to abstract 
the ratio entis from the sense data that it can appreciate as real […] Lonergan and 
Transcendental Thomists assume that every inclination of a power is an inclination 
to impose a tendency. But inclination can also be an inclination to abstract rather 
than to project.121 
Knasas says: “Both Boyer and myself understand the truth judgment as bearing upon 
a mental act whose content the intellect has drawn from the sensible real. […] No 
constitutive a priori factor precedes the formation of the proposition.”122 
In an aposterioristic theory, Knasas says, “… what is seen in the data is the decisive 
epistemological moment for assessing the correctness of the judgment.” 123 and quotes 
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Owens in confirmation: “The cause and criterion of the certainty is the existence that is 
apprehended.”124 For Knasas it is a problem that “the data of sense are accorded reality in 
and through its relation to something subjective – the mind’s intention of being.”125 It is 
clear that for Knasas, in judgment also, the intelligible content is taken from the sensible. 
He does not believe that certain passages of the Summa could be used to support 
the opposite view:  
Angels have innate species of things, and humans have innate knowledge of first 
principles. But the texts admit the interpretation that in our case the first principles 
are inborn because we are naturally disposed to abstract them so easily. Similarly, 
we say that someone is a natural born baseball player. This remark does not mean 
that the individual is born with the ability to throw a curve ball.126 
Although rather a long text, the following is useful in making clear that, for Knasas, 
the agent intellect is not a formal a priori and the intelligible content comes from sensible 
things by abstraction: 
Wilkins ends… by claiming that the efficient cause of understanding is the agent 
intellect, which he describes as the spirit of wonder and the active orientation 
towards the unknown. Citing S.T. I-II, 94, 2, De ver. 11, 1c, and C.G. II, 83, Wilkins 
identifies the unknown with the notion of being which should be distinguished from 
the concept of being as the more primitive from the derived. […] In my opinion, this 
is the Thomistic Achilles heal of Transcendental Thomism. There is no distinction 
between the notion of being and the concept of being, pace Rousselot. Taking up 
the De ver. I, 1’s primum cognitum description of the ratio entis, De ver. XXI, 1c, 
characterizes the ratio entis as the “prima conceptio intellectus.” Also, at Wilkins’s 
cited De ver. XI, 1c, the ratio entis, again described as one of “prima conceptiones 
intellectus,” is not regarded as belonging to the agent intellect but as known 
immediately by abstraction from sensible things. Contra Lonergan, what antedates 
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the concept of being is not the intending of being but sensible things and an 
abstraction from sensible things.127 
The following text may help to explain a preference for speaking of intellectual 
knowing as being “receptive of objective content.” He says: “Sensation is nothing other than 
a direct and immediate presence of something real, or as Aquinas says at De Ver. 2, 2c: 
“Existens perfectio unius, est nata esse in altero.”128 What is interesting is that in this text, 
Aquinas is defining not only sensation, but cognition in general. I suggest that, insofar as the 
universal content is real, and is immediately present through the intelligible species, the 
simple apprehension can be said to be “receptive of objective content,” as sensation is. This 
is meant not insofar as there is no mediation at all (which would be the case with sensible 
intuition), but insofar as there is no objective mediation; what is known is precisely what is 
“out there,” the (common) nature, and the intellect has direct contact with it.129 
It seems apparent that Knasas considers it crucial to distinguish the modes of being 
of the known perfection in the explanation of knowing: “formal reception of form assures 
that the received form remains numerically identical with the form of the real thing. As 
Owens says: ‘[…] It is individually the same form, actuating both child and percipient in two 
different ways of existing. It makes the percipient be the individual that exists in reality’” 
and in note, still Owens: “In the object [of sensation] there are the quidditative and 
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existential factors. As impressed passively on the sentient power both those aspects enter 
into the actuation of the faculty.”130  
I take “formal” reception to mean “intentional” reception. I find very appealing the 
fact that Knasas considers the identity “numerical.” That is, it is a great insight, but at the 
same time, it involves a great danger. The insight is that, if what is known is present in the 
knower in some way, there can be absolutely no difference between the known out there 
and the known present in the subject, insofar as we speak of the content. However, if the 
distinction between content and mode of being of the content is not made, there results 
either the problem of identifying in reality the object with the subject (which is one of my 
concerns with some interpretations of Aquinas) or the problem of not explaining properly 
this identity-in-alterity which knowing seems to be. In other words, it is not enough to 
affirm that there is an identity of two things that are not the same: we need to explain this 
identity’s condition of possibility. Or, if one prefers, it is enough to affirm the fact as long as 
the matter is set for discussion; but once this is done, it is here that Epistemology begins. 
For the reasons previously exposed (particularly his apparent lack of interest in the 
theory of the agent intellect) it does not seem that Owens, in his Cognition, gives the 
explanation that is required. If there is a different mode of being of the same thing (the 
object), there needs to be an explanation of this different mode of being, and this 
explanation is to be found in the doctrine of the agent intellect. Knasas is very much in 
                                                     





agreement with the Epistemology of Owens, as Knasas himself claims,131 but it is not known 
to me if Knasas gives a better explanation elsewhere. The point I would suggest is that the 
emphasis on the efficiency of the object does explain the presence of the content (insofar as 
the presence of the like is explained by the like), but it is missing the explanation of the 
different mode of being of the object, and particularly of the state of abstraction that the 
object finds in intelligence. It may be that, because the texts quoted refer rather to 
sensibility, the necessity of an explanation of the mode of being does not seem necessary 
(because an agent sense is not required). However, if the effect of the sensible object is not 
only physical but cognitional, do we not need the Thomistic celestial bodies or separate 
substances to make sense of the intentional effect? In what sense, otherwise, is there a 
“numerical” identity of known and knower? The natural efficiency is not enough, because 
the forms would be only “specifically” identical. 
Accused of falling into “knowing by confrontation,” Knasas says: “In fact, since my 
realism is immediate, my realism is knowledge by identity rather than confrontation.”132 
The problem with the confrontation paradigm, it is said, is that there needs to be a bridge 
to reach the object. But that bridge is not required for Knasas, because “The real is not just 
‘the out there.’ The real is also ‘the out there that is in here.’”133 We find the outside inside, 
and that is why the so-called bridge is not needed. It is a powerful exposition of the fact of 
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knowing, and Knasas is talking about identity as the intentional presence of the object to 
the subject.  
However, consideration should be given to speaking about this as not simply 
identity, in order to not dilute the otherness of the object. There is in knowing a 
confrontation, insofar as there is an “out there”, and there is also an identity, insofar as the 
out there is “in here” or “immediately present,” as Knasas says. “Intentional identity” or 
“intentional presence” could convey these same thoughts in a better fashion. Because 
knowing is a mode of being as “presence in/to the other,” saying only “identity” may 
obscure half of the mystery. This, however, is more a matter of terms than of doctrine. 
Knasas says:  
Identity of sense and sensible is only half the story. As noted above, when sense 
receives the form, sense does not subjectivize the form. Rather, since the reception 
is formal [read: “intentional”], the otherness of the received form is left intact. The 
objectivity of sensation is guaranteed […] Again, knowledge by way of identity 
means that the knower becomes the real.134 
I agree with Knasas in his aposterioristic reading of Aquinas and his definition of a 
formal a priori. With greater exposure to Knasas’ works, it might be possible to see whether 
he is elsewhere more specific regarding the explanation of the distinction of the modes of 
being of the known, and of identity in knowing. However, his understanding of 
intentionality and of the cognitional fact are very precise, where he says: “The real is not 
just ‘the out there.’ The real is also ‘the out there that is in here.’”135 
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4) Cornelio Fabro 
Finally, we arrive at Cornelio Fabro (1911-1995),136 the philosopher who inspired this 
discussion about the agent intellect as a metaphysical a priori. Although the interpretation 
of the agent intellect in the current proposal is based on the same general epistemological 
orientation as that of Fabro, the agent intellect as metaphysical a priori is spoken of 
somewhat differently in the current view than in Fabro’s. To begin, let us consider some of 
the principles of his Epistemology, and then more particularly his doctrine on the agent 
intellect. 
The alterity of the object of knowing, the explanation of knowing by the distinction 
of the modes of being of the known perfection, and the origin of the intellectual content in 
the object itself, are clear features of Fabro’s doctrine about knowing as participation:  
It seems therefore that “knowing” realizes, in the realm of nature, “participating” in 
the full sense of the term. To know is to assimilate and to become similar, is to 
possess the act and the form of another thing insofar as the act and the form are 
                                                     
truth as known in Metaphysics (Cognoscitur, etc.). That is why the intellect has to know first its own 
nature (as part of the definition of truth, adaequatio rei etc.); and this is the reflection St. Thomas is 
talking about, a metaphysical reflection, which is the same as the reditio completa that allows the 
intellect to know its essentia propria. In other words, we do not need to know the essence of the 
intellect to know a truth, that is, to know the truth regarding something and to affirm it: in this case, 
we need only to know “what’s going on.” But we do need to know the essence of the intellect as the 
faculty of knowing being, in order to know what truth is, as adaequatio rei et intellectus. The 
objection that St. Thomas is also speaking about truth in sensibility (in the first sense), should be put 
into context, noticing that he speaks about a judgment in the senses as well, and that the senses 
know that they sense: he is therefore not speaking of any faculty of sense, but of a particular 
operation of the internal senses, that is analogous to judgment, and only in that sense can be said to 
possess the truth. It should be clear that, for St. Thomas, the truth is adaequatio rei et intellectus 
judicantis, and therefore the senses (and even the intellect insofar as it apprehends) are excluded 
from possessing the truth, properly speaking. 
136 The following remarks focus on Fabro, Cornelio, La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione 
secondo San Tommaso d’Aquino (NMP); and La Svolta Antropologica di Karl Rahner (LS), already 
quoted. As I have been doing with other authors, I will omit Fabro’s name in the references to his 





and remain of the other thing. Is it the case, then, that one and the same act is, at 
the same time and under the same respect, act of different subjects, the knower and 
the known? Yes, but Thomistic Aristotelism adds immediately, not in the same way. 
The act and the form are present in the object known in a physical and real way, in 
the subject, instead, in an objective and “intentional” way, that is to say by means of 
an “intermediary”, the “species” (impressa) which is the quality that disposes the 
subject to enter into that participation. By means of this qualitative modification, 
which has all its ratio [italian: ragione] and structure from the object and that comes 
to emerge upon the being of the knower as a flower upon the stem, it appears clear 
that knowing is truly a “participating.”137 
Regarding Aquinas’ agent intellect, Fabro in La Svolta (cf. LS 52 and 116) refers to it 
as a metaphysical a priori in opposition to Rahner’s formal a priori. In LS, Fabro refers to 
what he had written in his previous NMP (cf. 272-273). The respective contexts of the two 
works are different from each other. Let us examine each of them. 
4.1.  A Metaphysical A Priori in The Metaphysical Notion of Participation 
In La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione (NMP), Fabro is distinguishing the Platonic 
“objective” participation of the intelligible (i.e., the content of knowing as bestowed on 
human intelligence) from the Thomistic “subjective” participation of a light making 
intelligible. Fabro here does not use the terms “metaphysical” participation nor “a priori” 
for the agent intellect, but it is evident that 1) the agent intellect is, for Fabro, a subjective 
participation insofar as it is a real subjective faculty derived from God in order to make 
intelligible, and that 2) human knowing is not verified by a participation of the intelligible 
content in a Platonic way. Although, in using the term “intelligible,” Fabro does not 
differentiate between the content and its mode of being,138 it seems clear that he considers 
                                                     
137 NMP 270. 
138 “The agent intellect is principle productive [fattivo] of the intelligible and this intelligible 





the content of the intelligible as coming from the sensible things, “by a complex work of 
abstraction exercised by the participated light, the agent intellect, in the realm of the 
concrete and diffuse participation of the sensible world” (then he quotes the text of 
Aquinas at 84, 4 ad 1, in which the content of knowing is said to come from the forms of 
sensible things). Without saying it explicitly, Fabro suggests two participations in intellectual 
knowing and both, of course, as derived from God. The first is a participation of the light 
(subjective participation, the agent intellect) and the second is a participation of the 
content, which also comes from God, not directly, but through the forms of sensible things. 
And precisely because our direct participation from God is not of the content, but of the 
light making intelligible, the agent intellect is a subjective, not an objective participation. 
The content as well comes remotely from God, as the source of all truth, but only (naturally) 
through the concrete participations of His eternal ideas in the forms of the sensible things.  
For Fabro, the content of intellectual knowing is the nature existing in the sensible 
things. In fact, he says that the human idea is not an intensive intelligible “totality”, like the 
infused idea of the angels, because it does not come by (objective) participation but by 
abstraction. And he continues:  
Matter, which in concrete beings is principle of ontological limitation of the form, 
becomes for our abstracting mind an obstacle to intelligibility […] From an objective 
point of view, that is to say, the point of view of the noetic content, the human idea, 
possessed by abstraction, is said knowledge by participation in the strong sense […] 
                                                     
by the participated light, the agent intellect, in the realm of the concrete and diffuse participations 
of the sensible world” (NMP 272-273, see the complete text in question in Appendix, Note 22). In my 
view, the first “intelligible” is the species with its content, but the second is rather the content of the 
species. It is evident that, for Fabro, what the agent intellect produces comes also, in a certain 
sense, from the sensible things, but he does not make a clear distinction, in the use of the word 





insofar as [it] “est similitudo formae tantum”; it does not reach the matter, and so 
the human idea, as such, will arrive always at a general and undetermined 
content.139 
From NMP can be seen that the agent intellect is a subjective participation insofar as 
it is not a participation of the intelligible content (which comes from the things themselves) 
but a participation of a light in the subject, a light that, by abstraction, makes intelligible the 
forms of the real things. There is not a clear distinction, in what Fabro calls the “intelligible,” 
between content and mode of being of the content, and so it may not be so clear in what 
sense the agent intellect “makes intelligible.” However, he does say that the intelligible 
species “has all its ratio [ragione] and structure from the object”140 and he also distinguishes 
in the human idea the “point of view of the noetic content”141 in which the human idea is a 
likeness of the form of the sensible things. Therefore, even if Fabro does not refer to the 
agent intellect explicitly as productive of the intelligible mode of being of the content (that 
which I myself call “metaphysical a priori”), he would surely deny that it is productive of the 
intelligible content itself. The content of human knowing is a participation of the form of 
sensible things by which we are perfected, and not a participation of our own light in them, 
by which they would receive intelligibility as content. 
4.2.  A Metaphysical A Priori in La Svolta 
In La Svolta (LS), Fabro speaks explicitly of the agent intellect as a metaphysical a 
priori in opposition to Rahner’s formal a priori. There are two clear texts, both in footnote: 
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LS 52, and LS 116. In the first Fabro claims that, in Rahner, the agent intellect is a formal a 
priori in the sense of a Kantian transcendental, and Fabro uses the term “metaphysical” to 
express his own reading of the agent intellect in Aquinas.142 In the second, Fabro does not 
use the term “metaphysical” but “productive” [fattivo]. Here he explains a little more of 
what he means to say. However, because the contexts are somehow different, and his 
expressions are very dense, it appears necessary to offer an explanation of what Fabro 
meant, in order to show the similarities and differences between his position and the 
position being proposed in this thesis. 
In LS 116, the context is the following. For Fabro, Rahner identifies abstractio, 
conversio and reditio in intellectual knowing in this way: abstractio (to know the intelligible) 
is reditio, i.e., to know oneself (the only intelligible) as being in the world (conversio ad 
phantasmata); in other words, to know the intelligible (abstractio) is an action of self-
consciousness (and so a reditio) upon the material of sensibility (conversio). Fabro, in 
responding to Rahner, uses 84, 6 (the text of “materia causae”143) to show that, for Aquinas, 
the relationship with sensibility is not that which alone verifies intellectual knowing, but 
intellectual knowing is an operation of a higher level, exercised upon a higher object. At this 
point comes, in a footnote, Fabro’s observation that Rahner uses the same text144 to draw 
the opposite conclusion, that the agent intellect is a formal a priori or, in other words, that 
the action of intelligence is exercised on the material of sensibility in a Kantian fashion. 
                                                     
142 Fabro quotes here NMP 272-273. 
143 We will examine this particular text in Chapter 4, section 1. 





Fabro claims that, for Aquinas, the agent intellect is rather an a priori as effective [fattivo] 
principle, as faciens intelligibilia, and not a formal or constitutive principle.145 
The agent intellect, for Fabro, is not that which provides intelligibility to the material 
of sensibility (and therefore intelligibility as content), nor is it a projection of consciousness 
(the first “object” of intelligence) on the sensible material from experience. The agent 
intellect is, instead, that which makes the intelligible from the sensible, and that intelligible 
is the first object of intelligence. What Aquinas says in 84, 6, for Rahner, is that the agent 
intellect informs the material of sensibility with intelligibility as content and, therefore, that 
the action of the intellect (the knowing action) is exercised on the sensible; whereas for 
Fabro, Aquinas is saying the opposite, that is, that the act of intelligence is exercised not on 
matter but on something higher (the universal), which requires precisely the action of the 
agent intellect on the material of sensibility: not, though, as informing it with intelligible 
content, but as making the universal species. It is this “making the universal” which renders 
the agent intellect an a priori as productive principle, and not a formal one, as if it were a 
formal (intelligible) “part” of the object itself. 
Therefore, when in LS 52 Fabro speaks of “metaphysical a priori”, he means a 
subjective participation which is the condition of possibility of intellectual knowing insofar 
as it produces the intelligible species, which is the agent object of the knowing operation of 
intelligence. As a formal a priori, instead, the light of the agent intellect constitutes formally 
the object of knowing, providing intelligibility as content to an otherwise sensible object. 
                                                     
145 The difference between “productive” and “formal” is related to the difference between 
an efficient cause and a formal cause. The formal cause constitutes the “formed” thing together 




Fabro does not say, therefore, that the agent intellect is a metaphysical a priori 
insofar as it produces the intelligible mode of being of the content (which is the way that 
expression is used in this thesis), but insofar as it produces the intelligible species (without 
further specifications). However, Fabro’s denial of the agent intellect in Aquinas as a formal 
a priori and his affirmations regarding the origin of the noetic content in the sensible reality, 
are very much in line with the claim presently being made. 
4.3.  Intellectual Knowing as Receptive in Fabro 
We have considered the use of the term “metaphysical a priori” in Fabro. Now, in 
this dissertation, the intellectual apprehension is portrayed as reception of the universal 
content, a reception verified by abstraction of that content from experience, through the 
work of the agent intellect. This interpretation, as we have said, is a means to oppose the 
Kantian notion of intellectual activity as, in some way, providing the universal content. For 
Fabro, in a similar way, the difference between Aquinas and Modern Philosophy is that 
Aquinas maintains, at the beginning of the process of intellectual knowing, an abstractive 
absolute apprehension parallel to the intuitive absolute apprehension with which the 
process of sensible knowing begins.146 The interpretation being offered here is in agreement 
with Fabro, insofar as for Kant the universal is a product of the intellectual activity (as giving 
intelligible form to the raw material of experience) whereas, for Aquinas, it is the beginning 
of that activity (as original reception of intelligible content). 
                                                     
146 Cf. Cornelio Fabro, Percezione e Pensiero, 2nd Revised Edition (Brescia: Morcelliana, 




5) Other Relevant Authors 
Although the contributions of certain authors will be studied in the body of this 
dissertation, it seems useful that the following authors be given at least a brief mention in 
the introduction to this work.147 
Tsenay Serequeberhan,148 as regards the agent intellect in Aquinas and the Kantian 
categories, rightly relates both to the solution of the same problem, namely, the intellectual 
and universal knowledge of reality. However, Serequeberhan considers that which is rather 
a superficial analogy between these two realities (the fact that both are active in their 
respective systems)149 to be a shared fundamental view between Kant and Aquinas.150 What 
is interesting about this article is that, since Serequeberhan is not deceived about Kant’s 
                                                     
147 Three other works are briefly studied in Appendix, Note 1: John Haldane, “Aquinas and 
the Active Intellect,” Philosophy (UK) 67 (1992): 199-210; Wayne J. Hankey, “Participatio Divini 
Luminis, Aquinas' Doctrine of the Agent Intellect: Our Capacity for Contemplation,” Dionysius 22 
(2004): 149-178; R. E. Houser, “Philosophical Development through Metaphor: Light among the 
Greeks,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 64 (1990): 75-85. 
148 Cf. Tsenay Serequeberhan, “Aquinas and Kant: a Comparative Study,” Dialogue: Journal 
of Phi Sigma Tau 26 (1984): 40-48. The authors’ names are omitted in this section’s references, as 
long as the reference is under the corresponding title. 
149 The “concepts” of Aquinas are separated by Kant from their original “paradigm” but they 
are preserved with a new “content” in Kant’s own paradigm: “the passive intellect becomes the 
Faculty of Sensibility, which is the receptive and passive faculty of the mind; the agent intellect 
becomes the Faculty of Understanding, which is the spontaneous and active faculty of the mind; and 
the Soul becomes Transcendental Apperception, which is the grounding of the whole composite of 
sensibility and understanding” (44, cf. 47-48). 
150 Serequeberhan, in his conclusive phrase, says that “despite their radically differing 
philosophical perspectives, they share certain fundamental views which are not obvious” (48, my 
emphasis). He does show an understanding of the radical difference between the two, but if what is 
radical and what is fundamental are both differing and shared, I really wonder if this does not betray 
an attempt to mix water and oil. It needs to be clarified, however, that Serequeberhan wrote this 
article very early in his career, and is now specialized in African Philosophy, so I cannot ascertain by 





and Aquinas’151 differing respective views on the origin of the intellectual content, the 
danger of likening the agent intellect to the Kantian transcendental is more evident and, for 
a proper interpretation of Aquinas, the necessity of a distinction between that which the 
agent intellect produces and that which the categories contribute becomes more pressing. 
Hernán Martínez Millán152 tries to show how the analogies of the sun and the light 
are integrated in Aquinas’ doctrine. The analogy of the sun satisfies the need for a first 
cause in human knowing (something more Christian and Patristic),153 and the analogy of the 
light shows how the necessity of a first cause does not take away a proper level of 
proximate causality in the creature (something more Aristotelian and, in Martínez Millán’s 
view, “existentialist”, maybe in the anti-Platonic sense of attributing real being to the 
particular things). These reflections seem helpful for the interpretation of Aquinas, since 
they provide a plausible explanation for the systematic unity of elements coming from 
different sources. 
Christopher Cullen’s154 worries about a Kantian influence in Transcendental Thomism 
are very clear. One of Cullen’s concerns is the idea that the origin of intellectual content is 
not in sensible experience: “Donceel even says, ‘For Transcendental Thomism… being is 
                                                     
151 “Aquinas derives the agent intellect from the fact that human beings actually engage in 
the process of abstraction […] the forms of material things […] do not exist as distinct entities, but 
inhere in matter […] Human intellect, when it understands material things by grasping their 
‘species,’ does so by penetrating the natures or forms of sensible things” (42-43). 
152 Cf. Hernán Martínez Millán, “Sun and Light, or on the Agent Intellect,” Revista Española 
De Filosofía Medieval 20 (2013): 49-56. 
153 Cf. 55. 
154 Cf. Christopher M. Cullen, S.J., “Transcendental Thomism: Realism Rejected” in The 
Failure of Modernism: The Cartesian Legacy and Contemporary Pluralism, ed. Brendan Sweetman 





contributed a priori by the intellect itself.’ Being comes to us through the senses but in no 
way from the senses.”155 Regarding Rahner in particular, Cullen says: “Rahner also gives 
much emphasis to the importance of the judgment, for he seeks an a priori ground for all 
affirmation of finite esse. Rahner believes that sensation cannot ground universality or 
necessity.”156 
Cullen worries that the doctrine of the agent intellect is used to produce a Kantian 
interpretation of Aquinas. Cullen says: “Rahner is very clear that Aquinas does not think 
there are any innate ideas. Nevertheless, Rahner does argue that there is an a priori 
element of knowledge and that this a priori element is contributed by the agent 
intellect.”157 “Donceel explains that Transcendental Thomists argue that the agent intellect 
contributes ‘something’ to sense experience.”158 To consider the agent intellect a formal a 
priori is, for Cullen, a misinterpretation of Aquinas: 
The Transcendental Thomists have misinterpreted Aquinas’s doctrine of the agent 
intellect in various ways. First, they have made the light of the agent intellect to be 
the formal cause of our knowledge. Secondly, they have made the light of the agent 
intellect to be the habitual knowledge of the first principles (always implicit but 
made explicit in the science of metaphysics)159 directly contradicting Aquinas’s 
teaching in his Disputed Questions on the Soul [he refers q.5 c, which is Q.D. De 
Anima a.5, c.]160 





159 Cf. Cullen, 79: “Donceel argues that we are ‘entitled to conclude that the light of the 
agent intellect consists precisely in the truth of the first principles,’ and that these first principles are 
‘the a priori contribution of our intellect to every object we know.’” 
160 83. Cf. Cullen, 85: “For St. Thomas being is not contributed to knowing by the intellect 
nor is it the formal cause of knowledge. But to make the transcendental turn is to isolate the 





Cullen also says: “This misinterpretation of the agent intellect doctrine in Thomas 
leads the Transcendentalists to justify their transcendental turn, which in turn leads to their 
fundamental metaphysical doctrines.”161 It is interesting that, for Cullen, it is a 
misinterpretation of St. Thomas’ agent intellect which leads to the “justification” of a 
Kantian turn to the subject. Note that Cullen does not say that the agent intellect is taken as 
an “excuse” for the Kantian turn. What Cullen’s statement arguably means is that, once the 
transcendental turn is taken for granted, that is, as the only rational way to do philosophy 
today, Aquinas’ doctrine of the agent intellect, misinterpreted, can justify the turn from a 
Thomistic point of view, given the concerns that Modern Philosophy has always raised in 
Catholic environments. Regardless of his interpretation of Transcendental Thomism, 
Cullen’s statement helps us to see the relevance of an interpretation of Aquinas which 
distinguishes clearly the Thomist agent intellect from a Kantian formal a priori. Hopefully, by 
trying to identify in Aquinas and Kant two differing approaches to the same problem (that of 
the universals), something more helpful will be offered to modern scholarship than what 
could be offered by focusing on other authors’ interpretations of Aquinas. 
Elena Baltuta162 seems to propose that the universal exists in the extramental thing 
itself, and is abstracted from it by the agent intellect.163 Although she does not emphasize, 
                                                     
161 83-84. 
162 Cf. Elena Baltuta, “Thomas Aquinas on Bridging the Gap between Mind and Reality,” 
Revue Roumaine De Philosophie 56, no. 1 (2012): 147-60. 
163 “The mark of the individuality present in the images must be removed and, at the same 
time, the object’s universal essence, the informational core of the extra mental object, must be 
kept. This is performed by the action of the agent intellect, which illuminates and abstracts the 





as is done herein, that the universal content is the same but the mode of being is different 
(in reality or in the mind), she does lead to this point by comparing the agent intellect to an 
x-ray apparatus which lets hidden things be seen while leaving the rest invisible.164 In my 
view, Baltuta does not maintain that the agent intellect has a cognitive character, although 
some passages from her work may lead us to think that way.165 For Baltuta, rather, the 
agent intellect seems to be a condition for the possibility of the extramental things’ 
universal essences having visibility. 
Héctor Zagal Arreguín, in his article,166 strongly criticizes Aquinas’ interpretation of 
the Aristotelian agent intellect, pointing out several inconsistencies he perceives in St. 
Thomas, both internal (lack of systematic coherence) and exegetical (lack of faithfulness to 
Aristotle). In Zagal Arreguín’s appreciation of Aquinas there seems to be a certain lack of 
familiarity with the meaning of important Thomistic metaphysical notions and distinctions 
(particularly, the notion of participation, the distinctions between active and passive 
potency, etc.). More acquaintance with these notions would probably help this author to 
see at least the internal coherence of Aquinas’ doctrine. Still, in his interpretation of 
                                                     
164 “What was first visible only in potency […] becomes visible in act and, at the same time, 
the skin, its color […] become invisible. Acting just like such an apparatus the agent intellect does not 
need the ability to ‘see’ both sensible particulars and immaterial universals for being able to abstract 
the latter ones from the images” (157). 
165 “The agent intellect removes the individual and material characteristics of the object 
from its essence. But how can the agent intellect tell the difference between what is particular 
(individual) and what is universal in an image? […] would we be entitled to believe that, since it has 
the power of discriminating and removing individual elements from universal ones, it has access to 
both particular and universal features?” (155). 
166 Cf. Héctor Zagal Arreguín, “The Separate Substances and Aquinas' Intellectus 





Aquinas, Zagal Arreguín expresses very well the proposed portrayal of the agent intellect as 
a metaphysical a priori, when he says, 
What makes [the agent intellect] therefore in act with respect to inteligible objects is 
the fact that it is an active immaterial force able to assimilate other things to itself, 
i.e., immaterialize them. In this way it renders actually intelligible something that 
was only potentially intelligible: like light, which without containing any particular 
color, brings colors into act.167 
 
This review of several authors has hopefully made clear the timeliness and possible 
benefits of a discussion, such as that being proposed in this dissertation, about the role of 
the agent intellect in Aquinas. Several issues of interpretation of Aquinas’ text have been 
raised, those being the question of a common nature, the distinction between intelligibility 
as content and as mode of being of the content, the proper meaning of the Aristotelian 
identity, etc.. It is hoped that what follows will be helpful regarding these and other related 
questions.




Chapter One: The Thomistic Fact and  
the Role of the Agent Intellect 
1) The Thomistic Fact  
In order to understand what the agent intellect is for St. Thomas, it is important to 
understand why St. Thomas requires an agent intellect in human intellectual knowing. The 
precise text in which he deals with this point in the Summa is 79, 3. The immediate purpose 
is to show how, for St. Thomas, the fact that we know the universal aspect of corporeal 
things, their nature, requires an agent intellect as its condition of possibility. The agent 
intellect is the “light” making intelligible in act the nature of corporeal things. 
In the corpus, St. Thomas begins to make his point by establishing a contrast with 
the Platonic doctrine of ideas: 
According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for an active intellect in order to 
make things actually intelligible […] For Plato supposed that the forms of natural 
things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that they are intelligible: since 
a thing is actually intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial. And he called 
such forms ‘species or ideas’.168 
Both for Aristotle and for Plato, the object of human understanding is the nature or 
form of corporeal things. However, because in the Platonic system those forms are already 
intelligible in act in their real being, an agent intellect is not needed for Plato, at least not in 
the way it is needed for Aristotle: “But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural 
things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it 
                                                     
168 79, 3, c.: “Secundum opinionem Platonis, nulla necessitas erat ponere intellectum 
agentem ad faciendum intelligibilia in actu […] Posuit enim Plato formas rerum naturalium sine 
materia subsistere, et per consequens eas intelligibiles esse, quia ex hoc est aliquid intelligibile actu, 





follows that the natures or forms of the sensible things which we understand are not 
actually intelligible.”169 
This point is important. For St. Thomas, it is a fact that we understand the nature of 
the sensible things. This is the reason he interrupts the flow of the phrase with the relative 
sentence, “quas intelligimus.” On the other hand, it is also a fact that, since their real being 
is individuated in matter, those forms are not intelligible in act. These two facts or, better 
said, this double-sided fact, is what requires an agent intellect as its condition of possibility:  
Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the 
senses [are] made actual by what is actually sensible. We must therefore assign on 
the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by 
abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an 
active intellect.170 
In other words, if we understand the nature of corporeal things it is because they 
are for us already intelligible in act.171 We would not understand those things in act if they 
                                                     
169 79, 3, c.: “Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine 
materia; formae autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae 
seu formae rerum sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu.” 
170 79, 3, c.: “Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut 
sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, 
quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. Et haec 
est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem.” 
171 Cf. 85, 1, ob. 4. There is a metaphysical priority of the intelligible in act (= species 
impressa) over the intellect in act (= species expressa). The result of the action of the agent intellect 
on the phantasm is the intelligible in act, but not yet “intellected” in act; the intelligible in act, as 
agent object, “causes” the possible intellect to understand, to pass from potency to act of 
understanding. The agent intellect produces the passage from potency to act of being intelligible 
(regarding the nature of corporeal things); the agent object (already intelligible in act) produces the 
passage from potency to act of understanding. The two passages are clear for example in 79, 7, c.: 
“Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the passive 
intellect: because as regards the same object, the active power which makes the object to be in act 
must be distinct from the passive power, which is moved by the object existing in act.” 
[Diversificatur tamen potentia intellectus agentis, et intellectus possibilis, quia respectu eiusdem 





were not already intelligible in act (our intellect is in potency to all intelligible things). But 
because those natures do not subsist in that way (intelligible in act), there is a need for 
some efficient power to make them pass from intelligible in potency172 to intelligible in act. 
Herein lies the necessity for an agent intellect. And because what prevents something from 
being intelligible in act is matter, the way to make it pass from potentially to actually 
intelligible is a sort of separation of its nature from its individual matter; this is called 
abstraction. It is this sort of action which the agent intellect will be called to perform. The 
whole of Thomistic Epistemology announces itself. Our immediate concern, however, is to 
establish as it were a point of departure for this discussion, or better said, the Thomistic 
point of departure or “Thomistic fact.” Nothing can be understood if it is not intelligible in 
act. Nothing is intelligible in act if it is not separated from matter. Now, we do understand 
the nature of corporeal things and certainly they are not separated from matter (this is the 
“Thomistic fact”). Therefore, what is required is a power which makes intelligible in act the 
nature of corporeal things, by means of a certain separation from their individual conditions 
in matter.173 
                                                     
potentiam passivam, quae movetur ab obiecto in actu existente.] Cf. section 4 of this Chapter, and 
Chapter 3, section 4, where the nature of this “movement” of the possible intellect is also explored. 
172 The meaning of this being “intelligible in potency” will be explored in more detail in 
Chapter 4, section 2. 
173 An interesting parallel regarding the necessity of the agent intellect in human beings is 
found in Summa I, 54, 4, c: “The necessity for admitting an active intellect is due to this—that the 
natures of the material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul, as immaterial and 
actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in potentiality so long as they are outside the soul. 
Consequently it is necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such natures 
actually intelligible.” [Necessitas autem ponendi intellectum agentem fuit, quia naturae rerum 
materialium, quas nos intelligimus, non subsistunt extra animam immateriales et intelligibiles in 
actu, sed sunt solum intelligibiles in potentia, extra animam existentes, et ideo oportuit esse 




As clear as these issues may seem (at least from a direct reading of Aquinas’ text), a 
whole range of questions begins to arise. Some of them will be treated in the following 
pages, but two of them can be proposed now. Firstly, does this doctrine make sense? Could 
Aquinas really mean that? Although the second question is the immediate concern of this 
dissertation, it is actually the first which prevents some of Aquinas’ readers from 
understanding him. Still, it is by directly facing the second question, which is a question of 
interpretation, that the path for the clarification of the first question may be open. In other 
words, if a plausible case can be made that Aquinas really meant the doctrine that is here 
suggested and, if a coherent reading of this doctrine can be offered, it will be easier to 
answer the question of fact, that is, whether things actually are as Aquinas seems to think. 
Some other texts may be helpful to complement this section, and to prepare the 
ground for the following. Right from the beginning, St. Thomas in his treatise presupposes 
that we know the nature of corporeal things. In the crucial text of 75, 2 c., this is the point 
of departure for arguing the subsistence of the human soul: “For it is clear that by means of 
the intellect man can have knowledge of [the natures of] all corporeal things.”174 These 
natures are perfections of another (“aliorum”) that are somehow received in the subject175 
through knowledge: “Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its 
own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything 
                                                     
174 75, 2, c.: “Manifestum est enim quod homo per intellectum cognoscere potest naturas 
omnium corporum.” 
175 Later on, in Chapter 3, the receptive character of knowledge will be treated, but it is 
already suggested in 75, 2. Knowing is a certain inesse that would not be possible if the perfection to 





else…”176 This fact allows Aquinas to draw the conclusion intended: the human soul does 
not have the nature of a body, because what is able to receive those natures in a cognitive 
way cannot have that nature metaphysically in itself. It is not our purpose here to assess the 
strength of the Thomistic argument, but to take from this text the following three 
suggestions.  
1) For Aquinas, the nature of a body is a metaphysical property of things, i.e., it 
belongs metaphysically to them but not to the human soul (the soul is not a body).  
2) There is a difference between the cognitive and the metaphysical presence of the 
nature of a body. In the human soul, the latter is denied whereas the former is admitted 
(the soul is able to know the nature of all bodies).  
3) The human soul is in potency of receiving cognitively the nature of all bodies.  
This crucial text of Aquinas, therefore, supports the first side of what we have called 
the Thomistic fact, namely, that we know the nature of corporeal things. 
What we know intellectually is the nature of corporeal things. The nature is outside 
the mind but not with the same mode of being with which it is known. The nature we 
understand is universal:  
But there is this difference, according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the sense 
and the intelligence—that a thing is perceived by the sense according to the 
disposition which it has outside the soul—that is, in its individuality; whereas the 
nature of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode according 
                                                     
176 75, 2, c.: “Quod autem potest cognoscere aliqua, oportet ut nihil eorum habeat in sua 





to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is 
understood.177 
What we understand is not the intelligible species, but the thing itself through its 
likeness. The species is the form through which the action of knowing is performed. A few 
lines before the previous text, St. Thomas says: 
 For what is understood is in the intellect, not according to its own nature, but 
according to its likeness; for ‘the stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is,’ as is said, 
De Anima iii, 8. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the likeness of the stone; 
except by a reflection of the intellect on itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences 
would not be things, but only intelligible species.178 
This latter remark clarifies the meaning of what we call the Thomistic fact: to know 
the nature of corporeal things means to know something that belongs to the things 
themselves, not something that pertains to the subject. The Thomistic species is a subjective 
modification through which the intellect has direct contact with the thing, not with itself.179 
This idea is repeated in one of the most relevant articles for Thomistic Gnoseology:  
Therefore if what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it 
would follow that every science would not be concerned with objects outside the 
soul, but only with the intelligible species within the soul; thus, according to the 
teaching of the Platonists all science is about ideas, which they held to be actually 
understood.180 
                                                     
177 76, 2 ad 4: “Sed hoc tantum interest inter sensum et intellectum, secundum sententiam 
Aristotelis, quod res sentitur secundum illam dispositionem quam extra animam habet, in sua 
particularitate, natura autem rei quae intelligitur, est quidem extra animam, sed non habet illum 
modum essendi extra animam, secundum quem intelligitur.” The object of understanding as the 
universal nature, and not the thing in its particularity, will be the focus of the next section. 
178 76, 2 ad 4: “Id enim quod intelligitur non est in intellectu secundum se, sed secundum 
suam similitudinem, lapis enim non est in anima, sed species lapidis, ut dicitur in III De Anima. Et 
tamen lapis est id quod intelligitur, non autem species lapidis, nisi per reflexionem intellectus supra 
seipsum, alioquin scientiae non essent de rebus, sed de speciebus intelligibilibus.”  
179 Cf. In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a.1 ad 16; De Ver 2, 3, ad 3. 
180 85, 2, c.: “Si igitur ea quae intelligimus essent solum species quae sunt in anima, 





The mention of Plato reminds us of the first text examined181 and is important for 
our purposes. To say that the subjective modification as such (the species) is the object of 
human understanding is as mistaken as to say, with Plato, that the separate ideas are the 
object of understanding. In both cases, in fact, human understanding would not refer to the 
real things, which are the sensible corporeal things. And in both cases, the mistake 
according to St. Thomas is the same. That is, it is a mistake to think that the object of 
human understanding needs to be separated from matter in its own (real) being or, in other 
words, to think that there is nothing intelligible in the particular, that there is nothing 
universal subsisting in the matter. As we shall see, St. Thomas would blame Kant for the 
same mistake. The need of the agent intellect arises because the mode of being of what we 
know is not intelligible in act, not because there is nothing intelligible in corporeal things.182 
                                                     
speciebus intelligibilibus quae sunt in anima; sicut secundum Platonicos omnes scientiae sunt de 
ideis, quas ponebant esse intellecta in actu.” 
181 79, 3. 
182 Cf. In I De Anima 4, 106-111: “Plato took the objects known by the intellect to be things in 
themselves, existing apart from matter in perpetual actuality, and the causes of knowledge and of 
being in things of sense. For Aristotle this view involved so many difficulties that he was compelled 
to excogitate the theory of the ‘agent intellect’…” [Plato posuit, quod intelligibilia essent per se 
subsistencia et separata et essent semper in actu, et essent causa cognitionis et esse rebus 
sensibilibus (quod Aristotiles tamquam inconveniens volens evitare, coactus est ponere intellectum 
agentem)…]; In III De Anima 6, 297-305: “And the mind in act is its object in every way; for (as an 
object includes matter in its notion or does not include it, in the same way this object is perceived by 
the intellect). And just because Plato overlooked this process of abstraction he was forced to 
conceive of mathematical objects and specific natures as existing in separation from matter; 
whereas Aristotle was able to explain that process by the agent intellect.” [Et omnino intellectus in 
actu est res intellecta, quia sicut res in sui ratione habent materiam vel non habent, sic ab intellectu 
percipiuntur. Et quia hunc modum abstractionis Plato non consideravit, coactus fuit ponere 
mathematica et species separatas, loco cuius ad praedictam abstractionem faciendam Aristoteles 





In 79, 3 ad 3, Aquinas says that the intelligible in act does not exist in reality as such, 
regarding the nature of sensible things: “Now the intelligible in act is not something existing 
in nature; if we consider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart from 
matter.”183 Still, the natures of sensible things, which are the object of intelligence, are 
distinguished from the matter in which they subsist (as is implied in the corpus).184 There is 
a perfection, namely the nature of corporeal things, which cannot subsist without matter, 
but is not confounded with the matter itself. St. Thomas also distinguishes these natures 
from other natures that do not need matter to subsist and, because of that, are intelligible 
in act (this is the meaning of the clarification, “quantum ad naturam rerum sensibilium”). 
The fact that the object of human intelligence is not in reality intelligible in act brings St. 
Thomas, not to find the origin of the intelligible content outside reality and in the subject 
(like Kant), but to find in the subject a capacity of abstracting the intelligible content (the 
nature) from its individual conditions in the matter, thus making the intelligible in act (the 
species representing this intellectual content).185 That is why St. Thomas concludes the 
previous text with the following: “And therefore in order to understand them, the 
immaterial nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for the presence of the 
                                                     
183 79, 3 ad 3: “Intelligibile autem in actu non est aliquid existens in rerum natura, quantum 
ad naturam rerum sensibilium, quae non subsistunt praeter materiam.” 
184 Cf. 79, 3, c.: “But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from 
matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it follows that the natures of 
forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible.” [Sed quia Aristoteles 
non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia; formae autem in materia existentes 
non sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum sensibilium, quas 
intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu.] 
185 The distinction between the two meanings of “intelligibilis” and “universalis” (as 
intellectual content and as mode of being of the content), which is a crucial element of our 





active intellect which makes things actually intelligible by way of abstraction.”186 What 
Aquinas means is that, in order for intelligence to receive the intelligible in act, it is not 
enough to be itself immaterial (as the objection proposes), but what is also necessary is an 
intelligible in act which could be received. It is the function of the agent intellect to produce 
this intelligible in act, for the reasons exposed and in the sense explained. 
Our immediate purpose was to situate the role of the agent intellect as the 
explanation of the Thomistic fact. Given that we know the natures of corporeal things, but 
these natures do not subsist in the corporeal things in a way that we can take hold of them, 
there needs to be an agent intellect that makes those natures available to the possible 
intellect, by making them intelligible in act.187 The natures of corporeal things are intelligible 
only in potency (because they are imbedded in matter); our intelligence is also in potency of 
understanding (because it is tabula rasa); in order to understand, we need those natures to 
be intelligible in act. This is precisely the function of the agent intellect: to make the nature 
of corporeal things intelligible in act, by means of an abstraction from matter. In this way, 
those natures will be able to actualize the possible intellect.188 
                                                     
186 79, 3 ad 3: “Et ideo ad intelligendum non sufficeret immaterialitas intellectus possibilis, 
nisi adesset intellectus agens, qui faceret intelligibilia in actu per modum abstractionis.” 
187 A similar interpretation of the Thomistic fact can be found in Martínez Millán, 55-56: “As 
Aquinas notes in De Anima, Aristotle wanted to overcome the negative effects of Platonic 
philosophy, which had reduced sensible things to nothing more tan shadows, objects of opinion but 
not of knowledge […]. Aristotle […] had postulated the agent intellect in order to save the sensible 
world from the unknowable”; and Serequeberhan, 42-43: “Aquinas derives the agent intellect from 
the fact that human beings actually engage in the process of abstraction […] the forms of material 
things […] do not exist as distinct entities, but inhere in matter. [Human intellect understands] by 
penetrating the natures or forms of sensible things.” 
188 Cf. In III De Anima 4, 54-63: “The reason why Aristotle came to postulate an agent 
intellect was his rejection of Plato’s theory that the essences of sensible things existed apart from 





2) The Object of Intelligence in its Formal Aspect: The Universal as 
Different from the Particular 
The purpose of the following sections of this Chapter is to clarify the Thomistic fact. 
The present section intends to show how, for St. Thomas, the object of intelligence is not 
the material of sensibility, nor the particular as such, but the universal as nature of the 
corporeal thing. 
As we have seen, the need of an agent intellect comes from the fact that the object 
of intelligence is not intelligible in act in reality. The object of intelligence, for St. Thomas, is 
the universal as the nature of corporeal things. The metaphysical framework of this 
assertion is the following: the universal, “the one that is said of the many,” is in the first 
place the nature that is predicated of many individuals of the same species, because it 
subsists in all of them. Therefore the universal as such is distinguished from the particular 
individual as a certain “part” from the whole.189 The nature is the principle by which the 
individual is what it is (specifically); but in order to be this individual another principle is 
required, namely the matter. Because matter is that which differentiates individuals, and 
                                                     
intellect. But Aristotle, who regarded the essences of sensible things as existing in matter [and not 
intelligible in act], had to invoke some abstractive principle in the mind itself to render these 
essences actually intelligible.” [Inducitur autem Aristoteles ad ponendum intellectum agentem, ad 
excludendum opinionem Platonis, qui posuit quidditates rerum sensibilium esse a materia 
separatas, et intelligibiles actu; unde non erat ei necessarium ponere intellectum agentem. Sed quia 
Aristoteles ponit, quod quidditates rerum sensibilium sunt in materia, et non intelligibiles actu, 
oportuit quod poneret aliquem intellectum qui abstraheret a materia, et sic faceret eas intelligibiles 
actu.] 
189 The nature as the specific perfection of each individual can be considered a part of the 
whole that is this individual. But the individual itself can also be considered part of the other 





the nature instead is that which unites them, nature and principle of individuation are 
distinct in the individual.190 For St. Thomas, the nature is the direct object of human 
understanding. 
There is no question that, for St. Thomas, this is the object of intelligence: “But since 
Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms 
existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it follows that the natures of forms of the 
sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible.”191 He is not shy of 
repeating it multoties: “The first object of our knowledge in this life is the ‘quiddity of a 
material thing,’ which is the proper object of our intellect, as appears above in many 
passages.”192  
 The human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the first act of 
apprehension; but it first apprehends something about its object, such as its 
quiddity, and this is its first and proper object; and then it understands the 
properties, accidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus it necessarily 
compares one thing with another by composition or division…193 
                                                     
190 With these affirmations I do not claim to have demonstrated the Thomistic metaphysical 
framework. I mean to offer it as a helpful interpretative key that makes sense of Aquinas’ texts. 
191 79, 3, c.: “Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine 
materia; formae autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae 
seu formae rerum sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu.”  
192 88, 3, c.: “Primum autem quod intelligitur a nobis secundum statum praesentis vitae, est 
quidditas rei materialis, quae est nostri intellectus obiectum, ut multoties supra dictum est.”; cf. 84, 
7; 85, 8; 87, 2 ad 2. 
193 85, 5, c.: “Intellectus humanus non statim in prima apprehensione capit perfectam rei 
cognitionem; sed primo apprehendit aliquid de ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae est primum et 
proprium obiectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit proprietates et accidentia et habitudines 






“Our intellect's proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing.”194 
“And there is yet another, namely, the human intellect, which neither is its own act of 
understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of its act of understanding, for this 
object is [something extrinsic, that is,] the nature of a material thing. And therefore that 
which is first known by the human intellect is an object of this kind…”195 
This intellectual object is clearly distinguished from the object of sensibility. Both 
intelligence and sensitivity are apprehensive, but as different species of the same genus: 
“Indeed, the passive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its active principle. 
Therefore, since what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense 
                                                     
194 84, 8, c.: “Proprium obiectum intellectui nostro proportionatum est natura rei sensibilis.” 
That the natures of corporeal things can be intelligible objects can be taken also from CG II, 99, par. 
1-2: “Thus, through the intelligible forms in question a separate substance knows not only other 
separate substances, but also the species of corporeal things. For their intellect, being wholly in act, 
is perfect in point of natural perfection, and, therefore, it must comprehend its object—intelligible 
being—in a universal manner. Now, the species of corporeal things are also included within 
intelligible being, and the separate substance, therefore, knows them.” [Per dictas igitur formas 
intelligibiles substantia separata non solum cognoscit alias substantias separatas, sed etiam species 
rerum corporalium. Cum enim intellectus earum sit perfectus naturali perfectione, utpote totus in 
actu existens, oportet quod suum obiectum, scilicet ens intelligibile, universaliter comprehendat. 
Sub ente autem intelligibili comprehenduntur etiam species rerum corporalium. Eas igitur substantia 
separata cognoscit.] 
195 87, 3, c.: “Est autem alius intellectus, scilicet humanus, qui nec est suum intelligere, nec 
sui intelligere est obiectum primum ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet natura 
materialis rei. Et ideo id quod primo cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est huiusmodi obiectum …” It 
is not our concern to focus on the various words that Aquinas uses, natura, forma or quidditas. It 
could be granted that St. Thomas is always speaking of the formal universal principle of a material 
individual thing (cf. In Met. 8, lect. 3, 1710, text on p. 100). Berger also says that according to St. 
Thomas, the human intellect posseses a proper object: the natures or quiddities present in coporal 
matter (cf. André de Deus Berger, “A condição do homem no estado da vida presente como 
determinante para a teoría do conhecimento tomasiana: Suma de Teologia Iª, 84,” Kínesis: Revista 
De Estudos Dos Pós-Graduandos Em Filosofia 2, no. 3 [2010]: 35); cf. Richard T. Lambert, “A Textual 
Study of Aquinas’ Comparison of the Intellect to Prime Matter,” New Scholasticism 56 (1982): 87, 
“Matter receives its forms by contracting them, to individuality, while forms are in the mind as 





are generically different; consequently, the intellectual appetite is distinct from the 
sensitive.”196 In the next two texts it is clear also that both objects, being different, are 
nevertheless extrinsic, “out there”:197 
There is another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a more 
universal object—namely, every sensible body, not only the body to which the soul 
is united. And there is yet another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus 
regards a still more universal object—namely, not only the sensible body, but all 
being in universal. Wherefore it is evident that the latter two genera of the soul's 
powers have an operation in regard not merely to that which is united to them, but 
also to something extrinsic.198 
It follows of necessity that this something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's 
operation, must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. First, inasmuch as this 
something extrinsic has a natural aptitude to be united to the soul, and to be by its 
likeness in the soul. In this way there are two kinds of powers —namely, the 
"sensitive" in regard to the less common object—the sensible body; and the 
"intellectual," in regard to the most common object—universal being. Secondly, 
forasmuch as the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something 
extrinsic.199 
                                                     
196 80, 2, c.: “… [I]psa potentia passiva propriam rationem habet ex ordine ad suum activum. 
Quia igitur est alterius generis apprehensum per intellectum et apprehensum per sensum, 
consequens est quod appetitus intellectivus sit alia potentia a sensitiva.” 
197 The precise meaning of “extrinsic,” “out there,” “outside the mind,” “in re,” etc., will 
hopefully become clear in the following section and chapters. It is to be noted, for now, that it is 
Aquinas who says that the object is “extra animam.” It means that the content of our knowing is out 
there, even if it is not out there with the mode of being it has in our faculty. In that sense, the object 
is out there in act (it is there) although it is not there in its cognitive mode of being. Other nuances, 
the relevant texts, etc., will be offered later. Cf. our study of CG II, 77 par. 2, at the end of Chapter 4; 
Summa I, 79, 4 ad 4; In Boet. De Trin. 5, 3, c. (quoted on p. 90) and In Met. 8, lect. 1, 1687 (see 
Appendix, Note 5). 
198 78, 1, c.: “Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae, quod respicit universalius 
obiectum, scilicet omne corpus sensibile; et non solum corpus animae unitum. Est autem aliud 
genus potentiarum animae, quod respicit adhuc universalius obiectum, scilicet non solum corpus 
sensibile, sed universaliter omne ens. Ex quo patet quod ista duo secunda genera potentiarum 
animae habent operationem non solum respectu rei coniunctae, sed etiam respectu rei 
extrinsecae.” 
199 78, 1, c.: “Necesse est extrinsecam rem, quae est obiectum operationis animae, 
secundum duplicem rationem ad animam comparari. Uno modo, secundum quod nata est animae 
coniungi et in anima esse per suam similitudinem. Et quantum ad hoc, sunt duo genera potentiarum, 





Because the object of intelligence is not the same as the object of sensitivity, and 
because both faculties are apprehensive, “… the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the 
passive intellect, and require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect…”200 
“Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of intellectual knowledge. And therefore it is 
not strange that intellectual knowledge should extend further than sensitive knowledge.”201 
“Further than sensitive” etc. means that what is understood is an object formally different 
from the object of sensitivity. The object which perfects human intelligence is not the 
phantasm (phantasmata non sufficiunt), but the intelligible in act.202 More about this crucial 
text will have to be said later.203 
There is, however, a series of texts that seems to challenge the main point of this 
section, that is, that the object of intelligence is the universal nature. Referring to Aristotle’s 
                                                     
respectu obiecti communissimi, quod est ens universale. Alio vero modo, secundum quod ipsa 
anima inclinatur et tendit in rem exteriorem.” 
200 84, 6, c.: “Sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed 
oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem…” 
201 84, 6 ad 3: “Sensitiva cognitio non est tota causa intellectualis cognitionis. Et ideo non est 
mirum si intellectualis cognitio ultra sensitivam se extendit.” 
202 Cf. In III De Anima 7, 105-113: “[Aristotle] distinguishes between intellect and imagination 
[first, regarding the second operation, and then he shows] how the primary intellectual notions, the 
understanding of indivisible objects, differ from phantasms; and he replies that while these are 
always attended by phantasms, they differ from phantasms; [because phantasms are 
representations of particulars, whereas the things understood are universal, abstracted from 
individuating conditions…]” [… ostendit differenciam inter fantasia et intellectum (…) in quo 
differant primi intellectus, idest intelligentiae indivisibilium, quod non sint phantasmata. Et 
respondet, quod non sunt sine phantasmatibus, sed tamen non sunt phantasmata, quia 
phantasmata sunt similitudines particularium, intellecta autem sunt universalia ab individuantibus 
condicionibus abstracta…] 
203 Cf. Chapter 4, section 1. It could be argued that the agent intellect makes the phantasm 
itself intelligible in act, in which case the phantasm would be the object perfecting the possible 
intellect, and the agent intellect would take the role of a formal a priori. However, it will be shown 





III De Anima, St. Thomas affirms that “… the phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the 
sight.”204 It would seem that, if colour is the object of vision, then the phantasm of 
sensitivity is the object of intelligence.205 To begin with, these texts will be examined in their 
respective contexts and then other references will be used to complete the vision being 
presented. 
In 75, 2, St. Thomas is demonstrating the subsistence of the intellectual principle. In 
order to do that, he shows that it has an operation in which the body does not participate. 
Therefore, because operare sequitur esse, the intellectual principle does not need the body 
to subsist, but subsists in itself. To say that the body does not participate in the activity of 
understanding means that the body is not the faculty nor the instrument of understanding. 
It does not mean that a body cannot be the object of understanding (here the phantasm 
comes into play). What does object mean here? This is the point of confusion. St. Thomas 
says in the Ad Tertium:  
The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its origin of action, but on 
the part of the object; for the phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight. 
Neither does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to be non-
subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent, since it 
requires external objects of the senses in order to perform its act of perception.206 
It must be noted that ratione obiecti does not necessarily mean sicut obiectum 
formale. The following comparison with the subsistence of animals may be enlightening: an 
                                                     
204 75, 2 ad 3: “… [P]hantasma enim comparatur ad intellectum sicut color ad visum.” Cf. 76, 
1, c.; 54, 4 sc; as an objection in 85, 1 ob. 3; In I De Anima 2, 60-69. 
205 This seems to be Cory’s interpretation. See Appendix, Note 2. 
206 75, 2 ad 3: “Dicendum quod corpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicut organum 
quo talis actio exerceatur, sed ratione obiecti, phantasma enim comparatur ad intellectum sicut 
color ad visum. Sic autem indigere corpore non removet intellectum esse subsistentem, alioquin 




animal subsists in itself even if it needs exterioribus sensibilibus in order to know. Color ad 
visum, therefore, means the colour in the thing itself, not in the faculty as perfective of it. In 
the same way, the phantasm is needed as the bodily representation of the external thing, 
not as an image perfecting the faculty itself. Ratione obiecti means, therefore, that the 
phantasm is like a material object for the intelligence,207 insofar as it is required in order to 
have something to understand.208 St. Thomas’ point in the Ad Tertium is this: the need of a 
body to perform an action would imply the non-subsistence of the soul only if the body 
were needed as an instrument of the action; but, because the body is needed only as a 
material object of this action, the argument does not conclude.209 St. Thomas is not stating 
                                                     
207 The sense in which Aquinas speaks about object can be illuminated with In Boet. De Trin. 
6, 2, ad 5: “The phantasm is principle of human knowing, as that from which the intellectual 
operation begins: not though as something temporary, but as a certain permanent ground of the 
intellectual operation, in the way the principles of demonstration must remain in the process of 
science; the phantasms, in fact, are related to the intellect as objects, in which the intellect sees 
everything, either by perfect representation or by negation.” (my trans.) [… phantasma est 
principium nostrae cognitionis, ut ex quo incipit intellectus operatio non sicut transiens, sed sicut 
permanens ut quoddam fundamentum intellectualis operationis; sicut principia demonstrationis 
oportet manere in omni processu scientiae, cum phantasmata comparentur ad intellectum ut 
obiecta, in quibus inspicit omne quod inspicit vel secundum perfectam repraesentationem vel per 
negationem.] “In quibus” is referred to the material objectivity of the phantasm, “quod” to the 
formal objectivity of the universal. 
208 For Aquinas, it seems, the colours and the phantasms have the same relationship to 
vision and intelligence insofar as they stand for the object in its real being. It could be objected that 
the phantasm is just an image, but for Aquinas the phantasm is an image precisely insofar as it 
represents the real content. What we understand is what is represented in the phantasm, i.e., the 
real thing. 
209 The first mention of this Aristotelian text in In De Anima can be helpful here. It is In I De 
Anima 2, 60-69: “… [F]or understanding is not accomplished with a bodily organ, though it does bear 
on a bodily object; because, as will be shown later, in Book III, the phantasms in the imagination are 
to the intellect as colours to sight: as colours [are the objects of sight, so phantasms are the objects 
of the intellect…]” [… intelligere enim non est per organum corporale, sed indiget obiecto corporali. 
Sicut enim Philosophus dicit in tertio huius, hoc modo phantasmata se habent ad intellectum, sicut 
colores ad visum. Colores autem se habent ad visum, sicut obiecta: phantasmata ergo se habent ad 
intellectum sicut obiecta…] Cf. also In III De Anima 6, 130-134: “… [I]f intellect is related to 





that the formal object of intelligence is the phantasm, or that the phantasm perfects the 
intelligence as the colour (= species coloris) perfects the vision. 
The text of 76, 1, c. is even clearer. The article is about the kind of union between 
the soul and the body. After discarding the possibility that man is only his soul, St. Thomas 
says: “It follows therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands is a part of 
Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of Socrates.”210 He then examines 
Averroes’ solution:  
The Commentator held that this union is through the intelligible species, as having a 
double subject, in the possible intellect, and in the phantasms which are in the 
corporeal organs.211 Thus through the intelligible species the possible intellect is 
linked to the body of this or that particular man.212 
Remember that for Averroes the possible intellect is one for all human beings. 
Aquinas rejects Averroes’ solution, and our text comes into play here: 
But this link or union does not sufficiently explain the fact, that the act of the 
intellect is the act of Socrates. This can be clearly seen from comparison with the 
sensitive faculty, from which Aristotle proceeds to consider things relating to the 
                                                     
the soul cannot understand without phantasms.” [… si phantasmata se habent ad animam 
intellectivam sicut sensibile ad sensum; sicut sensus non potest sentire sine sensibili, ita anima non 
potest intelligere sine phantasmate.] 
210 76, 1, c.: “Relinquitur ergo quod intellectus quo Socrates intelligit, est aliqua pars Socratis 
ita quod intellectus aliquo modo corpori Socratis uniatur.” 
211 In order to clarify in what sense the phantasm is “subjectum” for Averroes, cf. Q.D. De 
Anima, a.2, c.: “Thus an intelligible species has two subjects: one in which it exists with an intelligible 
mode of existing, and this is the possible intellect: another in which it exists with a real mode of 
existing, and this subject is the phantasms.” [Sic igitur species intelligibilis habet duplex subiectum: 
unum in quo est secundum esse intelligibile, et hoc est intellectus possibilis; aliud in quod est 
secundum esse reale, et hoc subiectum sunt ipsa phantasmata.] 
212 76, 1, c.: “Hanc autem unionem Commentator, in III De Anima, dicit esse per speciem 
intelligibilem. Quae quidem habet duplex subiectum, unum scilicet intellectum possibilem; et aliud 
ipsa phantasmata quae sunt in organis corporeis. Et sic per speciem intelligibilem continuatur 





intellect. For the relation of phantasms to the intellect is like the relation of colors to 
the sense of sight, as he says De Anima iii.213 
How does Aquinas understand what Aristotle said? 
Therefore, as the species of colors are in the sight, so are the species of phantasms 
in the possible intellect. Now it is clear that because the colors, the images of which 
are in the sight, are on a wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to the wall: for 
we do not say that the wall sees, but rather that it is seen. Therefore, from the fact 
that the species of phantasms are in the possible intellect, it does not follow that 
Socrates, in whom are the phantasms, understands, but that he or his phantasms 
are understood.214  
What needs to be understood is the meaning of the words here. Phantasmata are 
the phantasms subsisting in the organs of sensitivity, as colores are the colours subsisting in 
the bodies (in pariete). Species colorum are the objective representations of the colours in 
the faculty of vision, as species phantasmatum are the objective intelligible representations 
of the phantasms in the possible intellect. That is why, as the wall does not see just because 
it possesses the colour, one does not understand just because one possesses the 
phantasms. The vision sees insofar as it possesses the species coloris, and the possible 
intellect understands insofar as it possesses the species intelligibilis, here species 
phantasmatum (in the sense of species referring to the phantasms).215 St. Thomas is not 
                                                     
213 76, 1, c.: “Sed ista continuatio vel unio non sufficit ad hoc quod actio intellectus sit actio 
Socratis. Et hoc patet per similitudinem in sensu, ex quo Aristoteles procedit ad considerandum ea 
quae sunt intellectus. Sic enim se habent phantasmata ad intellectum, ut dicitur in III De Anima, 
sicut colores ad visum.” 
214 76, 1, c.: “Sicut ergo species colorum sunt in visu, ita species phantasmatum sunt in 
intellectu possibili. Patet autem quod ex hoc quod colores sunt in pariete, quorum similitudines sunt 
in visu, actio visus non attribuitur parieti, non enim dicimus quod paries videat, sed magis quod 
videatur. Ex hoc ergo quod species phantasmatum sunt in intellectu possibili, non sequitur quod 
Socrates, in quo sunt phantasmata, intelligat; sed quod ipse, vel eius phantasmata intelligantur.” 
215 Maybe in this sense can be understood also In I De Anima 6, 248-254, where Aquinas 
says: “… [A]s Aristotle has proved, the intellectual potency is brought into act precisely by means of 





saying here that the phantasm is the perfection of intelligence, but precisely the opposite: 
“Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are in the possible intellect, it does 
not follow that Socrates, in whom are the phantasms, understands, but that he or his 
phantasms are understood.”216 Here it is most clear that the species phantasmatum, which 
are in the (separate) possible intellect, are distinct from the phantasms, which are in 
Socrates. Species phantasmatum and phantasmata, in this text, are different notions.217 
The Aristotelian phrase is also used in 85, 1 ob. 3. The article is asking whether we 
understand corporeal things by means of abstraction from phantasms: 
The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that the phantasm is to the intellectual soul 
what color is to the sight. But seeing is not caused by abstraction of species from 
color, but by color impressing itself on the sight. Therefore neither does the act of 
understanding take place by abstraction of something from the phantasm, but by 
the phantasm impressing itself on the intellect.218 
                                                     
intellectus possibilis reducitur per ipsa, scilicet per species rerum sensibilium, in actum et ideo 
oportet quod moveatur ab eis hoc modo.] It could be that he is referring instead to the phantasm in 
the aforementioned sense, as material object. The context is the opposition to Plato regarding the 
role of sensible things in intellectual knowing. 
216 76, 1, c.: “Ex hoc ergo quod species phantasmatum sunt in intellectu possibili, non 
sequitur quod Socrates, in quo sunt phantasmata, intelligat; sed quod ipse, vel eius phantasmata 
intelligantur.” 
217 The parallel in the In III De Anima 1, 342-352 is worth quoting: “[The object of which the 
species present in the knowing faculty is a representation, does not thereby become knower, but 
rather known.] If the eye contains a likeness of a coloured wall, this does not cause the colour to 
see, but, on the contrary, to be seen. Therefore if the intelligible idea in the intellect is a sort of 
likeness of our phantasms, it does not follow that we perceive anything intellectually, but rather 
that we--or more precisely our phantasms--are understood by that separated intellectual 
substance.” [Id enim cuius similitudo est species, in virtute aliqua cognoscitiva existens, non ex hoc 
fit cognoscens, sed cognitum. Non enim per hoc quod species quae est in pupilla, est similitudo 
coloris qui est in pariete, color est videns, sed magis est visus. Per hoc igitur quod species 
intelligibilis, quae est in intellectu possibili, est similitudo quaedam phantasmatum, non sequitur 
quod nos sumus intelligentes, sed quod nos, vel potius phantasmata nostra sint intellecta ab illa 
substantia separate.] 
218 85, 1 ob. 3: “In III De Anima dicitur quod phantasmata se habent ad animam intellectivam 





In other words, what would perfect the intellect is the phantasm, and not an alleged 
species abstracted from it. Aquinas’ response is in line with 76, 1 c., by taking colores and 
phantasmata as the objects in their particular material being, distinct from their respective 
species or similitudines: “Colors, as being in individual corporeal matter, have the same 
mode of existence as the power of sight: therefore they can impress their own image on the 
eye.”219 Note Aquinas’ precision regarding the objection: what is impressed in vision is the 
similitudinem (species) of the colours, and not the colours in their real being, prout sunt in 
materia corporali individuali, as the objection could have suggested (ob. 3: “visio non fit per 
abstractionem aliquarum specierum a coloribus, sed per hoc quod colores imprimunt in 
visum”). Now, eundem modum existendi means here that both the potency of vision and 
the colour in reality are particular and individual. This same mode of being allows the 
colours to impress the potency of vision by means of their species. But this does not apply 
to the phantasms regarding the potency of understanding: “But phantasms, since they are 
images of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the same mode of existence as 
the human intellect, and therefore have not the power of themselves to make an 
impression on the passive intellect.”220 The phantasm is not that which perfects the potency 
of understanding. What is it, then? “This is done by the power of the active intellect which 
                                                     
hoc quod colores imprimunt in visum. Ergo nec intelligere contingit per hoc quod aliquid abstrahatur 
a phantasmatibus, sed per hoc quod phantasmata imprimunt in intellectum.” 
219 85, 1 ad 3: “Ad tertium dicendum quod colores habent eundem modum existendi prout 
sunt in materia corporali individuali, sicut et potentia visiva, et ideo possunt imprimere suam 
similitudinem in visum.” 
220 85, 1 ad 3: “Sed phantasmata, cum sint similitudines individuorum, et existant in organis 
corporeis, non habent eundem modum existendi quem habet intellectus humanus, ut ex dictis 





by turning towards the phantasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which 
represents, as to its specific conditions only, the thing reflected in the phantasm.”221 Here it 
seems clear that the phantasm (as sensible species) and the intellectual species are two 
different things, one representing the particular as such and the other representing the 
same thing (what else if not?) but only in its nature, in its universal content. There are two 
different species with two different contents, because there are two different faculties and 
two formally different objects: particular and universal.222 
The last text to be presented is actually outside the section of the Summa being 
studied, but it may be helpful: 
                                                     
221 85, 1 ad 3: “Sed virtute intellectus agentis resultat quaedam similitudo in intellectu 
possibili ex conversione intellectus agentis supra phantasmata, quae quidem est repraesentativa 
eorum quorum sunt phantasmata, solum quantum ad naturam speciei.” Cf. Q.D. De Anima, a.3, ad 
18: “A phantasm moves the intellect [insofar as it is made intelligible in act] by the power of the 
agent intellect, to which the possible intellect is related as potency is to [its respective active 
power]. This is the way in which the intellect has something in common with a phantasm.” 
[Phantasma movet intellectum prout est factum intelligibile actu, virtute intellectus agentis ad quam 
comparatur intellectus possibilis sicut potentia ad agens, et ita cum eo communicat.]; Q.D. De 
Anima, a.3, c.: “For species are actually intelligible only by being abstracted from phantasms and by 
existing in the possible intellect.” [Species enim non sunt intelligibiles actu nisi per hoc quod a 
phantasmatibus abstrahuntur, et sunt in intellectu possibili.]; Q.D. De Anima, a.2, ob. 7: “Inasmuch 
as intelligible forms inhere in the soul, they are individuated; but as the likenesses of things, they are 
[universal], representing things according to their common nature and not according to their 
individuating principles.” [Formae intelligibiles ex illa parte qua inhaerent animae, sunt individuatae; 
sed ex illa parte qua sunt rerum similitudines, sunt universales, repraesentantes res secundum 
naturam communem, et non secundum principia individuantia.] 
222 Cf. De Spirit. Creat., a.10, ad 17: “A species which is in the imagination is of the same 
genus as a species which is in a sense, because both are individual and material. But a species which 
is in an intellect belongs to another genus, because it is universal. And consequently an imagined 
species cannot imprint an intelligible species as a sensitive species imprints an imagined species; and 
for this reason an active intellectual power is necessary, whereas an active sense power is not.” 
[Species quae est in imaginatione, est eiusdem generis cum specie quae est in sensu, quia utraque 
est individualis et materialis; sed species quae est in intellectu, est alterius generis, quia est 
universalis. Et ideo species imaginaria non potest imprimere speciem intelligibilem, sicut species 
sensibilis imprimit speciem imaginariam; propter quod necessaria est virtus intellectiva activa, non 





The distinction of active and passive intellect in us is in relation to the phantasms, 
which are compared to the passive intellect as colors to the sight; but to the active 
intellect as colors to the light, as is clear from De Anima iii. But this is not so in the 
angel. Therefore there is no active and passive intellect in the angel.223 
The comparison here goes beyond the possible intellect to include a comparison 
with the agent intellect. This text reinforces the interpretation previously presented of 
colours and phantasms as objects in their concrete and real being, and not as already 
perfecting the faculty. If the comparison with the possible intellect could have left things 
ambiguous, the comparison with the agent intellect leaves little room for doubt. The 
colours which are subject to the influence of light are the colours in their real being, also 
before knowledge happens. The phantasm which is compared with the agent intellect 
represents the particular thing insofar as it is or can be illuminated, and then intellectually 
known. The influence of light is a necessary condition of actual knowing, as making 
knowable the real object. According to Aquinas, therefore, colour and phantasm in the 
Aristotelian text stand for the objects in their respective realities, and not for the perfective 
objects of vision and of possible intellect. The perfective object of the intellect, as has been 
shown, is a different species representing the same thing as is represented in the phantasm, 
but only in its nature.224 
                                                     
223 54, 4, sc.: “Sed contra est quod in nobis intellectus agens et possibilis est per 
comparationem ad phantasmata; quae quidem comparantur ad intellectum possibilem ut colores ad 
visum, ad intellectum autem agentem ut colores ad lumen, ut patet ex III De Anima. Sed hoc non est 
in Angelo. Ergo in Angelo non est intellectus agens et possibilis.” 
224 Another text in which this Aristotelian text is quoted is In Boet. De Trin. 6, 3, c.: “In the 
present state of life, our intellect is not able to refer immediately to the Divine essence or other 
separate substances, since it refers immediately to the phantasms, to which the intellect is 
compared as sight to colours, as we read in III De Anima. In this way, the intellect is able to 
apprehend immediately only the quiddity of a sensible thing, not the quiddity of an intelligible 





This solution is consistent with other works of Aquinas, for example in the Contra 
Gentiles: 
Now, the species understood is compared to the phantasm as the actually visible 
species to the colored thing outside the mind; indeed, Averroes himself uses this 
comparison, as does Aristotle. Through the intelligible form, therefore, the possible 
intellect is in touch with the phantasm in us, even as the power of sight is in touch 
with the color present in the stone. But this contact does not make the stone to see, 
but only to be seen.225 
                                                     
Dei et in alias essentias separatas, quia immediate extenditur ad phantasmata, ad quae comparatur 
sicut visus ad colorem, ut dicitur in III De Anima. Et sic immediate potest concipere intellectus 
quiditatem rei sensibilis, non autem alicuius rei intelligibilis.] Again, that the phantasm is object does 
not mean that the phantasm is the object quod. Compare with In III De Anima 2, 178-186: “… [W]e 
could not make any comparison between the universal and the individual if we had not a faculty 
which perceived both […]. The intellect therefore knows both […], but in different ways. It knows the 
specific nature or essence of an object by (reaching) out directly to that object; but it knows the 
individual thing indirectly or reflexively, by a return to the phantasms from which it abstracted what 
is intelligible.” [… non possemus cognoscere comparationem universalis ad particulare, nisi esset 
una potentia quae cognosceret utrumque. Intellectus igitur utrumque cognoscit, sed alio et alio 
modo. Cognoscit enim naturam speciei, sive quod quid est, directe extendendo seipsum, ipsum 
autem singulare per quamdam reflexionem, inquantum redit super phantasmata, a quibus species 
intelligibiles abstrahuntur.] In this second text, the phantasm is considered in its singularity, and that 
is why it is not the immediate object of intelligence. In my view, in these texts, “immediate” and 
“direct” could mean the same. 
225 CG II, 59, par. 10: “Species autem intellecta comparatur ad phantasma sicut species 
visibilis in actu ad coloratum quod est extra animam: et hac similitudine ipse [Averroes] utitur, et 
etiam Aristoteles. Similis igitur continuatio est intellectus possibilis per formam intelligibilem ad 
phantasma quod in nobis est, et potentiae visivae ad colorem qui est in lapide. Haec autem 
continuatio non facit lapidem videre, sed solum videri.” Cf. also CG II, 59, par. 13: “Hence, the 
species of a thing, as present in phantasms, is not actually intelligible, since in this state it is not one 
with the intellect in act, but is one with it according as the species is abstracted from the phantasms. 
Just so, the species of color is not actually perceived [insofar] as it [is] in the stone, but only [insofar] 
as it [is] in the pupil.” [Species igitur rei, secundum quod est in phantasmatibus, non est intelligibilis 
actu: non enim sic est unum cum intellectu in actu sed secundum quod est a phantasmatibus 
abstracta; sicut nec species coloris est sensata in actu secundum quod est in lapide, sed solum 
secundum quod est in pupilla.] Cf. Stump, 257 note 55. The word “species” indicates here something 
that is both in reality and in knowing, so not so much the similitudo but rather the content of it. It is 





In other texts St. Thomas says explicitly that the perfecting object of intelligence is 
not the phantasm.226 In that which follows, the difference between the species of the 
senses and of the intellect is also clear. That is, numerically different phantasms refer to 
only one intelligible species (species = cognitional similitudo), because the phantasms, and 
therefore the things represented, are of the same species (species = nature as metaphysical 
formal principle). 
But the phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the intelligible 
species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. Now in one intellect, from 
different phantasms of the same species, only one intelligible species is abstracted; 
as appears in one man, in whom there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet 
from all of them only one intelligible species of a stone is abstracted; by which the 
intellect of that one man, by one operation, understands the nature of a stone, 
notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms.227 
Our intellect is able to know corporeal things, not by means of corporeal images 
(phantasms) but by means of intelligible species:  
These words of Augustine are to be understood as referring to the medium of 
intellectual knowledge, and not to its object. For the intellect knows bodies by 
understanding them, not indeed through bodies, nor through material and corporeal 
                                                     
226 Cf. Q.D. De Anima, a.2, c.: “… [A] phantasm is not the subject of an intelligible species 
inasmuch as [it] is [what is] actually understood. On the contrary, [what is actually understood is 
made] by abstraction from phantasms. [On the other hand,] the possible intellect is the subject of 
an intelligible species only inasmuch as an intelligible species is already actually understood and 
abstracted from phantasms.” [… phantasma non est subiectum speciei intelligibilis secundum quod 
est intellectum in actu, sed magis per abstractionem a phantasmatibus fit intellectum in actu. 
Intellectus autem possibilis non est subiectum speciei intelligibilis, nisi secundum quod est intellecta 
iam in actu, et abstracta a phantasmatibus.] The context is also the polemic with Averroes. 
227 76, 2, c.: “Sed ipsum phantasma non est forma intellectus possibilis, sed species 
intelligibilis quae a phantasmatibus abstrahitur. In uno autem intellectu a phantasmatibus diversis 
eiusdem speciei non abstrahitur nisi una species intelligibilis. Sicut in uno homine apparet, in quo 
possunt esse diversa phantasmata lapidis, et tamen ab omnibus eis abstrahitur una species 
intelligibilis lapidis, per quam intellectus unius hominis operatione una intelligit naturam lapidis, non 
obstante diversitate phantasmatum.” It should be noted that the context is the important polemic 





species; but through immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the soul by 
their own essence.228 
The formal object of intelligence is the nature in its absoluteness, not in its 
particularity: “But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance, it 
knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its 
proper formal idea, is in the intellectual soul.”229 “Now the receptive potentiality in the 
intellectual soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the 
diversity of the things received by each. For primary matter receives individual forms; 
whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms.”230 
                                                     
228 84, 1 ad 1: “Dicendum quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum quantum ad ea quibus 
intellectus cognoscit, non autem quantum ad ea quae cognoscit. Cognoscit enim corpora 
intelligendo, sed non per corpora, neque per similitudines materiales et corporeas; sed per species 
immateriales et intelligibiles, quae per sui essentiam in anima esse possunt.” Cf. De Spirit. Creat., 
a.9, c.: “Nor can it be said that my act of understanding is different from your act of understanding 
by reason of the diversity of the phantasms; because a phantasm is not a thing that is understood in 
act, but this latter is something abstracted from it, which is held to be a word. Hence the diversity of 
the phantasms is extrinsic to intellectual activity, and thus cannot cause differences in it.” [Nec 
potest dici quod intelligere meum sit aliud ab intelligere tuo per diversitatem phantasmatum; quia 
phantasma non est intellectum in actu, sed id quod est ab eo abstractum, quod ponitur esse verbum. 
Unde diversitas phantasmatum est extrinseca ab intellectuali operatione; et sic non potest 
diversificare ipsam.] 
229 75, 5, c.: “Anima autem intellectiva cognoscit rem aliquam in sua natura absolute, puta 
lapidem inquantum est lapis absolute. Est igitur forma lapidis absolute, secundum propriam 
rationem formalem, in anima intellectiva.”  
230 75, 5 ad 1: “Est autem alia potentia receptiva in anima intellectiva, a potentia receptiva 
materiae primae, ut patet ex diversitate receptorum, nam materia prima recipit formas individuales, 
intellectus autem recipit formas absolutas.” Cf. In III De Anima 1, 323-329: “Therefore the intelligible 
idea cannot be the form of the intellectual power until it is actually [intelligible]; and this cannot 
happen until it is disengaged from phantasms by abstraction. Hence, precisely in the degree that it is 
joined to the intellect it is removed from phantasms. Not in this way therefore could an intellectual 
power be united with us.” [Species igitur intelligibilis non est forma intellectus possibilis, nisi 
secundum quod est intelligibilis actu: non est autem intelligibilis actu, nisi secundum quod est a 
phantasmatibus abstracta et remota. Manifestum est igitur, quod secundum quod unitur intellectui, 
est remota a phantasmatibus. Non igitur intellectus per hoc unitur nobiscum.] The context is the 





Thus it seems clear that, for St. Thomas, the object of intelligence in its formal 
aspect is different from the object of sensitivity.231 It is different in its content, and it is 
known through a different species.232 Although there have been some anticipations, the 
subsistence of this object in reality as a formal perfection of corporeal things outside the 
mind will be the focus of the next section. And the characteristic of knowing as receptive, 
and in this sense similar to sensibility, will be the focus of Chapter 3. 
                                                     
231 Cf. In Met. 12, lect. 8, 2540-2541: “Now its proper intelligible object is substance, since 
the object of the intellect is a quiddity. Hence he says that the intellect is receptive of something 
intelligible and of substance. […] But it should be borne in mind that material substances are not 
actually intelligible but only potentially; and they become actually intelligible by reason of the fact 
that the likenesses of them which are gotten by way of the sensory powers are made immaterial by 
the agent intellect. And these likenesses are not substances but certain intelligible forms received 
into the possible intellect. But according to Plato the intelligible forms of material things are self-
subsistent entities.” [Intelligibile autem proprie est substantia; nam obiectum intellectus est quod 
quid est; et propter hoc dicit, quod intellectus est susceptivus intelligibilis et substantiae. (…) Sed 
sciendum est quod substantiae materiales non sunt intelligibiles actu, sed potentia; fiunt autem 
intelligibiles actu per hoc quod mediantibus virtutibus sensitivis earum similitudines immateriales 
redduntur per intellectum agentem. Illae autem similitudines non sunt substantiae, sed quaedam 
species intelligibiles in intellectu possibili receptae. Sed secundum Platonem, species intelligibiles 
rerum materialium erant per se subsistentes.] The intelligible species is called “immaterial” and is 
compared with the Platonic idea, for which it cannot be the phantasm. Cf. Stump, 248 and note 12. 
232 Cf. Q.D. De Anima, a.4, ad 5: “… [T]he species existing in the medium and in the sense is a 
particular and nothing more. The possible intellect, however, receives species of a higher genus than 
those present in the imagination; because the possible intellect receives universal species, whereas 
the imagination contains only particular species. Therefore we require an agent intellect in the case 
of intelligible things…” [… cum species in medio et in sensu non sit nisi particularis. Intellectus autem 
possibilis recipit species alterius generis quam sint in imaginatione; cum intellectus possibilis recipiat 






3) The Object of Intelligence in its Real Aspect: The Universal is in the 
Things Themselves. 
The purpose of this section is to show that, for St. Thomas, the object of intelligence, 
which is formally different from the object of sensibility,233 subsists in the corporeal 
things.234 In other words, the universals, as objects of understanding, are in the particular 
things themselves, neither in a different world of Platonic ideas, nor as coming from or 
belonging to the subjectivity. 
Two sections, already quoted, of 78, 1, c. will help to show that, for St. Thomas, both 
sensibility and intelligence relate the soul to that which is external to it. This implies that the 
universal is something extrinsic, something objective as “out there.” After speaking about 
the vegetative potencies of the soul, Aquinas says: 
There is another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a more 
universal object—namely, every sensible body, not only the body to which the soul 
is united. And there is yet another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus 
regards a still more universal object—namely, not only the sensible body, but all 
being in universal. Wherefore it is evident that the latter two genera of the soul's 
powers have an operation in regard not merely to that which is united to them, but 
also to something extrinsic.235 
                                                     
233 Cf. the previous section in this Chapter. 
234 Cf. In I De Anima 3, 198-203; 8, 125-131. 
235 78, 1, c.: “Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae, quod respicit universalius 
obiectum, scilicet omne corpus sensibile; et non solum corpus animae unitum. Est autem aliud 
genus potentiarum animae, quod respicit adhuc universalius obiectum, scilicet non solum corpus 
sensibile, sed universaliter omne ens. Ex quo patet quod ista duo secunda genera potentiarum 






A few lines later, he stresses that this relationship with the extrinsic thing is verified 
by means of an image (similitudo) and is different from the relationship established by the 
appetitive faculties: 
It follows of necessity that this something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's 
operation, must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. First, inasmuch as this 
something extrinsic has a natural aptitude to be united to the soul, and to be by its 
likeness in the soul. In this way there are two kinds of powers —namely, the 
"sensitive" in regard to the less common object—the sensible body; and the 
"intellectual," in regard to the most common object—universal being. Secondly, 
forasmuch as the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something 
extrinsic.236 
As in the previous text, if there is a difference with sensibility, that difference does 
not lie in the object of intelligence not being “out there”: 
But there is this difference, according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the sense 
and the intelligence—that a thing is perceived by the sense according to the 
disposition which it has outside the soul—that is, in its individuality; whereas the 
nature of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode according 
to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is 
understood.237 
                                                     
236 78, 1, c.: “Necesse est extrinsecam rem, quae est obiectum operationis animae, 
secundum duplicem rationem ad animam comparari. Uno modo, secundum quod nata est animae 
coniungi et in anima esse per suam similitudinem. Et quantum ad hoc, sunt duo genera potentiarum, 
scilicet sensitivum, respectu obiecti minus communis, quod est corpus sensibile; et intellectivum, 
respectu obiecti communissimi, quod est ens universale. Alio vero modo, secundum quod ipsa 
anima inclinatur et tendit in rem exteriorem.” 
237 76, 2 ad 4: “Sed hoc tantum interest inter sensum et intellectum, secundum sententiam 
Aristotelis, quod res sentitur secundum illam dispositionem quam extra animam habet, in sua 
particularitate, natura autem rei quae intelligitur, est quidem extra animam, sed non habet illum 





This is the meaning of realism for St. Thomas: if the things we know by our 
intellectual faculty were not out there,238 our knowing would not refer to the things 
themselves. Immediately preceeding the quotation above, Aquinas says: 
For what is understood is in the intellect, not according to its own nature, but 
according to its likeness; for ‘the stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is,’ as is said, 
De Anima iii, 8. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the likeness of the stone; 
except by a reflection of the intellect on itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences 
would not be things, but only intelligible species.239 
A similar remark occurs in 85, 2, c., where it is clear that “out there” for St. Thomas 
does not mean outside the world of corporeal things:  
Therefore if what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it 
would follow that every science would not be concerned with objects outside the 
soul, but only with the intelligible species within the soul; thus, according to the 
teaching of the Platonists all science is about ideas, which they held to be actually 
understood.240 
What we know by means of the intelligible species are the natures of corporeal 
things, and that is why we need conversio ad phantasmata: “We need further to make use 
of them [i.e. ‘species preserved in the passive intellect’] in a manner befitting the things of 
which they are the species, which things are natures existing in individuals.”241 
                                                     
238 It is not possible to treat thoroughly the mediation of the phantasm in intellectual 
knowing, but certain principles may orient the reader to understand my position. See Appendix, 
Note 3. 
239 76, 2 ad 4: “Id enim quod intelligitur non est in intellectu secundum se, sed secundum 
suam similitudinem, lapis enim non est in anima, sed species lapidis, ut dicitur in III De Anima. Et 
tamen lapis est id quod intelligitur, non autem species lapidis, nisi per reflexionem intellectus supra 
seipsum, alioquin scientiae non essent de rebus, sed de speciebus intelligibilibus.” 
240 85, 2, c.: “Si igitur ea quae intelligimus essent solum species quae sunt in anima, 
sequeretur quod scientiae omnes non essent de rebus quae sunt extra animam, sed solum de 
speciebus intelligibilibus quae sunt in anima; sicut secundum Platonicos omnes scientiae sunt de 
ideis, quas ponebant esse intellecta in actu.” 
241 84, 7 ad 1: “oportet quod eis [i.e. ‘species conservatae in intellectu possibili’] utamur 





Particularly clear are the statements in 85, 2 ad 2, and it is worth the long quotation. 
For St. Thomas, the object of knowing and the mode of being of this object in the knower 
are not the same. What we know is in the thing itself, although not with the same mode of 
being, and this applies even to the senses: 
In these words ‘the thing actually understood’ there is a double implication—the 
thing which is understood, and [its being] understood. In like manner the words 
‘abstract universal’ imply two things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction or 
universality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be understood, 
abstracted or considered as universal is only in individuals; but [its being] 
understood, abstracted or considered as universal is in the intellect. [We can see the 
point by a comparison with the senses]. For the sight sees the color of the apple 
apart from its smell. If therefore it be asked where is the color which is seen apart 
from the smell, it is quite clear that the color which is seen is only in the apple: but 
that it be perceived apart from the smell, this is owing to the sight, forasmuch as the 
faculty of sight receives the likeness of color and not of smell. In like manner 
humanity understood is only in this or that man; but that humanity be apprehended 
without conditions of individuality, that is, that it be abstracted and consequently 
considered as universal, occurs to humanity inasmuch as it is brought under the 
consideration of the intellect, in which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but 
not of the principles of individuality.242 
The object of intelligence in its subsistence in reality is the nature as formal principle 
of the corporeal thing. Insofar as it is considered in its abstraction, the universal is 
principium cognoscendi; but insofar as it subsists in reality, it is principium essendi: 
                                                     
242 85, 2 ad 2: “Cum dicitur intellectum in actu, duo importantur, scilicet res quae intelligitur, 
et hoc quod est ipsum intelligi. Et similiter cum dicitur universale abstractum, duo intelliguntur, 
scilicet ipsa natura rei, et abstractio seu universalitas. Ipsa igitur natura cui accidit vel intelligi vel 
abstrahi, vel intentio universalitatis, non est nisi in singularibus; sed hoc ipsum quod est intelligi vel 
abstrahi, vel intentio universalitatis, est in intellectu. Et hoc possumus videre per simile in sensu. 
Visus enim videt colorem pomi sine eius odore. Si ergo quaeratur ubi sit color qui videtur sine odore 
manifestum est quod color qui videtur, non est nisi in pomo; sed quod sit sine odore perceptus, hoc 
accidit ei ex parte visus, inquantum in visu est similitudo coloris et non odoris. Similiter humanitas 
quae intelligitur, non est nisi in hoc vel in illo homine, sed quod humanitas apprehendatur sine 
individualibus conditionibus, quod est ipsam abstrahi, ad quod sequitur intentio universalitatis, 
accidit humanitatis secundum quod percipitur ab intellectu, in quo est similitudo naturae speciei, et 





The universal, as understood with the intention of universality, is, indeed, in a way, a 
principle of knowledge, in so far as the intention of universality results from the 
mode of understanding by way of abstraction. […] But if we consider the generic or 
specific nature itself as existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the nature of a 
formal principle in regard to the singulars…243 
In the following text, the word “species” stands for formal principle in reality, and 
not in the sense of image. There is in reality something that allows us to say that various 
individuals are not different in their species, but only in number: “The difference of form 
which is due only to the different disposition of matter, causes not a specific but only a 
numerical difference: for different individuals have different forms, diversified according to 
the difference of matter.”244 
As has already been shown in 79, 3, and will yet be shown especially in Chapter 2, 
the fact that the nature of corporeal things is not intelligible in act does not enable one to 
conclude that the nature is not there with another mode of being. To draw such a 
                                                     
243 85, 3 ad 4: “Universale, secundum quod accipitur cum intentione universalitatis, est 
quidem quodammodo principium cognoscendi, prout intentio universalitatis consequitur modum 
intelligendi qui est per abstractionem […] Si autem consideremus ipsam naturam generis et speciei 
prout est in singularibus, sic quodammodo habet rationem principii formalis respectu singularium…” 
244 85, 7 ad 3: “Differentia formae quae non provenit nisi ex diversa dispositione materiae, 
non facit diversitatem secundum speciem, sed solum secundum numerum; sunt enim diversorum 
individuorum diversae formae, secundum materiam diversificatae.” The two meanings of “species” 
(one real and one gnoseological) can be seen at work in 76, 2, c., in which various phantasms are 
said to be of the same species: “But the phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is 
the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. Now in one intellect, from 
different phantasms of the same species, only one intelligible species is abstracted; as appears in 
one man, in whom there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet from all of them only one 
intelligible species of a stone is abstracted; by which the intellect of that one man, by one operation, 
understands the nature of a stone, notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms.” [Sed ipsum 
phantasma non est forma intellectus possibilis, sed species intelligibilis quae a phantasmatibus 
abstrahitur. In uno autem intellectu a phantasmatibus diversis eiusdem speciei non abstrahitur nisi 
una species intelligibilis. Sicut in uno homine apparet, in quo possunt esse diversa phantasmata 
lapidis, et tamen ab omnibus eis abstrahitur una species intelligibilis lapidis, per quam intellectus 





conclusion is precisely Plato’s error and—it will be argued—Kant’s error also: “Having 
observed that all knowledge takes place through some kind of similitude, he thought that 
the form of the thing known must of necessity be in the knower in the same manner as in 
the thing known. […] Wherefore he concluded that the things which we understand must 
have in themselves an existence under the same conditions of immateriality and 
immobility.”245  
For St. Thomas, we may conclude, that which is known by intelligence is the formal 
principle subsisting in corporeal things, their nature or species, the formal principle of their 
being, which subsists in composition with the principle of individuation in the thing itself. 
This same nature, concretely subsistent in the thing, is known in a state of abstraction. The 
different mode of being does not affect the objectivity of the content. 
An examen of other works of Aquinas follows.246 Because the truth in the intellect 
depends on the things themselves, there must be something in the things that corresponds 
to our knowing: “… for our intellectual conceptions are true inasmuch as they actually 
represent the thing known by a certain process of assimilation. Otherwise they would be 
false, that is, if they corresponded to nothing.”247 That the universal subsists in the things 
themselves implies that there is a certain necessity and stability in them: 
                                                     
245  84, 1 c.: “… [C]um aestimaret omnem cognitionem per modum alicuius similitudinis esse, 
credidit quod forma cogniti ex necessitate sit in cognoscente eo modo quo est in cognito. […] Et ideo 
existimavit quod oporteret res intellectas hoc modo in seipsis subsistere, scilicet immaterialiter et 
immobiliter.” 
246 I follow, in general, the chronological order offered by Stump, xvi-xx: De Veritate (1256-
1259), In Boet. De Trin. (1257-1258), Contra Gentiles (1259-1265), Q.D. De Anima (1265-1266), In De 
Anima (1267-1268), De Spirit. Creat. (1267-1268), In Met. (1270-1273). 
247 De Ver. 2, 1, c.: “… [C]onceptio enim intellectus nostri secundum hoc vera est, prout 





The difficulty of this question obliged Plato to postulate his ideas. In fact, because […] 
he believed that all of sensible things were always in movement […] and therefore he 
thought it was impossible to have science of them, he postulated certain substances 
separated from sensible things, which would be the objects of the various sciences 
and of definitions. But this misconception came from the fact that he did not 
distinguish that which belongs to something in itself from that which is accidental 
[…]. As it is demonstrated in VII Metaphysicae, given that in the sensible substance 
we find the whole, that is, the composite, and also the ratio, that is, its form; we 
must say that what is generated and corrupted in itself is the composite, not the 
ratio or form, unless by accident. […] Now, anything can be considered without those 
things that do not belong to it in itself. Thus the forms and rationes of things, even 
subject to movement, are without movement insofar as they are considered in 
themselves. It is in this way that they are objects of the various sciences and of 
definitions, as the Philosopher says in the abovementioned place. And the sciences 
of sensible substances are not based on the knowledge of substances separated 
from sensible things, as it is also there demonstrated.248 (my trans.) 
 
The mind’s dependence on reality in knowing the abstracted universal is stressed 
here also: 
The mathematician in abstracting does not consider his object differently than it is. 
In fact, he does not understand the line as being without sensible matter, but rather 
he considers the line and its properties without considering sensible matter. In this 
way, there is no discrepancy between the intellect and the thing because, even with 
regard to the thing itself, that which belongs to the nature of the line does not 
depend on that which makes the matter to be sensible, but rather vice versa. Thus it 
                                                     
248 In Boet. De Trin. 5, 2, c.: “Propter difficultatem huius quaestionis coactus est Plato ad 
ponendum ideas. Cum enim […] crederet omnia sensibilia semper esse in fluxu […] et ita existimaret 
de eis non posse esse scientiam, posuit quasdam substantias a sensibilibus separatas, de quibus 
essent scientiae et darentur diffinitiones. Sed hic defectus accidit ex eo quod non distinxit quod est 
per se ab eo quod est secundum accidens […] Ut autem probatur in VII Metaphysicae, cum in 
substantia sensibili inveniatur et ipsum integrum, id est compositum, et ratio, id est forma eius, per 
se quidem generatur et corrumpitur compositum, non autem ratio sive forma, sed solum per 
accidens […] Unumquodque autem potest considerari sine omnibus his quae ei non per se 
comparantur. Et ideo formae et rationes rerum quamvis in motu exsistentium, prout in se 
considerantur, absque motu sunt. Et sic de eis sunt scientiae et diffinitiones, ut ibidem Philosophus 
dicit. Non autem scientiae sensibilium substantiarum fundantur super cognitione aliquarum 
substantiarum a sensibilibus separatarum, ut ibidem probatur.” This stability in material things is 
affirmed in other texts as well. Cf. In Boet. De Trin. 5, 2, ob. 6 et ad 6 (text in Appendix, Note 4); In I 
De Anima 3, 198-205 (text in Appendix, Note 4); De Spirit. Creat., a.10, ad 8 (text in Appendix, Note 





is evident that there is no falsity regarding abstraction, as it is said in II 
Physicorum.249 (my trans.) 
 
The simple apprehension corresponds with the nature as a metaphysical principle in 
the thing itself: 
… [A]ccording to the Philosopher in III De Anima, the intellect has two operations: 
one that is called intelligence of the indivisible, by which the intellect knows of each 
thing what it is; the other one, by which the intellect composes and divides […] And 
these two operations correspond to two things that are in the things themselves. 
The first operation regards the nature itself of the thing, according to which the 
thing understood obtains a certain degree in the realm of beings, be it a complete 
thing, like a certain whole, or an incomplete thing, like a part or an accident. The 
second operation instead regards the being itself of the thing, which results from the 
congregation of the thing’s principles in composites, or accompanies the thing’s 
simple nature itself, as it happens in simple substances.250 (my trans.) 
The universal as nature is something which is known separately even if it does not 
exist separately in the thing itself. What is actual in the composite substance allows us to 
know its nature: 
… [B]y means of the first operation, the intellect is able to abstract those things that 
are not separate in reality; not, however, all of them, but only some. In fact, since 
something is intelligible insofar as it is in act, as we read in IX Metaphysicae, it is 
necessary that we understand the thing’s nature or quiddity either insofar as the 
nature itself is a certain act, as it happens in simple forms and substances, or in that 
                                                     
249 In Boet. De Trin. 5, 3, ad 1: “Mathematicus abstrahens non considerat rem aliter quam sit. 
Non enim intelligit lineam esse sine materia sensibili, sed considerat lineam et eius passiones sine 
consideratione materiae sensibilis, et sic non est dissonantia inter intellectum et rem, quia etiam 
secundum rem id, quod est de natura lineae, non dependet ab eo, quod facit materiam esse 
sensibilem, sed magis e converso. Et sic patet quod abstrahentium non est mendacium, ut dicitur in 
II Physicorum.”  
250 In Boet. De Trin. 5, 3, c.: “… [S]ecundum Philosophum in III De Anima duplex est operatio 
intellectus. Una, quae dicitur intelligentia indivisibilium, qua cognoscit de unoquoque, quid est. Alia 
vero, qua componit et dividit […]. Et hae quidem duae operationes duobus, quae sunt in rebus, 
respondent. Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei, secundum quam res intellecta 
aliquem gradum in entibus obtinet, sive sit res completa, ut totum aliquod, sive res incompleta, ut 
pars vel accidens. Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei, quod quidem resultat ex 






which is act of that nature, as we understand composite substances by their 
forms…251 (my trans.) 
That which ensures objectivity in our intellectual knowing is the fact that, as with the 
senses, that which is known is something belonging to the things outside the mind: 
Consequently, in the act of understanding, the intelligible species received into the 
possible intellect functions as the thing by which one understands, and not as that 
which is understood, even as the species of color in the eye is not that which is seen, 
but that by which we see. And that which is understood is the very intelligible 
essence of things existing outside the soul, just as things outside the soul are seen by 
corporeal sight. For arts and sciences were discovered for the purpose of knowing 
things as existing in their own natures.252 
That which is apprehended by the intellect is “something one” because there is 
“something one” in the thing itself. Again, knowing depends on things; whatever is in 
knowing must be something that is in the things themselves: 
Moreover, it produces these intelligibles by abstracting them from matter and from 
material conditions which are the principles of individuation. And since the nature as 
such of the species does not possess these principles by which the nature is given a 
multiple existence among different things, because individuating principles of this 
sort are distinct from the nature itself, the intellect will be able to receive this nature 
apart from all material conditions, and consequently will receive it as a unity [i.e., as 
a one-in-many].253 
                                                     
251 In Boet. De Trin. 5, 3, c.: “… [S]ecundum primam operationem potest abstrahere ea quae 
secundum rem separata non sunt, non tamen omnia, sed aliqua. Cum enim unaquaeque res sit 
intelligibilis, secundum quod est in actu, ut dicitur in IX Metaphysicae, oportet quod ipsa natura sive 
quiditas rei intelligatur: vel secundum quod est actus quidam, sicut accidit de ipsis formis et 
substantiis simplicibus, vel secundum id quod est actus eius, sicut substantiae compositae per suas 
formas…” 
252 CG II, 75, par. 7: “Habet se igitur species intelligibilis recepta in intellectu possibili in 
intelligendo sicut id quo intelligitur, non sicut id quod intelligitur: sicut et species coloris in oculo non 
est id quod videtur, sed id quo videmus. Id vero quod intelligitur, est ipsa ratio rerum existentium 
extra animam: sicut et res extra animam existentes visu corporali videntur. Ad hoc enim inventae 
sunt artes et scientiae ut res in suis naturis existentes cognoscantur.” 
253 Q.D. De Anima, a. 4, c.: “Facit autem [intelligibilia in actu] per abstractionem a materia, et 
a materialibus conditionibus, quae sunt principia individuationis. Cum enim natura speciei, quantum 
ad id quod per se ad speciem pertinet, non habeat unde multiplicetur in diversis, sed individuantia 





The indivisibility of the intelligible nature in the thing itself is the reason to affirm the 
indivisibility of the intellect (note again the reasoning from the object to the subjective 
conditions). What is relevant for the present purposes is that the materiality of a thing does 
not prevent it from having an indivisible nature. 
Notice that Aristotle is implying here that intellect is indivisible of its nature. What is 
intelligible in any thing is its essence or nature; which is present wholly in every part 
of it, as the specific nature is wholly present in each individual of the species; the 
whole nature of man in each individual man; and the individual as such is indivisible. 
Hence what is intelligible in anything is indivisible; and therefore so is the intellect254 
The most clear text in St. Thomas’ commentary on the De Anima, regarding the 
presence of the universal nature in the things themselves, seems to be the following. The 
difference between St. Thomas’ view and Plato’s is not that the object of knowing is extra 
animam but that, for St. Thomas, it is not separate from the material things (as it is for 
                                                     
individuantes; et sic accipietur aliquid unum.” Cf. Q.D. De Anima, a.3, ad 8: “… according to Aristotle, 
the fact that the intellect understands a one-in-many in abstraction from individuating principles, is 
to be attributed to the intellect itself. And though nothing abstract exists in reality, the intellect is 
not void of any real content, nor is it misrepresentative of things as they are; because, of those 
things which necessarily exist together, one can be truly understood or named without another 
being understood or named. But it cannot be truly understood or said of things existing in this way, 
that one exists without the other. Thus whatever exists in an individual which pertains to the nature 
of its species, and in respect of which it is like other things, can be known and spoken of truly 
without taking into consideration its individuating principles, which distinguish it from all other 
individuals.” [… secundum sententiam Aristotelis hoc est ab intellectu, scilicet quod intelligat unum 
in multis per abstractionem a principiis individuantibus. Nec tamen intellectus est vanus aut falsus, 
licet non sit aliquid abstractum in rerum natura. Quia eorum quae sunt simul, unum potest vere 
intelligi aut nominari, absque hoc quod intelligatur vel nominetur alterum; licet non possit vere 
intelligi vel dici, quod eorum quae sunt simul, unum sit sine altero. Sic igitur vere potest considerari 
et dici id quod est in aliquo individuo, de natura speciei, in quo simile est cum aliis, absque eo quod 
considerentur in eo principia individuantia, secundum quae distinguitur ab omnibus aliis.] 
254  In I De Anima 8, 123-131: “Et notandum, quod hic Aristoteles occulte ostendit, quod 
intellectus de natura sua non est partibilis, sed quid impartibile. Intelligibile enim in unaquaque re 
est quidditas, et natura rei est tota in qualibet parte, sicut natura speciei est tota in quolibet 
individuo: tota enim natura hominis est in quolibet individuo, et hoc est indivisibile: unde illud quod 





Plato). Moreover, the presence of the object in the material things is a metaphysical 
presence, to the extent that the individual conditions accompany the universal nature: 
The intellect’s proper object is indeed the essence of things; but not the essence by 
itself, in separation from things, as the Platonists thought. Hence this ‘proper object’ 
of our intellect is not, as the Platonists held, something existing, outside sensible 
things; it is something intrinsic to sensible things; and this, even though the mode in 
which essences are grasped by the mind differs from their mode of existence in 
sensible things; for the mind discerns them apart from the individuating conditions 
which belong to them in the order of sensible reality.255 
Another text a few lines later tells us that the object of intelligence, the quidditas, is 
present in the things themselves as much as is the object of sensibility. Because of this we 
can say that science is of the things themselves, and not of the species as subjective 
modifications:  
Furthermore, it is clear that the intelligible ideas by which the potential intellect is 
actualised are not in themselves the intellect’s object: for they are not that which, 
                                                     
255 In III De Anima 2, 240-249: “… [P]roprium obiectum intellectus est quidditas rei, quae non 
est separata a rebus, ut Platonici posuerunt. Unde illud, quod est obiectum intellectus nostri non est 
aliquid extra res sensibiles existens, ut Platonici posuerunt, sed aliquid in rebus sensibilibus existens; 
licet intellectus apprehendat alio modo quidditates rerum, quam sint in rebus sensibilibus. Non enim 
apprehendit eas cum conditionibus individuantibus, quae eis in rebus sensibilibus adiunguntur.” Cf. 
In III De Anima 2, 63-86: “And whilst Plato had separated the quiddities (called by him ‘ideas’ or 
‘species’) of things from things in their singularity, Aristotle was concerned to show that quiddities 
are only accidentally distinct from singular things. For example, a white man and his essence are 
distinct […] And the same is true of anything whose form exists in matter; there is something in it 
besides its specific principle. The specific nature is individualised through matter; hence the 
individualising principles and individual accidents are not included in the essence as such. That is 
why there can be many individuals of the same specific nature—having this nature in common, 
whilst they differ in virtue of their individuating principles. Hence, in all such things, the thing and its 
essence are not quite identical. Socrates is not his humanity.” [Et quia Plato ponebat quidditates 
rerum esse separatas a singularibus, quas dicebat ideas, vel species; ideo ostendit, quod quidditates 
rerum non sunt aliud a rebus nisi per accidens; utputa non est idem quidditas hominis albi, et homo 
albus (…) Hoc autem contingit in omnibus habentibus formam in materia, quia in eis est aliquid 
praeter principia speciei. Nam natura speciei individuatur per materiam: unde principia individuantia 
et accidentia individui sunt praeter essentiam speciei. Et ideo contingit sub una specie inveniri plura 
individua: quae licet non differant in natura speciei, differunt tamen secundum principia 
individuantia. Et propter hoc in omnibus habentibus formam in materia, non est omnino idem, et res 





but that by which it understands. For, as with sight the image in the eye is not what 
is seen, but what gives rise to the act of sight (for what is seen is colour which exists 
in an exterior body), so also what the intellect understands is the essence existing in 
things; it is not its own intelligible idea, except in so far as the intellect reflects upon 
itself. Because, obviously, it is what the mind understands that makes up the 
subject-matter of the sciences; and all these, apart from rational science, have 
realities for their subject-matter, not ideas. Clearly then, the intellect’s object is not 
the intelligible idea, but the essence of intelligible realities.256 
The following text can be taken as a clear expression of the Thomistic fact as has 
been discussed in section 1 of this Chapter.257 Here, what is relevant is that the quidditas 
not being intelligible in act goes together with the quidditas being in the material things, 
contrary to Plato’s idea of the quidditas being separate from the material things: 
The reason why Aristotle came to postulate an agent intellect was his rejection of 
Plato’s theory that the essences of sensible things existed apart from matter, in a 
state of actual intelligibility. For Plato there was clearly no need to posit an agent 
intellect. But Aristotle, who regarded the essences of sensible things as existing in 
                                                     
256 In III De Anima 2, 264-279: “Manifestum est etiam, quod species intelligibiles, quibus 
intellectus possibilis fit in actu, non sunt obiectum intellectus. Non enim se habent ad intellectum 
sicut quod intelligitur, sed sicut quo intelligit. Sicut enim species, quae est in visu, non est quod 
videtur, sed est quo visus videt; quod autem videtur est color, qui est in corpore; similiter quod 
intellectus intelligit est quidditas, quae est in rebus; non autem species intelligibilis, nisi inquantum 
intellectus in seipsum reflectitur. Manifestum est enim quod scientiae sunt de his quae intellectus 
intelligit. Sunt autem scientiae de rebus, non autem de speciebus, vel intentionibus intelligibilibus, 
nisi sola scientia rationalis. Unde manifestum est, quod species intelligibilis non est obiectum 
intellectus, sed quidditas rei intellectae.” 
257 Cf. in the same sense De Spirit. Creat., a.9, c.: “And similarly it would not be necessary to 
posit an agent intellect if the universals which are actually intelligible subsisted of themselves 
outside the soul, as Plato asserted. But because Aristotle asserted that these universals do not 
subsist except in sensible objects, which are not actually intelligible, he necessarily had to posit 
some power, which would make the objects that are intelligible in potency to be actually intelligible, 
by abstracting the species of things from matter and from individuating conditions; and this power is 
called the agent intellect.” [Et similiter non esset necesse ponere intellectum agentem, si universalia 
quae sunt intelligibilia actu, per se subsisterent extra animam, sicut posuit Plato. Sed quia 
Aristoteles posuit ea non subsistere nisi in sensibilibus, quae non sunt intelligibilia actu, necesse 
habuit ponere aliquam virtutem quae faceret intelligibilia in potentia esse intelligibilia actu, 






matter with only a potential intelligibility, had to invoke some abstractive principle 
in the mind itself to render these essences actually intelligible.258 
De Spirit. Creat., a.10, ad 8 should be quoted in its entirety.259 In the corpus, Aquinas 
says: “For one particular man, such as Socrates or Plato, makes things intelligible in act 
when he pleases, that is, by apprehending a universal form from particulars, when he 
separates that which is common to all individual men from those things which are peculiar 
                                                     
258 In III De Anima 4, 54-63: “Inducitur autem Aristoteles ad ponendum intellectum agentem, 
ad excludendum opinionem Platonis, qui posuit quidditates rerum sensibilium esse a materia 
separatas, et intelligibiles actu; unde non erat ei necessarium ponere intellectum agentem. Sed quia 
Aristoteles ponit, quod quidditates rerum sensibilium sunt in materia, et non intelligibiles actu, 
oportuit quod poneret aliquem intellectum qui abstraheret a materia, et sic faceret eas intelligibiles 
actu.” Cf. In III De Anima 6, 274-276: “Therefore the intellect abstracts things present in the sense-
objects, not understanding them to be separate, but understanding them in separation and 
distinctly.” (my trans.) [Ea ergo quae sunt in sensibilibus abstrahit intellectus, non quidem intelligens 
ea esse separata, sed separatim et seorsum ea intelligens.]; 7, 64-77: “… [T]he doctrine just stated 
[…] might lead one to suppose that the intellect did not depend on the senses; as would be the case 
indeed if the intelligible objects attained by our mind had their existence apart from sensible things, 
as the Platonists thought […] First, then, he observes that, since all the objects of our understanding 
are included within the range of sensible things existing in space, that is to say, that none seems to 
have that sort of distinct existence apart from things of sense which particular things of sense have 
apart from one another, it follows that all these intelligible objects have their beings in the objects 
of sense…” [… posset aliquis credere, quod intellectus non dependeret a sensu. Et hoc quidem 
verum esset si intelligibilia nostri intellectus essent a sensibilibus separata secundum esse, ut 
Platonici posuerunt (…) Dicit ergo primo, quod quia nulla res intellecta a nobis, est praeter 
magnitudines sensibiles, quasi ab eis separata secundum esse, sicut sensibilia videntur abinvicem 
separata: necesse est quod intelligibilia intellectus nostri sint in speciebus sensibilibus secundum 
esse…] 
259 Cf. Appendix, Note 4 (partially quoted). Most interesting is the final phrase of this 
response: “Now it does not matter much if we say that intelligible things themselves are 
participated […] from God, or that the light which makes them intelligible is participated […] from 
God.” [Non multum autem refert dicere, quod ipsa intelligibilia participentur a Deo, vel quod lumen 
faciens intelligibilia participetur.] More than a conciliatory phrase (between St. Augustine and 
Aristotle), it seems to me the assumption of the most powerful intuition of the Doctor of Hippo: in 
any case, as St. Augustine saw clearly, there is a participation from God, God must be the source of 
truth. Not though as providing the truth as content (as the holy Doctor seems to have proposed) but 





to each.”260 Once again, that which is common is taken to exist in composition with the 
individuating features, and it is distinguished from them. 
The text in De Spirit. Creat., a.9, ad 6 will occupy us more directly and extensively in 
Chapter 2, but a short reference may confirm the point at hand: 
For there is no difference between Aristotle and Plato, except in this: that Plato 
asserted that the thing which is understood has actual being outside the soul in 
exactly the same way as the intellect understands it, that is, as something abstract 
and universal; but Aristotle asserted "that the thing which is understood is outside 
the soul, but in another way, because it is understood in the abstract and has actual 
being in the concrete. […] Whereas Plato said that the sciences have to do with 
separated forms, Aristotle said that they have to do with the quiddities of things that 
exist in those things.261 
Some texts from Aquinas’ commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics will be presented 
now to show how, for Aquinas, the universal-nature exists in the singular material things.262 
The fact that the nature also includes matter, in a sense, does not make it less “universal”: 
                                                     
260 De Spirit. Creat., a.10, c.: “Unus enim homo particularis, ut Socrates vel Plato, facit cum 
vult intelligibilia in actu, apprehendendo scilicet universale a particularibus, dum secernit id quod est 
commune omnibus individuis hominum, ab his quae sunt propria singulis.” 
261 De Spirit. Creat., a.9, ad 6: “Non enim est differentia inter Aristotelem et Platonem, nisi in 
hoc quod Plato posuit quod res quae intelligitur eodem modo habet esse extra animam quo modo 
eam intellectus intelligit, idest ut abstracta et communis; Aristoteles vero posuit rem quae 
intelligitur esse extra animam, sed alio modo, quia intelligitur abstracte et habet esse concrete. […] 
Plato quidem dixit scientias esse de formis separatis, Aristoteles vero de quidditatibus rerum in eis 
existentibus.” Cf. De Spirit. Creat., a.9, c.. 
262 In my interpretation of In Metaphysicorum, the universal as the common nature existing 
in the concrete coincides with the quod quid erat esse, which for Aquinas is first of all the formal 
principle (with the matter of the species included) of the real material substance (cf. In Met. 7, lect. 
2, 1275; lect. 5, 1379; lect. 7, 1422; lect. 9, 1470; lect. 10, 1491. 1497; lect. 11, 1535). The definition 
is also of the quod quid erat esse (sometimes called also quod quid est) and there is an identity of 
content between the object of definition and the common nature in reality. The difference is in the 
mode of being (with the individual conditions in reality, abstracted from them in the definition of 
the intellect). The definition is the species expressa of the simple apprehension, and therefore not a 
judgment; and the definition represents the quod quid erat esse, and not the proposition that 
attributes the quod quid erat esse to a thing. These general remarks may assist in understanding for 





Aquinas draws a distinction between the matter that belongs to the species and the 
individual matter. What is relevant for us now is that the common species, matter and form, 
belongs to the individual and is distinguished from its individual matter; and that it is this 
species which is the object of definition:  
For, as was said above, what the definition signifies is the essence, and definitions 
are not assigned to individuals but to species; and therefore individual matter, which 
is the principle of individuation, is distinct from the essence. But in reality it is 
impossible for a form to exist except in a particular substance. Hence if any natural 
thing has matter which is part of its species, and this pertains to its essence, it must 
also have individual matter, which does not pertain to its essence. Therefore, if any 
natural thing has matter, it is not its own essence but is something having an 
essence; for example, Socrates is not humanity but something having humanity.263 
When the existence of the universals is denied, it is only in the sense of existing as 
such, as one separate from the many: 
Hence, if universals as universals are things, they must be distinct from singulars, 
which are not universals. […] However, for those who claim that genera and species 
are not things or natures distinct from singulars but are the singular things 
themselves (for example, that there is no man who is not this man), it does not 
follow that second substance signifies an accident or modification.264 
                                                     
263 In Met. 7, lect. 11, 1535: “Sicut enim supra dictum est, quod quid erat esse est id quod 
significat definitio. Definitio autem non assignatur individuis, sed speciebus; et ideo materia 
individualis, quae est individuationis principium est praeter id quod est quod quid erat esse. 
Impossibile est autem in rerum natura esse speciem nisi in hoc individuo. Unde oportet quod 
quaelibet res naturae, si habeat materiam quae est pars speciei, quae est pertinens ad quod quid 
est, quod etiam habeat materiam individualem, quae non pertinet ad quod quid est. Unde nulla res 
naturae si materiam habeat, est ipsum quod quid est, sed est habens illud. Sicut Socrates non est 
humanitas, sed est humanitatem habens.” 
264 In Met. 7, lect. 13, 1582f: “Si ergo universalia, inquantum universalia sunt, sint res 
quaedam, oportebit quod sint aliae res a singularibus, quae non sunt universalia […] Sed ponentibus 
quod genera et species non sunt aliquae res vel naturae aliae a singularibus, sed ipsamet singularia, 
sicut quod non est homo qui non sit hic homo, non sequitur quod secundae substantiae significent 
accidens vel passionem.” Cf. In Met. 12, lect. 4, 2482 and passim. Every time he says that the 
universal does not exist, he means that the nature of sensible things does not exist in reality in a 
state of intellectual abstraction, in the Platonic sense; in other words, that it does not exist separate 
from the particular things. Cf. Q.D. De Anima, a.4, c.: “Moreover, the intelligible […] which the 





The universal does not exist as one (separate) thing, but it does exist as a common 
thing in the particulars: 
Unity itself cannot be present in many things at the same time; for this is opposed to 
the notion of unity, [so long as we are talking about a unity which exists by itself as a 
substance]. But what is common is present in many things at the same time, for 
common means what may be predicated of many things and be present in many 
things.265 Hence it is clear that a common unity cannot be one in the sense that it is 
one substance. Furthermore, it is evident from all the points already discussed 
above in this chapter that no universal—either being or unity or genera or species—
has a separate being apart from singular things.266 
                                                     
understands something as though it were a one-in-many and common to many […] However, such 
an entity is not found subsisting in (sensible) reality, as Aristotle proves in the Metaphysics.” 
[Intelligibile autem per intellectum possibilem non est aliquid in rerum natura existens, in quantum 
intelligibile est; intelligit enim intellectus possibilis noster aliquid quasi unum in multis et de multis. 
Tale autem non invenitur in rerum natura subsistens, ut Aristoteles probat in VII Metaphys..] 
265 Cf. In Met. 10, lect. 3, 1963-1964: “… no universal can be a substance which subsists of 
itself because every universal is common to many. A universal also cannot be a subsisting substance 
because otherwise it would have to be one thing apart from the many, and then it could not be 
common but would be in itself a singular thing […] and thus it must be in some way a one-in-many, 
and not something subsisting apart from them.” (underline mine) [… nullum universalium esse 
potest substantia, quae scilicet per se sit subsistens; quia omne universale commune est multis. Nec 
possibile est universale esse substantiam subsistentem; quia sic oporteret quod esset unum praeter 
multa, et ita non esset commune, sed esset quoddam singulare in se (…) oportet quod aliquo modo 
sit unum in multis, et non seorsum subsistens ab eis.]; In Met. 10, lect. 1, 1930: “For in distinct 
singular things there is no nature numerically one which can be called a species, but the intellect 
apprehends as one that attribute in which all singulars agree. Hence the species, which is distinct in 
distinct individuals in reality, becomes undivided when apprehended by the intellect.” [Non enim in 
diversis singularibus est aliqua natura una numero, quae possit dici species. Sed intellectus 
apprehendit ut unum id in quo omnia inferiora conveniunt. Et sic in apprehensione intellectus, 
species fit indivisibilis, quae realiter est diversa in diversis individuis.] “Realiter diversa” means that 
each individual has its own nature, and therefore is not una numero. But that nature is common 
(una formaliter), insofar as there is something in which all of the individuals concur (“conveniunt”). 
266 In Met. 7, lect. 16, 1641: “… [H]oc ipsum quod est unum, non potest apud multa simul 
inveniri. Hoc enim est contra rationem unius, si tamen ponatur aliquod unum per se existens ut 
substantia. Sed illud quod est commune, est simul apud multa. Hoc enim est ratio communis, ut de 
multis praedicetur, et in multis existat. Patet igitur quod unum quod est commune, non potest esse 
sic unum quasi una substantia. Et ulterius palam est ex omnibus praedictis in hoc capitulo, quod 
nullum universale, nec ens, nec unum, nec genera, nec species habent esse separatum praeter 
singularia.” As with many texts in Aquinas, the existence of the universal in the particulars could be 
taken to mean that they are in the particulars insofar as they are predicated of them, and so their in-
existence in the particular would depend on a subjective function or action. But this would be not to 





The species enters into real composition with individual matter and, because of that, 
the real particular substance is corruptible. Notice how the species is called “rationem 
conceptam” insofar as it is the content of definition: 
And I say that these differ; i.e., ‘that the latter,’ which is substance in the sense of 
the concrete whole, is substance taken as something having its intelligible structure 
conceived with matter; but the former, which is the form or intelligible structure or 
essence of a thing, is the intelligible structure or form in general, and this does not 
have individual matter connected with it. Therefore all those things which are called 
substance in the sense of a composite are capable of being corrupted.267 
What is known in the simple apprehension (= “quod significat definitio”) is the same 
nature which is present in the thing itself together with the individuating principles. Notice 
how, in this text, quod quid erat esse is equated with natura speciei, quidditas and quod 
quid est esse suum: 
The reason for this position is that essence is what the definition signifies, and the 
definition signifies the nature of the species. But if there is something which is 
composed of matter and form, then in that thing there must be some other principle 
besides the nature of the species. For since matter is the principle of individuation, 
then in anything composed of matter and form there must be certain individuating 
                                                     
Plato had denied the presence of the universal object of understanding in the material things 
themselves; St. Thomas is opposing him on that point, by means of a distinction between the mode 
of being of the universal in reality and in the intellect, with the intellect always depending on reality 
(cf. In Met I, lect. 10, 158; In Met. 9, lect.11, 1896-1898; In I Sent. d. 2, q. 1, a.3, c.). In a sense, this 
whole dissertation is meant to clarify this point in the interpretation of Aquinas. 
267 In Met. 7, lect. 15, 1606f: “Dico autem eas esse alteras quia hoc quidem, scilicet 
substantia, quae est totum, sic est substantia sicut habens rationem conceptam cum materia; illa 
vero, quae est sicut forma et ratio et quod quid erat esse, est totaliter ratio et forma non habens 
materiam individualem adiunctam. Quaecumque igitur dicuntur substantiae hoc modo sicut 
composita, eorum potest esse corruptio.” 
The reason for calling the species or form ratio (cf. also In Met. 12, lect. 10, 2595) can be 
taken from In Met. 8, lect. 1, 1687 (text in Appendix, Note 5). Notice how, although the name ratio 
comes from reason, what is in reason comes (“sumitur”) from reality. Notice also how the form of 
the thing is something “actu”: the content of intellectual knowing is already actual in this sense; it is 
in potency only of its intelligible mode of being. The content of intellectual knowing is the perfection 
of a material thing which, because of its character as perfection, is already in act. The fact that it is in 





principles distinct from the nature of the species. Hence such a thing is not just its 
own essence but is something in addition to this. But if such a thing exists which is 
only a form, it will have no individuating principles in addition to the nature of its 
species. For a form that exists of itself is individuated of itself. Therefore this thing is 
nothing else than its own essence.268 
The intellect’s first operation is characterized as a reaching out to grasp (attingere) 
something of the thing itself, namely its quod quid est or quid est:  
The intellect is deceived about a quiddity only accidentally; for either a person 
comes in contact with a thing’s quiddity through his intellect, and then he truly 
knows what that thing is; or he does not come in contact with it, and then he does 
not know what it is. Hence, with regard to such a thing the intellect is neither true 
nor false.269 
Stump,270 Berger,271 and Baltuta272 seem to share the interpretation herein proposed 
regarding the presence of the universal nature in the things themselves. For the reasons 
previously exposed, Owens is more reticent to affirm something like that, and interprets 
Aquinas’ denial of the existence of the universal in reality273 as a denial of a common nature 
                                                     
268 In Met. 8, lect. 3, 1710: “Et huius ratio est, quia quod quid erat esse est id quod significat 
definitio. Definitio autem significat naturam speciei. Si autem aliqua res est, quae sit composita ex 
materia et forma, oportet quod in illa re sit aliquid praeter naturam speciei. Cum enim materia sit 
individuationis principium, oportet quod in quolibet composito ex materia et forma sint principia 
individuantia, quae sunt praeter naturam speciei. Unde huiusmodi res non tantum est quidditas sua, 
sed aliquid praeter hoc. Si qua vero res est, quae sit forma tantum, non habet aliqua principia 
individuantia praeter naturam speciei, cum ipsa forma per se existens per seipsam individuetur. Et 
ideo ipsa res nihil aliud est quam quod quid est esse suum.”  
269 In Met. 9, lect. 11, 1907: “Circa quod quid est non decipitur intellectus nisi per accidens: 
aut enim per intellectum attingit aliquis quod quid est rei, et tunc vere cognoscit quid est res; aut 
non attingit, et tunc non apprehendit rem illam. Unde circa eam non verificatur neque decipitur.” 
270 Cf. Stump, 264: “By ‘quiddity’ here Aquinas means that form of a thing that put it into 
one rather than another species or genus, its nature or essence. Natures do not exist in the world on 
their own; in the world they exist only as incorporated into the things that have natures.” And in 
note “See, e.g., In DA III.8.705–706.” 
271 Cf. Berger, 44: “The intellectual act refers to the natures of the sensible things, 
understood as immaterial forms of material things.” 
272 Cf. Baltuta, 151. 
273 Cf. In Met. 11, lect. 2, 2189: “Although universals do not exist of themselves, it is still 





in the things themselves.274 Cory says: “The phantasm […] is potentially intelligible and 
individual through-and-through, whereas actually intelligible, universal horseness exists 
only in the intellect”275 and in note gives an interesting clarification:  
[Quoting Q.D. De Anima, a. 4] Intelligit enim intellectus possibilis noster aliquid quasi 
unum in multis et de multis. Tale autem non inuenitur in rerum natura subsistens.276 
This is not to deny Aquinas’s realism about essences; he holds that Marengo and 
other horses really do share a common nature, although this nature exists 
extramentally only as instantiated as individual horses (hence the famous statement 
from De ente et essentia 2 [Leon. 43.374:80–82]: [I]n Sorte non inuenitur 
communitas aliqua, sed quicquid est in eo est individuatum277). Whether this 
position is in fact consistent with realism about essences, is not within the scope of 
this paper.278 
Now, in order to truly understand abstraction, is this really a problem we can set 
aside? Abstraction is not simply the spiritualization of the phantasm, but an operation that 
gives us a different (heterogeneous) content. The “scandal” of abstraction is not that the 
phantasm receives a different mode of being, but that I know a universal nature, a whatness 
in the phantasm, that seems not to be real because it is not particular. Is that universal 
                                                     
universalia non per se existant, tamen naturas eorum quae per se subsistunt est considerare 
universaliter.] 
274 Cf. the Introduction of this dissertation; Owens, 134: “The reason we need an express 
species is because the object does not exist in universal fashion in the sensible thing.” 
275 Therese Cory, “Rethinking Abstractionism: Aquinas's Intellectual Light and Some Arabic 
Sources,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 53, no. 4 (2015): 613. 
276 “For our possible intellect understands something as though it were a one-in-many and 
common to many. However, such an entity is not found subsisting in reality” (Q.D. De Anima, a. 4, 
c.). 
277 “In Socrates there is no commonness, but whatever is in him is individuated” (De Ente et 
Essentia, 2). 





content real or not? This is most relevant because this is the condition of possibility of 
abstraction.279 
4) The Role of the Agent Intellect and its Necessity: To Make 
Intelligible in Act the Universal in re  
In the previous sections we have tried to clarify what is for St. Thomas the 
cognitional fact requiring an agent intellect as its explanation. The fact is that we know the 
nature of the corporeal thing, that is, its universal aspect, but this nature is not intelligible in 
act. We have also considered some of the presuppositions of this fact, namely, the specific 
difference between the object of intelligence and the object of sensibility, and also the 
subsistence of the object of intelligence (the universal) in the particular real things. In light 
of these considerations, we now turn to study more closely that which St. Thomas says 
about the role of the agent intellect. The view herein proposed is that the role of the agent 
intellect is to make intelligible in act the universal in re, i.e. the nature of the corporeal 
thing, so that this nature may be seen by the possible intellect. 
The role of the agent intellect is characterized as “facere intelligibilia in actu.” In 
order to understand what St. Thomas means when he speaks about this “facere intelligibilia 
                                                     
279 I suggest that a more helpful approach to the causal problem (cf. Cory, Averroes, 4) in 
Aquinas would be to take as a point of departure, not the immateriality of the effect of the 
phantasm in the possible intellect, but the universality of the known (intelligibility as content), and 
the fact that this content is present in the intellect with a mode of being that (the same content) 
does not have in its presence in the phantasm. In other words, the point of departure for the causal 
problem (what I call the “Thomistic fact”) should be the intelligible mode of being of the universal 
content, not the intelligible mode of being of the particular content (Cf. Section 1 of this Chapter). I 
have the impression that Cory’s point of departure is the latter alternative. Cf. Cory, Averroes, 23: 
“The Agent Intellect must accomplish some sort of metaphysical change that makes images capable 




in actu,” what must be kept in mind is a series of actualizations which, in Aquinas’ mind, 
must take place in order to explain the fact that we simply understand. This fact is already 
an actualization; that is, we pass from understanding in potency to understanding in act. 
The perfection which allows us to understand, that which formally actualizes our faculty, is 
the intelligible nature of a corporeal thing, already in act of being intelligible. Now, that 
intelligible is not available to the intelligence, insofar as the nature of a corporeal thing is 
not out there already intelligible in act; the intelligible exists only in the potentiality of the 
phantasm. In order for the intelligible in potency, which is in the phantasm, to become 
intelligible in act, an agent, an efficient cause is needed. Therefore, it is the agent intellect 
which, in an efficient way, actualizes the intelligible in potency so that it becomes intelligible 
in act; but it is the intelligible in act which, in a formal way, actualizes the possible intellect, 
which was previously in potency.280 We could go even further by affirming, with St. Thomas, 
a previous actualization: the phantasm, again by the action of the agent intellect, receives 
the ability that from itself intelligible species may be abstracted; in other words, receives 
the potential intelligibility itself.281 This is because, for St. Thomas, it does not seem right to 
                                                     
280 The necessity of the intelligible in act in human understanding could be found in Plato 
also, but not the necessity of an agent intellect (at least not in the Aristotelian sense, cf. 79, 3). Cf. 
De Spirit. Creat., a.9, c.: “And similarly it would not be necessary to posit an agent intellect if the 
universals which are actually intelligible subsisted of themselves outside the soul, as Plato asserted. 
But because Aristotle asserted that these universals do not subsist except in sensible objects, which 
are not actually intelligible, he necessarily had to posit some power, which would make the objects 
that are intelligible in potency to be actually intelligible…” [Et similiter non esset necesse ponere 
intellectum agentem, si universalia quae sunt intelligibilia actu, per se subsisterent extra animam, 
sicut posuit Plato. Sed quia Aristoteles posuit ea non subsistere nisi in sensibilibus, quae non sunt 
intelligibilia actu, necesse habuit ponere aliquam virtutem quae faceret intelligibilia in potentia esse 
intelligibilia actu…] 
281 Cf. 85, 1 ad 4: “Not only does the active intellect throw light on the phantasm: it does 





ascribe an intelligible potentiality, which is of a different order, to something merely 
material.282 
                                                     
phantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with the 
intellectual part, so by the power of the active intellect the phantasms are made […] fit for the 
abstraction therefrom of intelligible intentions.” [Phantasmata et illuminantur ab intellectu agente; 
et iterum ab eis, per virtutem intellectus agentis, species intelligibiles abstrahuntur. Illuminantur 
quidem, quia, sicut pars sensitiva ex coniunctione ad intellectivam efficitur virtuosior, ita 
phantasmata ex virtute intellectus agentis redduntur habilia ut ab eis intentiones intelligibiles 
abstrahantur.] 
282 I speak here about intelligibility as mode of being, which implies immateriality (we will 
see especially in Chapter 2 the two meanings of intelligible and universal in Aquinas). The Thomistic 
doctrine of the celestial bodies’ influence in sensible knowing is in my view related to this. Fabro 
treats this issue in PP 64-68, quoting extensively Aquinas’ De Potentia, q. 5, a. 8. In Fabro’s reading, 
Aquinas affirms in the sensible bodies a double causality by the influence of the celestial bodies: one 
physical and the other intentional, by which the sensible bodies are able to perfect the faculties of 
the senses not only physically but also cognitively. It is, I suggest, the same principle that Aquinas 
uses in 85, 1 ad 4. In order for something to be known, it must be knowable in act; for something to 
be knowable in act, it must be knowable in potency, that is to say, it needs to have the ability to be 
knowable in act. But knowability, in potency or in act, is a quality that does not belong to a sensible 
body merely for being what it is. This is because it implies a capacity to perfect a faculty of knowing, 
a perfection which for St. Thomas is a “second mode of being” (cf. De Ver. 2, 2) different from the 
physical mode of being. What produces in the sensible bodies this capacity of producing sensible 
knowing is the (second kind of) influence of the celestial bodies; what produces in the phantasm 
(which stands for the particular sensible thing) this ability of being intelligible in act is the agent 
intellect itself. We do not need an agent sense because, granted the influence of the celestial bodies, 
the perfection to be known (content) is already particular, and so sensible in act in its physical mode 
of being. We do need the second action of the agent intellect because, even granted the first action 
of illumination, the perfection to be known (in the phantasm) is still material, and so not intelligible 
in act in its physical mode of being. The celestial bodies and the first action of the agent intellect 
effect in the concrete things the ability to produce a cognitive species out of themselves (De Pot. q. 
5, a. 8: “at communicating a certain likeness [of] its form to the ‘medium,’ which may be compared 
to the spiritual ‘intention’ which things impress on the senses or intelligence” [ad quamdam 
diffusionem similitudinis formae in medio secundum similitudinem spiritualis intentionis quae 
recipitur de re in sensu vel intellectu]; 85, 1 ad 4: “phantasms are made […] fit for the abstraction 
therefrom of intelligible intentions” [phantasmata (…) redduntur habilia ut ab eis intentiones 
intelligibiles abstrahantur]) or, perhaps better said, the ability in order to perfect cognitively a 
faculty of knowing. In the senses, because the perfection to be known is already particular (sensible 
in act), this influence is enough to make the act of sensation possible regarding the object. In 
intelligence, this influence is enough to elevate the concrete thing to the intentional intelligible 
realm but only as a being in potency and not in act. In other words, this influence gives to the 
phantasm as it were an intelligible quality, making it intelligible in potency, i.e. able to be the source 
of an intelligible species. Granted, as a condition of possibility, this first action of illumination, the 





Therefore, when St. Thomas says “facere intelligibilia in actu” he means that the 
agent intellect produces from the potentiality of the phantasm an intelligible species 
representing the nature of a corporeal thing, a species which is able (because it is in act) to 
perfect the possible intellect with the knowledge of that nature itself.283 
Let us now review some texts. Probably the best is again 79, 3, c. “Now nothing is 
reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses are made actual 
by what is actually sensible.”284 These words refer to the formal actualization by means of 
the intelligible in act, as the parallel with the senses suggests. But because the object of 
intelligence is not intelligible in act in the corporeal things, as he already says at the 
beginning of the corpus,285 St. Thomas continues: “We must therefore assign on the part of 
                                                     
means of a separation from its individual conditions in matter. That a cosmology of celestial bodies 
is today at least questionable, does not take away the metaphysical problem that Aquinas sees, nor 
the possibility of its solution by means of the separate substances’ influence. I will come back briefly 
to this topic in Chapter 4. 
283 In this section, we are not focusing on the act of abstraction directly, but on the role of 
the agent intellect in the process of understanding, particularly its relationship to the act of the 
possible intellect. Abstraction and making intelligible are certainly related. Cf. In III De Anima 4, 50-
53: “The agent intellect, on the other hand, actualises the intelligible notions themselves, [which 
were previously in potency,] abstracting them from matter: [it is in this way that they are intelligible 
in act].” [Intellectus autem agens facit ipsa intelligibilia esse in actu, quae prius erant in potentia, per 
hoc quod abstrahit ea a materia; sic enim sunt intelligibilia in actu, ut dictum est.] It is very 
important to keep in mind, with Cromp, the two meanings of abstraction: as action of the agent 
intellect and as consideration (or better “non-consideration”) of the possible (cf. Germaine Cromp, 
L'intellect agent et son rôle d'abstraction [Canada?: 1980], 16ff.). St. Thomas speaks about this 
abstraction as non-consideration in 85, 1, ad 1 and ad 2. 
284 79, 3, c.: “Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut 
sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu.” 
285 Cf. also 79, 3 ad 3: “Now the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; if we 
consider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart from matter. And therefore in 
order to understand them, the immaterial nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for 
the presence of the active intellect which makes things actually intelligible by way of abstraction.” 
[Intelligibile autem in actu non est aliquid existens in rerum natura, quantum ad naturam rerum 





the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species 
from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect.”286 The action of 
the agent intellect, called here “abstraction,” is that which allows the act of the possible 
intellect, that is, understanding. These are two different passages from potency to act, by 
two different faculties: “Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active 
intellect and of the passive intellect: because as regards the same object, the active power 
which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the passive power, which is 
moved by the object existing in act.”287 In this latter text, the two aforementioned distinct 
processes of actualization can be seen clearly. 
Another important passage about the nature and role of the agent intellect, in 
polemic with Averroes, is 88, 1, c.: 
As was shown above, the active intellect is not a separate substance; but a faculty of 
the soul, extending itself actively to the same objects to which the passive intellect 
extends receptively; because, as is stated (De Anima iii, 5), the passive intellect is ‘all 
things potentially,’ and the active intellect is ‘all things in act.’ Therefore both 
intellects, according to the present state of life, extend to material things only, 
which are made actually intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in the 
passive intellect.288 
                                                     
immaterialitas intellectus possibilis, nisi adesset intellectus agens, qui faceret intelligibilia in actu per 
modum abstractionis.] 
286 79, 3, c.: “Oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret 
intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. Et haec est 
necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem.” 
287 79, 7, c.: “Diversificatur tamen potentia intellectus agentis, et intellectus possibilis, quia 
respectu eiusdem obiecti, aliud principium oportet esse potentiam activam, quae facit obiectum 
esse in actu; et aliud potentiam passivam, quae movetur ab obiecto in actu existente.” 
288 88, 1, c.: “Supra ostensum est quod intellectus agens non est substantia separata, sed 
virtus quaedam animae, ad eadem active se extendens, ad quae se extendit intellectus possibilis 
receptive, quia, ut dicitur in III De Anima, intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri, intellectus 





The distinction between the two faculties and their respective roles is here very 
clear. Both faculties refer to the same object insofar as what is received by the possible 
intellect is what is made by the agent intellect: an intelligible in act. But these two faculties 
differ from each other, insofar as the action of the agent intellect is that of an “efficient 
causality” or active potency, and the act of the possible intellect that of a “material cause” 
or passive potency.289 The fact that the possible intellect presupposes the product of the 
agent intellect in order to act, makes even more evident the distinction: it is not just a 
temporal distinction, but a metaphysical one. There is no way we can think of the 
actualization of the possible intellect if there is not an intelligible in act and, therefore, 
something like an agent intellect making the intelligible in act. The possible intellect cannot 
be actualized with anything else. 
In the following text, the series of actualizations also is clear, and particularly clear is 
the way in which we could speak of the agent intellect actualizing the possible intellect: it is 
by means of the intelligible species produced in abstraction. 
[Our intellect] understands itself according as it is made actual by the species 
abstracted from sensible things, through the light of the active intellect, which not 
only actuates the intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, 
                                                     
vitae, ad materialia sola; quae intellectus agens facit intelligibilia actu, et recipiuntur in intellectu 
possibili.” 
289 85, 1 ad 4 should be understood in this same sense when speaking on abstraction: 
“Furthermore, the active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, forasmuch as 
by the power of the active intellect we are able [to take into our consideration the specific nature 
without the conditions of individuality, since the image of that specific nature] informs the passive 
intellect.” [Abstrahit autem intellectus agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum per 
virtutem intellectus agentis accipere possumus in nostra consideratione naturas specierum sine 
individualibus conditionibus, secundum quarum similitudines intellectus possibilis informatur.] The 
characterization of the agent intellect is active, whereas the possible intellect is the one which 





actuates the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence, 
but by its act.290 
The agent intellect, by an efficient causality on the material of sensibility, produces 
an intelligible in act which is then able to actualize the possible intellect. For St. Thomas, the 
possible intellect can receive—or be informed by—an intelligible in act only. Human 
intelligence, i.e., the faculty that understands, is in potency of the intelligible. That is why, if 
something like intellectual knowing happens, an intellectual agent is required in order to 
make that intelligible in act and impress it on the possible intellect. 
Does this not imply that the agent intellect produces the object, or at least 
completes it formally? In the next Chapter, the crucial distinction between res intellecta and 
modus rei intellectae will be examined, and the tension between Thomism and Kantian 
philosophy will be brought more clearly to the fore. 
It may be helpful to collect the findings of this first Chapter and assess what remains 
to be discussed. So far, the fact that brings Aquinas to introduce an agent intellect in human 
knowing has been elucidated. It is a double-sided fact. One side of this fact is that our 
intelligence knows the nature of corporeal things as something distinct from their sensible 
content and also present in the things themselves. Although already implied in many texts, 
the characterization of intellectual knowing as receptive of this content (the nature present 
in the thing itself) will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. The other side of this 
                                                     
290 87, 1, c.: “… [C]onsequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod 
fit actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum 
intelligibilium, et eis mediantibus intellectus possibilis. Non ergo per essentiam suam, sed per actum 
suum se cognoscit intellectus noster.” The meaning of the agent intellect as “actus ipsorum 




Thomistic fact is that those natures we know are not intelligible in act; that is to say, they 
cannot be known by our intelligence with the mode of being they have in the things 
themselves. Therefore, the fact that we actually know them necessarily implies that there is 
an agent intellect producing that mode of being, that intelligibility, which allows those 
natures to be received cognitively by the possible intellect. However, this Thomistic 
distinction between intelligible content and intelligibility as a mode of being, already 
anticipated to a certain extent, will be the precise focus of the next Chapter. 
As is clear, the intention was not to demonstrate the Thomistic fact, but to 
demonstrate that this is a fact for Aquinas, exactly the fact that, in his mind, requires an 
agent intellect as a condition of possibility. Still, the demonstration so far may be found 
lacking, because the issues indicated in the previous paragraph have not been discussed in 
detail. I can only say that the issue at hand is very complex, and one could have begun in a 
different way, but a starting point was necessary, and it seemed fair to begin by the “fact,” 
in this way, and simply anticipate for the reader what will be found in the next chapters. 
Hopefully, at the end, the reader will be satisfied regarding these anticipations.
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Chapter Two: The Thomistic Distinction between  
the Object and the Mode of Being of the Object  
(res intellecta and modus rei intellectae) 
 
It is here that the question of the agent intellect is seen to be relevant to the critical 
problem. According to Kant, because in reality there is nothing universal (all reality is 
particular), the origin of the universal in scientific knowledge must be the subject itself,291 
not the reality out there. Considered carefully, this line of thinking exposes the same error 
as that of Plato. That is, because Kant does not find, in the (particular) reality “out there,” 
the object of understanding in the way it is in our consciousness, Kant must place the origin 
of this object, not in an old-fashioned Platonic world of ideas, but in a more modern 
concept of subjectivity.292 Like Plato, Kant believes that the object of understanding must 
exist in the same way we know it; in other words, Kant does not differentiate between the 
object and its mode of being.293 Because material reality can have nothing to do with our 
spirit (Descartes), because the particular is merely multiple and the universal is merely one, 
and because nothing like a universal can be seen in the particular, if there is universality in 
                                                     
291 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Guyer and Wood (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), B 1-4. 
292 Cf. Owens, 323-324, where Plato is portrayed as admitting a double origin for human 
cognition, one being the knowledge of ever changing things coming through the senses, and the 
other being the knowledge of stable things coming from somewhere else, by anamnesis. 
293 In 84, 2 c., the same error is attributed to the Natural philosophers (“They thought that 
the form of the thing known is in the knower in the same mode as in the thing known.” 
[Existimabant autem quod forma cogniti sit in cognoscente eo modo quo est in re cognita.]), but 
instead of making immaterial the res intellecta in its subsistence, as does Plato, they make the soul 
itself material, or composed of the same principles of the material things. Cf. In I De Anima 4, 19-36; 




our knowing, it must come from the subject itself; and, if the universal is referred to the 
particular, it must be by a function of the subject.  
St. Thomas, by contrast, is careful to distinguish the object that is understood from 
the mode of being of the object. He also realizes, with Plato and Kant, that nothing in reality 
is intelligible in act, and that reality is particular; but he cannot deny the cognitive fact that 
we understand corporeal things, that we know them not only in their individuality but also 
in their nature, in their specific perfection. He cannot overcome the alterity of the object of 
understanding: it is for St. Thomas a fact. Therefore, if the object of understanding is out 
there (extra animam), but not in the way we understand it, it is evident for him that there 
must be a difference between the object and the way in which the object is known or 
received in our faculties of knowing. 
Therefore, whatever the related doctrinal difficulties may be, it seems clear that, for 
Aquinas, because what we understand is truly imbedded in the particular things 
themselves, the res intellecta and the modus rei intellectae cannot be the same. This is the 
immediate concern of this Chapter. The alterity of the object of knowing instead will be 
treated in the next Chapter.294 
1)  The Distinction in 84, 1, c.: The “Platonic Problem” 
In the Summa, the passage that most clearly addresses this issue is 84, 1, c. The 
question is whether the soul knows the corporeal things by means of intelligence, and the 
point is located precisely in the problem of the universals. Having considered those who 
                                                     
294 The distinction between the species as subjective modification and the object of knowing 




denied the possibility of a scientific knowledge of reality because of its instability, having 
considered also Plato, who put stability outside the “apparent” reality in a true “world of 
reality” (his “ideas”), and having shown the inconvenience of Plato’s solution, Aquinas goes 
to the root of the problem. The text will be quoted extensively, and commented upon when 
needed: 
“Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because, having observed that all 
knowledge takes place through some kind of similitude, he thought that the form of the 
thing known must of necessity be in the knower in the same manner as in the thing 
known.”295 This is the main problem in the form of a general principle.296 The following is an 
explanation of Plato’s error in the intellectual realm:  
Then he observed that the form of the thing understood is in the intellect under 
conditions of universality, immateriality, and immobility: which is apparent from the 
very operation of the intellect, whose act of understanding has a universal 
extension, and is subject to a certain amount of necessity: for the mode of action 
corresponds to the mode of the agent's form.297 Wherefore he concluded that the 
                                                     
295 84, 1, c.: “Videtur autem in hoc Plato deviasse a veritate, quia, cum aestimaret omnem 
cognitionem per modum alicuius similitudinis esse, credidit quod forma cogniti ex necessitate sit in 
cognoscente eo modo quo est in cognito.” 
296 Cf. 85, 1 ad 2: “Because Plato failed to consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above 
explained […], he held that all those things which we have stated to be abstracted by the intellect, 
are abstract in reality” [Et quia Plato non consideravit quod dictum est de duplici modo 
abstractionis, omnia quae diximus abstrahi per intellectum, posuit abstracta esse secundum rem.] 
Cf. also In Met. 1, lect. 10, 158; In I De Anima 4, 30-33; In III De Anima 2, 261-263. 
297 Cf. 89, 6, c.: “Action offers two things for our consideration—its species and its mode. Its 
species comes from the object, whereto the faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) 
species, which is the object's similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the power of the agent. 
Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species of the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, 
is due to the eye's visual power.” [In actu est duo considerare, scilicet speciem actus, et modum 
ipsius. Et species quidem actus consideratur ex obiecto in quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis dirigitur 
per speciem, quae est obiecti similitudo, sed modus actus pensatur ex virtute agentis. Sicut quod 
aliquis videat lapidem, contingit ex specie lapidis quae est in oculo, sed quod acute videat, contingit 





things which we understand must have in themselves an existence under the same 
conditions of immateriality and immobility.298 
Here the Thomistic distinction between the res intellecta and the mode of being of 
the same is already very clear. St. Thomas proceeds by showing the inconsistency of Plato’s 
principle, and he tries to make it more clear by using an interesting progression. In his first 
step, he considers the sensible realm in its objectivity: “But there is no necessity for this. For 
even in sensible things it is to be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible than in 
another: for instance, whiteness may be of great intensity in one, and of a less intensity in 
another: in one we find whiteness with sweetness, in another without sweetness.”299 That 
                                                     
298 84, 1, c.: “Consideravit autem quod forma rei intellectae est in intellectu universaliter et 
immaterialiter et immobiliter, quod ex ipsa operatione intellectus apparet, qui intelligit universaliter 
et per modum necessitatis cuiusdam; modus enim actionis est secundum modum formae agentis. Et 
ideo existimavit quod oporteret res intellectas hoc modo in seipsis subsistere, scilicet immaterialiter 
et immobiliter.” Cf. regarding the error of Plato: In Met. 7, lect. 15, 1606; In Met. 12, lect. 1, 2423: 
“They did this because they investigated things from the viewpoint of dialectics; for they thought 
that universals, which are separate according to their mode of definition from sensible things, are 
also separate in reality, and that they are the principles of particular things.” [Et hoc ideo, quia logice 
inquirebant de rebus. Universalia enim, quae secundum rationem sunt abstracta a sensibilibus, 
credebant etiam in rerum natura abstracta fore, et principia particularium.]; In Met. 12, lect. 2, 
2426: “For just as a twofold method of separating is found in reason […] in a similar way they 
maintained that both universals, which they called separate Forms, and also the objects of 
mathematics, are separate in reality.” [Sicut enim invenitur secundum rationem duplex modus 
separationis (…) ita et secundum rem ponebant et universalia esse separata, quae dicebant species, 
et etiam mathematica.]; In Met. 8, lect. 1, 1683: “Certain particular thinkers […] claim that the Forms 
and the objects of mathematics have separate existence. They adopted this position because they 
thought that for every abstraction of the intellect there is a corresponding abstraction in reality.” 
[Quidam posuerunt singulariter eas (substantias) esse, qui ponunt species et mathematica separata 
secundum esse, volentes quod cuilibet abstractioni intellectus, respondeat abstractio in esse 
rerum.] Note in this last text how the universal is said to exist singulariter, insofar as, for Plato, it 
exists in reality as one thing, separated from the particular things. This is what Aquinas will always 
deny, and not the universal’s existence in the singular. Cf. Q.D. De Anima, a.3, ad 8 where it is also 
very clear the presence of the common nature in the particular thing (text quoted in Appendix, Note 
7). 
299 84, 1, c.: “Hoc autem necessarium non est. Quia etiam in ipsis sensibilibus videmus quod 
forma alio modo est in uno sensibilium quam in altero, puta cum in uno est albedo intensior, in alio 





is to say, the real accidental quality albedo, being the same in every white thing, can subsist 
in different modes in different white things. St. Thomas is trying to show in this first step 
how easy it is for us to conceive that one and the same quality may exist in different modes. 
The second step is already in the gnoseological realm: “In the same way the sensible form is 
conditioned differently in the thing which is external to the soul, and in the senses which 
receive the forms of sensible things without receiving matter, such as the color of gold 
without receiving gold.”300 It seems the main reason St. Thomas uses the senses as an 
example here is the ease with which one can accept that, when we see the colour, we 
receive the colour not as it subsists in reality (with the gold included, in the example), but in 
another way. St. Thomas thus opens the way to the solution: 
So also the intellect, according to its own mode, receives under conditions of 
immateriality and immobility, the species of material and mobile bodies: for the 
received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver. We must conclude, 
therefore, that through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which is 
immaterial, universal, and necessary.301 
It seems clear that “quae sunt materiales et mobiles” refers to the plural “species” 
and not to “corporum,” which is neutral. It should also be clear, however, that the species 
are material insofar as they subsist in the matter, but not as if they were nothing other than 
matter. The whole argument would be pointless. St. Thomas is highlighting precisely that, 
even if the form does not subsist in the same way in the intellect as it does in reality, this 
                                                     
300 84, 1, c.: “Et per hunc etiam modum forma sensibilis alio modo est in re quae est extra 
animam, et alio modo in sensu, qui suscipit formas sensibilium absque materia, sicut colorem auri 
sine auro.” 
301 84, 1, c.: “Et similiter intellectus species corporum, quae sunt materiales et mobiles, 
recipit immaterialiter et immobiliter, secundum modum suum, nam receptum est in recipiente per 
modum recipientis. Dicendum est ergo quod anima per intellectum cognoscit corpora cognitione 





fact does not prevent the intellect from knowing that same form. St. Thomas is implying 
that the stability denied by the natural philosophers (regarding corporeal things), and 
projected by Plato in a parallel world, is actually imbedded in the material things as their 
form or species, but not in the immaterial way in which it is known.302 
2) The Distinction in Other Texts 
In 85, 2 ad 2, the distinction between what is understood and its mode of being is 
also clear, in direct response to the objection that what is understood in act does not 
subsist in the thing outside the soul: 
In these words ‘the thing actually understood’ there is a double implication—the 
thing which is understood, and [its being] understood. In like manner the words 
‘abstract universal’ imply two things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction or 
universality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be understood, 
abstracted or considered as universal is only in individuals; but [its being] 
understood, abstracted or considered as universal is in the intellect.303 
It cannot be more clear that the nature that we understand subsists in the thing out 
there, to the extent that it just “happens” to it that it is understood.304 “Natura” is here 
                                                     
302 This stability in sensible things is also affirmed in In Boet. De Trin. 5, 2, c.; In Met. 11, lect. 
6, 2232 (cf. other texts quoted on p. 87). Martínez Millán tells us: “In order to overcome Plato’s 
Theory of Forms, Aristotle has to emphasize in many different ways the possibility that living things 
can be the objects of knowledge despite the fact that they are movable and perishable” (Martínez 
Millán, 50). “As Aquinas notes in De Anima, Aristotle wanted to overcome the negative effects of 
Platonic philosophy, which had reduced sensible things to nothing more tan shadows, objects of 
opinion but not of knowledge […] Aristotle […] had postulated the agent intellect in order to save 
the sensible world from the unknowable” (Ibid., 55-56). 
303 85, 2 ad 2: “Cum dicitur intellectum in actu, duo importantur, scilicet res quae intelligitur, 
et hoc quod est ipsum intelligi. Et similiter cum dicitur universale abstractum, duo intelliguntur, 
scilicet ipsa natura rei, et abstractio seu universalitas. Ipsa igitur natura cui accidit vel intelligi vel 
abstrahi, vel intentio universalitatis, non est nisi in singularibus; sed hoc ipsum quod est intelligi vel 
abstrahi, vel intentio universalitatis, est in intellectu.” 
304 Cf.  De Spirit. Creat., a.10, ad 14: “The universal, which the agent intellect causes, is one 





slightly distinguished from “universale,” the former with a clear metaphysical meaning, the 
latter with a more gnoseological one. St. Thomas, again, draws a comparison with the 
sensible realm to make the solution more clear (this time only in gnoseological terms): 
[We can see the point by a comparison with the senses]. For the sight sees the color 
of the apple apart from its smell. If therefore it be asked where is the color which is 
seen apart from the smell, it is quite clear that the color which is seen is only in the 
apple: but that it be perceived apart from the smell, this is owing to the sight, 
forasmuch as the faculty of sight receives the likeness of color and not of smell. 305  
Again, the res intellecta is in the thing itself, but its abstract mode of being depends 
on our understanding it. Because of this, the universal as a species-image refers to the (real) 
nature in the thing, not directly to its concreteness: 
In like manner humanity understood is only in this or that man; but that humanity 
be apprehended without conditions of individuality, that is, that it be abstracted and 
consequently considered as universal, occurs to humanity inasmuch as it is brought 
under the consideration of the intellect, in which there is a likeness of the specific 
nature, but not of the principles of individuality.306 
                                                     
the basis of their diversification. However, it is diversified on the basis of a diversity of intellects: 
because even the universal does not derive its oneness from the standpoint of its being understood 
by me and by you; for it is accidental to the universal that it is understood by me and by you. And 
hence the diversity of intellects does not affect the oneness of the universal.” [Universale quod facit 
intellectus agens, est unum in omnibus a quibus ipsum abstrahitur; unde intellectus agens non 
diversificatur secundum eorum diversitatem. Diversificatur autem [i. agens] secundum diversitatem 
intellectuum: quia et universale non ex ea parte habet unitatem qua est a me et a te intellectum; 
intelligi enim a me et a te accidit universali. Unde diversitas intellectuum non impedit unitatem 
universalis.] “Universal,” here, is the content-nature present in reality to which “happens” to be 
known. The unity of the universal is objective, not subjective. This text also helps us to see the word 
“universal” as indicating a content, and not directly its mode of being in the intellect (cf. next 
section). 
305 85, 2 ad 2: “Et hoc possumus videre per simile in sensu. Visus enim videt colorem pomi 
sine eius odore. Si ergo quaeratur ubi sit color qui videtur sine odore manifestum est quod color qui 
videtur, non est nisi in pomo; sed quod sit sine odore perceptus, hoc accidit ei ex parte visus, 
inquantum in visu est similitudo coloris et non odoris.” 
306 85, 2 ad 2: “Similiter humanitas quae intelligitur, non est nisi in hoc vel in illo homine, sed 
quod humanitas apprehendatur sine individualibus conditionibus, quod est ipsam abstrahi, ad quod 
sequitur intentio universalitatis, accidit humanitati secundum quod percipitur ab intellectu, in quo 





A similar text in the Contra Gentiles distinguishes also the object from its mode of 
being: 
Nor need we follow Plato in holding that, because science is about universals, 
universals are self-subsisting entities outside the soul. For, although the truth of 
knowledge requires the correspondence of cognition to thing, this does not mean 
that these two must have the same mode of being. For things united in reality are 
sometimes known separately; in a thing that is at once white and sweet, sight knows 
only the whiteness, taste only the sweetness. […] Similarly, although the generic 
nature and the specific nature never exist except in individual things, the intellect 
nevertheless understands those natures without understanding the individuating 
principles; and to do this is to understand universals. Thus, there is no 
incompatibility between the fact that universals do not subsist outside the soul, and 
that in understanding universals the intellect understands things that do exist 
outside the soul.307 
 
In earlier works Aquinas’ doctrine is the same. Despite the difference in the mode of 
being of the known and the mediation of the species, intelligence is able to reach directly to 
                                                     
“Hence this ‘proper object’ of our intellect is not, as the Platonists held, something existing, outside 
sensible things; it is something intrinsic to sensible things; and this, even though the mode in which 
essences are grasped by the mind differs from their mode of existence in sensible things; for the 
mind discerns them apart from the individuating conditions which belong to them in the order of 
sensible reality.” [Illud, quod est obiectum intellectus nostri non est aliquid extra res sensibiles 
existens, ut Platonici posuerunt, sed aliquid in rebus sensibilibus existens; licet intellectus 
apprehendat alio modo quidditates rerum, quam sint in rebus sensibilibus. Non enim apprehendit 
eas cum conditionibus individuantibus, quae eis in rebus sensibilibus adiunguntur.] 
307 CG II, 75, par. 8: “Nec tamen oportet quod, quia scientiae sunt de universalibus, quod 
universalia sint extra animam per se subsistentia: sicut Plato posuit. Quamvis enim ad veritatem 
cognitionis necesse sit ut cognitio rei respondeat, non tamen oportet ut idem sit modus cognitionis 
et rei. Quae enim coniuncta sunt in re, interdum divisim cognoscuntur: simul enim una res est et 
alba et dulcis; visus tamen cognoscit solam albedinem, et gustus solam dulcedinem […] Similiter 
autem, licet natura generis et speciei nunquam sit nisi in his individuis, intelligit tamen intellectus 
naturam speciei et generis non intelligendo principia individuantia: et hoc est intelligere universalia. 
Et sic haec duo non repugnant, quod universalia non subsistant extra animam: et quod intellectus, 





the thing itself.308 The content, the object understood, is distinguished from its mode of 
being: 
Corporeal creatures are not said to be immediately seen, unless that which in them 
is able to be united to sight is actually united. Now, they are not able to be united 
through their own essence because of their materiality. Thus, they are immediately 
seen when their representations are united to the intellect […] Moreover, the 
representation of a corporeal thing is received in sight with the same content it has 
in that thing, even though the mode of being is not the same; and for this reason, 
this representation leads directly to the thing itself.309 (my trans.) 
Therefore, these notions thus abstracted can be considered in two ways. The first 
one is to consider them in themselves. In this way, they are considered without 
movement and designated matter: this is found in the aforementioned notions only 
with regard to the being that they have in the intellect. The other way is to consider 
them with regard to the things of which they are notions, things that certainly 
subsist in matter and movement. And in this way these notions are principles of 
knowledge of those things, because every thing is known by means of its form. Thus, 
by means of these notions, immobile and considered without particular matter, we 
have knowledge (in natural science) of mobile and material things which exist 
outside the soul.310 (my trans.) 
                                                     
308 Cf. De Ver 2, 3, ad 3: “For to be directed to the likeness of a thing is the same as to be 
directed to the thing which is known through this likeness.” [... idem est ei ferri in similitudinem rei, 
et in rem quae per talem similitudinem cognoscitur.] 
309 In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a.1 ad 16: “[C]reaturae corporales non dicuntur immediate videri, 
nisi quando id quod in eis est conjungibile visui, ei conjungitur: non sunt autem conjungibiles per 
essentiam suam ratione materialitatis; et ideo tunc immediate videntur quando eorum similitudo 
intellectui conjungitur […] Et praeterea similitudo rei corporalis recipitur in visu secundum eamdem 
rationem qua est in re, licet non secundum eumdem modum essendi; et ideo similitudo illa ducit in 
illam rem directe.” In this text we can also see the comparison of intelligence with sensitivity (cf. 
Chapter 3, section 5), to the point that St. Thomas uses “vision” to speak about the intellectual act of 
understanding. This text is partially quoted in Stump, 246 note 5 (on page 527). 
310 In Boet. De Trin. 5, 2, c.: “Possunt ergo huiusmodi rationes sic abstractae considerari 
dupliciter. Uno modo secundum se, et sic considerantur sine motu et materia signata, et hoc non 
invenitur in eis nisi secundum esse quod habent in intellectu. Alio modo secundum quod 
comparantur ad res, quarum sunt rationes; quae quidem res sunt in materia et motu. Et sic sunt 
principia cognoscendi illa, quia omnis res cognoscitur per suam formam. Et ita per huiusmodi 
rationes immobiles et sine materia particulari consideratas habetur cognitio in scientia naturali de 





“The forms in our intellects, however, are received from things. Hence, they do not 
excel things, and are, as it were, equal to them as far as representation goes, even though 
they may excel them in mode of being because their [being] is immaterial.”311 
3) The Two Meanings of Universal 
There are some texts in which St. Thomas speaks about two meanings of “universal” 
and two meanings of “intelligible,” as we have somewhat anticipated.312 This distinguishing 
of two meanings relates to the main point of this Chapter, because one of the meanings of 
“universal” is related to the content, and the other one is related to the mode of being of 
the content in the mind. This distinction makes us more careful in how we interpret St. 
Thomas where he says that the agent intellect “makes the intelligible”; what is being 
proposed in this dissertation is that the agent intellect “makes the intelligible” insofar as it 
produces the intelligible mode of being of the intelligible content, and not insofar as it 
produces the intelligible content. In other words, the agent intellect’s action refers to one of 
                                                     
311 De Ver. 8, 10 ad 3: “Sed formae intellectus nostri accipiuntur ex rebus; unde non sunt 
superexcedentes rebus sed quasi adequatae quantum ad repraesentationem, licet sint excedentes 
quantum ad modum essendi in quantum habent esse immateriale.” Stump brings other texts from 
De Ver (her translation) where we can see this distinction between the object and its mode of being 
in the cognizer: “the similitude of two things to one another can be grounded in two [different] 
ways. In one way, insofar as there is sharing of a nature (convenientia in natura), and such a 
similitude is not needed between a cognizer and what is cognized. In another way, according to 
representation, and this [sort of] similitude is needed on the part of a cognizer with respect to what 
is cognized. QDV 2.3 ad 9” (Stump, 255 note 48); “a similitude existing in a cognitive power is not a 
source of the cognition of an [extramental] thing in accordance with the being which the similitude 
has in the cognitive power, but in accordance with the relationship which the similitude has to the 
cognized thing. And for this reason an [extramental] thing is cognized not by means of the mode in 
which the similitude has being in the one cognizing, but rather by means of the mode in which the 
similitude existing in the intellect is representative of that thing. QDV 2.5 ad 17” (Stump, 272 note 
119). 





the meanings of universal, but not to the other. Let us begin by seeing this distinction in 
some texts of the Summa, and then, in other works of Aquinas. 
3.1. In the Summa 
Let us examine the passage of 85, 3 ad 4. Note here how the word “universale” has a 
meaning which includes connotations both gnoseological and natural (or metaphysical). The 
first connotation analyzed is the gnoseological one: “The universal, as understood with the 
intention of universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of knowledge, in so far as the 
intention of universality results from the mode of understanding by way of abstraction.”313 
“Universale” is a notion that may imply a mode of being which depends on our 
understanding: as we can see, the difference between res intellecta and modus rei 
intellectae is already suggested. In the objection it is argued that, because the universals are 
certain principles, they are known posteriorly by their effects. The confusion is between the 
principles of being and the principles of knowing, and here St. Thomas clarifies: “But what is 
a principle of knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato thought: since 
at times we know a cause through its effect, and substance through accidents.”314 Aquinas’ 
criticism of Plato is the same as in 84, 1, c., as the notes of the Ottawa edition suggest. 
“Wherefore the universal thus considered, according to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a 
                                                     
313 85, 3 ad 4: “Universale, secundum quod accipitur cum intentione universalitatis, est 
quidem quodammodo principium cognoscendi, prout intentio universalitatis consequitur modum 
intelligendi qui est per abstractionem.” 
314 85, 3 ad 4: “Non autem est necesse quod omne quod est principium cognoscendi, sit 
principium essendi, ut Plato existimavit, cum quandoque cognoscamus causam per effectum, et 





principle of existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. vii).”315 “Universale sic 
acceptum” is again a clear indication of the possibility of employing the term “universal” in 
a different way, as Aquinas illustrates immediately in our passage: “But if we consider the 
generic or specific nature itself as existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the nature of 
a formal principle in regard to the singulars.”316 St. Thomas, then, is showing the distinction 
between the universals as principles of knowing and as principles of being, because the two 
meanings of universal are confused in the objection. What is important for our purposes is 
that, for Aquinas, there is such a thing as a universal in re (the natura prout est in 
singularibus), which is not to be confounded with the universal cum intentione 
universalitatis; but at the same time, the difference is between modes of being of the same: 
“intentio universalitatis consequitur modum intelligendi qui est per abstractionem.” 
The two different modes of being of the universal are already distinguished in the 
answer to the first objection:317 “The universal can be considered in two ways. First, the 
universal nature may be considered together with the intention of universality […] Secondly, 
the universal can be considered [regarding] the nature itself—for instance, animality or 
humanity, [insofar as it exists] in the individual.”318 In the section omitted, St. Thomas 
explains what he means by intentio universalitatis, a notion used in both Ad unum and Ad 
                                                     
315 85, 3 ad 4: “Unde universale sic acceptum, secundum sententiam Aristotelis, non est 
principium essendi, neque substantia, ut patet in VII Metaphys.” 
316 85, 3 ad 4: “Si autem consideremus ipsam naturam generis et speciei prout est in 
singularibus, sic quodammodo habet rationem principii formalis respectu singularium.” 
317 85, 3 ad 1. 
318 85, 3 ad 1: “Universale dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod natura 
universalis consideratur simul cum intentione universalitatis […] Alio modo potest considerari 





quartum: “And since the intention of universality—viz. the relation of one and the same to 
many—is due to intellectual abstraction, the universal thus considered is a secondary 
consideration. Hence it is said (De Anima i, 1) that the ‘universal animal is either nothing or 
something secondary’.”319 When Aquinas says “intentio universalitatis,” “intentio” is 
“reference to,” “relation towards,” in the sense that the one meaning is referred to the 
many particulars. Now, in what sense does St. Thomas say that the universal is posterior 
and, with Aristotle, either nothing or posterior? Aquinas certainly does not mean to deny 
that there is something common in the particulars; he affirms this a few lines later, as we 
have already seen. What he means is that one and the same thing (unum et idem) as 
referred to the many, is not in reality as such (because every individual thing actually has its 
own nature as an intrinsic principle, though only numerically different) but follows the 
process of abstraction; abstraction produces this one thing (the intelligible in act) which 
refers to the many, from the knowledge of the many (the realm of the particular); it is in 
this sense that the universal is posterior. This is also related to what he means by intentio 
universalitatis: he means the reference of the universal as known to the particulars from 
which it is abstracted. The universal as known (in the state of abstraction) is one as one 
thing (unum et idem), as one unique principle of knowing the many. But this does not deny 
that the universal subsists as something common in the particulars, one as formally or 
specifically one, which is the nature of the different individuals of the same species (“ipsam 
naturam, scilicet animalitatis vel humanitatis, prout invenitur in particularibus”). In the 
                                                     
319 85, 3 ad 1: “Et cum intentio universalitatis, ut scilicet unum et idem habeat habitudinem 
ad multa, proveniat ex abstractione intellectus, oportet quod secundum hunc modum universale sit 




conclusion of this passage, Aquinas underlines once more the difference between his view 
and Plato’s: “But according to Plato, who held that universals are subsistent, the universal 
considered thus would be prior to the particular, for the latter, according to him, are mere 
participations of the subsistent universals which he called ideas.”320 Again, Plato’s universal 
idea and St. Thomas’ universal nature prout invenitur in particularibus are both real. In 
Plato, however, the idea subsists in reality cum intentione universalitatis, i.e., as one thing 
(unum et idem) referred to the many, as happens in the intellect. For St. Thomas, instead, it 
is not necessary that what is known have in reality the same mode of being as it has in the 
intellect. 
3.2. Two Meanings of “Universal” in other Works of Aquinas. 
Consider In I De Anima 1, 215-230, St. Thomas’ examination of the Aristotelian 
“animal autem universale, aut nihil est, aut posterius.” Aquinas’ explanation follows by 
distinguishing, not two, but three possible meanings of universal. A numbering system has 
been inserted into the following text in order to make more clear the remarks about it 
which come after: 
We must understand that one can speak of a ‘universal animal’ in two ways: either 
(1) as universal, i.e. as one nature existing in, or predicated of, many individuals; or 
(2) as animal. [As universal, again, it] can be regarded either (1A) in relation to 
existence in the real world or (1B) as existing in the mind. As regards existence in the 
real world, Plato held that the universal animal did so exist (i.e., 1A) and existed 
prior to particular animals; because, as has been said, he thought that there were 
universals and ideas with an independent existence. Aristotle, however, said that the 
                                                     
320 85, 3 ad 1: “Sed secundum Platonem, qui posuit universalia subsistentia, secundum hanc 
considerationem [that is, the universal cum intentione universalitatis] universale esset prius quam 
particularia, quae secundum eum non sunt nisi per participationem universalium subsistentium, 





universal as such had no [existence in the real world], and that if it was anything at 
all it came after the individual thing (i.e., 1B). But if we regard the nature of animals 
from a different point of view, i.e. not as a universal (i.e., 2), then it is indeed 
something real [and prior,] as the potential precedes the actual.321 
As it appears, (1) and (2) correspond to the division of 85, 3 ad 1 y ad 4 (universal 
regarded as nature or as the abstracted mode of being of that nature) and the further 
division (1A and 1B) is actually the doctrinal division between Plato and Aristotle (the 
universal subsists in rerum natura for Plato, and for Aristotle only in the intellect after the 
process of abstraction, and because of this “posterius”). But the universal as nature (2) is 
first, precisely because the nature as abstracted comes from it; that is, the nature of the 
animal is in potency of becoming universal in the second sense (1B). In this text, then, the 
nature in the thing itself is called universal in one sense, and in potency of being universal in 
a second sense. 
In the following text, also from In De Anima, the division is the usual. Notice the 
duplex esse attributed to the nature (the two modes of being under discussion): 
Note that the term ‘universal’ can be taken in two senses. It can refer to the nature 
itself, common to several things, in so far as this common nature is regarded in 
relation to those several things; or it can refer to the nature taken simply in itself. 
[…] Now a nature—say, human nature,—which can be thought of universally, has 
two modes of existence: one, material, in the matter supplied by nature; the other, 
immaterial, in the intellect. […] Nevertheless, there is no deception when the mind 
apprehends a common nature apart from its individuating principles; for in this 
                                                     
321 In I De Anima 1, 215-230: “Sciendum est, quod de animali universali possumus loqui 
dupliciter, quia aut (1) secundum quod est universale (quod scilicet est unum in multis aut de 
multis), aut (2) secundum quod est animal; [si secundum quod est] universale, et hoc vel (1A) 
secundum quod est in rerum natura, vel (1B) secundum quod est in intellectu. Secundum autem 
quod est in rerum natura, Plato voluit animal universale aliquid esse (i.e., 1A) et esse prius 
particulari, quia, ut dictum est, posuit universalia separata et ydeas; Aristotiles autem, quod nichil 
est in rerum natura; et si aliquid est, dixit illud esse posterius (i.e., 1B). Si autem accipiamus naturam 
animalis non secundum quod subiacet intentioni universalitatis (i.e., 2), sic aliquid est et prius, sicut 





apprehension the mind does not judge that the nature exists apart; it merely 
apprehends this nature without apprehending the individuating principles […]. For 
the truth of our conceptions does not require that, merely apprehending anything, 
we apprehend everything in it. […] It is clear, then, that universality can be 
predicated of a common nature only in so far as it exists in the mind: for a unity to 
be predicable of many things it must first be conceived apart from the principles by 
which it is divided into many things. Universals as such exist only in the soul; but the 
natures themselves, which are conceivable universally, exist in things.322 
Although Aquinas seems to prefer the word “universal” for the nature in its state of 
abstraction, it is important to note the reason for his allowing also the nature in the thing 
itself to be called “universal.” He refers this word more to the abstracted nature, because it 
is only in this sense that a truly one (with a real unity) is said of the many. However, the 
reason he calls also the nature in itself “universal” is that he wants to explain the objectivity 
of knowing; that is, the reason there is only one form in the intellect, is that there is really a 
common perfection in the things themselves, which is formally one. In this way, St. Thomas 
safeguards the correspondence of the mind to the things themselves.323 
                                                     
322 In II De Anima 12, 95-147: “Considerandum est, quod universale potest accipi dupliciter. 
Uno modo potest dici universale ipsa natura communis, prout subiacet intentioni universalitatis. Alio 
modo secundum se. […] Ista autem natura, cui advenit intentio universalitatis, puta natura hominis, 
habet duplex esse: unum quidem materiale, secundum quod est in materia naturali; aliud autem 
immateriale, secundum quod est in intellectu […] Nec tamen intellectus est falsus, dum apprehendit 
naturam communem praeter principia individuantia, sine quibus esse non potest in rerum natura. 
Non enim apprehendit hoc intellectus, scilicet quod natura communis sit sine principiis 
individuantibus; sed apprehendit naturam communem non apprehendendo principia individuantia 
[…] Non enim exigitur ad veritatem apprehensionis quod qui apprehendit rem aliquam, apprehendat 
omnia quae insunt ei. […] Sic igitur patet, quod naturae communi non potest attribui intentio 
universalitatis nisi secundum esse quod habet in intellectu: sic enim solum est unum de multis, 
prout intelligitur praeter principia, quibus unum in multa dividitur. Unde relinquitur, quod 
universalia, secundum quod sunt universalia, non sunt nisi in anima. Ipsae autem naturae, quibus 
accidit intentio universalitatis, sunt in rebus.” 
323 The distinction of the two meanings of universal is also found in In Met. 7, lect. 13, 
1570ff.: “For the clarification of this chapter it must be noted that the term universal can be taken in 
two senses. First, it can be taken to mean the nature of the thing to which the intellect attributes 
the aspect of universality, and in this sense universals such as genera and species signify the 





In the following text, Aquinas prefers to use “universal” for the content, and 
“intelligible” for the mode of being. The universal is something in the things themselves, 
something needing to be separated from matter because it enters into composition with 
matter. This separation from matter makes the universal intelligible: 
Scientific knowledge is only about universals. But God is not a universal, for every 
universal is had by abstraction. There can be no abstraction from God, however, 
since He is perfectly simple. Hence, God does not know Himself. […] A universal is 
intelligible in direct proportion to its separation from matter. Hence, those things 
which have not been separated from matter by an act of our intellect but are, in 
themselves, free from all matter, are most knowable. Consequently, God is most 
knowable, even though He is not a universal.324 
The two meanings of “universal” “and “intelligible” are at play in other texts, even 
though the distinction is not explicit. In the following text, the angelic infused species are 
called “intelligible” (an indication of their mode of being) and are the means to understand 
not only the separate substances but also the species of corporeal things. These species are 
also called “intelligible” (as content): 
Thus, through the intelligible forms in question a separate substance knows not only 
other separate substances, but also the species of corporeal things. For their 
intellect, being wholly in act, is perfect in point of natural perfection, and, therefore, 
it must comprehend its object—intelligible being—in a universal manner. Now, the 
                                                     
substance of the thing of which it is predicated, and so also does man. Second, a universal can be 
taken insofar as it is universal, and insofar as the nature predicated of a thing falls under the aspect 
of universality.” [Sciendum est autem, ad evidentiam huius capituli, quod universale dupliciter 
potest accipi. Uno modo pro ipsa natura, cui intellectus attribuit intentionem universalitatis: et sic 
universalia, ut genera et species, substantias rerum significant, ut praedicantur in quid. Animal enim 
significat substantiam eius, de quo praedicatur, et homo similiter. Alio modo potest accipi universale 
inquantum est universale, et secundum quod natura praedicta subest intentioni universalitatis.] 
324 De Ver. 2, 2, ob. 4 and ad 4: “[S]cientia non est nisi de universali. Sed Deus non est 
universale: quia universale omne est per abstractionem; a Deo autem, cum sit simplicissimus, non 
potest fieri abstractio. Ergo Deus non cognoscit seipsum […] Universale pro tanto est intelligibile, 
quia est a materia separatum; unde illa quae non sunt per actum intellectus nostri a materia 
separata, sed per seipsa sunt ab omni materia libera, maxime cognoscibilia sunt; et sic Deus maxime 





species of corporeal things are also included within intelligible being, and the 
separate substance, therefore, knows them.325 
What is noteworthy is that the intelligibility of the species (= natures) of material 
things is affirmed and, affirmed also, is the intelligibility of the species (= subjective 
representation) by which we know those natures. One and the same word, “intelligible”, is 
being used in two different ways. 
“And similarly it would not be necessary to posit an agent intellect if the universals 
which are actually intelligible subsisted of themselves outside the soul, as Plato asserted. 
But because Aristotle asserted that these universals do not subsist except in sensible 
objects, which are not actually intelligible…” etc.,326 where it is clear that a universal (in re) 
is not intelligible in act. The text of the Ad Sextum, besides showing this distinction at play, 
illustrates several points made thus far in this thesis, as well as pointing out the alterity of 
the object (which will be treated subsequently in more detail): 
For there is no difference between Aristotle and Plato, except in this: that Plato 
asserted that the thing which is understood has actual being outside the soul in 
exactly the same way as the intellect understands it, that is, as something abstract 
and universal; but Aristotle asserted that the thing which is understood is outside 
the soul, but in another way, because it is understood in the abstract and has actual 
being in the concrete. And just as, according to Plato, the thing itself which is 
understood is outside the soul itself, so it is according to Aristotle: and this is clear 
from the fact that neither of them asserted that the sciences have to do with those 
things which are in our intellect, as with substances; but whereas Plato said that the 
sciences have to do with separated forms, Aristotle said that they have to do with 
                                                     
325 CG II, 99, par. 1-2: “Per dictas igitur formas intelligibiles substantia separata non solum 
cognoscit alias substantias separatas, sed etiam species rerum corporalium. Cum enim intellectus 
earum sit perfectus naturali perfectione, utpote totus in actu existens, oportet quod suum 
obiectum, scilicet ens intelligibile, universaliter comprehendat. Sub ente autem intelligibili 
comprehenduntur etiam species rerum corporalium. Eas igitur substantia separata cognoscit.” 
326 De Spirit. Creat., a.9, c.: “Et similiter non esset necesse ponere intellectum agentem, si 
universalia quae sunt intelligibilia actu, per se subsisterent extra animam, sicut posuit Plato. Sed 





the quiddities of things that exist in those things. But the character of universality, 
which consists in commonness and abstractness, is merely the result of the mode of 
understanding, inasmuch as we understand things abstractly and universally; but 
according to Plato it is also the result of the mode of existence of the abstract forms: 
and consequently Plato asserted that universals subsist, whereas Aristotle did not.327 
The difference between Plato and Aristotle is not a difference between knowing by 
confrontation and knowing by identity: for both of them what is known is the universal, and 
it is outside the soul. The difference is between the modes of being attributed by each to 
the object of human understanding. The originality of Aristotle, at least in Aquinas’ 
interpretation, is in establishing the difference between res intellecta and modus rei 
intellectae. 
Some texts may give the impression that, for Aquinas, the universal does not exist in 
any way in the things themselves. Let us examine one such text. Its context is an apparent 
contradiction in Aristotle. That is, Aristotle begins by saying that the quod quid erat esse and 
the thing to which it belongs are one and the same thing, without excluding material 
substances; but then he excludes them, saying that only in separate substances does the 
species coincide with the individual. Why does Aristotle not previously exclude the material 
substances? St. Thomas explains that this is because of a different consideration of the 
                                                     
327 De Spirit. Creat., a.9, ad 6: “Non enim est differentia inter Aristotelem et Platonem, nisi in 
hoc quod Plato posuit quod res quae intelligitur eodem modo habet esse extra animam quo modo 
eam intellectus intelligit, idest ut abstracta et communis; Aristoteles vero posuit rem quae 
intelligitur esse extra animam, sed alio modo, quia intelligitur abstracte et habet esse concrete. Et 
sicut secundum Platonem ipsa res quae intelligitur est extra ipsam animam, ita secundum 
Aristotelem: quod patet ex hoc quod neuter eorum posuit scientias esse de his quae sunt in 
intellectu nostro, sicut de substantiis; sed Plato quidem dixit scientias esse de formis separatis, 
Aristoteles vero de quidditatibus rerum in eis existentibus. Sed ratio universalitatis, quae consistit in 
communitate et abstractione, sequitur solum modum intelligendi, in quantum intelligimus abstracte 
et communiter; secundum Platonem vero sequitur etiam modum existendi formarum abstractarum: 





nature of material things: when the nature is considered in its state of abstraction, then it is 
also only one for each species, as happens with the separate substances. The text says: 
Now even though man does not exist apart from singular men in reality, 
nevertheless man is separable in his intelligible expression, which pertains to the 
domain of logic. Therefore, above, where he considered essence from the viewpoint 
of logic, he did not exclude material substances from being their own essence; for 
man as a universal is the same as his essence, logically speaking. And now having 
come to natural principles, which are matter and form…328 
Now, because it is considered in its reality, the nature cannot be said to be one and 
the same thing with that to which it belongs; in each thing, together with the common 
nature, there are also individuating principles. As it seems clear, the text is saying that the 
universal is not in reality in its state of abstraction, but the same text is implying that the 
species is in reality together with the individuating principles.329 
4) The Distinction between “ex parte rei intellectae” and “ex parte 
intelligentis” 
For St. Thomas, the difference between the res intellecta and the modus rei 
intellectae can be seen also in a group of texts referring to the distinction (regarding the act 
of understanding) between what belongs to it ex parte rei intellectae and ex parte 
intelligentis. Let us see, for example, 85, 1 ad 1: 
If, therefore, the intellect is said to be false when it understands a thing otherwise 
than as it is, that is so, if the word ‘otherwise’ refers to the thing understood; for the 
                                                     
328 In Met. 7, lect. 11, 1536: “Licet autem homo praeter singularia non sit in rerum natura, 
est tamen in ratione quae pertinet ad logicam considerationem. Et ideo superius ubi logice 
consideravit de quod quid erat esse, non exclusit substantias materiales, quin in illis etiam esset 
idem quod quid est, cum eo cuius est. Homo enim communis est idem cum suo quod quid est, logice 
loquendo. Nunc autem postquam iam descendit ad principia naturalia quae sunt materia et 
forma...” 





intellect is false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is; and so the 
intellect would be false if it abstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such 
a way as to regard the species as not existing in matter, as Plato held. But it is not so, 
if the word "otherwise" be taken as referring to the one who understands. For it is 
quite true that the mode of understanding, in one who understands, is not the same 
as the mode of a thing in existing: since the thing understood is immaterially in the 
one who understands, according to the mode of the intellect, and not materially, 
according to the mode of a material thing.330 
5)  Concluding Remarks 
For St. Thomas, Plato’s error is his denying the universal nature of corporeal things a 
subsistence in the matter. Kant makes the same error. The reason Plato makes this mistake 
is that he fails to distinguish the res intellecta from the modus rei intellectae or, in other 
words, he supposes that the object of knowledge must subsist in reality with the same 
                                                     
330 85, 1 ad 1: “Cum ergo dicitur quod intellectus est falsus qui intelligit rem aliter quam sit, 
verum est si ly aliter referatur ad rem intellectam. Tunc enim intellectus est falsus, quando intelligit 
rem esse aliter quam sit. Unde falsus esset intellectus, si sic abstraheret speciem lapidis a materia, 
ut intelligeret eam non esse in materia, ut Plato posuit. Non est autem verum quod proponitur, si ly 
aliter accipiatur ex parte intelligentis. Est enim absque falsitate ut alius sit modus intelligentis in 
intelligendo, quam modus rei in existendo, quia intellectum est in intelligente immaterialiter, per 
modum intellectus; non autem materialiter, per modum rei materialis.” Cf. 85, 7, c.; De Ver 2, 2, ad 
9; De Spirit. Creat., a.10, ad 12: “There is one essence of numbers in all minds, just as there is also 
one essence of a stone; and this essence is one on the part of the thing that is understood, but not 
on the part of the act of understanding, which is not essential to the thing that is understood; for it 
is not essential to a stone that it be understood.” [Sic est una ratio numerorum in omnibus 
mentibus, sicut et una ratio lapidis; quae quidem est una ex parte rei intellectae, non autem ex parte 
actus intelligendi, quod non est de ratione rei intellectae: non enim est de ratione lapidis quod 
intelligatur.]; De Spirit. Creat., a.9, ad 6; In Boet. De Trin. 5, 1, c.: “Something belongs to the object of 
speculation, which is object of the speculative potency, with regard to the intellectual potency and 
something else belongs to it with regard to the habit of science by which the intellect is perfected. 
What belongs to the object of speculation with regard to the intellect is its being immaterial, 
because the intellect itself is immaterial. What belongs to this object with regard to science is its 
being necessary, because science is of the necessary, as it is demonstrated in I Posteriorum.” 
[Speculabili autem, quod est obiectum speculativae potentiae, aliquid competit ex parte 
intellectivae potentiae et aliquid ex parte habitus scientiae quo intellectus perficitur. Ex parte 
siquidem intellectus competit ei quod sit immateriale, quia et ipse intellectus immaterialis est; ex 






mode of being as it does in the intellect. This is also what Kant does. Of Plato, Aquinas says: 
“The Platonists posited Ideas chiefly in order that they might apply them both to definitions 
and demonstrations, which have to do with what is necessary, since all these sensible 
substances seemed to be in motion.”331 
It might be said that the speculative genius of Plato and Kant is combined with a no 
less surprising intellectual “adolescence.” Their genius is seen in their safeguarding the 
rights of intellect over sensibility; like Parmenides, they cannot give up the life of the spirit, 
they do not want to surrender to the torrent of everchanging reality. At the same time, 
however, they cannot overcome the appearances; they cannot see in reality other than 
change, because they cannot overcome the data of sensibility. The data of sensibility cause 
them anxiety, as a storm causes children to be afraid. They escape the storm only to find 
refuge in themselves; they create a world of categories where everything corresponds to 
their conceptions, where everything seems safe . . . and Kant (if not Plato as well) 
engendered for Western culture a life without real adventure: the a priori world.  
It is not a matter of giving life to the spirit out of a desire for adventure: instead, it is 
a true Phenomenology of perception which will help Epistemology to mature and to 
overcome Kantian biases. Fabro devotes much of his research to this issue.332 Neither is it a 
matter of denying the depth of Plato and Kant, these two “Aristocrats of the Spirit”; which 
other thinkers have managed, as have they, to inspire so many philosophers and 
                                                     
331 In Met. 7, lect. 15, 1606: “Platonici ad hoc praecipue ponebant ideas, ut eis adaptarentur 
et definitiones et demonstrationes, quae sunt de necessariis, cum ista sensibilia videantur omnia in 
motu consistere.” 





theologians after them? The thrust of the Spirit is fascinating . . . But the weaknesses in 
Plato and Kant must be recognized in order not to confound inspiration with the finished 
work of a solid system. Evidently, St. Thomas’ certainty that the universal belongs to the 
thing, and is not a product of subjectivity, is rooted in his unchanging consideration of 
knowledge as being defined by alterity, knowledge as an encounter with the other. This is 
one of the points in Chapter 3. 
It should be noted, however, that the express purpose of this dissertation is to 
understand the role of the agent intellect in the act of understanding for Aquinas. The 
necessity of drawing the comparison with Kant (through Plato) is to show that the efficiency 
of the agent intellect, for Aquinas, is not “formal,” as productive of the universal nature as 
content of knowledge (res intellecta), but “metaphysic” as productive of a mode of being of 
the universal nature that is the object of understanding.333 
If our reflections so far have not missed the point, it is clear that the nature (or 
better quidditas) of corporeal things, which is the res intellecta or the proper object of 
human understanding, admits two different modes of being: its subsistence in the 
particular, materialiter; and its presence in the intellect, cum intentione universalitatis and 
                                                     
333 Germaine Cromp (+1990) exemplifies how, when the distinction between the two 
meanings of “intelligibility” is not made, the agent intellect necessarily becomes a formal a priori (cf. 
Cromp, 204, 167-168, 192, 201, 206-208). She suggests that the content comes in a sense from the 
phantasm (cf. 200), and raises three times the question of how this is possible (cf. 167, 180, 192); 
but because she does not distinguish the intelligible content from an added mode of being of the 
phantasm by the agent intellect, she does not escape from making the agent intellect responsible 





in a state of abstraction.334 The agent intellect is required because the mode of being of the 
natures in the matter is not proportionate to the intellectual faculty. The agent intellect is 
brought into play to produce intelligibility as a mode of being, and not intelligibility as 
content (res intellecta).335 The distinction of these two meanings of universal and intelligible 
in Aquinas is explicit, as has been argued. As will be shown, the agent intellect for Aquinas is 
required to separate the res intellecta (or intelligenda) from its individual conditions in the 
matter, not to complete the matter with an intelligible unity that would not otherwise be 
there. 
What still needs to be shown in more detail is that intellectual knowing, for Aquinas, 
is originally verified by the reception of this abstracted quidditas. Having brought to the fore 
the crucial distinction between that which is understood and its mode of being (and the 
related distinction between the two meanings of universal), it now becomes possible to 
better understand what Aquinas means when he speaks about receptivity, alterity and 
                                                     
334 Lambert seems to be well oriented when he says: “Human abstracted concepts are 
identical in content to things in the real physical order and in that respect are never more than the 
equal of things; their superiority lies exclusively in their function as “re-presentation” of those things 
in an immaterial mode” (Lambert, 98). Though well oriented also in many other respects, he does 
not seem to manage to distinguish between the two meanings of intelligibility, considering 
intelligibility solely as a real mode of being, as separation from matter. This prevents him from 
expressing clearly in what way material things can be intelligible (cf. 90-92, 99). He also seems to 
confuse immateriality, as referring to knowing in general, with spiritual immateriality, risking the 
exclusion of sensible knowing from its proper immateriality. 
335 This distinction could also prove helpful to overcome the worries of Juan F. Sellés (cf. 
Sellés, EIA, 256 nota 72). He acknowledges that, for St. Thomas, the agent intellect is cognitive only 
insofar as it concurs with the possible intellect, neither before nor apart from it. But in evident 
disagreement, he wonders “… how is it that something which is non-cognitive is able to 
subsequently generate knowledge in the possible intellect?” My suggestion would be that, because 
in the object of knowledge Aquinas distinguishes between its content and its mode of being, the 
agent intellect generates (= makes possible) knowledge insofar is it produces the intelligible mode of 
being of the content. “Intelligibility” is an analogous notion that does not refer only to the content 




identity in human knowing. Briefly put: on the one hand, receptivity and alterity are 
referred to the res intellecta, insofar as what is received by the possible intellect is the 
perfection of the known (which for Aquinas is “other” in its real mode of being, subsisting in 
the matter) in an intelligible mode of being. On the other hand, identity is referred to this 
intelligible mode of being, insofar as the intellect in its operation is one and the same, not 
with the res intellecta (whose perfection receives intentionally and not physically) but with 
the species as subjective modification, i.e., with the species as perfecting subjectively the 




Chapter Three: Knowing as Receptive 
 
A topic introduced in Chapter 1 is the consideration of intelligence as a certain 
“vision.” Thus arises a very important issue underlying the whole doctrine of the agent 
intellect in Aquinas; that is, intellectual knowing is originally receptive, intentional as 
possession of the other and even defined by alterity. In other words, to say that the agent 
intellect is a metaphysical a priori of intellectual knowing as receptive of objective content, 
implies that understanding is not a certain “perfecting” of something, but a “being 
perfected” by something; to understand is not to communicate a perfection, but to receive 
a perfection. Therefore, the agent intellect which is by definition something “perfecting,” is 
not the faculty of understanding, but something required by the possible intellect in order 
to understand (and in that sense a priori). If we show that, for Aquinas, understanding is 
originally receptive of the perfection of the other as such, what becomes more clear is the 
questionability of any conception of the agent intellect as contributing the universal content 
of knowing or as completing formally the material of sensibility. If knowing is not 
performance336 of the object but reception of the other, the agent intellect cannot be 
                                                     
336 I use both “performative” and “productive” to refer to the formal a priori. The first term 
seems to have a more cognitive connotation, the second seems more “physical”, and because 
“performative” has been used in other interpretations, a clarification is in order. I am not suggesting 
that a formal a priori is simply a physical activity of organization or a “putting together” a physical 
material element. What I mean to say is that, if 1) we consider the object of human science like a 
“composite” of matter and form (which is already a limited analogy from the physical order), 2) we 
consider the “matter” of this object that which comes from experience (particular in content), 3) we 
consider the “form” of this object the “unity” of universality which this material from experience 
finds in human mind, and 4) we consider that this unity of universality does not come from 
experience but from the human mind itself, because we take the universality of the content to be an 





productive of the object, but productive only of the intelligible mode of being of the 
other.337 
This central issue will be approached by attending to six groups of texts:  
1. Passages in which the role of knowing in creation is characterized as a remedy for 
the specific imperfection of certain creatures.  
2. Texts referring to alterity and identity in knowing, trying to establish in what 
sense Aquinas speaks of these things.  
3. Texts showing how for Aquinas the identity in knowledge is based on the 
species338 and is not an ontological identity with the known.  
4. Texts in which knowing is presented as a certain “receiving,” which reinforces the 
idea of alterity as a characteristic of knowing.  
5. Texts showing the so frequent comparison between intelligence and sensitivity 
will be another confirmation of the alterity and receptivity of knowing.  
                                                     
is “productive” of the intellectual object, insofar as universality, which is considered the “form” of 
the object, is a characteristic of the object coming from the mind. If the analogy, insofar as it comes 
from the physical order, does not manage to convey perfectly the reality of an epistemological 
formal a priori, it does allow to understand that, as in the physical realm whatever is perfect in a 
body comes from the agent cause and not from the matter, in a similar way, in the intentional 
realm, whatever is defined (determined) in the object comes from the subject, and not from 
experience. 
337 We suppose in this Chapter our previous findings, particularly that the object of 
understanding is the nature subsisting in the particular and not the particular as such. Therefore the 
other we are talking about is not just the material of sensibility. 
338 I mean species as subjective modification. In this sense, the species is not the known, but 
the means by which the known is present to the mind. Aquinas can also use “species” in the sense of 




6. Finally, as a corollary of the previous reflections, if knowing is neither a “tending 
towards” nor a “making,” it means that there is, for Aquinas, a clear distinction 
between the agent intellect, the possible intellect and the will.  
The rationale of this division will be more clear in what follows. It could be helpful to 
note however, on the doctrinal side, that the tension between identity and alterity, as has 
been anticipated in Chapter 2, will be resolved by referring identity to the species (and so to 
the mode of being of the known in the intellect), and alterity to the known perfection itself. 
 
1) The Metaphysical Explanation of Knowing as a “Remedy” 
For Aquinas, knowing is what allows certain creatures to remedy their natural 
imperfection, even to the point of obtaining a likeness of the supreme perfection of God. 
The reason for bringing this idea of “remedy” into our considerations is that it may help to 
establish knowing as a being perfected, rather than as a perfecting activity. 
St. Thomas refers to this point previously, in De Ver. 2, 2, c. What is interesting about  
this passage is that it locates knowing as part of the universal plan of creation; it gives us, as 
it were, the reason for knowledge to exist.  
A thing is perfect in two ways. First, it is perfect with respect to the perfection of its 
[being], which belongs to it according to its own species. But, since the specific 
[being] of one thing is distinct from the specific [being] of another, in every created 
thing, [this kind of perfection in each thing] falls short of absolute perfection to the 
extent that that perfection is found in other species. Consequently, the perfection of 




of the entire universe, which arises from the sum total of the perfections of all 
individual things.339  
The first mode of perfection can be called natural, physical or even “real” being. The 
second is intentional being, the being of the known in the knower. For St. Thomas, this 
second kind of possessing a perfection is a certain remedy for the original specific 
“imperfection” of creatures: 
In order that there might be some remedy for this imperfection, another kind of 
perfection is to be found in created things. It consists in this, that the perfection 
belonging to one thing is found in another. This is the perfection of a knower in so 
far as he knows; for something is known by a knower by reason of the fact that the 
thing known is, in some fashion, in the possession of the knower.340 
Knowing, therefore, is what allows human beings to arrive at a certain “universal” 
perfection. And it should be stressed from the beginning that human beings do not already 
                                                     
339 De Ver. 2, 2, c.: “Res aliqua invenitur perfecta dupliciter. Uno modo secundum 
perfectionem sui esse, quod ei competit secundum propriam speciem. Sed quia esse specificum 
unius rei est distinctum ab esse specifico alterius rei, ideo in qualibet re creata huiusmodi 
perfectioni in unaquaque re tantum deest de perfectione simpliciter, quantum perfectionis in 
speciebus aliis invenitur; ut sic cuiuslibet rei perfectio in se consideratae sit imperfecta, veluti pars 
perfectionis totius universi, quae consurgit ex singularum rerum perfectionibus, invicem 
congregatis.” 
340 De Ver. 2, 2, c.: “Unde ut huic imperfectioni aliquod remedium esset, invenitur alius 
modus perfectionis in rebus creatis, secundum quod perfectio quae est propria unius rei, in altera re 
invenitur; et haec est perfectio cognoscentis in quantum est cognoscens, quia secundum hoc a 
cognoscente aliquid cognoscitur quod ipsum cognitum est aliquo modo apud cognoscentem.” Cf. In I 
De Anima 4, 18-26. In Summa I, 78, 3 c., St. Thomas distinguishes in the senses between natural and 
spiritual immutatio, where “spiritual” refers to this second mode of being. As Stump clarifies: 
“Aquinas tends to use ‘immaterial’, ‘intentional’, and ‘spiritual’ roughly synonymously to refer to 
this kind of change or reception of form” (Stump, 251, note 35, cf. note 36). Cf. In I De Anima 10, 
191-195: “Here there is no movement of the material substance itself, but only a ‘spiritual’ 
movement of cognition: for example, the act of seeing is not a material modification; it is ‘spiritual’ 
reception into the eye of sensible forms.” [In his enim non est motus secundum esse naturae, sed 
solum secundum esse spirituale, sicut patet in visu cuius operatio non est ad esse naturale, sed 





possess this universal perfection but, rather, this perfection is something to which human 
beings are in potency. This is the meaning of the Aristotelian “quodammodo omnia”: 
Hence, it is said in The Soul that the soul is, ‘in some manner, all things,’ since its 
nature is such that it can know all things. In this way it is possible for the perfection 
of the entire universe to exist in one thing. The ultimate perfection which the soul 
can attain, therefore, is, according to the philosophers, to have delineated in it the 
entire order and causes of the universe. This they held to be the ultimate end of 
man; [which, in our view,] consists in the vision of God; for, as Gregory says: ‘What is 
there that they do not see who see Him who sees all things?’341  
According to St. Thomas, then, it is by means of knowledge that “possibile est” (not 
actual) that this universal perfection may exist in the soul; this perfection is “ultima 
perfectio” at which the soul may arrive, not something it possesses from the beginning. It is 
clear then, that knowing is something allowing a human being to arrive at his or her final 
perfection by an acquisition of the perfection of other things, such perfection being found in 
him or her with this second mode of being. Precisely because each creature does not have 
in itself the perfection of other creatures, this second mode of being provides some 
creatures with a “remedy” for this “imperfection”; knowing allows them to possess the 
perfection of others, so that a certain likeness to the first principle may be attained. 
A similar text is found in 80, 1, c., where Aquinas is dealing with the necessity of 
attributing appetitive potencies to the human soul. He says: “For in those which lack 
knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being—that is, to its 
                                                     
 341 De Ver. 2, 2, c.: “Et ideo in III De Anima dicitur, anima esse quodammodo omnia, quia 
nata est omnia cognoscere. Et secundum hunc modum possibile est ut in una re totius universi 
perfectio existat. Unde haec est ultima perfectio ad quam anima potest pervenire, secundum 
philosophos, ut in ea describatur totus ordo universi, et causarum eius; in quo etiam finem ultimum 
hominis posuerunt, quod secundum nos, erit in visione Dei, quia secundum Gregorium, “quid est 





nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the 
natural appetite.”342 This is the first mode of being considered previously in the text of De 
Veritate, the natural being. The second mode is introduced immediately:  
But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own 
natural being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive 
of the species of other things: for example, sense receives the species of all things 
sensible, and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a 
way, all things by sense and intellect: and thereby, those things that have 
knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God, ‘in Whom all things pre-exist,’ as 
Dionysius says.343  
We also have here the reference to the Aristotelian “quodammodo omnia” in the 
same sense; that is, those beings who are able to know are certainly determined in their 
specific being, but in such a way that they are also able to receive the perfection (here 
“species”) of other beings. The word “receptivum” clearly expresses a passive potentiality; 
the word “appropinquant” also reminds us of the “pervenire” in De Veritate, in the sense 
that there is a progress towards an “ultima perfectio,” which is here “Dei similitudinem.” We 
should also note the contrast between human beings, who must “approach” the likeness of 
God, and God himself, in whom all things pre-exist, that is to say, in whom all of these 
perfections are already actually (virtually) present as in their first cause. In this text, 
knowing is the means by which human beings arrive at their ultimate perfection (distinct 
                                                     
342 80, 1, c.: “In his enim quae cognitione carent, invenitur tantummodo forma ad unum esse 
proprium determinans unumquodque, quod etiam naturale uniuscuiusque est. Hanc igitur formam 
naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio, quae appetitus naturalis vocatur.” 
343 80, 1, c.: “In habentibus autem cognitionem, sic determinatur unumquodque ad 
proprium esse naturale per formam naturalem, quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum 
rerum, sicut sensus recipit species omnium sensibilium, et intellectus omnium intelligibilium, ut sic 
anima hominis sit omnia quodammodo secundum sensum et intellectum, in quo quodammodo 





from their natural initial perfection), that ultimate perfection being a certain likeness to 
God, in whom all things pre-exist. 
The word “remedy” is also used in the Summa in a text that may illuminate this 
notion of knowing as a means of progress towards perfection. A human being is able to 
attain his or her ultimate perfection by means of many operations, according to his or her 
status in the scale of beings. Again, the difference between us and God is that, for God, this 
ultimate perfection is a possession, not something to be attained by operations. What is 
denied in God, however, is not the operation itself, but the “to be attained” element, which 
is proper to creatures. The metaphysical distinction between God and human beings 
illuminates what is created knowledge for St. Thomas, namely, a secondary perfection, the 
end or goal of the development of the knowing creature. 
Of necessity we must place several powers in the soul. To make this evident, we 
observe that, as the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, 12), the lowest order of things 
cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by 
few movements; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness 
by many movements; and those yet higher acquire perfect goodness by few 
movements; and the highest perfection is found in those things which acquire 
perfect goodness without any movement whatever. Thus he is least of all disposed 
of health, who can only acquire imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better 
disposed is he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies; and 
better still, he who can by few remedies; best of all is he who has perfect health 
without any remedies. We conclude, therefore, that things which are below man 
acquire a certain limited goodness; and so they have a few determinate operations 
and powers. But man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can 
acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, according to his nature, of those to 
whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul requires many and various 
operations and powers. But to angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In God 
there is no power or action beyond His own Essence.344 
                                                     
344 77, 2, c.: “Necesse est ponere plures animae potentias. Ad cuius evidentiam, 





In De Veritate, the “illness” seems to be more the relative imperfection of each 
creature regarding the perfection of the rest (and so a more “static” imperfection), and in 
the Summa the “illness” is the imperfection of the intellectual creature as a being in 
potency towards its final end (and so a dynamic imperfection). In the first two texts, St. 
Thomas refers to both sensible and intellectual knowledge, whereas in the third text he 
refers only to intellectual knowing; that is probably why he prefers to speak simply about 
Dei similitudinem in the second text and of beatitudinem in the third. In all three texts, 
finally, knowing in human beings is a being towards God, not a being-in-the-world; it is a 
means to obtain their final end by the gradual acquisition of perfections, and is not a 
perfecting activity of any kind.345 In other words, knowing is a being towards God as an all-
inclusive universal perfection; quodammodo omnia and Dei similitudinem refer more 
universally to the likeness of God, attainable also by sensible knowing or by purely natural 
knowledge; visione Dei, universalem et perfectam bonitatem instead are more restricted to 
the final end of intellectual creatures obtained only by grace. 
                                                     
possunt consequi perfectam bonitatem, sed aliquam imperfectam consequuntur paucis motibus; 
superiora vero his adipiscuntur perfectam bonitatem motibus multis; his autem superiora sunt quae 
adipiscuntur perfectam bonitatem motibus paucis; summa vero perfectio invenitur in his quae 
absque motu perfectam possident bonitatem. Sicut infime est ad sanitatem dispositus qui non 
potest perfectam consequi sanitatem, sed aliquam modicam consequitur paucis remediis; melius 
autem dispositus est qui potest perfectam consequi sanitatem, sed remediis multis; et adhuc melius, 
qui remediis paucis; optime autem, qui absque remedio perfectam sanitatem habet. Dicendum est 
ergo quod res quae sunt infra hominem, quaedam particularia bona consequuntur, et ideo quasdam 
paucas et determinatas operationes habent et virtutes. Homo autem potest consequi universalem 
et perfectam bonitatem, quia potest adipisci beatitudinem. Est tamen in ultimo gradu, secundum 
naturam, eorum quibus competit beatitudo, et ideo multis et diversis operationibus et virtutibus 
indiget anima humana. Angelis vero minor diversitas potentiarum competit. In Deo vero non est 
aliqua potentia vel actio, praeter eius essentiam.” 
345 The Heideggerian “being-in-the-world”, in my view, is in direct opposition to Aquinas’ 





The latter text346 situates knowing in Aquinas’ metaphysical world. For Aquinas, only 
God is His own being, and only in Him are being and operation the same. God is complete, 
perfect, possessing His own perfection. All other creatures need to obtain their final 
perfection by means of operations, which are secondary perfections added to a substantial 
primary perfection. What is one in the source is multiple in its effects. Every creature is a 
likeness of God, insofar as each has received from God a participation of God’s goodness. 
But this original “fall”347 from the source implies a distinction both at the static level of 
being (essentia – esse) and at the dynamic level (esse substantialis – operatio). If this second 
distinction did not take place, neither would the first make any sense: if a creature were 
perfect just because of what it is, it would mean that its essence and being would also be 
the same, and therefore it would not be a creature but God. This, I suggest, is the way to 
understand knowledge in Aquinas; that is, knowing is one of the operations allowing certain 
creatures to obtain their end, their secondary perfection. It is a remedy to their substantial 
imperfection, not an overflowing of their perfection onto other things.348 
A connection with Chapter 2 may be helpful at this point. Knowing is a remedy for 
the imperfection of the knower insofar as the perfection of the known does not belong 
specifically to the knower; we are, therefore, talking about the res intellecta. The fact that 
                                                     
346 77, 2, c.. 
347 In the sense that the creature “falls short of” the perfection of the Creator, and that the 
creature comes from the Creator as a certain “descending.” In other words, the creature 
participates of the Creator in both a static sense (as a limited realization of the divine fullness of 
perfection) and a dynamic sense (as receiving his partial perfection from God). It is this being per 
participationem that is the reason for the different levels of composition in creatures. 
348 An image somewhat similar to that of “remedy” is the figure of “food.” Cf. In II De Anima 





the agent intellect “remedies” the lack of intelligibility of the object is not against the 
aforementioned because, in this case, “intelligibility” refers to the modus rei intellectae. The 
knower receives a perfection as content, whereas the real nature in the object (represented 
in the phantasm) receives a perfection as a mode of being.349 
2) Alterity and Identity in Human Knowing 
2.1. Alterity  
In Aquinas, the original alterity of the object of knowing is clear. For example, in 75, 
2, c.: “For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of [the natures 
of] all corporeal things. Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its 
own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything 
else.”350 Precisely because to know is to receive the perfection of others, it is necessary that 
the faculty of knowing not be already perfected with a natural (and so “own”) perfection of 
                                                     
349 An interesting text in In De Anima also suggests that the “remedy” which human knowing 
is (here “salus”) refers to receiving the perfection of the other as such (the “res intellecta”). This is 
related to the particular kind of receptivity that knowledge implies, which we will discuss later in 
section 4 of this same Chapter: “In another and looser sense the term (passio) connotes any 
reception of something from outside. And as a receiver is to what it receives as a potency to its 
actuality; and as actuality is the perfection of what is potential; so being acted upon (i.e., passio) in 
this sense implies, [not that a certain corruption takes place, but] rather that a certain [“salvation”] 
and perfection of a thing in potency is received from a thing in act.” [Alio modo passio communiter 
dicitur et minus proprie, secundum scilicet quod importat quamdam receptionem. Et quia quod est 
receptivum alterius, comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum: actus autem est perfectio 
potentiae; et ideo hoc modo dicitur passio, non secundum quod fit quaedam corruptio patientis, sed 
magis secundum quod fit quaedam salus et perfectio eius quod est in potentia, ab eo quod est in 
actu.] (In II De Anima 11, 109-117). Human knowing is this receiving the perfection of other things as 
a remedy for our original imperfection. 
350 75, 2, c.: “Manifestum est enim quod homo per intellectum cognoscere potest naturas 
omnium corporum. Quod autem potest cognoscere aliqua, oportet ut nihil eorum habeat in sua 





the same kind. Later, St. Thomas designates alterity as a commonality shared by sensibility 
and intelligence, despite the difference in each as regards the mode of being of the known: 
But there is this difference, according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the sense 
and the intelligence—that a thing is perceived by the sense according to the 
disposition which it has outside the soul—that is, in its individuality; whereas the 
nature of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode according 
to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is 
understood.351 
What is known, the object, is “extra animam.” In 84, 2, c. (a parallel of De Ver. 2, 2), 
in explaining the immateriality of knowing, St. Thomas says: “The reason of this is, because 
the act of knowledge extends to things outside the knower: for we know things even that 
are external to us.”352 The references to the exteriority of the known are clear also in 78, 1, 
c., already quoted. Referring to sensitive and intellectual potencies, he says: “… [T]he latter 
two genera of the soul's powers have an operation in regard not merely to that which is 
united to them, but also to something extrinsic.”353 Knowing is no doubt related to the thing 
“extra animam,” although in a different way than are the affective potencies.354 
                                                     
351 76, 2 ad 4: “Sed hoc tantum interest inter sensum et intellectum, secundum sententiam 
Aristotelis, quod res sentitur secundum illam dispositionem quam extra animam habet, in sua 
particularitate, natura autem rei quae intelligitur, est quidem extra animam, sed non habet illum 
modum essendi extra animam, secundum quem intelligitur.” Cf. De Spirit. Creat., a.9, ad 6 (quoted 
on p. 96). 
352 84, 2, c.: “Et huius ratio est, quia actus cognitionis se extendit ad ea quae sunt extra 
cognoscentem, cognoscimus enim etiam ea quae extra nos sunt.” 
353 78, 1, c.: “… [I]sta duo secunda genera potentiarum animae habent operationem non 
solum respectu rei coniunctae, sed etiam respectu rei extrinsecae.” 
354 Cf. 78, 1, c.: “It follows of necessity that this something extrinsic, which is the object of 
the soul's operation, must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. First, inasmuch as this 
something extrinsic has a natural aptitude to be united to the soul, and to be by its likeness in the 
soul. In this way there are two kinds of powers —namely, the "sensitive" […] and the "intellectual" 
[…]. Secondly, forasmuch as the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something 
extrinsic.” [Necesse est extrinsecam rem, quae est obiectum operationis animae, secundum 





The reference to the external thing is direct, despite the mediation of the species, as 
we have already seen in 76, 2 ad 4. To say that “lapis non est in anima” is the same as to say 
that it is “extra animam.”355 
In the following text, Aquinas almost defines understanding by alterity. The question 
is whether the separate soul can have any knowledge of the separate substances (other 
separate souls or angels). The answer is affirmative, but the perfection of this knowledge 
varies, depending on the object; other separate souls can be known perfectly; the angels, 
instead, can be known in an imperfect way. The reason, for St. Thomas, is as follows: “Now, 
every separate substance ‘understands what is above itself and what is below itself, 
according to the mode of its substance’ (De Causis viii): for a thing is understood [insofar] as 
it is in the one who understands; while one thing is in another according to the nature of 
that in which it is.”356 The act of understanding, for St. Thomas, is verified by the presence 
of the object in the knowing subject, which is a “species” of one thing being present in 
                                                     
in anima esse per suam similitudinem. Et quantum ad hoc, sunt duo genera potentiarum, scilicet 
sensitivum (…) et intellectivum (…) Alio vero modo, secundum quod ipsa anima inclinatur et tendit in 
rem exteriorem.] As has been shown before, and here again, what is extrinsic for St. Thomas is not 
only the object of sensitivity, but also the object of intelligence, i.e., the nature of the material thing. 
355 76, 2 ad 4: “For what is understood is in the intellect, not according to its own nature, but 
according to its likeness; for ‘the stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is,’ as is said, De Anima iii, 8. 
Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the likeness of the stone; except by a reflection of the 
intellect on itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but only intelligible 
species.” [Id enim quod intelligitur non est in intellectu secundum se, sed secundum suam 
similitudinem, lapis enim non est in anima, sed species lapidis, ut dicitur in III De Anima. Et tamen 
lapis est id quod intelligitur, non autem species lapidis, nisi per reflexionem intellectus supra 
seipsum, alioquin scientiae non essent de rebus, sed de speciebus intelligibilibus.] St. Thomas also 
uses the expression “extra animam” in CG II, 75, par. 8 (quoted on p. 114). 
356 89, 2, c.: “Est autem commune omni substantiae separatae quod intelligat id quod est 
supra se, et id quod est infra se, per modum suae substantiae, sic enim intelligitur aliquid secundum 





another.357 Although what is present in the other (other = the knower) is the thing itself, the 
mode in which it is present depends on the knower. This is not to say that the thing which is 
present is no longer the same and becomes the knower, but exactly the opposite. St. 
Thomas makes this very point in De Ver. 2, 2, referring to every knowledge:   
In order that there might be some remedy for this imperfection, another kind of 
perfection is to be found in created things. It consists in this, that the perfection 
belonging to one thing is found in another. This is the perfection of a knower in so 
far as he knows; for something is known by a knower by reason of the fact that the 
thing known is, in some fashion, in the possession of the knower…358 
Although in these texts alterity is referred directly to the knower, it is obvious that 
the opposite of the “other” is also “another.” Even more, it is significant that the focus is on 
the perfection of the known, and that the “other” is the subject as receptive of it; it is not 
the perfection of the knower which is in the known, but the perfection of the known which 
is in the knower. 
                                                     
357 Cf. Lambert, 90: “The necessity that a knowing being be able to asume other forms is 
expressed in this definition of knowledge, which shows immateriality to be only one component: ‘To 
possess something in oneself formally and not materially, in which knowing consists, is a most noble 
way of possessing or containing something’ [my trans., original Latin follows: Sicut autem habere 
aliquid in se formaliter et non materialiter, in quo consistit ratio cognitionis, est nobilissimus modus 
habendi vel continendi aliquid] (In De Caus, lect. 18, n. 339).” 
358 De Ver. 2, 2, c.: “Unde ut huic imperfectioni aliquod remedium esset, invenitur alius 
modus perfectionis in rebus creatis, secundum quod perfectio quae est propria unius rei, in altera re 
invenitur; et haec est perfectio cognoscentis in quantum est cognoscens, quia secundum hoc a 
cognoscente aliquid cognoscitur quod ipsum cognitum est aliquo modo apud cognoscentem…” Cf. In 
I De Anima 4, 19-36 “The truth, in fact, is that knowledge is verified by the presence of a likeness of 
the thing known in the knower; for the known must be in the knower somehow.” (my trans.) 
[Veritas autem est, quod cognitio fit per similitudinem rei cognitae in cognoscente: oportet enim 





This original fact, the presence of something in another (the knower), is that which 
requires a different mode of being of that perfection,359 as we have seen in Chapter 2, and 
we see here again: 
The perfection of one thing cannot be in another according to the determined 
[being] which it has in the thing itself. Hence, if we wish to consider it in so far as it 
can be in another, we must consider it apart from those things which determine it by 
their very nature. Now, since forms and perfections of things are made determinate 
by matter, a thing is knowable in so far as it is separated from matter. For this 
reason, the subject in which these perfections are received must [also] be 
immaterial; for, if it were material, the perfection would be received in it according 
to a determinate [being]. It would, accordingly, not be in the intellect in a state in 
which it is knowable, that is, in the way in which the perfection of one thing can be 
in another.360 
                                                     
359 Stump offers a similar interpretation when explaining this “distinction of Aquinas’s 
between two different ways of receiving a form”: “But [the form] is transferred in such a way that it 
does not confer on the eye the substantial or accidental characteristics of a stone. A purple stone 
visually cognized does not make the eye purple even though the form of the stone’s color is 
transferred to the eye” (Stump, 252). The distinction of the two modes of being of De Ver 2, 2 can be 
read in the following text of In II De Anima 14, 262-268: “I mean by ‘material change’ what happens 
when a quality is received by a subject according to the material mode (of) the subject’s own 
existence, as e.g. when anything is cooled, or heated, or moved about in space; whereas by a 
‘spiritual change’ I mean, here, what happens when the likeness of an object is received in the 
sense-organ, or in the medium between object and organ, as a form, causing knowledge, and not 
merely as a form in matter. For there is a difference between the mode of being which a sensible 
form has in the senses and that which it has in the thing sensed.” [Dico autem immutationem 
naturalem prout qualitas recipitur in patiente secundum esse naturae, sicut cum aliquid infrigidatur 
vel calefit aut movetur secundum locum. Immutatio vero spiritualis est secundum quod species 
recipitur in organo sensus aut in medio per modum intentionis, et non per modum naturalis formae. 
Non enim sic recipitur species sensibilis in sensu secundum illud esse quod habet in re sensibili.] 
360 De Ver. 2, 2, c.: “Perfectio autem unius rei in altero esse non potest secundum 
determinatum esse quod habebat in re illa; et ideo ad hoc quod nata sit esse in re altera, oportet 
eam considerari absque his quae nata sunt eam determinare. Et quia formae et perfectiones rerum 
per materiam determinantur, inde est quod secundum hoc aliqua res est cognoscibilis secundum 
quod a materia separatur. Unde oportet ut et illud in quo suscipitur talis rei perfectio, sit 
immateriale; si enim esset materiale, perfectio recepta esset in eo secundum aliquod esse 
determinatum; et ita non esset in eo secundum quod est cognoscibilis; scilicet ut, existens perfectio 
unius, est nata esse in altero.” Cf. Lambert, 94: “The immateriality of a knowing being bestows on it 






Notice how, in the end, being as known (“cognoscibilis”) is identified with being in 
the other as other (“existens perfectio unius, est nata esse in altero”). There is no difference 
between this doctrine and the Summa’s, except for the more explicit expressions of alterity 
in knowing. 
2.2. Identity: What Identity is Not 
But what about identity? Is there not an identity in knowing, as St. Thomas himself 
says many times? What that identity is not will be more the focus in this section; in the 
next, the focus will be what that identity means for Aquinas.  
To begin with, the identity is not absolute or per se, but quodammodo and by 
participation: “The intellectual soul forasmuch as it is actually understanding, participates 
the thing understood: for, in a way, the intellect in act is the thing understood in act.”361 
Then, if there is an identity, it is not an ontological identity at the level of the 
(substantial) being of the knower, as has been shown at the end of section 1 of this Chapter. 
Substantial being and cognitive operation are distinct in all creatures, even in the angels.362 
For Aquinas, the potency of being (essentia) cannot be the potency of the operation, 
                                                     
361 84, 4 ob. 1: “Anima intellectiva, secundum quod est actu intelligens, participat ipsa 
intelligibilia, intellectus enim in actu, quodammodo est intellectum in actu.” 
362 Cf. 77, 1 sc: “Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi) says that ‘heavenly spirits are divided into essence, 
power, and operation.’ Much more, then, in the soul is the essence distinct from the virtue or 
power.” [Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, XI cap. Caelest. Hier., quod caelestes spiritus 
dividuntur in essentiam, virtutem et operationem. Multo igitur magis in anima aliud est essentia, et 
aliud virtus sive potentia.] and 77, 1, c.: “Wherefore the Divine power which is the principle of His 
operation is the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true either of the soul, or of any creature; as 
we have said above when speaking of the angels.” [Unde Dei potentia, quae est operationis 
principium, est ipsa Dei essentia. Quod non potest esse verum neque in anima, neque in aliqua 





because that would mean an identity of (substantial) being and operation (esse et operare), 
which is proper to God alone. 
Let us next examine the text which will occupy us more directly in the following 
section. According to 85, 2 ad 1, an identity between the known in act and the intelligence 
in act cannot mean that the intellect knows its own subjective (natural) perfection, that is, 
the species as perfecting the faculty subjectively (according to the first mode of being of De 
Ver. 2, 2).363 This identity (the Aristotelian “intellectum in actu est intellectus in actu”) and 
the presence of the known in the knower (by means of the species) are two different 
concepts: 
The thing understood is in the intellect by its own likeness; and it is in this sense that 
we say that the thing understood [in act] is the intellect in act, because the likeness 
of the thing understood is the form of the intellect, as the likeness of a sensible thing 
is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not follow that the intelligible species 
abstracted is what is actually understood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof.364 
For Aquinas, in knowledge there are two realms of actualization: the act of the 
intellect as accidental faculty in its natural being, and the act of the intellect insofar as it 
understands. The first perfection is real, and it is the species in its real being (as accidental 
or secondary act of the intellect as operative potency). The second perfection is intentional, 
that is to say, the perfection of the known in the knower, by means of the species. The 
                                                     
363 It is challenging to indicate with one term the first mode of being of De Ver 2, 2, and 
therefore “subjective”, “real”, “natural” or “metaphysical” will be used alternatively, as seems more 
fitting. No term, in my view, is exempt from misunderstanding, since the intentional presence could 
also be referred to as something real, metaphysical, and so on. I hope that, by the context of 
opposition with “intentional”, the reader will have a clear grasp of what is meant. 
364 85, 2 ad 1: “Dicendum quod intellectum est in intelligente per suam similitudinem. Et per 
hunc modum dicitur quod intellectum in actu est intellectus in actu, inquantum similitudo rei 
intellectae est forma intellectus; sicut similitudo rei sensibilis est forma sensus in actu. Unde non 
sequitur quod species intelligibilis abstracta sit id quod actu intelligitur, sed quod sit similitudo 




species as image has, then, a double aspect: it is a real being which represents something 
else, like a photo containing both its own being as paper and the presence of someone (the 
one whose photo was taken). The known is in the knower intentionally (“Intellectum est in 
intelligente per suam similitudinem”), whereas the species perfects the intellect naturally, 
subjectively (“similitudo rei intellectae est forma intellectus”). The species is the real being 
(forma quo) which allows the knower to be perfected intentionally, bringing to the knower 
the perfection of the known (forma quod) in a mode of being proportionate to the potency. 
Therefore, it must be noted from the beginning that the identity in the text of 
Aristotle, according to St. Thomas, is not simply the identity of intellectum (object) and 
intellectus, but the identity of intellectum in actu and intellectus in actu. Intellectum in actu 
connotes here, for St. Thomas, the mode of being of the known as known (because it is not 
intelligible in act in reality), and therefore in this phrase it signifies for St. Thomas the 
species as real (not intentional) perfective form of the intellect as faculty. As a consequence, 
Intellectus in actu means here the intelligence as operative potency perfected by its proper 
form and, because this form is the real act of the intellect as a real operative potency, 
nothing prevents us from identifying a (real) thing with its own (real) perfection, here 
respectively the intellect and the species. More will be said in the next subsection. 
3) The Identity is by Means of the Species 
If knowledge is originally knowledge of the other, the only sense in which an identity 
with this object can be conceived is insofar as the subject becomes somehow the object. 
The subject is indeed perfected, in some way, with the perfection that is proper to the 




present in the subject as belonging to the object. That is why it is said to be “intentionally” 
present, as an attempt to express in words an original phenomenon that does not admit 
further resolution or images: it is present insofar as I am subjectively modified, developed, 
by the “possession” of a new perfection; but this presence is “intentional,” insofar as that 
presence does not bring the object to be physically in me, but rather it is I who in some way 
refer to it, it is I who enter into a new relationship with the object. The object modifies me 
insofar as I refer to it. But it is not my reference that perfects the object; rather, it is the 
object that perfects me, or rather I who grow with the perfection of the object, in my 
intending of it. The problem in Epistemology is to understand this fact, or rather to accept 
it, instead of trying to reduce it to a physical phenomenon, easier to transform into images 
of physical causality. St. Thomas took as a point of departure this fact, and that is why, 
where St. Thomas is speaking about knowing, he cannot be understood by those who 
interpret him in physical terms. When one thing perfects another in the physical realm, the 
perfection of the agent becomes the perfection of the patient, and the act of the patient is 
its own. St. Thomas says in 85, 2 that knowing is not like that. When an object perfects a 
subject in the intentional realm, the perfection of the object becomes the perfection of the 
subject insofar as it remains the perfection of the object, insofar as it belongs to the other 
(the object) which is distinct from the subject. 
This “identity in alterity”365 in human knowing is verified by means of the species. 
The species is the real modification of the subject that allows him or her to intend the 
                                                     
365 “Greek reason […] was able to see that the human intellect, in identifying itself 





object as other. It is a real-subjective becoming or modification that allows the intellect to 
become intentionally what the knowing subject is not (really-subjectively).366 It seems that 
the best example is a picture,367 so common in our human experience. We know perfectly 
well that, in the picture, the person is not really present, and yet, the picture enables us to 
know the person, with our full realization that what we are seeing is only an image. We do 
not have any difficulty in recognizing that there is both a picture and something else that is 
pictured, with all of that in one real picture. The real thing and the reference are both there. 
Two real things are present though; that is, the person also is there, although not in the 
same way as is the material of the picture. The real person is present there with another 
mode of being. This is an “image” of what happens with the cognitive species. 
The immediate purpose of this section is not to explain the nature of the species. It 
should be enough to understand that the species is a subjective quality in the intelligence 
that allows this faculty to refer to an object as such. It is very difficult to say more without 
falling into images from the physical realm that more obscure than clarify what knowing is. 
The best that can be said about knowing, I suggest, is what St. Thomas says in De Veritate: 
that knowing is a mode of perfection different from the natural mode of being, according to 
which the perfection of one thing is present in another as other. 
The immediate purpose of this section, then, is to show that for Aquinas the 
Aristotelian “intellectum in actu est intellectus in actu” refers to the species, and not to an 
                                                     
minds” (Jaques Maritain, The Peasant of the Garonne [New York: Hold, Rinehart and Winston, 1968], 
p. 18 in Cullen, 72). 
366 This is a reference to the first mode of being of De Ver. 2, 2. 





ontological identity between knower and known. Several reasons for this have already been 
expressed. First, the ontological being of the knower for St. Thomas is different from the 
knower’s operation (as we have seen previously368). Secondly, knowing is not perfective of 
the object but is perfected by it (which is the point of this whole section); if knowing were 
the form of the known as such, it would make perfect sense to say that the known does not 
have any other perfection than the act of the knower. Thirdly, Aquinas never defines 
knowing as a real identity with the known,369 and he does, instead, characterize knowing as 
an alterity between the perfection of the knower and the known (as was shown in the 
previous section). It remains, however, to deal more directly with the text where the 
Aristotelian identity is explicitly treated370 and to explore other texts that may enlighten the 
role of the species regarding the identity in knowing. 
Some remarks may be helpful in order to summarize the proposed interpretation. 
For Aquinas, there is certainly an identity between intellect and species (a subjective 
identity of actualized potency and its own act); but, because what is known is not the 
species, this real identity does not take away the alterity of knowing, that is to say, the 
reference of the intellect to the other; rather, the species is the formal principle (principium 
quo) of the reference of the intellect to the real object. 
The presence of the known in the knower is not called identity but rather a “being 
in”, presence in, being in the other, etc., which is verified by means of the species. The 
                                                     
368 Cf. section 2 of this Chapter. 
369 The fact that Aquinas acknowledges a certain knowing that implies the identity of knower 
and known (at least in the separate substances), does not mean that he characterizes knowing as 
essentially an identity. 




mediation of the species does not take away the direct contact with the object. It would 
take it away, if the mediation were “objective”; that is to say, if the species had to be known 
first in order to know the thing itself. But for St. Thomas, the species is a subjective 
mediation, a subjective modification that makes the direct objective reference possible. 
There is a distinction in the species between the species itself and what is represented, 
between its real being as subjective modification and the content it possesses as image. The 
faculty, by means of this subjective modification, has access to the thing represented, as 
one who sees a picture recognizes the person him or herself, and not necessarily the 
materials of the picture. 
3.1. The Aristotelian Identity 
Let us now examine some texts that may show more clearly the position of St. 
Thomas in these matters. Aquinas’ specific interpretation of the Aristotelian “The thing 
understood in act is the intellect in act” (“Intellectum in actu est intellectus in actu”) has 
been anticipated in the previous section. In 85, 2 ob. 1, it is suggested that the presence of 
the object in the intellect is the same as the presence of the species in it as its perfection; 
therefore, species and object of the intellect are the same thing.371 The argument is the 
                                                     
371 85, 2 ob. 1: “It would seem that the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is 
related to our intellect as that which is understood. For the understood in act is in the one who 
understands: since the understood in act is the intellect itself in act. But nothing of what is 
understood is in the intellect actually understanding, save the abstracted intelligible species. 
Therefore this species is what is actually understood.” [Videtur quod species intelligibiles a 
phantasmatibus abstractae, se habeant ad intellectum nostrum sicut id quod intelligitur. Intellectum 
enim in actu est in intelligente, quia intellectum in actu est ipse intellectus in actu. Sed nihil de re 
intellecta est in intellectu actu intelligente, nisi species intelligibilis abstracta. Ergo huiusmodi 





Aristotelian text, to the authority of which St. Thomas will not object. But Aquinas says in 
the Ad Unum: “The thing understood is in the intellect by its own likeness.”372 Notice how, 
from the beginning, he is not talking about “intellectum in actu” but about “intellectum”, 
which stands for the object itself and not for the species (here “similitudinem”); this is the 
confusion in the objection. Aquinas continues: “And it is in this sense that we say that the 
thing understood [in act] is the intellect in act, because the likeness of the thing understood 
is the form of the intellect, as the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in 
act.”373 This is the precise interpretation of the Aristotelian text for Aquinas. That is, the 
identity (“est” can be interpreted in that way to some extent) is the identity of an actualized 
operative potency (intellectus in actu = intellectus formatum) with its perfective form 
(similitudo rei intellectae = intellectum in actu). This may not be Aquinas’ interpretation of 
the Aristotelian text in other contexts, and it may also be a misinterpretation of Aristotle; 
however, for Aquinas, here, intellectum in actu does not mean object of the intellect (quod 
actu intelligitur). Therefore, he can conclude: “Hence it does not follow that the intelligible 
species abstracted is what is actually understood; but rather that it is the likeness 
thereof.”374 The species is certainly the perfective form of the intellect for Aquinas, and still 
it is not what is understood, but a representation of what is understood. That is why, if an 
identity is supported with this Aristotelian text in Aquinas, it is not the identity between 
                                                     
372 85, 2 ad 1: “Intellectum est in intelligente per suam similitudinem.” 
373 85, 2 ad 1: “Et per hunc modum dicitur quod intellectum in actu est intellectus in actu, 
inquantum similitudo rei intellectae est forma intellectus; sicut similitudo rei sensibilis est forma 
sensus in actu.” 
374 85, 2 ad 1: “Unde non sequitur quod species intelligibilis abstracta sit id quod actu 





object and knower, nor the identity between the being of the object and the being of the 
knower, but the identity of the intellect with its species as perfective form. 375 
Other works of Aquinas can help us to confirm our interpretation: “The known is a 
perfection of the knower, not by its substance (for the thing is outside the knower), but 
rather by the likeness by which it is known; for a perfection exists in the perfected—and the 
likeness of the stone, not the stone, exists in the soul.”376 In the following text “species” 
stands for the perfection that is known: 
Hence, the species of a thing, as present in phantasms, is not actually intelligible, 
since in this state it is not one with the intellect in act, but is one with it according as 
the species is abstracted from the phantasms. Just so, the species of color is not 
perceived [in act insofar] as it exists in the stone, but only [insofar] as it exists in the 
pupil.377 
What is interesting is that the species is something that is present in the thing itself, 
but in the thing itself is not united to the faculty (and therefore is not known in act). What is 
united to the faculty is the abstracted species (in the case of the intellect), not the realities 
themselves in their natural being. Although it is clear that the perfection itself is one with 
the intellect in act and that St. Thomas is referring to the Aristotelian identity, it is even 
more clear that this identity does not come about on account of the content, but on 
account of the mode of being of the content. In other words, the nature of the stone in its 
                                                     
375 The same interpretation can be seen clearly in other texts and works of Aquinas: cf. CG II, 
98, par. 14-19; Ibid., 99, par. 5-7; In III De anima 7, 37-48; Summa I, 14, 2 (see Appendix, note 10). 
376 De Ver. 2, 3 ad 1: “Intellectum non est perfectio intelligentis secundum illam rem quae 
cognoscitur (res enim illa est extra intelligentem), sed secundum rei similitudinem qua cognoscitur, 
quia perfectio est in perfecto; lapis autem non est in anima, sed similitudo lapidis.” 
377 CG II, 59, par. 13: “Species igitur rei, secundum quod est in phantasmatibus, non est 
intelligibilis actu: non enim sic est unum cum intellectu in actu sed secundum quod est a 
phantasmatibus abstracta; sicut nec species coloris est sensata in actu secundum quod est in lapide, 




abstracted mode of being, i.e., the species (= representation) of the nature of the stone (= 
universal content), is the perfection of the intellect in act. This is the same doctrine as that 
of the Summa. 
It seems that In De Anima uses the word “species” moreso to indicate the cognitive 
representation: “But these intelligible ideas are not precisely what the mind understands; 
they are only the latter’s likeness present in the soul; hence it is quite possible for many 
intellects to possess likenesses of one and the same object, so that one thing is understood 
by all.”378 In the following text we have an alternative  
expression of the Aristotelian identity: Scientia = intellectus in actu and scibile in actu 
= intellectum in actu.379 Species is again the representation of the thing known. The text 
says: “Speculative knowledge and what is knowable ‘in this way’ (i.e. in act) are identical. 
Therefore the [species] of the actually understood thing is also [the species] of the [intellect 
itself], through which the latter can understand itself.”380 Because the representation of the 
                                                     
378 In III De Anima 2, 285-289: “Non enim est species intelligibilis, ipsum intellectum, sed 
similitudo eius in anima: et ideo si sunt plures intellectus habentes similitudinem unius et eiusdem 
rei, erit eadem res intellecta apud omnes.” 
379 In the same way should be understood the following text, although the wording is slightly 
different. In III De Anima 4, 173-176: “He states three properties of intellect in act. First, its actual 
knowledge is identical with the thing known; which is not true of intellect as potential.” [Tres ponit 
conditiones intellectus in actu: quarum prima est, quod scientia in actu, est idem rei scitae. Quod 
non est verum de intellectu in potentia.] Cf. In III De Anima 5, 263-269: “He repeats what he has said 
of intellect in act, that actual knowledge is one with (the thing known in act).” [Resumit quiddam 
quod supra dictum est de intellectu secundum actum (…) et dicit quod scientia secundum actum es 
idem rei scite secundum actum.”] (my underline, Leon. emphasis) In this latter text St. Thomas 
himself clarifies that the first text referred to the intellectum in actu, and not simply to the res 
intellecta. Cf. In Met. 12, lect. 11, 2620. 
380 In III De Anima 3, 78-82: “Ipsa enim scientia speculativa et sic scibile, idest scibile in actu, 
idem est. Species igitur rei intellectae in actu, est species ipsius intellectus; et sic per eam seipsum 
intelligere potest.” (Leon. emphasis) Cf. In Met. 12, lect. 8, 2539: “For an intellect becomes 





thing known is the form (“species” as subjective actuality) of the intellect itself, by means of 
this species (representation) of the thing already understood (“rei intellectae”) the intellect 
can subsequently know itself (“seipsum intelligere potest”). For Aquinas, the first object of 
human understanding is not the intellect itself, but the nature of corporeal things, and it is 
by the knowledge of them that the intellect becomes intelligible in act and, thus, object of 
its own understanding.381  
3.2. Species, Identity and Alterity 
Let us now examine some texts about the role of the species concerning the 
aforementioned. In doing so, we are trying to emphasize that, for Aquinas, there is a 
distinction between species and object of knowledge. Identity in knowing refers to the 
species, whereas alterity refers to the object. That the object is not the phantasm but a 
universal content abstracted from its individual conditions in matter has already been 
discussed.382 
                                                     
becomes intelligible by conceiving some intelligible object, it follows that the intellect and its 
intelligible object are the same.” [Fit enim intellectus intelligibilis per hoc quod attingit aliquod 
intelligibile. Et ideo, cum ipse intellectus fiat intelligibilis concipiendo aliquod intelligibile, sequetur 
quod idem sit intellectus et intelligibile.] 
381 The fact that it is already an immaterial reality (and so in act, in a sense) does not take 
away the fact that the human intellect is in potency regarding its proper act (before the subject 
understands something, the human intellect is tabula rasa) and therefore the intellect cannot be 
known in itself, because what is known is known insofar as it is in act. The reality of the intellect 
before the subject understands is immaterial, and so it could be intelligible for someone whose 
object of understanding is the separate substances. But our intellect is completely potential, and it is 
moved to understand by an agent object (the nature of corporeal things): only then does it pass 
from potency to act of understanding, and so becomes actual and intelligible for us. In other words, 
the presence of the intellect to itself, while it is in potency of understanding, does not produce 
knowledge of itself, because what is in potency cannot be known as such, nor be an agent object. Cf. 
In Met. 12, lect. 8, 2539, just quoted. For other studied texts in support of our interpretation of the 
Aristotelian identity, coming from In Metaphysicorum, see Appendix, Note 11. 





For Aquinas, the species is principium quo (not the object) of knowing, for both 
sense and intellect. For example: “The intelligible species is to the intellect what the 
sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not what is perceived, but rather 
that by which sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not what is actually 
understood, but that by which the intellect understands.”383 Principium quo means that the 
species is a form or perfection by which a certain operation is accomplished or made real.384 
Similarly in 89, 6, c., in talking about the act of understanding in the separate soul, the 
species is clearly principium quo and not the object:  
Action offers two things for our consideration—its species and its mode. Its species 
comes from the object, whereto the faculty of knowledge is directed by the 
(intelligible) species, which is the object's similitude; whereas the mode is gathered 
from the power of the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species of 
the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is due to the eye's visual power.385 
                                                     
383 85, 2, sc.: “Species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum, sicut species sensibilis ad sensum. 
Sed species sensibilis non est illud quod sentitur, sed magis id quo sensus sentit. Ergo species 
intelligibilis non est quod intelligitur actu, sed id quo intelligit intellectus.” This distinction between 
species and object can be seen in other texts as well: cf. De Ver 2, 3, ad 2, ad 3 and ad 10; CG II, 75, 
par. 7 and 9; Q.D. De Anima, a.2, ad 5; Q.D. De Anima, a.3, ad 7; De Spirit. Creat., a.9, ad 6; De Spirit. 
Creat., a.10, ad 12. (see Appendix, Note 12). 
384 Cf. 85, 2, c.: “There is a twofold action (Metaph. ix), one which remains in the agent; for 
instance, to see and to understand; and another which passes into an external object; for instance, 
to heat and to cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form […] Hence that by 
which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that 
is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands.” [Cum enim sit duplex 
actio, sicut dicitur IX Metaphys., una quae manet in agente, ut videre et intelligere, altera quae 
transit in rem exteriorem, ut calefacere et secare; utraque fit secundum aliquam formam (…) Unde 
similitudo rei visibilis est secundum quam visus videt; et similitudo rei intellectae, quae est species 
intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit.]  
385 89, 6, c.: “In actu est duo considerare, scilicet speciem actus, et modum ipsius. Et species 
quidem actus consideratur ex obiecto in quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis dirigitur per speciem, quae 
est obiecti similitudo, sed modus actus pensatur ex virtute agentis. Sicut quod aliquis videat 






The species is the real act of the intellect as operative potency and, because of this, 
it is the species that can make the intellect an object of knowing in itself: “[The intellect] 
understands itself according as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible 
things, through the light of the active intellect, which not only actuates the intelligible 
things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates the passive intellect.”386 This 
takes us to the important difference in the species between what it is and what it 
represents as image. The species makes the intellect intelligible in act because of what the 
species is in itself387 but, as image, the species makes known directly the represented 
object. That is why, for St. Thomas, the species in itself is known only in a second moment, 
by reflection: “But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands 
both its own act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the 
intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily 
understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness.”388 The end of the corpus 
reinforces the same point, that the species is a form in the soul (real being) that makes us 
know the thing outside the soul (intentional being): 
This also appears from the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that ‘like is 
known by like.’ For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself, by the 
earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we take the species of the earth 
instead of the earth, according to Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who says ‘that a stone is 
                                                     
386 87, 1, c.: “Consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit 
actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum 
intelligibilium, et eis mediantibus intellectus possibilis.” 
387 Cf. In Met. 12, lect. 8, 2539 (quoted on p. 158 at footnote 380) and footnote 381. 
388 85, 2, c.: “Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eandem reflexionem 
intelligit et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellecta secundario est id quod 





not in the soul, but only the likeness of the stone’; it follows that the soul knows 
external things by means of its intelligible species.389 
Knowing is of the things outside the soul, not of the species: “Therefore if what we 
understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it would follow that every science 
would not be concerned with objects outside the soul, but only with the intelligible species 
within the soul.”390 
The following text has already been quoted, but it also shows how the real presence 
of the species in the mind is perfectly compatible for Aquinas with the reference to the 
thing outside the mind. The thing is in the mind by means of the species: “It follows of 
necessity that this something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's operation, must be 
related to the soul in a twofold manner. First, inasmuch as this something extrinsic has a 
natural aptitude to be united to the soul, and to be by its likeness in the soul.”391 
Significantly, it is the thing that is in the mind, and not the mind in the thing, which is the 
characteristic of the secunda ratio according to which the mind is compared to the external 
thing. 
                                                     
389 85, 2, c.: “Et hoc etiam patet ex antiquorum opinione, qui ponebant simile simili cognosci. 
Ponebant enim quod anima per terram quae in ipsa erat, cognosceret terram quae extra ipsam erat; 
et sic de aliis. Si ergo accipiamus speciem terrae loco terrae, secundum doctrinam Aristotelis, qui 
dicit quod lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis; sequetur quod anima per species intelligibiles 
cognoscat res quae sunt extra animam.” This “double being” of the species, i.e., its real being as 
subjective modification and its “representative” being, can be seen in other texts: cf. De Ver 2, 3, ad 
9; In Boet. De Trin. 5, 2, c.; Q.D. De Anima, a.2, ob. 7 (see Appendix, Note 13). 
390 85, 2, c.: “Si igitur ea quae intelligimus essent solum species quae sunt in anima, 
sequeretur quod scientiae omnes non essent de rebus quae sunt extra animam, sed solum de 
speciebus intelligibilibus quae sunt in anima…” 
391  78, 1, c.: “Necesse est extrinsecam rem, quae est obiectum operationis animae, 
secundum duplicem rationem ad animam comparari. Uno modo, secundum quod nata est animae 





Knowing, if not by identity, can be said to be by likeness.392 But this likeness implies 
precisely the distinction between knower and known; likeness implies a “formal” oneness, 
not a substantial one.393 In the following text, for example, the material things, evidently 
different from the knower, are the main object. Moreover, knowing does not imply a 
physical likeness, as the natural philosophers supposed. In the case of our knowing of 
material things, knowing implies, instead, a distinction between the mode of being of the 
known in the mind (“similitudinibus… a phantasmatibus abstractis”) and outside the mind 
(“materialia”). In knowing there is a likeness because the same perfection is present, but 
not in a physical way: it is present by means of a species, which is not the known but a 
likeness of the known. 
The likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause of knowledge; otherwise what 
Empedocles said would be true —that the soul needs to have the nature of all in 
                                                     
392 At the conclusion of this section we will see in what sense we could still speak about an 
identity in knowing (namely as intentional identity). I prefer not to speak about identity as a 
primordial characteristic of knowing insofar as identity means (in general and in the text of the 
Aristotelian identity) an ontological oneness. As we have seen, in human knowing the priority, 
phenomenologically speaking and for Aquinas, belongs to alterity, insofar as the (ontological) 
identity between the species and the intellect is the means by which this more original identity-in-
alterity is explained. In other words, identity comes to explain the presence of the other in the 
subject. As suggests Gilles Mongeau (TST professor), “likeness” refers to (the perfection of) the 
object as present by the species, and “identity” to the species as perfecting the intellect; knowing by 
likeness and not by identity means, therefore, that what is proper to knowing is not that we are one 
thing with our species (real identity), but that the object (originally other) is present to us by means 
of its species. 
393 By “formal” oneness I simply mean here “intentional.” See my remarks on Knasas’ 
“numerical” identity on p. 40 ff. The intentional identity could be called “numerical” in a wide sense, 
insofar as there is no distinction between content of knowing and the thing that is known; and it 
could be also called “formal” identity, again in a wide sense, insofar as there is a certain distinction 
between the thing itself (which is not in the mind in its real being) and the content in its cognitive 
mode of being. But because both words express imperfectly the phenomenon of knowing, 
“intentional” seems to be the best word to indicate this identity-in-alterity. This is why I think that 
the phenomenon of knowing (the intentional identity) cannot be reduced to (meta)physical 





order to know all. But knowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in 
the knower, as a kind of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in the present state 
of life, is such that it can be informed with similitudes abstracted from phantasms: 
and therefore it knows material things rather than immaterial substances.394 
The species, even in the case of the second intellectual operation, is never an 
objective intermediary that would block the way to the extra-mental reality.395 The point is 
worth noting because, in the case of judgment, what is represented is actually not in reality 
as such; that is, the affirmation is an act of the mind that is not found in reality.396 Still, 
because the affirmation refers to reality, the enunciations also refer to reality through the 
species, and not primarily to the species themselves. This is another indication that, for St. 
Thomas, the direct contact with reality does not need to rely on a real identity with the 
known. Rather, it is the mediation of the species that ensures the contact with reality. 
In the following passage, the distinction between the known (ea quae cognoscit) and 
the species by which it is known (ea quibus) is clear, and it can also be seen that the 
                                                     
394 88, 1 ad 2: “Dicendum quod similitudo naturae non est ratio sufficiens ad cognitionem, 
alioquin oporteret dicere quod Empedocles dixit, quod anima esset de natura omnium, ad hoc quod 
omnia cognosceret. Sed requiritur ad cognoscendum, ut sit similitudo rei cognitae in cognoscente 
quasi quaedam forma ipsius. Intellectus autem noster possibilis, secundum statum praesentis vitae, 
est natus informari similitudinibus rerum materialium a phantasmatibus abstractis, et ideo cognoscit 
magis materialia quam substantias immateriales.” Here, that which has been discussed in Chapter 1 
regarding the formal object of intelligence is very clear. The species is a likeness of the material 
things (because it is a likeness of their nature) and at the same time it is abstracted from matter (the 
intelligible species that informs the intellect is not the phantasm). The species is not a reference of 
the intellect to the phantasm, but a likeness of the quidditas of that phantasm. The conversio will 
therefore be the reference of the abstracted species (as act of the possible intellect) to the 
phantasm. 
395 Cf. 85, 2 ad 3; 85, 5, sc. Fabro distinguishes between the species of Democritus (objective 
– objective: perception is reduced to a physical relationship and causality between object and 
faculty, cf. PP 40-44), the species of idealism (subjective – subjective: the subject knows only his or 
her subjective modification) and the Thomistic species (subjective – objective: a real modification in 
the subject that makes intentionally present the perfection of the object). Cf. PP 463-476, especially 
page 472. 





distinction between the mode of being of the species and the mode of being of the known 
is not an obstacle to the objectivity of knowing: 
These words of Augustine are to be understood as referring to the medium of 
intellectual knowledge, and not to its object. For the intellect knows bodies by 
understanding them, not indeed through bodies, nor through material and corporeal 
species; but through immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the soul by 
their own essence.397 
The fact that many things can be known by means of one species398 is another way 
to say that, in the species, there is a difference between its real being (one) and what it 
represents (in this case, the many). Because the intellect is one, and the species is really-
subectively perfective of that intellect, there can be no more than one species at a given 
time. But the same does not apply to the object, at least not for the same reason. Again, 
what is understood is not the species in its identity with the intellect, but the thing itself 
through the species. 
In 84, 7, the reason for the conversio ad phantasmata is the reference of the 
intelligible species to the material thing outside the mind. In the Ad Unum, we can see again 
                                                     
397 84, 1 ad 1: “Dicendum quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum quantum ad ea quibus 
intellectus cognoscit, non autem quantum ad ea quae cognoscit. Cognoscit enim corpora 
intelligendo, sed non per corpora, neque per similitudines materiales et corporeas; sed per species 
immateriales et intelligibiles, quae per sui essentiam in anima esse possunt.” 
398 Cf. 85, 4, c.: “The intellect can, indeed, understand many things [as a unity], but not as 
many: that is to say by one but not by many intelligible species. For the mode of every action follows 
the form which is the principle of that action. Therefore whatever things the intellect can 
understand under one species, it can understand at the same time […] Therefore it is impossible for 
one and the same intellect to be perfected at the same time by different intelligible species so as 
actually to understand different things.” [Intellectus quidem potest multa intelligere per modum 
unius, non autem multa per modum multorum, dico autem per modum unius vel multorum, per 
unam vel plures species intelligibiles. Nam modus cuiusque actionis consequitur formam quae est 
actionis principium. Quaecumque ergo intellectus potest intelligere sub una specie, simul intelligere 
potest (…) Impossibile est ergo quod idem intellectus simul perficiatur diversis speciebus 





a double aspect in the species. One aspect allows presence and possession, insofar as the 
species is kept in the possible intellect (identity). Another aspect allows objectivity, insofar 
as it represents the natures subsisting in the particular (alterity). The text says: “We need 
further to make use of them in a manner befitting the things of which they are the species, 
which things are natures existing in individuals.”399 
“Species” may sometimes refer more to the object than to the image in its 
subjective being:  
In the same way the sensible form is conditioned differently in the thing which is 
external to the soul, and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things 
without receiving matter, such as the color of gold without receiving gold. So also 
the intellect, according to its own mode, receives under conditions of immateriality 
and immobility, the species of material and mobile bodies: for the received is in the 
receiver according to the mode of the receiver.400 
In the following text, also, the word “species” in “naturam speciei” refers to 
something real in the thing whereas, in “speciem intelligibilem,” the same word has the 
meaning of form of the intellect. The species as form of the intellect is representative of the 
universal nature subsistent in the particular, as the phantasm is representative of the 
individual principles of the same thing: “This is what we mean by abstracting the universal 
from the particular, or the intelligible species from the phantasm; that is, by considering the 
                                                     
399 84, 7 ad 1: “… oportet quod eis [species conservatae in intellectu possibili] utamur 
secundum quod convenit rebus quarum sunt species, quae sunt naturae in particularibus 
existentes.” 
400 84, 1, c.: “Et per hunc etiam modum forma sensibilis alio modo est in re quae est extra 
animam, et alio modo in sensu, qui suscipit formas sensibilium absque materia, sicut colorem auri 
sine auro. Et similiter intellectus species corporum, quae sunt materiales et mobiles, recipit 






nature of the species apart from its individual qualities represented by the phantasms.”401 
Similarly in the Ad Tertium:  
This is done by the power of the active intellect which by turning towards the 
phantasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which represents, as to 
its specific conditions only, the thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the 
intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm…402 
This interpretation of the word “species” here, however, could be considered 
questionable. Therefore, an important clarification is in order. As has been shown, the 
species or similitudo is certainly called quod intelligitur and intellectum in actu by Aquinas. 
What Aquinas means is not that the intellect knows its own subjective perfection, but that it 
knows the nature of the corporeal thing insofar as it is present in an intelligible mode of 
being in the species. In other words, the species is quod intelligitur insofar as it is the nature 
understood (intellectum) in a mode of being proportionate to the faculty (in actu, i.e., in act 
of being intelligible). For the same reason, the object of intelligence seems, at least in the 
two previous texts, to be called species intelligibilis. What Aquinas means is not that we 
know the species as subjective modification, but that we know the species of the thing (= 
the real nature subsisting in the thing) in an intelligible mode of being.403 In any case, and 
                                                     
401 85, 1 ad 1: “Et hoc est abstrahere universale a particulari, vel speciem intelligibilem a 
phantasmatibus, considerare scilicet naturam speciei absque consideratione individualium 
principiorum, quae per phantasmata repraesentantur.” 
402 85, 1 ad 3: “Sed virtute intellectus agentis resultat quaedam similitudo in intellectu 
possibili ex conversione intellectus agentis supra phantasmata, quae quidem est repraesentativa 
eorum quorum sunt phantasmata, solum quantum ad naturam speciei. Et per hunc modum dicitur 
abstrahi species intelligibilis a phantasmatibus…” 
403 Stump also acknowledges a similar tension in Aquinas’ use of “species”, particularly in 
sensible knowing: “It is important to emphasize that a sensible species is not itself what is sensed. 
Instead it is the means by which the senses sense extramental things. There is room for confusion 
here, because Aquinas does talk about the sensory power apprehending the sensible species, and 





hopefully enough evidence has been offered for this, Aquinas does not confuse object with 
species, he denies explicitly that the object of knowing is the species, and he does not 
explain the Aristotelian identity as an identity between knowing subject and what is 
understood (object), but as an identity between knowing subject and the species as a 
perfective form (intellectum in actu in the sense explained, not simply intellectum). 
It could be objected that such an account does not rely so much on the words of 
Aquinas as it does on the interpretation of the words. This is exactly the point. The words of 
Aquinas can be used in any sense (as has been done for centuries even with the Bible). But 
an interpretation of his words must look for the unity that was in his mind. It would be very 
difficult to substantiate a claim that Aquinas changes his mind in the space of fifteen 
questions of the Summa. Granted, then, that he maintains the same Epistemology all the 
way through, it is necessary to look for coherence in his statements. Explicit statements 
need to be used to clarify the more obscure. If, then, Aquinas does not explicitly deny that 
which he explicitly affirms several times, and if his more obscure texts find a plausible 
explanation, we may have a human hope of reaching his mind. That a human work is 
perfectible and even fallible should not make us shy away from offering the fruits of our 
work. 
A final remark on the importance of the intellectual cognitive species in Aquinas 
would not be out of place. Although the intellect is a participation of the uncreated light, in 
which (in the uncreated light) the eternal reasons are contained, we still need species 
                                                     
view, is in fact the sensible species, contrary to what I just claimed” (cf. Stump, 249); and she quotes 
Aquinas: “To cognize things by means of their similitudes existing in the cognizer is to cognize those 




coming from the corporeal things in order to know them. The species is thus essential in 
Thomistic gnoseology, and it is not to be confounded with the light of the intellect: “But 
since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible species, which are derived from 
things, are required in order for us to have knowledge of material things; therefore this 
same knowledge is not due merely to a participation of the eternal types…”404 We will later 
discuss more extensively this passage.405 
It seems clear, then, that for Aquinas the identity in the Aristotelian phrase 
“intellectum in actu est intellectus in actu” is referred to the species in its subjective, real 
being as act of the intellect, and not to the object, as if it were an identity of knower and 
known. It is the identity between operative potency and its own forma quo, the latter 
carefully distinguished by St. Thomas from the object (forma quod). 
If a certain identity with the object itself were to be affirmed, it should be first of all 
clearly distinguished from a real identity (the oneness in substance, or in the natural being); 
then, it should be established on the basis of the species as likeness (and so on the basis of 
a certain formal or qualitative oneness); finally, it could be called an “intentional identity,” 
provided that the terms “natural” and “intentional” are clearly distinguished (as in De 
Veritate) and that the word “intentional” implies the more original alterity of the object. 
The best formula to speak about this identity secundum quid is also Aristotelian, and St. 
Thomas embraces it: “anima est quodammodo omnia.” The soul can be all things, at least in 
                                                     
404 84, 5, c.: “Quia tamen praeter lumen intellectuale in nobis, exiguntur species intelligibiles 
a rebus acceptae, ad scientiam de rebus materialibus habendam; ideo non per solam 
participationem rationum aeternarum de rebus materialibus notitiam habemus…” 





a sense, insofar as by knowing them it becomes the other things, it does receive their 
perfection. But because that perfection is not received subjectively, that is, because the 
becoming is not “real”, the identity is quodammodo, only in a certain sense.406 When we say 
“intentionally,” I suggest, we do not say much more than this, nor are we able to say much 
more.407 
It is not uncommon to find a certain confusion in Thomism between the Aristotelian 
“intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu” and the intentional identity between object and 
subject.408 In the case of Gilson, such confusion appears to be at the level of textual 
interpretation only; Gilson uses the Aristotelian phrase to indicate the intentional identity 
between knower and known, but at the same time he distinguishes the intentional 
presence of the object from its subjective-real being.409 He says that the identity between 
the actuality of subject and object is not numerical, but formal. It is not numerical, because 
the being of each thing in itself is preserved when we know (alterity in knowing). It is formal 
because, for Gilson, there is no other identity between the form of the object itself and of 
the object as known. This formal identity is actually the identity between the species as 
such and the thing itself. Now, this identity is not the Aristotelian identity, firstly because 
                                                     
406 The following text in In De Anima puts together beautifully these two “identities.” In II De 
Anima 12, 76-79: “Now, all knowledge implies that the thing known is somehow present in the 
knower, that is, present by its similitude. The knower in act, in fact, is the thing known in act.” (my 
trans.) [Cognitio autem omnis fit per hoc, quod cognitum est aliquo modo in cognoscente, scilicet 
secundum similitudinem. Nam cognoscens in actu, est ipsum cognitum in actu.] The knower 
possesses in a certain sense the known, because the representation of the known is really one with 
the knower. 
407 For an interesting text in which St. Thomas speaks about this intentional identity without 
quodammodo, cf. In III De Anima 6, 297-305 (see Appendix, Note 14). 
408 A similar use of the Aristotelian phrase to indicate an identity between subject and object 
can be seen in Cromp, 37. 




the latter is numerical (as a potency is one with its own act) and secondly because this 
identity is not between the species and the object in its real being, but between the intellect 
in act and the abstracted species. Still, is this formal identity enough to express the 
intentional presence of the object to the subject, and is this formal identity not making of 
the species an objective intermediary between the intellect and the thing itself (i.e., 
something to be known first, before the thing itself, and not something that makes known 
immediately the thing itself, as St. Thomas suggests)?410 Postulating a simply formal identity 
between the species and the object in its real being may lead to the problem of the bridge 
and to considering truth as a copy of reality. 
4) Knowing as Receptive 
At this point, it may not be out of place to recall the aim of this research. It has been 
important to clarify in what sense Aquinas speaks of identity and alterity in knowing, in 
order to show that, for him, intellectual knowing is not to provide intelligible content to the 
object, but to receive it from the object; that is, knowing is a being perfected by a 
                                                     
410 Cf. Gilson, Thomisme: Introduction a la Philosophie de Saint Thomas d’Aquin, Cinquième 
Édition Revue et Augmentée, Paris: Vrin, 1944, p. 320 in Berger, 36: “It is crucial to understand that 
it is not that the species of an object is one thing, and the object itself another thing; the species is 
the object itself as species, that is, the object considered in its action and in its efficacy which it 
exercises on a subject. Only in this sense can it be said that it is not the species of the object that 
which is present in thinking, but the object itself through its species; and in the same way that the 
object’s form is the object’s active and determinant principle, it is also the object’s form which 
becomes, by its species, the intellect that understands it” (my emphasis). As I have suggested in the 
Introduction, it seems to me that a greater distinction between content and mode of being of the 
content could have made things more clear: the species is the object insofar as it represents it, and 
it is not the object insofar as it is a subjective modification of the subject. My worry is that the 
agency (“efficace”) in Gilson is not the intentional agency of the agent object (the species impressa) 
on the possible intellect, but a certain “real” causality of the object in itself on the intellect, where 




perfection belonging to the object and lacking in the subject. The agent intellect then, if it is 
to provide an intelligibility of some sort, it will be in the realm of what has been called 
intelligibility as mode of being, not as content. That which should also be clear is the reason 
for stressing the interpretation of the Aristotelian identity in Aquinas as an identity, not 
between intellect and object, but between intellect and species; if the subjective perfection 
of the intellect (intellectus in actu) and the perfection of the object as content were the 
same, that is, if understanding itself were the form of the known, it would be possible to 
consider intelligibility as an effect of the intellect, and to ascribe to the agent intellect this 
active function. Now, because, for Aquinas, the perfection of the known as content is its 
own, the “materia prima” which is actualized with the form of the known is the possible 
intellect. The agent intellect perfects the phantasm with intelligibility as a mode of being, 
but this is a condition of possibility of knowing, not knowing itself, and this implies that the 
content is already present in the material thing, and is distinct from its individual 
conditions.411 
The present section is devoted to those texts in which knowing (both in general and 
as intellectual) is presented as a kind of receiving. This presentation of knowing as receiving 
will reinforce the idea of alterity as a characteristic of knowing, as well as the idea that 
understanding cannot be identified with the activity of the agent intellect; and as a 
consequence, the notion of knowing as a being perfected, and not a perfecting activity. That 
the agent intellect is not a formal but a metaphysical a priori means, in fact, that the agent 
intellect is not responsible for the perfection of the known as content, but rather allows this 
                                                     




perfection of the known to be intentionally perfective of the knower (in its possible 
intellect). 
The intellect is characterized from the beginning of Aquinas’ treatise on human 
being as a receptive potency: “Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual soul is other 
than the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the things 
received by each. For primary matter receives individual forms; whereas the intelligence 
receives absolute forms.”412 
The comparison with the materia prima deserves some attention, as there are both 
similarities and differences. In 84, 3, Aquinas is denying that we know by means of innate 
ideas. The second objection says: “The intellectual soul is more excellent than corporeal 
primary matter. But primary matter was created by God under the forms to which it has 
potentiality. Therefore much more is the intellectual soul created by God under intelligible 
species. And so the soul understands corporeal things through innate species.”413 The 
                                                     
412 75, 5 ad 1: “Est autem alia potentia receptiva in anima intellectiva, a potentia receptiva 
materiae primae, ut patet ex diversitate receptorum, nam materia prima recipit formas individuales, 
intellectus autem recipit formas absolutas.” The sense in which Aquinas speaks about passivity in 
human knowing can be taken from In II De Anima 11, 109-117 (quoted on p. 144 at footnote 349); 
cf. In I De Anima 10, 202-208: “In [the act of the intellect] there is no movement of the material 
substance, as in the case of vegetative activities, nor even any alteration of [a material] subject, as in 
the case of sense-awareness. There is only an activity which is called movement simply because the 
mind goes from potency into act.” [Nam in operatione intellectus non est mutatio secundum esse 
naturale, sicut est in vegetabili, nec subiectum naturale quod immutetur, sicut est in sensibili. Sed 
est ibi ipsa operatio, quae quodammodo dicitur motus, inquantum de intelligente in potentia fit 
intelligens in actu.]; In II De Anima 11, 173-179; Q.D. De Anima, a.6, c.: “To receive, to be a subject, 
and other things of this sort, are not found in the soul and in prime matter in the same specific 
way.” [Recipere et subjici et alia huiusmodi non secundum eamdem rationem conveniunt animae et 
materiae primae.]; Q.D. De Anima, a.6, ad 5 (the last two quotes also in Lambert, 87-88). 
413 84, 3 ob. 2: “Anima intellectiva est nobilior quam materia prima corporalis. Sed materia 





comparison is established on the basis that both matter and intellect are potencies of 
certain real perfective forms (first mode of being of De Veritate). St. Thomas does not deny 
that the species are real perfections of the intellect; they are not, however, its substantial 
perfection, but rather accidental ones. The comparison in the objection does not work: 
“Primary matter has substantial being through its form, consequently it had need to be 
created under some form: else it would not be in act. But when once it exists under one 
form it is in potentiality to others. On the other hand, the intellect does not receive 
substantial being through the intelligible species; and therefore there is no comparison.”414 
Again, the difference with the materia prima is not in the potentiality regarding the forms; 
St. Thomas, in this article, is denying precisely that these forms are already present in the 
intellect. The difference between materia prima and intellect lies here in the metaphysical 
“level” of the real perfections that they receive: the materia prima is in potency to 
substantial forms, whereas the intellect, as accidental operative faculty and already existing 
in a substantial subject, can be in potency only to accidental forms (the species); also, the 
difference lies in the fact that the materia prima is in potency of other substantial forms, 
but it already has its own; whereas the intellect, existing already as an accidental faculty, is 
in potency to all forms, having originally none.415 Finally, it is clear in the article that the 
                                                     
creata a Deo sub speciebus intelligibilibus. Et sic anima intelligit corporalia per species sibi 
naturaliter inditas.” 
414 84, 3 ad 2: “Materia prima habet esse substantiale per formam, et ideo oportuit quod 
crearetur sub aliqua forma, alioquin non esset in actu. Sub una tamen forma existens, est in potentia 
ad alias. Intellectus autem non habet esse substantiale per speciem intelligibilem; et ideo non est 
simile.” 





species is the real subjective form by which the knowledge of corporeal things is attained. 
The reason for denying the original (innate) presence in the intellect of species as forma quo 
of knowing things, is the fact that this knowing itself is originally in potency, and therefore 
we are also in potency of those forms by which knowing is verified.416 There is no confusion 
between object of knowing and species, even if both are strictly related.417 
The comparison between intellect and materia prima regarding their receptivity 
appears again in 87, 1, c.: “Now the human intellect is only a potentiality in the genus of 
intelligible beings, just as primary matter is a potentiality as regards sensible beings; and 
hence it is called ‘possible’.”418 In this and in the previous text,419 however, the intellect is 
considered in potency of the species as subjective form; in 75, 5 ad 1, instead, the 
potentiality seems rather to refer to the form of the known (content). In both cases, still, it 
is clear that the intellect is in potency of knowing other things and, thus, receptive of their 
content as well. 
Intellect and sensibility are considered “apprehensive” faculties.420 In the following 
text, the apprehensive faculty (here “apprehensive” is cognitive as opposed to appetitive) is 
                                                     
416 Cf. 84, 3, c.. 
417 More about this relationship will be said in the following, cf. p. 182. 
418 87, 1, c.: “Intellectus autem humanus se habet in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in 
potentia tantum, sicut et materia prima se habet in genere rerum sensibilium, unde possibilis 
nominatur.” 
419 84, 3. 
420 “Apprehension” or similar words are used in other texts as well. Cf. 80, 2, c.: “Indeed, the 
passive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its active principle. Therefore, since what 
is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different; 
consequently, the intellectual appetite is distinct from the sensitive.” [… ipsa potentia passiva 
propriam rationem habet ex ordine ad suum activum. Quia igitur est alterius generis apprehensum 
per intellectum et apprehensum per sensum, consequens est quod appetitus intellectivus sit alia 





brought to act in the reception of something. Here St. Thomas prefers to say actus rather 
than actio, the latter reserved for the appetitive act:  
For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement as the 
act of the appetite: since the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in 
the very fact that the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the 
operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is 
borne towards the thing desirable.421  
But he says exactly the same thing, using the words actio – actus in the exact 
opposite way: “For as we have said above, the action of the intellect consists in this—that 
the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while the act of the will 
consists in this—that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself.”422 In both 
cases, however, he is stressing that understanding is verified by the presence of the thing 
understood in the subject. 
The word “apprehension” in reference to knowing appears also in the following 
text,423 where it is clear that to apprehend means the opposite of possessing a form 
naturally. The form possessed naturally (be it accidental, as a faculty,424 or substantial) is 
followed by a natural appetite, whereas the form that is apprehended is followed by a 
different kind of tendency, which is called “appetitive faculty.” Thus, it is suggested again 
that knowing is receptive of a form which is not naturally in the subject: 
                                                     
421 81, 1, c.: “Actus enim apprehensivae virtutis non ita proprie dicitur motus, sicut actio 
appetitus, nam operatio virtutis apprehensivae perficitur in hoc, quod res apprehensae sunt in 
apprehendente; operatio autem virtutis appetitivae perficitur in hoc, quod appetens inclinatur in 
rem appetibilem.” 
422 82, 3, c.: “Ut enim supra dictum est, actio intellectus consistit in hoc quod ratio rei 
intellectae est in intelligente; actus vero voluntatis perficitur in hoc quod voluntas inclinatur ad 
ipsam rem prout in se est.” 
423 80, 1, c.. 





Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner 
and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be in them an inclination 
surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. And this 
superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the 
animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined 
by its natural form.425 
Knowing is verified by the possession of a form, but not as a form already possessed 
naturally. The intellect is informed (is perfected) by intelligible images of things abstracted 
from the senses: 
The likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause of knowledge; otherwise what 
Empedocles said would be true —that the soul needs to have the nature of all in 
order to know all. But knowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in 
the knower, as a kind of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in the present state 
of life, is such that it can be informed with similitudes abstracted from phantasms: 
and therefore it knows material things rather than immaterial substances.426 
The language of receptivity, this time in explicit comparison with the agent intellect, 
is also used in 88, 1, c. In this text, the distinction between possible intellect and agent 
intellect is as clear as it can be: 
As was shown above, the active intellect is not a separate substance; but a faculty of 
the soul, extending itself actively to the same objects to which the passive intellect 
                                                     
425 80, 1, c.: “Sicut igitur formae altiori modo existunt in habentibus cognitionem supra 
modum formarum naturalium, ita oportet quod in eis sit inclinatio supra modum inclinationis 
naturalis, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis. Et haec superior inclinatio pertinet ad vim animae 
appetitivam, per quam animal appetere potest ea quae apprehendit, non solum ea ad quae 
inclinatur ex forma naturali.” 
426 88, 1 ad 2: “Similitudo naturae non est ratio sufficiens ad cognitionem, alioquin oporteret 
dicere quod Empedocles dixit, quod anima esset de natura omnium, ad hoc quod omnia 
cognosceret. Sed requiritur ad cognoscendum, ut sit similitudo rei cognitae in cognoscente quasi 
quaedam forma ipsius. Intellectus autem noster possibilis, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est 
natus informari similitudinibus rerum materialium a phantasmatibus abstractis, et ideo cognoscit 
magis materialia quam substantias immateriales.” Cf. De Ver 2, 3, ad 9. The word “perfici” orients us 
in the same sense (knowing as reception), for example in 85, 4, c.: “Therefore it is impossible for one 
and the same intellect to be perfected at the same time by different intelligible species so as 
actually to understand different things.” [Impossibile est ergo quod idem intellectus simul perficiatur 





extends receptively; because, as is stated,427 the passive intellect is ‘all things 
potentially,’ and the active intellect is ‘all things in act.’ Therefore both intellects, 
according to the present state of life, extend to material things only, which are made 
actually intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in the passive intellect.428 
In other places, St. Thomas refers to intellectual knowing as a kind of vision, 
perception, etc.. In 84, 7, c., precisely referring to the intellect’s conversion to the 
phantasms, he says: “And, therefore, for the intellect to understand actually its proper 
object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal nature 
existing in the individual.”429 The verb “speculari” is used in place of “intelligere.” The verb 
“percipere” is used in reference to understanding immediately after being used for sensible 
knowledge in 85, 2 ad 2:  
                                                     
427 De Anima iii, 5. 
428 88, 1, c.: “Sexto, quia supra ostensum est quod intellectus agens non est substantia 
separata, sed virtus quaedam animae, ad eadem active se extendens, ad quae se extendit intellectus 
possibilis receptive, quia, ut dicitur in III De Anima, intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri, 
intellectus agens quo est omnia facere. Uterque ergo intellectus se extendit, secundum statum 
praesentis vitae, ad materialia sola; quae intellectus agens facit intelligibilia actu, et recipiuntur in 
intellectu possibili.” It is interesting that St. Thomas is not shy of calling the action of the agent 
intellect “intelligere”, although in a hypothetical statement, in the text immediately following: 
“Hence in the present state of life we cannot understand separate immaterial substances in 
themselves, either by the passive or by the active intellect.” [Unde secundum statum praesentis 
vitae, neque per intellectum possibilem, neque per intellectum agentem, possumus intelligere 
substantias immateriales secundum seipsas.] Finally, in what other way could the action of an 
intellect be described? But from here to saying that understanding for St. Thomas is an active 
performance, there is a long distance. For language of “receptivity”, cf. also Q.D. De Anima, a.4, ad 
5: “… [T]he species existing in the medium and in the sense is a particular and nothing more. The 
possible intellect, however, receives species of a higher genus than those present in the 
imagination; because the possible intellect receives universal species, whereas the imagination 
contains only particular species. Therefore we require an agent intellect in the case of intelligible 
things…” [… species in medio et in sensu non sit nisi particularis. Intellectus autem possibilis recipit 
species alterius generis quam sint in imaginatione; cum intellectus possibilis recipiat species 
universales, et imaginatio non contineat nisi particulares. Et ideo in intelligibilibus indigemus 
intellectu agente…] 
429 84, 7, c.: “Et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum 






[We can see the point by a comparison with the senses]. For the sight sees the color 
of the apple apart from its smell […] but that it be perceived apart from the smell, 
this is owing to the sight, forasmuch as the faculty of sight receives the likeness of 
color and not of smell. In like manner humanity understood is only in this or that 
man; but that humanity be apprehended without conditions of individuality, that is, 
that it be abstracted and consequently considered as universal, occurs to humanity 
inasmuch as it is [perceived by] the intellect, in which there is a likeness of the 
specific nature, but not of the principles of individuality.430 
The fact that St. Thomas uses the word “percipere” for both sensible and intellectual 
knowing is one more indication that for him knowing is receptive, a being perfected, and 
not a perfecting activity. 
The object is that which perfects the faculty of knowing: “There must needs be some 
proportion between the object and the faculty of knowledge; such as of the active to the 
passive, and of perfection to the perfectible. Hence that sensible objects of great power are 
not grasped by the senses, is due not merely to the fact that they corrupt the organ, but 
also to their being improportionate to the sensitive power.”431 Nothing can be more clear 
than the characterization of knowing in general as a “being perfected”: 
Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the 
senses [are] made actual by what is actually sensible. We must therefore assign on 
the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by 
                                                     
430 85, 2 ad 2: “Et hoc possumus videre per simile in sensu. Visus enim videt colorem pomi 
sine eius odore […] sed quod sit sine odore perceptus, hoc accidit ei ex parte visus, inquantum in visu 
est similitudo coloris et non odoris. Similiter humanitas quae intelligitur, non est nisi in hoc vel in illo 
homine, sed quod humanitas apprehendatur sine individualibus conditionibus, quod est ipsam 
abstrahi, ad quod sequitur intentio universalitatis, accidit humanitatis secundum quod percipitur ab 
intellectu, in quo est similitudo naturae speciei, et non individualium principiorum.” Cf. 84, 1, c., 
where similar expressions occur (quoted on p. 166). 
431 88, 1 ad 3: “Requiritur aliqua proportio obiecti ad potentiam cognoscitivam, ut activi ad 
passivum, et perfectionis ad perfectibile. Unde quod excellentia sensibilia non capiantur a sensu, 






abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an 
active intellect.432 
The act of the intelligence is the act of a passive potency needing an agent power in 
order to be actualized: “Our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to act by some 
being in act, that is, by the active intellect, which is a power of the soul, as we have said; 
and not by a separate intelligence, as proximate cause, although perchance as remote 
cause.”433  
The same idea can be seen regarding the possible intellect (in the following text), 
but here the word “agent” is referring more directly to the intelligible species which can be 
impressed in the intellect: “Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the 
incorporeal. And therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation according to 
Aristotle, the impression caused by the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble 
is required, for ‘the agent is more noble than the patient,’ as he says.”434 
The text of 84, 4 ad 3 (just quoted) raises an interesting question. Could we say that 
the intellect receives not the object itself, nor the species, but rather the intellect’s action 
                                                     
432 79, 3, c.: “Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut 
sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, 
quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. Et haec 
est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem.” 
433 84, 4 ad 3: “Dicendum quod intellectus noster possibilis reducitur de potentia ad actum 
per aliquod ens actu, idest per intellectum agentem, qui est virtus quaedam animae nostrae, ut 
dictum est, non autem per aliquem intellectum separatum, sicut per causam proximam; sed forte 
sicut per causam remotam.” The distinction between agent intellect and possible intellect will be 
approached in section 6 of this Chapter. 
434 84, 6, c.: “Nihil autem corporeum imprimere potest in rem incorpoream. Et ideo ad 
causandam intellectualem operationem, secundum Aristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio 






on the object? Is it not what Aquinas means, when he says that the agent intellect 
actualizes the possible? Is it not in this sense that the possible intellect is a passive potency? 
Let us proceed with some order. We have already shown that the object of intelligence, as 
universal content, is other than the intellect and is received as a remedium of its original 
poverty.435 Therefore, it cannot be denied that, for St. Thomas, the intellect is receptive of 
the perfection of the object. As well, we have shown that the intellect is also in potency of 
its own (subjective) act, which is the species (in its real being). We have also shown that 
species and object are not the same, such that we understand the object, not the species.436 
Still, a question may remain. Is the species different from the action of the intellect? Insofar 
as the species is the form by which we understand something, that is, if we consider the 
species without its content, there is no difference between species and action of the 
intellect; indeed, the action of the intellect is the act by which we understand an object, 
which is also the definition of the species.437 Now, we may distinguish them in fieri 
(intelligere is the act of understanding as proceeding from the faculty towards the object, 
species is the act of understanding  as completed),438 but because the action of the intellect 
is not a movement, fieri and factum are not distinct in reality. Now, is this intelligere 
                                                     
435 Cf. section 1 of this Chapter. 
436 Cf. section 2 and 3 of this Chapter. 
437 And this is exactly the meaning of the Aristotelian identity, as we have seen in section 3 
of this Chapter. 
438 Or rather the distinction is between the operation as such, in its essence (intelligere), 
abstracted from the object, and the operation in facto esse, where it cannot be separated from the 
species of the object, which is the subjective form of the intellect in act, and so the operation itself. 
We need to keep always in mind that understanding is an intentional operation, and therefore its 
act is on an object as such: it is not a physical operation that produces a modification in an object by 
means of its own movement, but rather it is the object that moves the potency to attain it as object, 





produced by the agent intellect? We could ask the same question in other words: is the 
agent intellect the cause of the species in the possible? In order to answer, we need to 
distinguish species impressa and expressa and, in both species, both content and the 
subjective being of the species.439 In no case is the agent intellect cause of the content; 
instead, the agent intellect is cause of the abstracted mode of being of the content.440 Is the 
agent intellect cause of the species impressa in its subjective being? Yes, it is: the result of 
the process of abstraction is the intelligible (not yet intellected) in act which, precisely 
because of its abstraction from matter, is able to be understood by the possible intellect.441 
This species impressa, however, is not the act of the possible intellect, but the “catalyst” of 
this act, the agent object which is able to actualize the possible intellect and will do so. Is 
the agent intellect the cause of the species expressa? It is cause of the agent object (the 
                                                     
439 Cf. Stump, 267: “Although the abstracting of an intelligible species is the beginning or 
source of an act of intellection, that act of intellection is not complete until the intellect has used the 
intelligible species to form an intention” (she quotes extensively in support CG I, 53); Stump, 268-
269: “The resulting [from abstraction] intelligible species are received spiritually by the potential 
intellect. Actualized in this way by the intelligible species, the intellect engages in a further act, 
transforming the intelligible species into a mental concept”; Francis A. Cunningham, “A Theory on 
Abstraction in St. Thomas,” Modern Schoolman: A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy 35 (1958): 253, “It 
is the function of the possible intellect to receive these intelligible species and conceive the 
corresponding verbum”; CG II, 59, par. 14: “For colors existing outside the soul are in the presence 
of light actually visible, as having the power to move the sight; but are not actually (seen) in the 
sense of being actually perceived as the result of becoming one with the sense power in act. And 
similarly, phantasms are made actually intelligible by the light of the agent intellect, so that they are 
able to move the possible intellect; but not so as to be actually understood, through union with the 
possible intellect actualized.” [Colores enim extra animam existentes, praesente lumine, sunt 
visibiles actu ut potentes movere visum: non autem ut actu sensata, secundum quod sunt unum 
cum sensu in actu. Et similiter phantasmata per lumen intellectus agentis fiunt actu intelligibilia, ut 
possint movere intellectum possibilem: non autem ut sint intellecta actu, secundum quod sunt 
unum cum intellectu possibili facto in actu.] 
440 Cf. Chapter 1, especially section 1 and 4, and Chapter 2; still, it is the main point of the 
dissertation, and so it will be shown more clearly in Chapter 4.  





species impressa), and the agent object is cause of the act of the intellect precisely as agent 
object.442 The agent intellect does not need to move the possible intellect in any other way 
because the possible intellect is already transcendentally ordered to its own object. It is the 
possible intellect itself that understands, that embraces intentionally (and thus possesses) 
the object which has been presented by the agent intellect.443 It does not seem necessary to 
add a divine pre-motion to the possible intellect, but understanding should be considered 
as an intentional potency (that is, moved by its proper object) and not as a physical potency, 
needing to be moved by a cause in order to “reach” or “affect” the object. In any case, a 
divine influence should be supposed on the side of the agent intellect and of the agent 
object. 
That the agent intellect is not the cause of an alleged action of the possible intellect 
on the phantasm has already been precluded by the fact that, for Aquinas, the action of the 
possible intellect is not on the phantasm: understanding is of the universal nature, not of 
the phantasm;444 and the conversio ad phantasmata is not the act of understanding, but a 
mode of the act of understanding the universal nature.445 The agent intellect could be 
                                                     
442 Cf. 87, 1, c.: “[Our intellect] understands itself according as it is made actual by the 
species abstracted from sensible things, through the light of the active intellect, which not only 
actuates the intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates the passive 
intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence, but by its act.” [… consequens est ut 
sic seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas 
per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum intelligibilium, et eis mediantibus intellectus 
possibilis. Non ergo per essentiam suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit intellectus noster.] 
443 As far as I can see, it is not that the possible intellect produces the expressa as a different 
species, but rather it only “embraces” the species (the impressa) that is already there: in this sense, 
the impressa “becomes” the expressa when it is understood. 
444 Cf. Chapter 1, section 2. 
445 Cf. 84, 7, c.: “And, therefore, for the intellect to understand actually its proper object, it 





considered as much cause of the conversio as it is cause of the act of understanding, that is, 
only insofar as it produces the species impressa and, strictly speaking, only insofar as it 
produces the abstracted mode of being of the universal nature.446 
Some texts in which Aquinas seems to characterize knowing in an active way will 
now be examined but, first, a more “methodological” remark needs to be made. That is, St. 
Thomas is not overly concerned about technical words and expressions. He respects the 
normal use of words; words can be used in different senses, as long as a certain core of 
meaning is respected.  Normally, one does not say “cold” when referring to “heat”, but may 
say “cold” to refer not only to the weather, but also to an answer, or a personality. St. 
Thomas, by respecting this fact, makes his writings not more obscure, but more clear. If he 
had locked himself up in a world of technical expressions, he would have had to spend 
countless and useless pages defining his technicalities, and then always with the risk of not 
being understood. Instead, trusting in the understanding of the reader, he simply speaks 
humanly. He sometimes says the same thing twice, using different words; he may use a 
comparison, or he may use an opposition, to make sure that the reader understands what 
he means; and most importantly, he always begins by telling the reader what he is talking 
about, what the problem is, and what the solution is not, so that the reader, by the 
combination of so many “phantasms”, may arrive at understanding him. This is not to 
suggest that understanding St. Thomas is particularly easy, nor that preparation is not 
                                                     
individual.” [Et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium, 
quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem.] 
446 The text in 89, 5, c., referring to science as “acquired” and to the species remaining in the 




needed to approach his text. However, one cannot take a phrase from St. Thomas to make a 
statement, and then say that it is so “because St. Thomas has said that it is so.” Because 
what St. Thomas means is not bound to the words he uses, but is free, one must follow the 
living current of his thinking, and then express, not one’s preferred thought about him, but 
what Aquinas is actually saying, in words meaningful to oneself and one’s own time. This 
implies, of course, that there is a meaning behind the words, and that we, human beings 
that we are, have the ability to get behind the words and discover that meaning. Nowadays, 
many people think that this is not the case. However, St. Thomas appears to have 
composed his works thinking that this is precisely the case. 
In the following text, then, St. Thomas refers to understanding as an action but, at 
the same time, not an action that perfects another thing. He is not denying that knowing 
refers to another thing as object, as he says in other places. However, if there is a reference 
to another, that reference is perfective of the subject, not of the object. It would be very 
difficult to use this text to affirm that knowing, for St. Thomas, is active, or to affirm that 
knowing does not imply alterity. The former is explicitly denied, and the latter is not said 
and does not follow. 
Secondly, because since Socrates is an individual in a nature of one essence 
composed of matter and form, if the intellect be not the form, it follows that it must 
be outside the essence, and then the intellect is [to] the whole Socrates as a motor 
to the thing moved. Whereas the act of intellect remains in the agent, and does not 
pass into something else, as does the action of heating. Therefore the action of 
understanding cannot be attributed to Socrates for the reason that he is moved by 
his intellect.447 
                                                     
447 76, 1, c.: “Secundo quia, cum Socrates sit quoddam individuum in natura cuius essentia 





A similar text follows, in which St. Thomas uses art (ars factibilium) rather than 
calefactio to differentiate between immanent and transient operations. Again, the denial of 
alterity is denial in the sense that knowing is not an activity perfecting another but, rather, a 
being perfected: “Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect consists in its own operation: 
for this is not an act tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work 
accomplished, as building is the perfection of the thing built; but it remains in the agent as 
its perfection and act, as is said [in] Metaph. ix.”448 Again, in this text, in almost the same 
context, Aquinas uses “actio” for the transient actions, and “actus” instead for the intellect.  
That the perfection of the intellect is, in one sense, the species and, in another 
sense, the object known, has already been said, but it bears repetition: epistemologically, 
species and object are strictly dependent on each other. The species, however, is for the 
sake of the object, and not the object for the sake of the species; it is understanding as 
receiving the perfection of other things which is the purpose of knowing (understanding as 
remedium). Still, it is the perfection of the subject which is the purpose of knowing; 
however, this is not a perfection bestowed, but a perfection realized in the intentional 
reception and possession of the other. Finally, the ultimate perfection of the subject is not 
in understanding the material-other but in understanding, through the corporeal things, the 
Author of the universe, at least in the Author’s existence as first cause. 
                                                     
essentiam eius; et sic intellectus comparabitur ad totum Socratem sicut motor ad motum. Intelligere 
autem est actio quiescens in agente, non autem transiens in alterum, sicut calefactio. Non ergo 
intelligere potest attribui Socrati propter hoc quod est motus ab intellectu.” 
448 87, 3, c.: “Ultima autem perfectio intellectus est eius operatio, non enim est sicut actio 
tendens in alterum, quae sit perfectio operati, sicut aedificatio aedificati; sed manet in operante ut 





Other texts may give the same impression of understanding as an activity.449 The 
intellect can be said to be the active principle of the sensibility in a metaphysical sense, 
because whatever is more perfect is principle of the imperfect, and the intellect is 
essentially more perfect than the senses. In a cognitional sense, or as receptive principles, 
however, the more imperfect potencies are principles of the higher ones, insofar as they 
provide, as it were, the material for the act of the latter:  
But since the essence of the soul is compared to the powers both as a principle 
active and final, and as a receptive principle, either separately by itself, or together 
with the body; and since the agent and the end are more perfect, while the 
receptive principle, as such, is less perfect; it follows that those powers of the soul 
which precede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are the principles of 
the others, after the manner of the end and active principle. For we see that the 
senses are for the sake of the intelligence, and not the other way about. The senses, 
moreover, are a certain imperfect participation of the intelligence; wherefore, 
according to their natural origin, they proceed from the intelligence as the imperfect 
from the perfect. But considered as receptive principles, the more [imperfect] 
powers are principles with regard to the others; thus the soul, according as it has the 
sensitive power, is considered as the subject, and as [a certain] material with regard 
to the intelligence.450 
Is Aquinas talking about the material (“materiale quoddam”) for a perfecting 
activity? Here, St. Thomas is speaking not of the intellect as active and even agent principle 
of the senses (as in the first part of the article), but as receptive principle. He is also very 
                                                     
449 Besides the following texts, see Appendix, Note 16. 
450 77, 7, c.: “Sed quia essentia animae comparatur ad potentias et sicut principium activum 
et finale, et sicut principium susceptivum, vel seorsum per se vel simul cum corpore; agens autem et 
finis est perfectius, susceptivum autem principium, inquantum huiusmodi, est minus perfectum, 
consequens est quod potentiae animae quae sunt priores secundum ordinem perfectionis et 
naturae, sint principia aliarum per modum finis et activi principii. Videmus enim quod sensus est 
propter intellectum, et non e converso. Sensus etiam est quaedam deficiens participatio intellectus, 
unde secundum naturalem originem quodammodo est ab intellectu, sicut imperfectum a perfecto. 
Sed secundum viam susceptivi principii, e converso potentiae imperfectiores inveniuntur principia 
respectu aliarum, sicut anima, secundum quod habet potentiam sensitivam, consideratur sicut 




careful in adding “quaedam”, “quoddam” and “quodammodo” throughout, in order not to 
be misunderstood. Aquinas’ goal here is to show the interdependence between the human 
potencies in two ways. First, in a metaphysical – static way, the unity of the soul requires 
that the less perfect originates from the more perfect and, thus, there is a dependence in 
the realm of being and natural perfection. Second, in a dynamic – operative way, the act of 
the lower potencies is prior, and because of that, a certain principle of the act of the higher 
potencies; thus, the act of the senses is a condition of possibility of the act of the 
intelligence. This is the point. Aquinas later clarifies that the material cause of the senses is 
not enough, and an agency on the part of the intellect is required.451 However, this does not 
make the intellect less receptive as a knowing faculty, as we have seen and will see again. 
One article just prior to the introduction of the agent intellect, St. Thomas refers to 
the intellect as a passive potency with regard to every universal being, making a contrast 
between this passive potency and other potencies which are active:  
The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and the passion are referred to the 
same thing: but not always, if they refer to different things. Now the intellect is a 
passive power in regard to the whole universal being: while the vegetative power is 
active in regard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united to the soul. 
Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force being nobler than such an active 
one.452 
This text helps to show that the agent intellect is not the potency of which St. 
Thomas is speaking here (he will later characterize both potencies as regarding the same 
                                                     
451 Cf. 84, 6. 
452 79, 2 ad 3: “Agens est nobilius patiente, si ad idem actio et passio referantur, non autem 
semper, si ad diversa. Intellectus autem est vis passiva respectu totius entis universalis. Vegetativum 
autem est activum respectu cuiusdam entis particularis, scilicet corporis coniuncti. Unde nihil 





but in different ways, one actively and the other passively);453 and that the intellect is 
receptive of something different from the particular; and that the passivity of the intellect 
does not make it a lesser potency in the human soul.454 
We may then conclude that, for Aquinas, knowing is not a perfecting activity, but an 
activity in which the perfection of something other than the subject perfects the subject 
itself, making the latter acquire a perfection it did not have, in a way that is not physical but 
intentional. The perfection of the object is received “passively”, insofar as the subject grows 
with a perfection that did not belong to it, a perfection regarding which it was in potency, 
where “potency” means a capacity of receiving intentionally. The fact that this “passivity” 
cannot mean an absolute indifference—a dead openness into which anything could enter—
can be explained by what Aquinas says about the natural appetite of the potency, by the 
proportion between potency and proper object, and mainly by the specific nature of 
knowing as opposed to physical processes.455 
                                                     
453 Cf. 88, 1, c. 
454 Aquinas has characterized knowing (and particularly understanding) as receptive in other 
works as well. See Appendix, Note 17. 
455 Cf. p. 149 ff. and p. 177, footnote 330. Other authors support our interpretation of 
knowing in Aquinas as receptive. Gilson would complain about an idealistic contamination of terms. 
“Invention” in human knowing does not mean “creation”, but rather something like an “encounter” 
(cf. RM 110). Cf. Lambert, 85 (after talking about the infused knowledge of angels): “The possible 
intellect, on the other hand, knows nothing naturally and must acquire each one of its species 
separately”; 93: “The human intellect is originally empty and so must acquire the species which 
actuate it.” 
Sellés, instead, says that Aquinas does not admit the preceeding interpretations of the 
Aristotelian agent intellect because all of them conceive human knowing as passive, which in the 
mind of Sellés is unacceptable because knowing is an act (cf. Crítica, 224; EIA, 200, 246). I would 
suggest that one should distinguish between act as perfection received and act as perfection 
bestowed, i.e., between the act of a perfected passive potency and the act of a perfecting active 
potency (cf. In II De Anima 6, 123-138); and should also distinguish between the natural passivity of 
matter and the intentional receptivity of the knowing faculties. Passion and act are analogous 




5) The Comparison between Intelligence and Sensitivity 
The following group of texts regards the so frequent comparison in Aquinas between 
sensitivity and intelligence. For Kant, the intuition of the senses as reception of the material 
of experience is the way to ensure contact with reality and, thus, the objectivity of human 
understanding. Objectivity for Kant has to do with extramental reality, which is only 
particular, and the contact with that reality is by means of sensible intuition. Now human 
science is universal; universal concepts do not come from experience, because reality is 
particular; but universal concepts are applied to the particular. Therefore, in Kant’s mind, 
human science has to be a subjective function, an activity, an application of subjective a 
priori categories to the objective reality of experience. 
As we have seen, St. Thomas does not have the same point of departure and so, for 
him, sensibility and intelligence are not understood in the same way. For Aquinas, both 
sensibility and intelligence are receptive of the object – content. And for this reason, he 
does not hesitate to constantly compare intelligence with sensibility regarding the most 
important characteristics of knowing: alterity, receptivity, species, identity with regards to 
the species, objectivity, etc.. Once again, the goal here is to show how different is Aquinas’ 
approach from any Kantian approach to Epistemology, and how for St. Thomas knowing has 
nothing to do with a perfecting activity.  
The texts in this section show that, for Aquinas, sensibility and intelligence realise or 
fulfil the same basic notion of knowing, in which the content is a posteriori, that is to say, 
has its origin in experience. Because of this, it seems, intellectual and sensible knowing are 




In 85, 2 ad 2 several similarities between senses and intelligence can be seen. The 
first is that the object of knowing is in reality but, insofar as it is known, possesses another 
mode of being in the faculty: “… the nature itself […] is only in individuals; but [its being] 
understood […] is in the intellect.”456 and “… the color which is seen is only in the apple: but 
that it be perceived apart from the smell, this is owing to the sight.”457 The second is that 
knowing is verified by means of a species, an image, that is present in the faculty: “… the 
faculty of sight receives the likeness of color and not of smell.”458 and “… in [the intellect] 
there is a likeness of the specific nature, but not of the principles of individuality.”459 The 
third is that, in both cases, knowing is called “perception”: “… that it be perceived apart 
from the smell, this is owing to the sight…”460 and “inasmuch as it is [perceived by] the 
intellect…”461 The text flows nicely in its complete form.462 
Helpful in showing another interesting comparison between sensibility and 
intelligence is our other textus princeps, 79, 3. Both faculties are receptive and in potency of 
their respective objects; moreover, the similarity with vision goes even further since, for 
both intellect and vision, a light is required for the object to be visible. From the first 
objection the comparison is explicit: “For as the senses are to things sensible, so is our 
                                                     
456 “Ipsa igitur natura […], non est nisi in singularibus; sed hoc ipsum quod est intelligi […] est 
in intellectu.” 
457 “Color qui videtur, non est nisi in pomo; sed quod sit sine odore perceptus, hoc accidit ei 
ex parte visus.” 
458 “… [I]n visu est similitudo coloris et non odoris.” 
459  “… [P]ercipitur ab intellectu, in quo est similitudo naturae speciei, et non individualium 
principiorum.” 
460 “… [Q]uod sit sine odore perceptus, hoc accidit ei ex parte visus…” 
461 “… [S]ecundum quod percipitur ab intellectu…” 





intellect to things intelligible.”463 Granted, however, a similarity to some extent, an agent 
sense is not required: “Sensible things are found in act outside the soul; and hence there is 
no need for an active sense.”464 In fact, although in both cases the faculty is in potency, and 
although both faculties are reduced to their proper act by something in act (the sensible or 
the intelligible object), in the case of intelligence the object is not intelligible in act and, for 
this reason, an agent intellect is required: 
Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the 
senses [are] made actual by what is actually sensible. We must therefore assign on 
the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by 
abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an 
active intellect.465 
Let us now consider the response to the second objection. If the first opinion 
regarding the role of light in vision is accepted, then vision and intelligence are similar in 
one more respect, that being the necessity of a light making their respective objects 
knowable in act. St. Thomas says: “There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For some 
say that light is required for sight, in order to make colors actually visible. And according to 
this the active intellect is required for understanding, in like manner and for the same 
reason as light is required for seeing.”466 Regardless of the doctrine of light, which will be 
                                                     
463 79, 3, ob. 1: “Sicut enim se habet sensus ad sensibilia, ita se habet intellectus noster ad 
intelligibilia.” 
464 79, 3 ad 1: “Sensibilia inveniuntur actu extra animam, et ideo non oportuit ponere 
sensum agentem.” 
465 79, 3, c.: “Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut 
sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, 
quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. Et haec 
est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem.” 
466 79, 3 ad 2: “Circa effectum luminis est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt quod lumen 
requiritur ad visum, ut faciat colores actu visibiles. Et secundum hoc, similiter requiritur, et propter 





examined in more detail later, it is clear that the similarity between the intentional 
receptivity of intelligence and of vision is the greatest possible. 
In 78, 1, c.,467 both potencies are said to refer to the extra-mental reality, and in 
both cases this reference is verified by means of a species. 
The Aristotelian identity (which, for St. Thomas, as we have seen, regards the 
identity of the species with the faculty) applies to both intelligence and sensibility: “The 
thing understood is in the intellect by its own likeness; and it is in this sense that we say that 
the thing understood [in act] is the intellect in act, because the likeness of the thing 
understood is the form of the intellect, as the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of the 
sense in act.” 468 The role of the species is, in both cases, the same: “The intelligible species 
is to the intellect what the sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not what 
is perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is 
not what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect understands.”469 The act of 
vision and the act of understanding are considered equally immanent actions: “There is a 
twofold action (Metaph. ix), one which remains in the agent; for instance, to see and to 
understand; and another which passes into an external object; for instance, to heat and to 
                                                     
467 Text quoted and translated p. 69. 
468 85, 2 ad 1: “Intellectum est in intelligente per suam similitudinem. Et per hunc modum 
dicitur quod intellectum in actu est intellectus in actu, inquantum similitudo rei intellectae est forma 
intellectus; sicut similitudo rei sensibilis est forma sensus in actu.” Cf. ob. 1. 
469 85, 2, sc.: “Species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum, sicut species sensibilis ad sensum. 
Sed species sensibilis non est illud quod sentitur, sed magis id quo sensus sentit. Ergo species 





cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form.”470 St. Thomas takes the 
similarity even further asserting that, in both sensibility and intelligence, there is a “double 
operation”, one which is strictly receptive and another which is formative and more active: 
There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in regard of impression only, 
and thus the operation of the senses takes place by the senses being impressed by 
the sensible. The other is formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an 
image of an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these operations 
are found in the intellect.471 
A clarification is in order. Although the text just quoted shows how similar are sense 
and intellect for Aquinas, it seems that this text should be understood not as referring to 
the receptivity of the content but, rather, to the receptivity of the species as agent object 
(species impressa). In that case, definition is understood as the formation of the species 
expressa by the possible intellect in the simple apprehension. This would be in line with the 
consideration of the definition as simple.472 It would also imply that the first species 
expressa in sensitivity is formed not in the external senses, but in the imagination. If we 
want to say that Aquinas refers “formation” only to judgment, then Aquinas implies in this 
text that the definition already presupposes a composition (of specific difference and 
genus); but the text seems to oppose ratio and compositio. In any case, the word 
“formation” cannot be taken to mean “activity” in the sense of providing content but, 
                                                     
470 85, 2, c.: “Cum enim sit duplex actio, sicut dicitur IX Metaphys., una quae manet in 
agente, ut videre et intelligere, altera quae transit in rem exteriorem, ut calefacere et secare; 
utraque fit secundum aliquam formam.” 
471 85, 2 ad 3: “In parte sensitiva invenitur duplex operatio. Una secundum solam 
immutationem, et sic perficitur operatio sensus per hoc quod immutatur a sensibili. Alia operatio est 
formatio, secundum quod vis imaginativa format sibi aliquod idolum rei absentis, vel etiam 
nunquam visae. Et utraque haec operatio coniungitur in intellectu.” 
472 This is more evident, for example, in In VII Metaphysicorum, lect. 11, n. 1528; lect. 12, 




rather, the intentional actualization of the faculty by means of the agent object. Only in this 
second moment (of formation, not impression) does the “reception” (as possession) of the 
content take place. Knowing is this intentional “activity of reception” and the difficulty of 
Epistemology is to grasp this fact as different from physical activities and receptions. 
Let us examine other texts.473 Both kinds of faculties are apprehensive but their 
respective objects are formally different: “Indeed, the passive power itself has its very 
nature from its relation to its active principle. Therefore, since what is apprehended by the 
intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different; consequently, the 
intellectual appetite is distinct from the sensitive.”474 
The clear acknowledgement of the differences between intellect and sense does not 
conflict with the aforementioned similarities. What St. Thomas says in 84, 4 ad 2: “Material 
things, as to the being which they have outside the soul, may be actually sensible, but not 
actually intelligible. Wherefore there is no comparison between sense and intellect.”475 is 
                                                     
473 For St. Thomas, both faculties are equally in potency to their respective objects, in such a 
way that the Aristotelian quodammodo omnia applies to both. Cf. 84, 2 ad 2: “Aristotle did not hold 
that the soul is actually composed of all things, as did the earlier philosophers; he said that the soul 
is all things, ‘after a fashion,’ forasmuch as it is in potentiality to all—through the senses, to all things 
sensible—through the intellect, to all things intelligible.” [… Aristoteles non posuit animam esse actu 
compositam ex omnibus, sicut antiqui naturales; sed dixit quodammodo animam esse omnia, 
inquantum est in potentia ad omnia; per sensum quidem ad sensibilia, per intellectum vero ad 
intelligibilia.] The quodammodo omnia referred to both faculties had already appeared in 80, 1, 
where they are also similar in their alterity, in the reception of species of their objects and in being 
apprehensive faculties as opposed to appetitive faculties (cf. 80, 1, c., ob. 2 y ad 2). 
474 80, 2, c.: “Ipsa potentia passiva propriam rationem habet ex ordine ad suum activum. 
Quia igitur est alterius generis apprehensum per intellectum et apprehensum per sensum, 
consequens est quod appetitus intellectivus sit alia potentia a sensitive.” 
475 84, 4 ad 2: “Res materiales, secundum esse quod habent extra animam, possunt esse 





clearly understood by what we have already seen in 79, 3 (the necessity of an agent 
intellect) and other texts, for example: 
But there is this difference, according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the sense 
and the intelligence—that a thing is perceived by the sense according to the 
disposition which it has outside the soul—that is, in its individuality; whereas the 
nature of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode according 
to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is 
understood.476 
Why, then, does St. Thomas say in 84, 4 ad 2 that “there is no comparison between 
sense and intellect”? The second objection is based on the alleged parallel between sense 
and intellect regarding the relationship of the object to the potency. This parallel, however, 
is misconstrued in the following way: as the sensible in act (the real corporeal thing, object 
of knowledge) is the cause of the sensible species actualizing the sense (as forma quo), in 
the same way the intelligible species actualizing the intellect must be caused by the 
intelligible in act (understood as real spiritual beings existing outside the mind). St. Thomas’ 
answer puts things in order: the object of human knowledge is the corporeal thing, not the 
separate substances. The corporeal things have a mode of being outside the mind which 
allows them to be sensible in act and, therefore, the corporeal things can actualize the 
senses as objects. However, because these corporeal, real things are not intelligible in act, 
they cannot actualize the intelligence in the same way. For Aquinas, that which is dissimilar 
is not the relationship between object and potency (once the object is in act, both potencies 
are actualized by the object in the same way), but the condition of the object in reality (i.e. 
                                                     
476 76, 2 ad 4: “Sed hoc tantum interest inter sensum et intellectum, secundum sententiam 
Aristotelis, quod res sentitur secundum illam dispositionem quam extra animam habet, in sua 
particularitate, natura autem rei quae intelligitur, est quidem extra animam, sed non habet illum 




its mode of being). That is why St. Thomas says in 76, 2 ad 4 that this (i.e., the mode of 
being of the object in reality) is the “only” difference between sense and intelligence. 
The texts reported reinforce the idea of human understanding as intentionally 
receptive, and not different from the sense in this respect. Knowing, for Aquinas, certainly 
has two species (sensible and intelligible), or even two levels of perfection in human being, 
but a common generic characteristic which is knowing as a being perfected by the formal 
perfection of the real-other as other. In order for that formal perfection to perfect the 
knower, it has to be knowable in act. In the case of the object of intelligence, because it 
does not subsist as knowable in act, there arises the need for an agent intellect.477 
6) Corollaries: Agent Intellect, Possible Intellect and Will 
The notions of intellectual knowing as an activity and of the agent intellect as a 
formal a priori tend to blur the distinctions between the possible intellect, the agent 
intellect and the will itself. The reasons are not difficult to understand.  
On a rather superficial level, if understanding is active as performative, the possible 
intellect (Thomistically the faculty of understanding) necessarily ceases to be receptive; 
unless by “reception” something like an “encounter” with the sensible material is meant, 
and therefore “reception” and “conversion to the particular” actually mean the same thing. 
The path for the identification of agent intellect with possible intellect is thus open. Also, 
because tending towards reality-in-itself is the Thomistic property of the appetite, and 
because there is no reality other than the one encountered by the spirit in its openness to 
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the (material) world, it is not difficult to see how this “being-in-the-world” is at the same 
time “understanding” and “tending towards reality,” “conversion” and “decision.”  
On a deeper level, the reason for the effacement of the distinction between the 
potencies is the effacement of the distinction between being and operation, or the 
reduction of being to action. Being (ens) becomes first being known: this is Modern 
Philosophy’s approach to being, that is, the reduction of being to being of consciousness. 
This being known, then, turns out to be the result of an active performance (knowing is 
performance of the object), and the only “being” (esse ut actus) left to this object of 
consciousness is that performance (action) itself. In other words, the being known (the 
object of consciousness) is a composite of material of sensibility plus performance or 
intellectual activity;478 intelligibility is the action of intelligence on the phantasm. The unity 
of the act of understanding is the unity of the object. The being of judgment is the being of 
the object, and so being (esse ut actus objecti) is action (esse ut actio subjecti).479  
One more step. If being is merely being affirmed, what is the being of the subject, if 
not this affirmation itself? The subject is not like other beings, but is in itself this 
performance: being-in-the-world. In this way, the being of the subject also is reduced to its 
own action. Now, this identification of being and operation is foreign to the mind of St. 
Thomas: it is precisely Aquinas’ distinction between essence and being, and the consequent 
distinction between esse and operari, that is the characteristic of created being. In any case, 
                                                     
478 The thrust of this doctrine can be found in Kant, KRV, B 1-2. 
479 This is, in my view, one of the reasons why the Aristotelian identity is interpreted 




this has been said in order to try to show why, in Modern Philosophy, the distinction 
between intellectual potencies tends to disappear. 
The immediate purpose of this section is to highlight the explicit distinction in 
Aquinas among agent intellect, possible intellect and will, this distinction being simply a 
consequence of what has been said so far regarding the nature of human understanding as 
intentionally receptive of the perfection of the other. There is certainly a place for activity 
(as opposed to “receptivity” as it is understood in this Chapter) in Aquinas, but this activity 
is not originally the capacity to understand. This activity is previous, as a metaphysical 
condition of possibility of understanding, in the case of the agent intellect; and it is 
posterior, as an inclination to the apprehended form, in the case of the will.  
Let us show first some texts about the distinction between intellect and will, and 
then between the possible intellect and the agent intellect. 
- Distinction between intellect and will.  Treating the appetitive potencies in 
general, Aquinas is clear in stating that they must be distinct from the cognitive potencies, 
despite the fact that the objects might be the same in reality. What necessitates a 
distinction of potencies is the formal distinction of the objects. In 80, 1, the second 
objection says: “Powers are differentiated by their objects. But what we desire is the same 
as what we know. Therefore the appetitive power is not distinct from the apprehensive 
power.”480 The answer: “What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality, 
but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, 
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whereas it is desired as suitable or good.”481 The appetitive potency is distinct also because 
its act is made possible by the act of the apprehensive faculty. In other words, the 
apprehended form is the condition of possibility of the appetitive inclination; but this 
apprehended form implies that the cognitive act is already completed and performed; 
therefore the capacity of this inclination depends essentially on the performed act of 
cognition, for which the respective capacities, though essentially related, must be 
essentially distinct. Another way to see this is to understand the concepts: to apprehend is 
an act finishing in the subject, whereas an inclination is an act finishing in the thing outside 
the mind; the reason the knower can tend towards the thing is that the thing has entered 
the knower’s horizon of possibilities. This “entrance” of the thing is knowing, and the 
tendency towards the known thing is the appetite. In the following passage, for example, 
we can see 1) the distinction between the substantial form and the cognitive form (being 
and operation), and the consequent distinction between natural appetite and the appetite 
that follows cognition; and 2) the act of knowing as condition of possibility of the act of the 
appetite (“the animal is able to desire what it apprehends”): 
Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner 
and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be in them an inclination 
surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. And this 
superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the 
animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined 
by its natural form.482 
                                                     
481 80, 1 ad 2: “Id quod apprehenditur et appetitur, est idem subiecto, sed differt ratione, 
apprehenditur enim ut est ens sensibile vel intelligibile; appetitur vero ut est conveniens aut 
bonum.” 
482 80, 1, c.: “Sicut igitur formae altiori modo existunt in habentibus cognitionem supra 





The fact that both knowing and appetite are passive potencies for Aquinas483 does 
not erase the distinction between apprehending and the act of the appetite. In fact, what 
moves the appetite is the object as apprehended. This is so much so that the condition of 
the object as (already) apprehended (intellectually or sensibly) qualifies and distinguishes 
the appetitive potencies.484 For Aquinas, because there is a formal difference between that 
which the subject apprehends through intelligence and that which the subject apprehends 
through sense, there is also a distinction between the intellectual appetite and the sensitive 
appetite. 
Despite the fact that both are passive, and as passive can be said to be “moved” by 
their objects, the qualification of “movement” does not fit so well the act of knowing as it 
does the act of the appetite. There is a clear distinction between the operations:  
For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement as the 
act of the appetite: since the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in 
the very fact that the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the 
operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is 
borne towards the thing desirable.485  
                                                     
naturalis, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis.  Et haec superior inclinatio pertinet ad vim animae 
appetitivam, per quam animal appetere potest ea quae apprehendit, non solum ea ad quae 
inclinatur ex forma naturali.” 
483 80, 2, c.. 
484 Cf. also 80, 2, ob. 1 and ad 1. 
485 81, 1, c.: “Actus enim apprehensivae virtutis non ita proprie dicitur motus, sicut actio 
appetitus, nam operatio virtutis apprehensivae perficitur in hoc, quod res apprehensae sunt in 
apprehendente; operatio autem virtutis appetitivae perficitur in hoc, quod appetens inclinatur in 
rem appetibilem.” Cf. 82, 3, c.: “For as we have said above, the action of the intellect consists in 
this—that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while the act of the will 
consists in this—that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself.” [Ut enim supra dictum 
est, actio intellectus consistit in hoc quod ratio rei intellectae est in intelligente; actus vero 




The explicit distinction between apprehensive and appetitive faculties, for Aquinas, 
is not a figure of speech, nor two ways of speaking of the same reality, nor even two aspects 
of the same phenomenon. The act of the appetite presupposes and follows the act of the 
apprehensive faculty; the objects are formally different, and the acts that reach out to those 
objects are also formally different, and even opposed. For Aquinas, “to apprehend” and “to 
tend towards” are not the same and, therefore, the faculties that regard those operations 
need to be distinct. 
- Distinction between agent intellect and possible intellect. The distinction between 
agent intellect and possible intellect is also explicit in Aquinas: “Nevertheless there is a 
distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect: because as 
regards the same object, the active power which makes the object to be in act must be 
distinct from the passive power, which is moved by the object existing in act.”486 It is clear 
that the action of the passive potency can begin when the action of the active potency 
finishes; once the object is available (by the action of the agent intellect), the other potency 
can be moved by it.  
                                                     
486 79, 7, c.: “Diversificatur tamen potentia intellectus agentis, et intellectus possibilis, quia 
respectu eiusdem obiecti, aliud principium oportet esse potentiam activam, quae facit obiectum 
esse in actu; et aliud potentiam passivam, quae movetur ab obiecto in actu existente.” So there 
must be two potencies in this sense, but clearly not two apprehensive potencies in the intelligence,  
cf. 82, 5, c.: “And therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there is no differentiation 
of appetitive powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a 
concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive powers 
multiplied, although they are on the part of the senses.” [Et ideo non diversificantur in ipsa, quae est 
appetitus intellectivus, aliquae potentiae appetitivae, ut sit in appetitu intellectivo alia potentia 
irascibilis, et alia concupiscibilis, sicut etiam ex parte intellectus non multiplicantur vires 





Let us explore similar texts: “Our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to act 
by some being in act, that is, by the active intellect, which is a power of the soul, as we have 
said; and not by a separate intelligence, as proximate cause, although perchance as remote 
cause.”487 It is obvious that what is attributed to the agent intellect is the capacity of 
actualizing the intellect which is passive, something which, if it does not need to be 
attributed to another separate intellect, can certainly not be attributed to the same faculty 
of understanding; St. Thomas introduces the agent intellect as a faculty of the soul precisely 
because whatever is in potency cannot be reduced to act if not by something that is actual. 
Moreover, the agent intellect does not even directly actualize the possible intellect, but 
does so through the species. The agent intellect is to be considered more precisely the act 
of the intelligible (in an efficient sense, producing the intelligible mode of being) and the 
species (impressae) themselves that which actualize the possible intellect as agent object: 
[Our intellect] understands itself according as it is made actual by the species 
abstracted from sensible things, through the light of the active intellect, which not 
only actuates the intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, 
actuates the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence, 
but by its act.488 
                                                     
487 84, 4 ad 3: “Dicendum quod intellectus noster possibilis reducitur de potentia ad actum 
per aliquod ens actu, idest per intellectum agentem, qui est virtus quaedam animae nostrae, ut 
dictum est, non autem per aliquem intellectum separatum, sicut per causam proximam; sed forte 
sicut per causam remotam.” 
488 87, 1, c.: “… consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit 
actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum 
intelligibilium, et eis mediantibus intellectus possibilis. Non ergo per essentiam suam, sed per actum 





The point of the article is to deny that the intellect can understand itself by itself, 
precisely because it is in potency. The agent intellect, instead, which could be considered 
“act,” is not itself the object but rather the active principle of the truly intelligible objects: 
The essence of an angel is an act in the genus of intelligible things, and therefore it is 
both intellect and the thing understood. Hence an angel apprehends his own 
essence through itself: not so the human mind, which is either altogether in 
potentiality to intelligible things—as is the passive intellect—or is the act of 
intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms—as is the active intellect.489 
It is clear that neither the possible intellect nor the agent intellect are “an act in the 
genus of intelligible things” because St. Thomas is opposing the human intellect (and here 
he includes both faculties) to the angelic intellect in that respect. But, the distinction 
between the two human faculties is also clear: the possible intellect is absolutely in potency 
regarding the intelligible objects, in potency of receiving them; and the agent intellect is 
“act” in a certain sense, but not insofar as it is itself intelligible (intelligibilium is plural here), 
but insofar as it is the active principle of the intelligible objects.490 
In 83, 4, ob. 3 and ad 3, we see again the word “intellectus” applied to the 
intellectual faculties in general and, at the same time, their distinction as “two potencies”: 
“The will is the intellectual appetite. But in the intellect there are two powers—the active 
and the passive.”491 The objection is not challenged in that regard; the possible intellect 
                                                     
489 87, 1 ad 2: “Essentia angeli est sicut actus in genere intelligibilium, et ideo se habet et ut 
intellectus, et ut intellectum. Unde Angelus suam essentiam per seipsum apprehendit. Non autem 
intellectus humanus, qui vel est omnino in potentia respectu intelligibilium, sicut intellectus 
possibilis; vel est actus intelligibilium quae abstrahuntur a phantasmatibus, sicut intellectus agens.” 
490 The agent intellect as actus intelligibilium will be treated in more detail in Chapter 4, 
section 1. 
491 83, 4, ob. 3: “Voluntas est appetitus intellectivus. Sed ex parte intellectus sunt duae 





needs a moving object which is not in act unless the agent intellect actualizes it; for this 
reason, there are two potencies in the intellectual part of the mind. But regarding the will, 
another potency is not required because the moving object is already in the intellect: “The 
intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to 
distinguish in the will an active and a passive will.”492 
In the same way, the mention of “two” potencies recurs in 85, 1, ob. 4, the objection 
which gives St. Thomas the opportunity to distinguish two “activities” in the agent intellect 
itself (illumination and abstraction). St. Thomas, in his answer, does not challenge the 
distinction of two potencies, nor the denial of the attribution of abstraction to the possible: 
he adds to the agent intellect one more activity, other than the one already attributed in 
the objection. The objection says: 
The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) there are two things in the intellectual soul—
the passive intellect and the active intellect. But it does not belong to the passive 
intellect to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm, but to receive them 
when abstracted. Neither does it seem to be the function of the active intellect, 
which is related to the phantasm, as light is to color; since light does not abstract 
anything from color, but rather streams on to it. Therefore in no way do we 
understand by abstraction from phantasms.493 
The answer begins: “Not only does the active intellect throw light on the phantasm: 
it does more; by its own power it abstracts the intelligible species from the 
                                                     
492 83, 4 ad 3: “Intellectus comparatur ad voluntatem ut movens. Et ideo non oportet in 
voluntate distinguere agens et possible.” 
493 85, 1, ob. 4: “Ut dicitur in III De Anima, in intellectiva anima sunt duo, scilicet intellectus 
possibilis, et agens. Sed abstrahere a phantasmatibus species intelligibiles non pertinet ad 
intellectum possibilem, sed recipere species iam abstractas. Sed nec etiam videtur pertinere ad 
intellectum agentem, qui se habet ad phantasmata sicut lumen ad colores, quod non abstrahit 






phantasm.”494 The rest of this interesting passage will occupy us in the next Chapter. What 
is important is that St. Thomas accepts the challenge of the objection; that is, that there are 
only two potencies; now, if neither of them does the job, there is no abstraction. The 
solution is that one of them does it, and allows the other to be actualized with the fruit of 
its own (the agent intellect’s) work.495 
The real distinction in Aquinas is sustained by metaphysical principles, not by a 
figure of speech.496 Potencies are distinct when their formal objects are distinct. Potencies 
are distinct when one is productive of something that the other only receives. St. Thomas 
speaks about “duo.” It is true that the soul does not have matter, for Aquinas, and therefore 
these two distinct potencies cannot be pictured as different places or instruments in a 
machine; however, neither can one surrender to the temptation of imagining them as just 
one big current towards the world. They are different, accidental, formal perfections of the 
one soul, united substantially in the soul and having between them a certain order which 
preserves in addition an operational unity. But there is a real distinction. Distinctions in 
Aquinas are important and, sometimes, real. For him, for example, the distinction between 
essence and (created) being is real, although it is impossible to separate them in reality. The 
reason for a real distinction, then, is not that two things cannot be imagined separately 
                                                     
494 85, 1 ad 4: “Phantasmata et illuminantur ab intellectu agente; et iterum ab eis, per 
virtutem intellectus agentis, species intelligibiles abstrahuntur.” 
495 The distinction between agent intellect and possible intellect is present in other works of 
Aquinas. See Appendix, Note 19. 
496 In a different context, but perhaps relevant to the point, cf. In I De Anima 6, 92-94: “Now 
in any self-mover there are two things to be considered, the thing moving, and the thing moved; and 
the former cannot as such be the same as the latter.” [In movente etiam seipsum duo sunt: unum 




from each other, but that one of them cannot be the other; a real distinction is grounded in 
the essence of each member and in the principle of non-contradiction. For this reason, if 
one understands what each of these potencies means for Aquinas, one realizes that they 
cannot be the same faculty, although they subsist in the same intellectual soul. 
*** 
In the present Chapter, the intention has been to show the receptive character of 
knowing in the sense of a reception of an object – content and, therefore, knowing as 
perfective of the subject in its radical original imperfection. The connection with our 
previous findings is not difficult to see. The object of intelligence is the intelligible nature of 
things, which is a perfection subsisting materially in the corporeal things themselves, and 
different from their principle of individuation. This intelligible perfection, even if it is not 
intelligible in act, is present in the things themselves; the key to understanding this is the 
distinction between intelligible as perfection – content (distinct in turn from the sensible 
content) and intelligible as mode of being of the content. This is also the sense in which 
knowing is receptive: because the perfection – content belongs to the thing itself, not to the 
intellect, the soul is in potency of this kind of perfection and, therefore, grows with its 
reception.  
All of this needed to be said in order to show that, for Aquinas, the agent intellect is 
not a formal a priori, which would be seen in the object as its perfection – content. Had it 
not been shown that the intelligible is a perfection belonging to the thing itself and different 
from its sensible content, it would not have been clear that the object of intelligence is, at 




subsists in the particular thing). Had it not been shown that intelligible in Aquinas is 
understood in two senses (the state of abstraction and the quidditas), it would not have 
been clear in what sense an intelligible perfection subsists in a material thing. At the same 
time, had it not been shown that understanding is receptive of the intelligible as content, it 
could have been said that the intelligible content is present in the material thing as 
belonging to it because of the activity of understanding.  
At the same time, as seems clear, these findings help in explaining the agent intellect 
as a metaphysical a priori of intellectual knowing as receptive of objective content, that is, 
as productive of the intelligible mode of being of the intelligible content. What remains to 
be said will be introduced in the next Chapter. 
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Chapter Four: The Thomistic Agent Intellect  
as a Metaphysical A Priori rather than a Formal A Priori 
 
This is the moment to take advantage of the previous clarifications to address more 
directly the main question of this research: is the agent intellect to be understood as a 
formal a priori of knowing as an activity of performance or, rather, as a metaphysical a 
priori of intellectual knowing as receptive of objective content? That intellectual knowing in 
Aquinas is not productive but intentionally receptive has already been addressed directly. 
What must now be addressed is the precise characterization of the agent intellect in the 
text of Aquinas as a metaphysical rather than a formal a priori. 
A formal a priori in intellectual knowing is basically productive of the universal – 
intelligible content as such. It is a subjective function which “makes” or “creates” the 
intellectual object of knowing by a certain organization or in-formation of the material data 
of sensible experience. It gives “form” to the “matter” provided by the senses, it organizes 
the raw material of sensible experience and so, in this sense, makes it intelligible. The basic 
assumption is that the unity that characterizes the object of human understanding cannot 
come from experience, for the simple reason that experience is considered a phenomenon 
without unity, as in Kant. The origin of that unity is therefore a priori, and the one 
responsible for that unity is the subject. The universal, the one in the many, is the result of a 
subjective function. It seems that this subjective function could be related to the Thomist 





This Chapter is divided into two sections. In the first, we will examine some texts 
that may seem to support the claim of Aquinas’ agent intellect as a formal a priori. In the 
second, we will examine some of the texts that support the view of this research, that the 
agent intellect is a metaphysical a priori. 
1) The Text of St. Thomas: the Agent Intellect as a Formal A Priori? 
We will present two groups of texts. The first group regards several 
characterizations of the human intellect that may seem to support the claim of a formal a 
priori in human understanding (in general). The second group deals directly with texts that 
may seem to suggest that this formal a priori is specifically the agent intellect. 
1.1. Infinity in the Human Intellect 
The intellect is infinite in a certain sense. Is this infinity a “virtual” infinity, pre-
containing in itself the perfection-content of the known? It does not seem so in Aquinas’ 
text. 
The human intellect can be said to be “infinite” only in potency, and in potency of 
receiving: “Therefore infinity is potentially in our mind through its considering successively 
one thing after another: because never does our intellect understand so many things, that it 
cannot understand more.”497 There is nothing like a habitual knowing of the infinite, 
because it would suppose the actual knowing of the infinite, which for St. Thomas is 
impossible:  
For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowledge of the infinite: because in 
us habitual knowledge results from actual consideration: since by understanding we 
                                                     
497 86, 2, c.: “Et ideo in intellectu nostro invenitur infinitum in potentia, in accipiendo scilicet 




acquire knowledge, as is said Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore it would not be possible for us to 
have a habit of an infinity of things distinctly known, unless we had already 
considered the entire infinity thereof, counting them according to the succession of 
our knowledge: which is impossible.498 
In Objection Four, the fact that the intellect is an infinite virtue (infinite = not 
determined by matter, subsistent in itself) is taken to imply that it is an infinite virtue in a 
different sense, i.e., as actively infinite, with an infinite active potential on infinite things. In 
the answer, St. Thomas concedes the first point of the objection, but clarifies in what 
precise sense that infinity (as non-determination by matter) implies an infinity in the object: 
because the object also is non-determined by matter (the quidditas in its abstraction), it can 
be called “infinite”, insofar as it can be understood or predicated of infinite individuals. The 
infinity of this universal is not an “intensive” infinity (including in itself all the perfections of 
the individuals) but an infinity of indetermination (it is not determined to this or that 
individual, but it can refer to all of them). The complete text of the Ad quartum says: 
As our intellect is infinite in power, so does it know the infinite. For its power is 
indeed infinite inasmuch as it is not terminated by corporeal matter. Moreover it 
can know the universal, which is abstracted from individual matter, and which 
consequently is not limited to one individual, but, considered in itself, extends to an 
infinite number of individuals.499 
                                                     
498 86, 2, c.: “Et eadem ratione non possumus intelligere infinita in habitu. In nobis enim 
habitualis cognitio causatur ex actuali consideratione, intelligendo enim efficimur scientes, ut dicitur 
in II Ethic. Unde non possemus habere habitum infinitorum secundum distinctam cognitionem, nisi 
consideravissemus omnia infinita, numerando ea secundum cognitionis successionem, quod est 
impossibile.” 
499 86, 2 ad 4: “Sicut intellectus noster est infinitus virtute, ita infinitum cognoscit. Est enim 
virtus eius infinita, secundum quod non terminatur per materiam corporalem. Et est cognoscitivus 
universalis, quod est abstractum a materia individuali, et per consequens non finitur ad aliquod 





Therefore, infinity in human intellect could be understood in two senses: first, as an 
infinite potency of receiving; second, as a potency of receiving something infinite, meaning 
now by infinite “undetermined to this or that individual.” 
It could be helpful to consider that, for Aquinas, the only potency that pre-contains 
virtually all perfection (as an active principle, as efficient cause) is the essence of God: “The 
First Act is the universal principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually ‘precontaining all 
things,’ as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).”500 The essence of God is, for St. Thomas, distinct 
from creatures, insofar as God is intensive fullness of perfection, and the creatures 
participate that perfection. The text just quoted continues:  
Wherefore things participate of It not as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its 
processions. Now as potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. 
But the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are 
participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one potentiality which 
receives all acts, as there is one act, from which all participated acts are derived; for 
then the receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the First Act.501 
It is in this sense, as one intensive act which the multiple things participate, that God 
is pure act and that the creatures are imperfect acts, mixed with their respective (multiple) 
potencies. The text, once the misconception of “(one) pure potency” has been discarded, 
continues by distinguishing the intellectual potency from the materia prima, as (both) 
receptive (but) of different kinds of forms: “Now the receptive potentiality in the 
                                                     
500 75, 5 ad 1: “Primus actus est universale principium omnium actuum, quia est infinitum, 
virtualiter in se omnia praehabens, ut dicit Dionysius.” 
501 75, 5 ad 1: “Unde participatur a rebus, non sicut pars, sed secundum diffusionem 
processionis ipsius. Potentia autem, cum sit receptiva actus, oportet quod actui proportionetur. 
Actus vero recepti, qui procedunt a primo actu infinito et sunt quaedam participationes eius, sunt 
diversi. Unde non potest esse potentia una quae recipiat omnes actus, sicut est unus actus influens 





intellectual soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the 
diversity of the things received by each. For primary matter receives individual forms; 
whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms.”502 What is important for us is the 
distinction between the active potency of God, containing virtualiter all perfection, and any 
other created potency, characterized as receptive (insofar as created potencies participate 
the first intensive act); and the precise characterization of the intellect as receptive of 
absolute forms, that is to say, the universals. 
Therefore the infinity of possibilities of the human intellect regards first of all the 
possibility of always receiving more in time: “… through its considering successively one 
thing after another: because never does our intellect understand so many things, that it 
cannot understand more.”503 Then, it implies the formal infinity of the universal received, 
that in itself can be referred to infinite individuals: “Moreover it can know the universal, 
which is abstracted from individual matter, and which consequently is not limited to one 
individual…”504 It is in any case an infinite capacity of reception, and not an active or virtual 
potentiality, pre-containing the perfection of the known.505 It should be clear, however, that 
                                                     
502 75, 5 ad 1: “Est autem alia potentia receptiva in anima intellectiva, a potentia receptiva 
materiae primae, ut patet ex diversitate receptorum, nam materia prima recipit formas individuales, 
intellectus autem recipit formas absolutas.” 
503 86, 2, c.: “… in accipiendo scilicet unum post aliud, quia nunquam intellectus noster tot 
intelligit, quin possit plura intelligere.” 
504 86, 2 ad 4: “Et est cognoscitivus universalis, quod est abstractum a materia individuali, et 
per consequens non finitur ad aliquod individuum…” 
505 When I speak about this objective “pre-containing” I certainly have in mind the language 
of pre-apprehension in some interpretations of Aquinas, but I am not addressing them directly. In 
order to address them, a clarification of what is meant by “pre-apprehension” in these 
interpretations would be necessary, and that is not the purpose of this dissertation. It is important, 
for example, to understand in what sense they speak of object, which cannot be simply identified 





St. Thomas is here speaking of the possible intellect. But, because the agent intellect is 
sometimes not properly distinguished from the possible intellect, and the texts themselves 
can be used to support the counterclaim, the clarification seems useful. 
Other works of Aquinas may help to confirm the proposed interpretation. In the 
following text of the Contra Gentiles, no separate substance (except God Himself) can be a 
sufficient principle of the knowledge of all things. The angels themselves need to receive 
intelligible content from infused species in order to know things other than themselves. This 
doctrine strongly suggests that the agent intellect does not precontain in some sort all 
intelligible content. 
We must, therefore, consider that, since none of these substances is by its essence a 
sufficient principle of the knowledge of all other things, there must accrue to each of 
them, over and above its own substance, certain intelligible likenesses, whereby 
each of them is enabled to know another in its proper nature. […] But such a likeness 
of all being, can be nothing other than an infinite nature: a nature not determined to 
some species or genus of being, but the universal principle of all being and the 
power productive of all being; and this, as was shown in Book I, is the divine nature 
alone. Indeed, no other nature can be the universal likeness of all being, since every 
nature except God is limited to some genus and species of being.506 
                                                     
‘Knowing about something else, about an object in the oppostition of subject and object is a 
derivative, not the original sense of knowing’” (Cullen, 77). We would also need to understand a 
notion of being that is in some way subjective: “In posing this question, however, Rahner also argues 
that man is already with being in its totality. If man were not, he could not ask about being” (Cullen, 
74). 
506 CG II, 98, par. 8-9: “Considerandum est igitur quod, cum nulla huiusmodi substantiarum 
secundum suam essentiam sit sufficiens principium cognitionis omnium aliarum rerum, unicuique 
earum, supra propriam substantiam, oportet superaddere quasdam intelligibiles similitudines, per 
quas quaelibet earum aliam in propria natura cognoscere possit […] Talis autem similitudo totius 
entis esse non potest nisi natura infinita, quae non determinatur ad aliquam speciem vel genus entis, 
sed est universale principium et virtus activa totius entis: qualis est sola natura divina, ut in primo 
ostensum est. Omnis autem alia natura, cum sit terminata ad aliquod genus et speciem entis, non 





St. Thomas denies, as we have seen, any actuality of the species to the intellect in 
itself: “It follows that the soul as a whole is not the ‘place’ of forms, but only that part of it 
which lacks a bodily organ, i.e. the intellect; and even this part does not, as such, possess 
them actually, but potentially only.”507 It would be Platonic to affirm that the soul possesses 
all science already, as if it were habitually: “This is against […] Plato’s opinion that the 
human soul is by nature in possession of a universal knowledge which only its union with 
the body has caused it to forget. (This theory is implicit in Plato’s reduction of learning to 
remembering.)”508 
That the agent intellect does not precontain the known can be taken from the 
following text also. The objection provides the context for the following answer: 
Further, in order to have activity, an agent and a patient alone are necessary. 
Therefore, if the possible intellect, which is the patient in cognition, is a part of our 
substantial principle, as was previously shown, and the agent intellect is also a part 
of our soul, it seems that we possess within ourselves everything necessary in order 
that we may be able to understand.509 
Although our soul possesses an agent and a possible intellect, nevertheless 
something extrinsic is required so that we may be able to understand. First of all, 
indeed, we need phantasms, derived from sensible things, by means of which the 
likenesses of particular (determinatarum) things are presented to the intellect. For 
the agent intellect is not an act in which the determinate species of all things [are 
present in order to know], any more than light can [determine sight to particular 
                                                     
507 In III De Anima 1, 233-236: “Non dicendum est, quod tota anima sit locus specierum, sed 
solum pars intellectiva, quae organum non habet. Nec ita est locus specierum, quod habeat actu 
species, sed potentia tantum.” 
508 In III De Anima 3, 53-60: “Et per hoc excluditur […] opinio Platonis, qui posuit naturaliter 
animam humanam habere omnem scientiam, sed esse eam quodammodo oblitam, propter 
unionem ad corpus: dicens, quod addiscere nihil aliud est quam reminisci.” We will examine later 
the meaning of the soul as “quodammodo omnia.” 
509 Q.D. De Anima, a.5, ob. 6: “Ad actionem aliquam non requiritur nisi agens et patiens. Si 
igitur intellectus possibilis, qui se habet ut patiens in intelligendo est aliquid substantiae nostrae, ut 
prius monstratum est, et intellectus agens est aliquid animae nostrae; videtur quod in nobis 





(determinatas) kinds of colors, unless those same colours determining sight are 
present.]510 
The following text511 is a very clear indication that, for Aquinas, the agent intellect 
does not precontain the intelligible content. The question is whether the agent intellect is 
one for all human beings or each has his or her own agent intellect. The objection wants to 
relate the actuality of the agent intellect to the actuality of the intelligible content: either 
the agent intellect possesses the content which will be impressed on the possible intellect 
(and so there is no need of abstraction), or it does not; but if it does not possess the 
content, it cannot produce the content by abstraction because, in order to find what one is 
searching for, there needs to be some previous idea (= content) of it. 
If the agent intellect is a part of the soul, it must either be created clothed or filled 
with species: and in that case it places those species also in the possible intellect, 
and will not need to abstract intelligible species from the phantasms; or else it is 
created naked and lacking in species: and in that case it will not be effectually able 
to abstract species from phantasms, because it will not recognize that species which 
it is seeking, after it has abstracted it, unless it previously had some notion of it.512 
Aquinas’ answer explicitly rejects the idea that the agent intellect be related to the 
content. To possess the content or not is proper to the knowing faculty, which is not the 
                                                     
510 Q.D. De Anima, a.5 ad 6: “Dicendum quod licet in anima nostra sit intellectus agens et 
possibilis, tamen requiritur aliquid extrinsecum ad hoc quod intelligere possimus. Et primo quidem 
requiruntur phantasmata a sensibilibus accepta, per quae repraesententur intellectui rerum 
determinatarum similitudines. Nam intellectus agens non est talis actus in quo omnium rerum 
species determinatae accipi possint ad cognoscendum; sicut nec lumen determinare potest visum ad 
species determinatas colorum, nisi adsint colores determinantes visum.” 
511 De Spirit. Creat., a.10, ob. 15 et ad 15. 
512 De Spirit. Creat., a.10, ob. 15: “Si intellectus agens est aliquid animae, oportet quod vel sit 
creatus vestitus seu opulentus speciebus, et sic illas species ponit etiam in intellectum possibilem, et 
non indigebit abstrahere species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus; aut creatus est nudus et carens 
speciebus, et sic non erit efficax ad abstrahendum species a phantasmatibus, quia non cognoscet 





agent intellect but the possible intellect. For Aquinas, the agent intellect does not in any 
way precontain the intelligible content:513 
It is incorrect to say that the agent intellect is naked or clothed, full of species or 
empty of them. For to be filled with species is characteristic of the possible intellect, 
but to cause them is characteristic of the agent intellect. Now it must not be said 
that the agent intellect understands in isolation from the possible intellect, but that 
the man understands by means of both…514 
1.2. “Quodammodo omnia” 
This Aristotelian phrase could also be used to support the idea that the intellect pre-
contains in some way the known. Some recurrences of this phrase will be noted, with 
Aquinas’ corresponding explanations. The most important, perhaps, is the following 
because it relates this characteristic of human knowing to God as pre-containing the 
perfection of everything:  
But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own 
natural being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive 
of the species of other things: for example, sense receives the species of all things 
sensible, and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a 
way, all things by sense and intellect: and thereby, those things that have 
knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God, ‘in Whom all things pre-exist,’ as 
Dionysius says.515 
                                                     
513 That the origin of the content is in sensibility will be more specifically treated in this 
Chapter, section 2. 
514 De Spirit. Creat., a.10 ad 15: “Inconvenienter dicitur intellectus agens nudus vel vestitus 
plenus speciebus vel vacuus. Impleri enim speciebus est intellectus possibilis sed facere eas est 
intellectus agentis. Non est autem dicendum quod intellectus agens seorsum intelligat ab intellectu 
possibili: sed homo intelligit per utrumque…” 
515 80, 1, c.: “In habentibus autem cognitionem, sic determinatur unumquodque ad 
proprium esse naturale per formam naturalem, quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum 
rerum, sicut sensus recipit species omnium sensibilium, et intellectus omnium intelligibilium, ut sic 
anima hominis sit omnia quodammodo secundum sensum et intellectum, in quo quodammodo 






As has already been suggested,516 it is clear that quodammodo omnia implies 
specifically the capacity of receiving all sensible and intelligible perfections proportionate to 
these potencies. It is also clear that, in this way, the beings possessing knowledge come 
closer to the perfection of God insofar as they progress from the possession of their own 
specific form only to the possession of other forms as well. The similarity (quodammodo) 
comes from the fact that those perfections, now intentionally present in the knower, were 
already virtually contained in God.  
It seems better to interpret this text as talking about the actual reception of the 
known perfections, rather than as talking about merely the potency of receiving them. If 
this is the case, then the text means “ut sic anima hominis sit omnia quodammodo,” that is 
to say, “sic” = by receiving the species of all sensible and intelligible objects. This 
interpretation would make better sense of the similarity with God “in quo omnia 
praeexistunt” in act (because the merely potential similarity would be a lesser similarity) 
and of the progress implied by the word “appropinquant” (although it could also mean a 
static-metaphysical proximity). 
This Aristotelian phrase, however, is used by Aquinas in other instances with the 
precise meaning of the soul being all things in potency. In 84, 2, Objection Two requires that 
the soul knows the corporeal things by itself. The reason is that the soul is all things and, 
therefore, has also the nature of the corporeal things, and since knowing is by the like, ergo: 
“The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 8) that ‘the soul, after a fashion, is everything.’ Since, 
therefore, like is known by like, it seems that the soul knows corporeal things through 
                                                     




itself.”517  But Aristotle, according to Aquinas, does not mean to say that the soul is all 
things as if it would have the perfection of all things in act:  
Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually composed of all things, as did the 
earlier philosophers; 518 he said that the soul is all things, ‘after a fashion,’ forasmuch 
as it is in potentiality to all—through the senses, to all things sensible—through the 
intellect, to all things intelligible.519  
For Aquinas, the mistake made by the Natural Philosophers is not only that the 
known is actual in the knower, but that this actuality is “natural,” that is to say, that the 
perfection of the known is in the knower with a real and natural being (the first mode of 
being of De Ver. 2, 2). Still, Aquinas’ point is that the soul, in knowing, is all things only in 
potency, and as much in potency of the sensible as of the intelligible. That this potency is 
potency of receiving rather than an active potency has already been shown in the previous 
text. In any case, the Aristotelian text as used by Aquinas does not support the idea of the 
intellect as “pre-containing” in a certain way the perfection of the known: potency of 
receiving content (even every possible content) implies precisely that the content is not yet 
in the potency itself. For Aquinas, the possible intellect can also be “tabula rasa” exactly 
because it is all things only “quodammodo.” That to be in potency of something is to pre-
                                                     
517 84, 2, ob. 2: “Philosophus dicit, in III De Anima, quod anima quodammodo est omnia. 
Cum ergo simile simili cognoscatur, videtur quod anima per seipsam corporalia cognoscat.” 
518 Cf. In I De Anima 12, 8-16. 
519 84, 2 ad 2: “Aristoteles non posuit animam esse actu compositam ex omnibus, sicut 
antiqui naturales; sed dixit quodammodo animam esse omnia, inquantum est in potentia ad omnia; 





contain it, in a certain sense, might also be said, but such an explanation does not seem to 
foster a better understanding of Aquinas.520 
That, for Aquinas, the intellect is “tabula rasa” insofar as it does not precontain any 
of its objects, can be taken from other works as well.521 It is not difficult to find agreement 
with other authors.522 
                                                     
520 That the soul is “quodammodo omnia” in potency only is clear also in In III De Anima 7, 
28-36; cf. In III De Anima 7, 54-61 (where the comparison with the senses in the receptivity of the 
forms of all things can also be seen); In III De Anima 1, 170-180 (see text in Appendix, Note 23). 
521 Cf. In III De Anima 1, 131-139: “Anything that is in potency with respect to an object, and 
able to receive it into itself, is, as such, without that object; thus the pupil of the eye, being potential 
to colours and able to receive them, is itself colourless. But our intellect is so related to the objects it 
understands that it is in potency with respect to them, and capable of being affected by them (as 
sense is related to sensible objects). Therefore it must itself lack all those things which of its nature 
it understands.” (translator’s parentheses) [Omne enim, quod est in potentia ad aliquid et 
receptivum eius, caret eo ad quod est in potentia, et cuius est receptivum; sicut pupilla, quae est in 
potentia ad colores, et est receptiva ipsorum, est carens omni colore: sed intellectus noster sic 
intelligit intelligibilia, quod est in potentia ad ea et susceptivus eorum, sicut sensus sensibilium: ergo 
caret omnibus illis rebus quas natus est intelligere.]; In III De Anima 3, 45-53: “And [there is also] the 
change which implies nothing more than a reception of forms from outside the changed thing. The 
mind, then, is called passive just in so far as it is in potency, somehow, to intelligible objects which 
are not actual in it until understood by it. It is like a sheet of paper on which no word is yet written, 
but many can be written. Such is the condition of the [possible] intellect, so long as [nothing of the 
intelligible objects is actual in it, but only in potency].” [Et est aliquod pati, quod dicitur secundum 
receptionem tantum. Intellectus igitur dicitur pati, inquantum est quodammodo in potentia ad 
intelligibilia, et nihil est actu eorum antequam intelligat. Oportet autem hoc sic esse, sicut contingit 
in tabula, in qua nihil est actu scriptum, sed plura possunt in ea scribi. Et hoc etiam accidit intellectui 
possibili, quia nihil intelligibilium est in eo actu, sed potentia tantum.]; Q.D. De Anima, a.2, ob. 17; 
De Spirit. Creat., a.9, c. (these two last texts in Appendix, Note 24). 
522 Cf. Lambert, 85 (after talking of the infused knowledge of angels): “The posible intellect, 
on the other hand, knows nothing naturally and must acquire each one of its species separately”; 
93: “The human intellect is originally empty and so must acquire the species which actuate it”; Sellés 
(cf. EIA, 272) places among the “Thomistic negations regarding the agent intellect” the claim that it 





1.3. The Process of Learning 
Is not the process of learning a proof that science (as what is known objectively) 
comes, in a certain sense, from ourselves? In fact, when we learn, we do not receive infused 
species from our teacher. If those new ideas do not come from ourselves, where do they 
come from? We will refer to two texts of Aquinas that may be enlightening.  
The first one is from the article where Aquinas denies that we understand things by 
innate ideas. The third objection will point out that, by means of questions in an orderly 
fashion, a person who had not previously acquired certain knowledge responds truly (as 
one knowing) about what is being questioned. The answer of St. Thomas is the following: “If 
questions be put in an orderly fashion they proceed from universal self-evident principles to 
what is particular. Now by such a process knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner. 
Wherefore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question, this is not because he had 
knowledge previously, but because he thus learns for the first time.”523 The text seems to 
suggest that the questions provoke the right phantasm which allows the disciple to learn ex 
novo what he did not know before. The other text appears to point in the same direction: 
Secondly, anyone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand 
something, he forms certain phantasms to serve him by way of examples, in which 
as it were he examines what he is desirous of understanding. For this reason it is 
that when we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay examples 
before him, from which he forms phantasms for the purpose of understanding.524 
                                                     
523 84, 3 ad 3: “Ordinata interrogatio procedit ex principiis communibus per se notis, ad 
propria. Per talem autem processum scientia causatur in anima addiscentis. Unde cum verum 
respondet de his de quibus secundo interrogatur, hoc non est quia prius ea noverit; sed quia tunc ea 
de novo addiscit.” 
524 84, 7, c.: “Secundo, quia hoc quilibet in seipso experiri potest, quod quando aliquis 
conatur aliquid intelligere, format aliqua phantasmata sibi per modum exemplorum, in quibus quasi 
inspiciat quod intelligere studet. Et inde est etiam quod quando alium volumus facere aliquid 




For Aquinas, it seems evident that, because the light of the agent intellect is 
connatural and cannot fail, yet requires a sensible phantasm to abstract, true understanding 
of things is possible only as long as the right phantasm is formed. The phenomenon of 
teaching is not explained by the presence of innate ideas, nor by the infusion of species; 
rather, teaching is the art of helping the learner to form the right phantasm, so that the 
learner’s own interior light (the agent intellect) abstracts the idea which was already in the 
mind of the teacher, and is present, by way of the latter’s art, in the phantasm produced for 
the learner. In any case, there is no indication that Aquinas is suggesting a pre-
comprehension or implicit knowledge of things in these texts.525 
1.4. The Natural Desire to Know 
One might be tempted to use the natural desire to know in Aquinas’ text as a basis 
for suggesting a formal a priori. It is true that what is desired must be known in a certain 
sense and, therefore, a natural desire to know things does seem to imply a certain 
knowledge of them. 
Aquinas always makes a clear distinction between the natural appetite and the 
appetite which follows an apprehension: 
                                                     
525 Cf. also the text previously studied (title: “Infinity in the human intellect”), De Spirit. 
Creat., a.10, ob. 15 et ad 15. In CG II, 75, par. 15 we find similar reflections: “And by proposing 
sensible examples, from which the phantasms necessary for the disciple’s understanding [may be 
formed] in the soul. And since the outward action of the teacher would have no effect without the 
inward principle of knowledge, whose presence in us we owe to God…” [Proponendo exempla 
sensibilia, ex quibus in anima discipuli formentur phantasmata necessaria ad intelligendum. Et quia 
exterior operatio docentis nihil operaretur nisi adesset principium intrinsecum scientiae, quod inest 
nobis divinitus…] The latter principium is the agent intellect, which is necessary on the side of the 





Some inclination follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, 
and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have a more perfect existence in 
those things which participate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. For in 
those which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its 
own being—that is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural 
inclination, which is called the natural appetite.526 
The natural appetite is that which follows the natural form: it is a certain tendency 
towards preserving that form’s being, and towards the things that are natural to that form 
(for the fire to go up, in the example). The appetite following an apprehension is the 
tendency towards the apprehended form, not as known (in which sense it is already 
possessed) but as real, as the perfection of the other which is fitting to the subject. 
Moreover, the natural appetite follows every natural form, be that form substantial or 
accidental. That is why the natural appetite belongs as well to the intellectual faculty: 
intelligence desires its own perfection with natural appetite. Aquinas says: 
The ‘natural appetite’ is that inclination which each thing has, of its own nature, for 
something; wherefore by its natural appetite each power desires something suitable 
to itself. But the ‘animal appetite’ results from the form apprehended; this sort of 
appetite requires a special power of the soul—mere apprehension does not suffice. 
For a thing is desired as it exists in its own nature, whereas in the apprehensive 
power it exists not according to its own nature, but according to its likeness. Whence 
it is clear that sight desires naturally a visible object for the purpose of its act only—
namely, for the purpose of seeing; but the animal by the appetitive power desires 
the thing seen, not merely for the purpose of seeing it, but also for other purposes. 
But if the soul did not require things perceived by the senses, except on account of 
the actions of the senses, that is, for the purpose of sensing them; there would be 
                                                     
526 80, 1, c.: “Quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio, sicut ignis ex sua forma inclinatur 
in superiorem locum, et ad hoc quod generet sibi simile. Forma autem in his quae cognitionem 
participant, altiori modo invenitur quam in his quae cognitione carent. In his enim quae cognitione 
carent, invenitur tantummodo forma ad unum esse proprium determinans unumquodque, quod 
etiam naturale uniuscuiusque est. Hanc igitur formam naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio, quae 





no need for a special genus of appetitive powers, since the natural appetite of the 
powers would suffice.527 
Also, in this latter text, it is clear both that the natural appetite does not imply a 
distinct faculty, and that the appetite following apprehension, in fact, needs a distinct 
faculty. Further, there is no confusion between the natural appetite of the object and the 
appetitive faculty, because what is desired in each case is formally different: the object in 
order to know (the perfection of the cognitive faculty itself), versus the object in itself (the 
perfection of the object as fitting to the subject also in other respects). Significantly, the 
appetitive faculty can also desire to know something, but in this case knowing is desired as 
a particular good of the subject, rather than for the good of the faculty itself. Similar 
reflections are found in the following text: 
Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to 
something. Wherefore each power desires by the natural appetite that object which 
is suitable to itself. Above which natural appetite is the animal appetite, which 
follows the apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to this 
or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing; but simply as suitable 
to the animal.528  
                                                     
527 78, 1 ad 3: “Ad tertium dicendum quod appetitus naturalis est inclinatio cuiuslibet rei in 
aliquid, ex natura sua, unde naturali appetitu quaelibet potentia desiderat sibi conveniens. Sed 
appetitus animalis consequitur formam apprehensam. Et ad huiusmodi appetitum requiritur 
specialis animae potentia, et non sufficit sola apprehensio. Res enim appetitur prout est in sua 
natura, non est autem secundum suam naturam in virtute apprehensiva, sed secundum suam 
similitudinem. Unde patet quod visus appetit naturaliter visibile solum ad suum actum, scilicet ad 
videndum, animal autem appetit rem visam per vim appetitivam, non solum ad videndum, sed 
etiam ad alios usus. Si autem non indigeret anima rebus perceptis a sensu, nisi propter actiones 
sensuum, scilicet ut eas sentiret; non oporteret appetitivum ponere speciale genus inter potentias 
animae, quia sufficeret appetitus naturalis potentiarum.” 
528  80, 1 ad 3: “Dicendum quod unaquaeque potentia animae est quaedam forma seu 
natura, et habet naturalem inclinationem in aliquid. Unde unaquaeque appetit obiectum sibi 
conveniens naturali appetitu. Supra quem est appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem, quo 
appetitur aliquid non ea ratione qua est conveniens ad actum huius vel illius potentiae, utpote visio 




What is the perfection desired by intelligence with natural appetite? It is its natural 
perfection as faculty, that is to say, to understand. The intellect desires to know; the will, 
instead, desires what is known, once it is known. The intellect desires to know as a 
subjective perfection (natural appetite); the will desires the known as an objective 
perfection (appetite following apprehension). The intellect’s transcendental orientation to 
know and, in that sense, to know things, is simply its nature, that which makes it “intellect.” 
The natural desire or tendency, then, comes from the fact that the intellect is able to know, 
a potency of knowing. This natural tendency does not imply that the intellect already 
knows; the tendency is there from the beginning while the intellect still does not know, and 
is still there once it has known.529 
Moreover, this natural desire to know should not be confounded with the conscious 
desire which one may have to always know more.530 In the mind of Aquinas, although this 
latter desire could be called “natural,” insofar as it is according to human nature, it 
evidently presupposes knowledge. The only natural intellectual desire previous to 
knowledge is the natural appetite, and this natural appetite, in the text of Aquinas, does not 
imply any formal anticipation of the object. In other words, for Aquinas, the appetite which 
                                                     
529 This is true insofar as the natural appetite applies also to the form that is possessed. 
530 A further distinction may be made between the desire of knowing more about an object 
(say, more about Mathematics) or of simply knowing more, being “more learned.” In both cases, this 
appetite implies knowledge, and although this is according to the natural appetite, it seems to me 
that knowing is desired more as a good of the subject than as a good of the faculty itself. In the first 
case, the drive to know more about the object seems more like a natural desire (as a desire of 
knowing Mathematics); but because what is desired is knowing Mathematics as something good, or 
better said, the good of knowing Mathematics (say, for the “pleasure” it implies), I think it would be 
more accurate to say that it is an elicit desire of the will. It could be granted, still, that the faculty 
which knows Mathematics will also “desire” to know more of it with natural appetite, and will 
“repose” in the possession of its knowledge; but it does not seem that this desire can be identified 




implies knowledge is not the natural appetite of the intellect, but the will; and the natural 
appetite of the intellect is not the appetite of the object in itself, but the appetite of the 
faculty’s perfection. The distinction between content and mode of being in the species here 
proves crucial in understanding the mind of St. Thomas. 
1.5. “Naturaliter nota vel indita” 
Despite the clear indications that, for Aquinas, there are no innate ideas, his 
affirmation of principles naturally  known or “included” (indita) in the mind may raise the 
question of a certain “objective” presence of those principles in the intellect previous to any 
act of knowing. Relevant texts to be examined now follow. 
In 79, 12, c., it is clear that, for St. Thomas, there are some naturally known 
principles from which reasoning must begin: 
Man's act of reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the 
understanding of certain things—namely, those which are naturally known without 
any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle—and ends 
also at the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally 
known, we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning. […] 
Therefore we must have, (imprinted in) us by nature, not only speculative principles, 
but also practical principles.531 
Now, in this text, it is said that those principles come without investigation, not 
without abstraction. A movement, as passage from potency to act, requires something in 
act in order to happen. Therefore, the beginning of reasoning as movement cannot be 
reasoning itself, but must be something immobile, an actual perfection (here, the first 
                                                     
531 79, 12, c.: “Ratiocinatio hominis, cum sit quidam motus, ab intellectu progreditur 
aliquorum, scilicet naturaliter notorum absque investigatione rationis, sicut a quodam principio 
immobili, et ad intellectum etiam terminatur, inquantum iudicamus per principia per se naturaliter 
nota, de his quae ratiocinando invenimus […] Oportet igitur naturaliter nobis esse indita, sicut 




principles). Granted that the first beginning of a movement cannot be the result of a 
specifically equal movement, it may well be the result of another kind of passage from 
potency to act, such as abstraction. The fact that those first principles are principles, in a 
certain sense, does not mean that they are not a result in a different sense.532 
Moreover, it is said that these first principles are “naturally known,” not that they 
are innate. “Naturally known” may simply mean known according to nature, according to 
the natural operation of the human faculties. 
At the same time, included or indita does not necessarily mean “innate”, but it may 
refer to the presence of those principles in the mind. If knowing is receptive, “naturally 
included” and “naturally known” mean the same thing; once something is known, it is “in” 
the mind by means of the species. 
                                                     
532 In this sense should be understood In II De Anima 11, 224-231: “When a man acquires 
knowledge […] there are two principles involved: an intrinsic one, which a man uses when he finds 
things out for himself; and an extrinsic one, as when he learns from others. But in both cases a 
potency is actualised by something already in act. The light of the agent intellect gives a man 
immediate actual knowledge of the first principles which we know by nature…” [Homo enim acquirit 
scientiam, et a principio intrinseco, dum invenit, et a principio extrinseco, dum addiscit. Utrobique 
autem reducitur de potentia in actum, ab eo quod est actu. Homo enim per lumen intellectus 
agentis, statim cognoscit actu prima principia naturaliter cognita…] Besides the fact that St. Thomas 
is saying “statim”, and therefore does not necessarily imply a pre-containing of the principles, his 
point here is that the actuality of the principles already known allows the “inveniens” to draw 
conclusions from them. What is principle in a certain sense (of the conclusions), can be a result in a 
different sense (of the agent intellect’s action on the phantasms). Cf. In II De Anima 12, 17-26: “Now, 
as a subject moves from primary potency into primary actuality when it acquires knowledge through 
teaching, so too a subject’s primary potency to the possession of a sense-faculty is actualised by his 
birth. But whereas a sense-faculty is natural to every animal,—so that in the act of being generated 
it acquires a sense-faculty along with its own specific nature—the case is not the same with 
intellectual knowledge; this is not naturally inborn in man; it has to be acquired through 
[investigation] and discipline.” [Sicut autem de potentia prima aliquid mutatur in primum actum, 
dum acquirit scientiam per doctrinam; ita de prima potentia ad sensum, aliquid mutatur in actum, ut 
scilicet habeat sensum per generationem. Sensus autem naturaliter inest animali: unde sicut per 
generationem acquirit propriam naturam, et speciem, ita acquirit sensum. Secus autem est de 





This line of interpretation is more consistent with what St. Thomas says four 
questions later: 
The cognitive soul is in potentiality both to the images which are the principles of 
sensing, and to those which are the principles of understanding. For this reason 
Aristotle (De Anima iii, 4) held that the intellect by which the soul understands has 
no innate species, but is at first in potentiality to all such species.533 
After denying the presence of species “naturally included”, however, St. Thomas 
does not hesitate to speak about things that are known naturally, precisely the first 
principles. In showing the inconsistency of Plato’s position, that the soul is naturally (from 
the beginning) endowed with species, St. Thomas says: “Because, if the soul has a natural 
knowledge of all things, it seems impossible for the soul so far to forget the existence of 
such knowledge as not to know itself to be possessed thereof: for no man forgets what he 
knows naturally; that, for instance, the whole is larger than the part, and such like.”534 
St. Thomas, therefore, is affirming the presence of principles “naturaliter indita” and 
then denying the presence of species “naturaliter indita.” It is not relevant here that St. 
Thomas speaks initially of principles and then of species because, for Aquinas, the species 
are the means to understand everything. The use of the same wording, however, should not 
confuse whomever is attentive to the clear context in which each of the statements occurs. 
In the first text,535 St. Thomas is not speaking about the origin of the principles, but about 
                                                     
533 84, 3, c.: “Oportet dicere quod anima cognoscitiva sit in potentia tam ad similitudines 
quae sunt principia sentiendi, quam ad similitudines quae sunt principia intelligendi. Et propter hoc 
Aristoteles posuit quod intellectus, quo anima intelligit, non habet aliquas species naturaliter inditas, 
sed est in principio in potentia ad huiusmodi species omnes.” 
534 84, 3, c.: “Si habet anima naturalem notitiam omnium, non videtur esse possibile quod 
huius naturalis notitiae tantam oblivionem capiat, quod nesciat se huiusmodi scientiam habere, 
nullus enim homo obliviscitur ea quae naturaliter cognoscit, sicut quod omne totum sit maius sua 
parte, et alia huiusmodi.” 




the origin of reasoning. Reasoning is a movement of the intellect from something already 
known to something unknown, and therefore it implies something known as principle. The 
known which is principle of this movement cannot be the fruit of reasoning, exactly because 
it is its principle. The known must, then, be the result of the first natural actualization of the 
intellect, and not of the movement of the intellect as already perfect. That is why St. 
Thomas says: “naturaliter notorum absque investigatione rationis.” Here, naturally means 
“without investigation,” because St. Thomas is dealing with the principle of investigation as 
movement. Naturally also means that it is an actualization according to nature, insofar as it 
depends, not on the perfection of a particular subject, but on the perfection of nature itself, 
and here the perfection of the intellectual faculties in order to know reality. Here, principles 
naturaliter indita simply means principles that are present in the mind, not as a result of the 
movement of the intellect in act, but as a result of the natural first actualization of the 
intellect. 
In the second text, St. Thomas is expressly denying that the knowledge we have of 
corporeal things comes from species included naturally (= ex natura as from the first origin) 
in the mind. Later in the question, St. Thomas affirms that this knowledge comes from 
species that are abstracted from the phantasm. That is to say, the species that are the 
means of human knowledge are not ready-made in the mind, but need to be abstracted 
from the phantasm of sensitivity. What Aquinas affirms here is that the reason for the lack 
of species “naturally included” is that the intellect is in potency of species like this: if they 
were naturally included, the intellect would not be tabula rasa or in potency, but in act or at 




what is denied here (“species naturaliter indita”) is that the intellect is already in act by 
nature (that is to say, by being what it is). The reason to deny this is that the intellect is by 
nature in potency of species like this. What is affirmed or supposed in the previous text is 
that the first actualization of the intellect is according to nature, and not a result of the 
reasoning activity of the intellect itself, which is still not in act. 
Therefore, it should be clear that, for Aquinas, there is originally nothing in the mind 
allowing us to say that the mind is in act, or even in the habit of knowing anything. The fact 
that the actualization of the mind is natural in the first place (first concepts and first 
judgments depending on those concepts) does not negate the fact that the intellect is in 
pure potency of all these things, and passive potency, as we have seen. 
The same doctrine can be seen in other works of Aquinas. A clear instance is the 
following text. Here, the explanation of the “naturaliter” known is that the light by which 
those principles are made intelligible is “natural” in human beings. Again, the universal 
principles known naturally come naturally from experience: 
In speculative sciences, every consideration is referred back to certain primary 
things, which man certainly does not need to learn nor find out (otherwise he will 
need to go on to infinity): man possesses naturally the cognition of these primary 
things. Of this kind are the indemonstrable principles of demonstration […] and also 
the first conceptions of the intellect, such as the notion of being, one, and the like 
[…]. Such naturally known things are made known to man through the very light of 
the agent intellect, which is natural to man, by which light something is made known 
to us, only insofar as by the agent intellect the phantasms are made intelligible in 
act. This is in fact the act of the agent intellect, as is said in III De Anima. Now, the 




of the aforementioned principles is in the senses and the memory, as the 
Philosopher demonstrates towards the end of Posteriorum.536 (my trans.) 
In the text of In III De Anima 4, 26-35, St. Thomas is denying that the agent intellect 
be the habitus of the first principles insofar as this would imply that the soul already 
understands in act the terms of these principles, and so that those terms are not acquired 
by the action of the agent intellect. It is evident that for Aquinas there is nothing naturally 
precontained in the soul, regarding the content of understanding: 
This last phrase has led some to suppose that the agent intellect is one with the 
‘intellect’ which is a habitual apprehension of first principles. But it is not so; for the 
latter ‘intellect’ presupposes [some things already understood in act, namely the 
terms of those principles], in understanding which we apprehend the truth of first 
principles. So the view in question would imply that the agent intellect was not, as 
Aristotle here maintains, the primary source, for us, of the actual intelligibility of 
anything.537 
                                                     
536 In Boet. De Trin. 6, 4, c.: “Omnis consideratio scientiarum speculativarum reducitur in 
aliqua prima, quae quidem homo non habet necesse addiscere aut invenire, ne oporteat in infinitum 
procedere, sed eorum notitiam naturaliter habet. Et huiusmodi sunt principia demonstrationum 
indemonstrabilia […] et etiam primae conceptiones intellectus, ut entis et unius et huiusmodi […] 
Huiusmodi autem naturaliter cognita homini manifestantur ex ipso lumine intellectus agentis, quod 
est homini naturale, quo quidem lumine nihil manifestatur nobis, nisi in quantum per ipsum 
phantasmata fiunt intelligibilia in actu. Hic enim est actus intellectus agentis, ut dicitur in III De 
Anima. Phantasmata autem a sensu accipiuntur; unde principium cognitionis praedictorum 
principiorum est ex sensu et memoria, ut patet per philosophum in fine Posteriorum.” The same 
reference to the Posteriora is found in another clear text De Ver 10, 6, sc 2: “At first, all our cognition 
consists in the knowledge of first undeducible principles. But the cognition of these arises in us from 
sense, as is clear from the Posterior Analytics. Therefore, all our knowledge arises from sense.” 
[Omnis nostra cognitio originaliter consistit in notitia primorum principiorum indemonstrabilium. 
Horum autem cognitio in nobis a sensu oritur, ut patet in fine Poster. Ergo scientia nostra a sensu 
oritur.] What is original as content in human understanding is not precontained but acquired from 
experience. 
537 In III De Anima 4, 26-35: “Huius autem verbi occasione, quidam posuerunt intellectum 
agentem idem esse cum intellectu qui est habitus principiorum. Quod esse non potest: quia 
intellectus, qui est habitus principiorum, praesupponit aliqua iam intellecta in actu: scilicet terminos 
principiorum, per quorum intelligentiam cognoscimus principia: et sic sequeretur, quod intellectus 
agens non faceret omnia intelligibilia in actu, ut hic philosophus dicit.” The text continues explaining 
in what sense Aristotle says that the agent intellect is a “habitus”: “Therefore I hold that the term 





That the first principles are also known from experience and, therefore, not to be 
confounded with the agent intellect, is explicit in the following text. From texts like this it is 
clear also that the first principles are not naturally present in the intellect, in the sense of 
previous to the agent intellect’s action on the phantasms: 
Indeed, some men thought that the agent intellect does not differ from our habitus 
of indemonstrable principles. But this cannot be the case, because we certainly 
know indemonstrable principles by abstracting them from singulars, as the 
Philosopher teaches in the Posterior Analytics.538 
                                                     
distinguish it from a privation or a potency. In this case the agent intellect is called a [habit] to 
distinguish it from the intellect in potency.” [Dicendum est ergo, quod habitus, sic accipitur 
secundum quod philosophus frequenter consuevit nominare omnem formam et naturam habitum, 
prout habitus distinguitur contra privationem et potentiam, ut sic per hoc quod nominat eum 
habitum distinguat eum ab intellectu possibili, qui est potentia.] 
538 Q.D. De Anima, a.5, c.: “Quidam vero crediderunt intellectum agentem non esse aliud 
quam habitum principiorum indemonstrabilium in nobis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia etiam ipsa 
principia indemonstrabilia cognoscimus abstrahendo a singularibus, ut docet philosophus in I 
Poster.” Among the “Thomistic negations regarding the agent intellect”, Sellés includes that it is not 
receptive of habits (innate, acquired or infused) and it is not to be confounded with the habit of the 
first principles (cf. Sellés, EIA, 272). In a footnote, Fabro says the following: “‘Praeexistunt enim in 
ipsa (natura humana) naturaliter principia demonstrationum per se nota, quae sunt semina 
quaedam sapientiae, et principia quaedam iuris naturalis quae sunt semina quaedam virtutum 
moralium’ [For self-evident principles of demonstrations, which are seeds of the contemplation of 
wisdom, naturally preexist in (that nature), as do principles of natural law, which are seeds of the 
moral virtues] (De Veritate, q. XIV, a. 2; cfr. q. XI, a. 1 ad 5um; q. XVIII, a. 6). Elsewhere it is explicitly 
said that the first principles are ‘innati quodammodo’ [innate, in a sense (my trans.)]. Cfr. In II Sent., 
Dist. 24, q. II, a. 3; In IV Sent., Dist. 49, q. I, a. 3, Sol. III; De Veritate, q. X, a. 6 ad 6um. This 
terminology, which was in common with the Agostinians (v. MATTHAEUS AB AQUASPARTA, QQ. De Fide 
et cognition, Ad Aquas Claras, 1903, q. 1, p. 53) disappears in the Thomistic works of maturity, 
where the origin of the first principles is absolutely entrusted to the [Greek] epagogué, which takes 
them from experience, not only regarding the content of the isolated terms but also regarding their 
connection. On this question cfr. C. Fabro, [English in the original] Knowledge and Perception in the 
aristotelic-thomistic Psychology, in: ‘The new Sholasticism’ XII (1938), pp. 337-365” (Fabro, NMP, 
277. A new edition of the cited article is in our Bibliography). Regardless of the terminology, I think it 





1.6. The Text of 84, 6: materia causae 
The fact that Aquinas mentions sensibility as not the total and perfect cause of 
intellectual knowing, but rather as the matter of the (total) cause (“materia causae”), may 
seem to imply that the form of the cause (the universal content) is provided by the (agent) 
intellect. In this way, Aquinas would be suggesting an Epistemology in line with Kant’s, in 
which the senses provide the matter and intelligence the form. Is this actually what the text 
suggests? Which other texts could shed light on a correct interpretation? 
Let us take a closer look at 84, 6. The question is whether or not the soul acquires its 
intellectual knowledge from the sensible things, and the answer is positive, but with a 
distinction. Throughout the entire article it seems clear that knowing is receptive and not 
active, since the issue of the source of knowing is referred to the principle of a 
proportionate cause, by which knowledge is produced in the faculty. In other words, the 
agent object of intellectual knowing must be different from the one of sensibility, because 
there must be a proportion between effect (here, the different knowing) and agent.539 In 
the third objection, in fact, St. Thomas argues: “An effect does not surpass the power of its 
cause. But intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensible things: for we understand some 
                                                     
539 A similar approach to the question, that is, the principle of a proportionate cause, may be 
seen in De Spirit. Creat., a.10, ad 17: “A species which is in the imagination is of the same genus as a 
species which is in a sense, because both are individual and material. But a species which is in an 
intellect belongs to another genus, because it is universal. And consequently an imagined species 
cannot imprint an intelligible species as a sensitive species imprints an imagined species; and for this 
reason an active intellectual power is necessary, whereas an active sense power is not.” [… species 
quae est in imaginatione, est eiusdem generis cum specie quae est in sensu, quia utraque est 
individualis et materialis; sed species quae est in intellectu, est alterius generis, quia est universalis. 
Et ideo species imaginaria non potest imprimere speciem intelligibilem, sicut species sensibilis 
imprimit speciem imaginariam; propter quod necessaria est virtus intellectiva activa, non autem 





things which cannot be perceived by the senses. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not 
derived from sensible things.”540 In the objection, then, the reason that our intellectual 
knowledge does not come from sensible things is because they are not, as sensible, 
proportionate cause for our knowledge of intellectual things. Sense knowledge here is 
clearly perception, and intellectual knowledge is allegedly too. As Fabro notes,541 St. 
Thomas in responding does not reject the principles of the objection: “Sensitive knowledge 
is not the entire cause of intellectual knowledge. And therefore it is not strange that 
intellectual knowledge should extend further than sensitive knowledge.”542 That is, it is true 
that the effect does not go beyond the cause: there must be proportion. However, because 
what is perceived by the senses is not the total cause of intellectual knowing, but is the 
cause only in a certain sense (materially), we can still say that intellectual knowing comes 
from sensible things, even if it is not reduced to the content of sensible cognition. 
The point is, then, that there must be a proportionate cause that produces 
intellectual knowledge in the possible intellect (i.e., the intelligible in act), as the sensible in 
act is proportionate cause of sensible knowledge. The corpus is better understood in this 
sense: ”And therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the 
impression caused by the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble is required, 
                                                     
540 84, 6, ob. 3: “Effectus non se extendit ultra virtutem suae causae. Sed intellectualis 
cognitio se extendit ultra sensibilia; intelligimus enim quaedam quae sensu percipi non possunt. 
Intellectualis ergo cognitio non derivatur a rebus sensibilibus.” 
541 Cf. LS, 116, footnote. 
542 84, 6 ad 3: “Ad tertium dicendum quod sensitiva cognitio non est tota causa intellectualis 





for ‘the agent is more noble than the patient,’ as he says.”543 Here agens does not refer to 
the agent intellect directly, but to the intelligible in act produced by the agent intellect, as 
the following comparison with the Platonic idea and the reference to “intelligibilia in actu” 
suggest:  
Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere 
impression of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more 
noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which we have spoken above,544 
causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a 
process of abstraction.545 
In other words, intellectual knowledge cannot be caused by the mere impression of 
sensible things (for lack of proportionate cause), nor is it caused by the impression of a 
Platonic idea (for the source of knowledge must be in the sensible things, which are the true 
reality), but by the impression of the intelligible in act, produced from the phantasm by the 
agent intellect and impressed in the possible intellect. 
According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms, intellectual 
knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the phantasms cannot of themselves 
affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actually intelligible by the active 
                                                     
543 84, 6, c.: “Et ideo ad causandam intellectualem operationem, secundum Aristotelem, non 
sufficit sola impressio sensibilium corporum, sed requiritur aliquid nobilius, quia agens est 
honorabilius patiente, ut ipse dicit.” 
544 The Ottawa edition refers to 79, 3 and 4. 
545 84, 6, c.: “Non tamen ita quod intellectualis operatio causetur in nobis ex sola 
impressione aliquarum rerum superiorum, ut Plato posuit, sed illud superius et nobilius agens quod 
vocat intellectum agentem, de quo iam supra diximus, facit phantasmata a sensibus accepta 
intelligibilia in actu, per modum abstractionis cuiusdam.” Cf. In III De Anima 4, 76-77, where St. 
Thomas interprets the Aristotelian phrase: “the agent is more noble than the patient” (my trans.) 
[honorabilius est agens paciente] in the De Anima’s text on the agent intellect as referred to the 
agent intellect itself. I do not think that this challenges my interpretation of the Summa, for the 
reasons exposed above, and for what we will say about the agent intellect as actus intelligibilium, 






intellect, it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of 
intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the [matter of the] cause.546 
Quodammodo materia causae, therefore, means that the phantasm is the “matter” 
out of which the agent intellect produces the intelligible in act by means of its illumination, 
and that same intelligible in act will be the proportionate cause of intellectual knowing. 
Is this not precisely what leads some readers of Aquinas to reduce sensible knowing 
to providing the matter for the completing activity of intelligence? It is important to 
remember that in question 84, Aquinas is trying to explain how intelligence works (in this 
life), not directly what it knows, which is already presupposed. In other words, the problem 
is not whether we understand corporeal things, but how. The first article tells us by which 
faculty we understand (precisely making the important distinction between res intellecta 
and modus rei intellectae), whereas the following articles tell us by which agent object. That 
is why, after denying that knowledge of corporeal things is verified by means of intelligible 
“ready-made” intermediaries (the intellect’s own essence, innate species, infused species, 
or the essence of God), Aquinas goes to the other “extreme”, the sensible things, in order to 
show in what sense something that is not actually intelligible can be the source of the 
intellectual operation; in this way, Aquinas finally arrives at the abstracted species as agent 
object. Therefore, in this context, that sensible knowing is in a certain sense the matter of 
intellectual knowing should be understood of the operation (how), not of the content 
(what), i.e., of intelligibility as a mode of being, not of what is understood. St. Thomas is not 
                                                     
546 84, 6, c.: “Secundum hoc ergo, ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a sensu 
causatur. Sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quod 
fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem; non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et 




saying that the phantasm is the matter of what is understood, but that the mode of being of 
the phantasm is not proportionate to be the agent object of intellectual knowing, and 
therefore, in its particularity, the phantasm works only as a “matter” from which the agent 
intellect produces the agent object, which is the intelligible in act. In other words, he is not 
saying that sensible things are a matter that obtains intelligibility as content when the agent 
intellect illuminates them; he is saying that the phantasm is like a matter that obtains 
intelligibility as a mode of being when it is illuminated by the agent intellect. As we have 
seen, for Aquinas, sensible things are what is understood, insofar as the universal nature 
subsisting in the corporeal things is the object of understanding. 
The agent object is necessarily an intelligible in act. That is why the sensible things 
cannot be the agent object of intellectual knowing. But because our agent object does come 
from sensible things, they can be said to be in a certain sense the source of our intellectual 
knowing. The agent intellect produces the intelligible in act from the phantasm, and for this 
reason, the phantasm can be considered a certain “matter” of the agent object, in the sense 
of “that out of which” the intelligible in act comes in some way. 
In what way? Aquinas mentions it: “per modum abstractionis cuiusdam.” The way 
the phantasm is made intelligible in act by the agent intellect is “by a certain abstraction,” 
that is, not by preserving the phantasm’s particularity, nor by borrowing a certain content, 




abstraction as a “separation” of the universal object from its individual conditions in the 
matter.547 
The following seems to be the passage that would mislead Aquinas’ readers: “causes 
the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of 
abstraction.”548 It does seem that what is understood is the phantasm itself, modified in 
                                                     
547 Cf. 79, 3, c.: “We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make 
things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions.” [Oportebat igitur 
ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem 
specierum a conditionibus materialibus.]; 79, 4, c.: “… we perceive that we abstract universal forms 
from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible.” [… percipimus nos 
abstrahere formas universales a conditionibus particularibus, quod est facere actu intelligibilia]; and 
afterwards in 85, 1 ad 3: “This is done by the power of the active intellect which by turning towards 
the phantasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which represents, as to its specific 
conditions only, the thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the intelligible species is said to 
be abstracted from the phantasm…” [Sed virtute intellectus agentis resultat quaedam similitudo in 
intellectu possibili ex conversione intellectus agentis supra phantasmata, quae quidem est 
repraesentativa eorum quorum sunt phantasmata, solum quantum ad naturam speciei. Et per hunc 
modum dicitur abstrahi species intelligibilis a phantasmatibus…] That St. Thomas considers 
abstraction more a “consideration” than a “separation” (cf. 85, 1 ad 1) does not take away the fact 
that he considers the species “taken from” the phantasm (cf. In I De Anima 2, 261: “plane-surfaces 
[…] which can be considered by the mind apart from the matter” [superficies, quae ratione possunt 
separari a naturali materia]). The context should be regarded in each case: when abstraction refers 
more to the production of the intelligible in act as agent object, it means something more like 
“separation”, because the intelligible species is really separate from the phantasm, as two different 
agent objects (cf. De Spirit. Creat., a.10, c.: “For one particular man, such as Socrates or Plato, makes 
things intelligible in act when he pleases, that is, by apprehending a universal form from particulars, 
when he separates that which is common to all individual men from those things which are peculiar 
to each.” [Unus enim homo particularis, ut Socrates vel Plato, facit cum vult intelligibilia in actu, 
apprehendendo scilicet universale a particularibus, dum secernit id quod est commune omnibus 
individuis hominum, ab his quae sunt propria singulis.]); but when it regards the universal content of 
the species, as distinct from the sensible, St. Thomas prefers to speak about “consideration”, 
because the content, though absolutely speaking distinct (and therefore knowable without the 
other), is not really separate from the particular (cf. In III De Anima 6, 274-276: “Therefore the 
intellect abstracts things present in the sense-objects, not understanding them to be separate, but 
understanding them in separation and distinctly.” [my trans.] [Ea ergo quae sunt in sensibilibus 
abstrahit intellectus, non quidem intelligens ea esse separata, sed separatim et seorsum ea 
intelligens.]) This is clearly related to the distinction between abstraction as act of the agent intellect 
and as act of the possible intellect (cf. Cromp, 16ff.; Chapter 1, section 4; Chapter 4, section 2). 





some way by the agent intellect, and so perhaps provided with intelligibility as content. But 
abstraction, which is explicitly the way in which the phantasm is made intelligible in act, 
does not support that assumption. We should rather say that the phantasm is what is made 
intelligible in act, insofar as it is the subject matter of the action of the agent intellect. 
There is another indication in the text that may support a reading in line with the 
rest of the proposed interpretation. Intellectual knowledge in the last paragraph is equated 
with the immutatio of the possible intellect by the agent object, and not with the agent 
intellect’s activity, which is the condition of the immutatio. The two potencies and their 
respective operations are not confused, as we have seen, and knowing is not portrayed as 
an activity on sensibility but as a receptivity conditioned by such activity (agent intellect as 
metaphysical a priori of intellectual knowing as receptive of objective content). We have 
already seen that this activity implies that the content is already present in the particular, 
and therefore refers to the mode of being of the content. 
For the reasons explained, it does not seem that a notion of experience that 
provides only the raw material for the informative activity of intelligence can be grounded 
on this text. I would add that the “quodammodo” should be taken more seriously, and 
therefore less as a precise reference to a “raw material.” It must be admitted that this 
particular text is not as clear as others; in any case, however, the meaning of more obscure 
statements should be clarified by paying attention to the rest of the treatise, since it is not 
plausible that St. Thomas denies here what he affirms elsewhere. The three previous 




In other passages St. Thomas refers to this “material” role of sensibility in other 
ways. 
In 77, 7, c., as we have seen previously, Aquinas says that if we consider the soul 
insofar as it is receptive, the lower potencies act as principles of the higher ones. Thus, the 
senses provide as it were the subject matter for the work of the intellect: “But considered 
as receptive principles, the more [imperfect] powers are principles with regard to the 
others; thus the soul, according as it has the sensitive power, is considered as the subject, 
and as [a certain] material with regard to the intelligence.”549 It is important to note that 
the senses are considered as a certain (again quoddam) matter for the intellect, but insofar 
as the intellect is considered a certain capacity of reception, and not as an active principle 
whatsoever. The first part of the article, instead, deals with the intellect as a certain active 
principle of the lower potencies with regards to their being (“sicut imperfectum a 
perfecto”).550 However, this activity is not referred to the activity of the agent intellect. In 
the second part of the article St. Thomas is dealing with the faculties in their operation,551 
and in that exact context the intellect is considered as a receptive – knowing faculty, whose 
subject matter is provided by the senses. This, of course, does not take away the necessity 
of an agent intellect acting on the phantasm of sensitivity, but it does show how the fact 
that St. Thomas considers the product of sensitivity a certain matter of the intellectual 
                                                     
549 77, 7, c.: “Sed secundum viam susceptivi principii, e converso potentiae imperfectiores 
inveniuntur principia respectu aliarum, sicut anima, secundum quod habet potentiam sensitivam, 
consideratur sicut subiectum et materiale quoddam respectu intellectus.” 
550 We set aside the other way in which the higher potencies are principles of the lower: by 
finality. 




operation, does not mean that he considers the intellectual operation as an activity. As in 
the interpretation of the phantasm as object, the important point is to understand the role 
of the senses in human knowing as providing the real in its “real” mode of being, in its 
particularity, and therefore putting the soul in contact with its object. Insofar as the senses 
provide what is to be known intellectually, they may be said to provide the “object” of 
human understanding; that is, we understand particular things. But, insofar as the proper 
object of human understanding is the quidditas of the corporeal things, which is not actually 
intelligible in the phantasm, the senses are said to provide the “material” of human 
understanding, that is to say, not the “form” that is understood, but the “material from 
which” that form will come, supposed the action of the agent intellect. The translation 
“subject matter” seems to convey accurately what Aquinas means by “materiale 
quoddam”552 and “quodammodo materia causae”,553 insofar as the matter here contains 
what is to be understood. 
A related understanding of the role of the senses with regards to the intellectual 
operation can be taken from 89, 5, c.: “But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and 
formally in the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior 
powers, the same distinction is to be applied to habit.”554 The act of the intellect is mainly 
and formally in the intellect itself insofar as the intellect is the place of the intelligible 
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553 84, 6. 
554 89, 5, c.: “Sed sicut actus intellectus principaliter quidem et formaliter est in ipso 






species (“locus specierum”555); it is materially and “in a way that creates the conditions” 
(“dispositive”) in the inferior faculties, insofar as the intellect turns to their phantasms in 
order to see (speculari) its own intelligible objects (as existing in the concrete)556 St. Thomas 
is speaking directly of the act of the intellect after the abstraction has happened, and 
therefore the “materiality” of the sensible object acquires here a different sense. 
Abstraction and conversion are distinct for St. Thomas. The sensible object is not here a 
“matter from which” the object will be taken, or a “subject matter” on which the agent 
intellect will realize its operation; it is rather like a “ground” or “support” for the intellectual 
activity, that which keeps the intelligible species bound to reality. The sensible object is 
what allows the intellect to see the universal nature as it is, as (existing) in the concrete. The 
act of intelligence should be truly understood as an “intus – legere,” a reading the universal 
nature in the concrete reality. This is, in my view, what Aquinas means by conversio ad 
phantasmata. The abstraction, instead, is still not a “reading into” because it is the 
“production” of what is to be read (the image) “out of” the phantasm. And the point of this 
dissertation is to show that what the agent intellect produces is not what is to be read in its 
content, but in its intelligible mode of being: the agent intellect produces the species, the 
image of the nature that exists in the concrete. Just as the light does not paint the different 
                                                     
555 Cf. In III De Anima 1, 226-236: “We can see the point of the old saying that the soul is the 
‘place’ of forms,—meaning that it receives these into itself […] It follows that the soul as a whole is 
not the ‘place’ of forms, but only that part of it which lacks a bodily organ, i.e. the intellect; and even 
this part does not, as such, possess them actually, but potentially only.” [Iam potest verificari dictum 
illorum, qui dixerunt, quod anima est locus specierum: quod per similitudinem dicitur, eo quod est 
specierum receptiva (…) Et ideo non dicendum est, quod tota anima sit locus specierum, sed solum 
pars intellectiva, quae organum non habet. Nec ita est locus specierum, quod habeat actu species, 
sed potentia tantum.] 
556 Cf. 84, 7, c.: “… [I]n order to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual.” [… ut 




colours but makes them all visible, the agent intellect makes visible the different natures of 
particular things. Finally, it is important to note that the material role of the senses, in this 
text, is not related to an activity of in-formation by the intelligence, but to the necessity of a 
connexion with the real through the conversio ad phantasmata of the intellect in act. The 
phantasm is not the object of the intellect, because it is sensible; however, the way in which 
the intellect contemplates its intelligible object is by converting to the phantasm (the 
sensible object). And, although it would be impossible to maintain that the intellect beholds 
two objects, it is not impossible to maintain that, while only one of them actualizes it 
formally, the other qualifies the operation. In the end, the intellect is the cause of the 
cognitive power of the senses, and they are for it, as Aquinas says. Their metaphysical 
interconnection may help in understanding the possibility of this cooperation in the 
operative realm. 
The distinction between the respective formal objects of the senses and intelligence, 
and the interconnection between them, is also mentioned in 78, 4 ad 4: “Although the 
operation of the intellect has its origin in the senses:557 yet, in the thing apprehended 
through the senses, the intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In 
like manner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect manner.”558 Although there 
is no explicit mention of materiality, the idea of the object of the senses as a “matter from 
which” (“oriatur a sensu”) and the idea of the intellect knowing its object in the object of 
                                                     
557 The material role of the senses is again related to the intellectual operation. 
558 78, 4 ad 4: “Licet intellectus operatio oriatur a sensu, tamen in re apprehensa per sensum 
intellectus multa cognoscit quae sensus percipere non potest. Et similiter aestimativa, licet inferiori 




the senses (“in re apprehensa per sensum”) are present. At the same time, the comparison 
between the estimative faculty and the intellect reassures us that St. Thomas is talking 
about both as “perceptive” (receptive) faculties. The estimative faculty, indeed, is able to 
perceive things that the external senses do not (the sensible per accidens), and in this it is 
similar to the intellect, which “perceives” the quidditas of the corporeal thing. 
Aquinas’ “materia causae” in 84, 6 does not seem to support a Kantian reading of his 
doctrine. St. Thomas is saying that the senses provide the object as subject matter, they 
present the real in its real mode of being, they provide the necessary contact with the real 
for the intellectual operation to happen. But, for that operation to happen, something else 
is required. The real in its real mode of being cannot actualize the intelligence: only an 
intelligible in act can do that. The agent intellect illuminates the phantasm and makes its 
quidditas visible to the eye of intelligence. More powerful than the eye of the senses is the 
eye of the intelligence, but intelligence still needs a light to see its proper object (and this is 
the agent intellect) as well as needing the real object itself (and this is the role of the 
senses). It is always in the phantasm that the eye of intelligence can see its proportionate 
object, which is the universal quidditas of this phantasm as objective representation of the 
corporeal thing. The phantasm, therefore, is the matter of the cause insofar as the efficient 
cause (the agent intellect) produces the agent object (the intelligible species) from the 
phantasm, making the latter (which stands for the particular real thing) intelligible in act by 
means of abstraction.559 
                                                     
559 Therese Cory, approaching instead the admission of a formal a priori in intellectual 





1.7. The Agent Intellect as “actus intelligibilium” 
The next task is to study the texts in Aquinas which seem to speak more directly 
about the agent intellect as a certain form of the object of intelligence. 
According to St. Thomas, we cannot say that there are intelligible species ready-
made in the mind. However, we cannot deny that the agent intellect is ready-made in the 
subject (i.e. something belonging to the soul). Now, Aquinas says that the agent intellect is 
the “act of the intelligible” objects in the mind. Might this mean that the agent intellect is 
the form (act, perfection) of everything we understand, and therefore what is understood in 
every act of intelligence? Might this be a clear Thomistic indication of the agent intellect as 
a formal a priori of human understanding? 
Let us begin with an explicit occurrence of “actus intelligibilium”: 
But as in this life our intellect has material and sensible things for its proper natural 
object, as stated above, it understands itself according as it is made actual by the 
species abstracted from sensible things, through the light of the active intellect, 
which […] actuates the intelligible things themselves, [and] also, by their 
                                                     
to speak of a metaphysical a priori, but in a different sense: “[O]ne might argue that APM3 [‘Active 
Principle Model 3’, her proposal for an interpretation of the action of the agent intellect in Aquinas] 
is not empiricist enough, because the intellectual light adds something to the intellect that was not 
‘first in the senses,’ that is, the form of intelligibility. Indeed, Aquinas agrees that ‘the senses are not 
the total cause of intellectual cognition.’ Nevertheless, this does not seem to be of major concern, 
since in APM3 the intellectual light does not add any content, but only a new mode of existing, that 
of intelligible being.” And in note she clarifies: “At least, it does not add new content relevant for 
understanding the essence of the extramental object. As I have argued, Aquinas holds that all 
actually intelligible being is self-intelligible, so because the agent intellect grants actually intelligible 
being to the possible intellect through the intelligible species, there is a sense in which the very 
intelligibility of the intelligible species is a kind of content that allows the intellect to cognize itself 
when it is cognizing anything else (Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge, ch. 6)” (Cory, Rethinking, 639, 
my underline). Cf. my previous remarks on Cory in Chapter 1. For a rather strange interpretation of 
the passage, see Berger, 38, 43. He refers the materia causae to the materiality of the external 





instrumentality, actuates the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself 
not by its essence, but by its act.560 
In what sense is the agent intellect the act of the intelligible (objects)? First, let us 
examine what St. Thomas is talking about, then what those intelligibles are, and finally the 
meaning here of “act.” 
1) St. Thomas is saying that the intellect cannot become an object of knowledge 
unless it is subjectively (as a real being) in act. This is because, even if it is a being in the 
realm of the intelligible, it is in that realm the least, insofar as it is only in potency, like the 
materia prima in the realm of corporeal things. Now, what makes the possible intellect 
subjectively in act is the species as subjective modification.  
2) Therefore, when St. Thomas says that the agent intellect is the act of the 
intelligible (objects) he is directly referring to this aspect of the intelligible species (its reality 
as forma quo), not to the intentional presence of the object. In other words, the agent 
intellect is “act of the intelligible” in its intelligible mode of being, not in its content. 
3) What does it mean that the agent intellect is the act of the species and, through 
it, of the possible intellect? Act is the principle by which something is perfect in some sense, 
belonging intrinsically to the thing itself. The agent cause is not “act of the thing” in this 
sense. But, if we take as “act of the thing” that which “perfects” the thing itself by 
                                                     
560 87, 1, c.: “Sed quia connaturale est intellectui nostro, secundum statum praesentis vitae, 
quod ad materialia et sensibilia respiciat, sicut supra dictum est; consequens est ut sic seipsum 
intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen 
intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum intelligibilium, et eis mediantibus [Ottawa edition adds: 






participating some perfection, then it certainly includes the agent cause but we would, 
then, be using the word “actus” in an analogical and broader sense. Is this what Aquinas is 
doing? Let us see whether or not this suggestion can be grounded in the text. 
If the correction of the Leonine edition is right, the agent intellect would be both the 
act of the species and the act of the possible intellect through the species.561 That means 
the species are that which directly actualize the possible intellect. Now, if we take “species” 
here as agent object (as species impressa), St. Thomas would be suggesting that the species 
are act of the possible intellect insofar as they are its agent object. This would also be in line 
                                                     
561 Cf. CG II, 76, par. 15: “Now, man is the most perfect of all lower movers, and his proper 
and natural operation is understanding, which is not accomplished without a certain passivity, in 
that the intellect is passive to the intelligible; nor again, without action, in that the intellect makes 
things that are potentially intelligible to be actually so. Therefore, the proper principles of both 
these operations must be in man’s nature, nor must either of them have being in separation from 
his soul. And these principles are the agent and the possible intellects.” [Homo autem est 
perfectissimus inter omnia inferiora moventia. Eius autem propria et naturalis operatio est 
intelligere: quae non completur sine passione quadam, inquantum intellectus patitur ab intelligibili; 
et etiam sine actione, inquantum intellectus facit intelligibilia in potentia esse intelligibilia in actu. 
Oportet igitur in natura hominis esse utriusque proprium principium scilicet intellectum agentem et 
possibilem; et neutrum secundum esse ab anima hominis separatum esse.] A few paragraphs later 
Aquinas clarifies that the forms actualizing the possible intellect are the intelligible species 
themselves, not the agent intellect. This is the meaning of the Aristotelian comparison of the agent 
intellect to art, for example in CG II, 76, par. 18: “For the agent intellect stands in the same relation 
to the intelligible species received into the possible intellect as art to the artificial forms which it 
produces in matter, as the example used by Aristotle in De anima III […] makes clear.” [Comparatur 
enim intellectus agens ad species intelligibiles receptas in intellectu possibili, sicut ars ad formas 
artificiales quae per artem ponuntur in materia: ut patet ex exemplo Aristotelis in III De Anima.] Also 
for Sellés (cf. EIA, 254, 272) the agent intellect has a function of act on the intelligible species, not 
directly on the possibile intellect. And he quotes Aquinas (translation follows): “Et si quis recte 
consideret, intellectus agens, secundum ea quae Philosophus de ipso tradit non est activum 
respectu intellectus possibilis directe, sed magis respectu phantasmatum, quae facit intelligibilia 
actu, per quae intellectus possibilis reducitur in actum quando aspectus eius inclinatur ad inferiora 
ex unione corporis.” [And if one considers rightly, he will see that, according to the Philosopher’s 
own treatment of the matter, the agent intellect is not active directly with respect to the possible 
intellect, but rather with respect to phantasms which the agent intellect makes actually intelligible. 
And it is by the phantasms thus actualized that the possible intellect is actualized when, as a result 
of its union with the body, its vision is turned to inferior things.] (Q.D. De Anima, a. 18, ad 11, in 




with what Aquinas has just said: “[intellectus] fit actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas 
per lumen intellectus agentis.” The preposition “per” is normally used for the agent cause: 
here the species is agent as agent object (intellectus “fit actu per”) and the agent intellect is 
agent as the one abstracting (= faciens intelligibilia) the species from the senses 
(“abstractas per”). I suggest that there is a clear connection between the “fit actu per” and 
“eis mediantibus intellectus possibilis,” and between “abstractas per” and “actus ipsorum 
intelligibilium.” In both cases, the agent intellect is cause of something (species impressa) 
that in turn is cause of the act of the intellect. The use of the word “actus” has to do with 
the fact that St. Thomas is looking for a subjective actuality in the intellect (its own actus) 
that would allow it to be object of knowing; this subjective intelligibility, or intelligibility as 
mode of being in the possible intellect, is the intelligibility of the species because, of itself, 
the intellect is in potency (intelligible species as actus intellectus); this intelligible mode of 
being of the species is in turn the perfection of the agent intellect since, of itself, the species 
(= nature) in its real mode of being is particular (agent intellect as “actus ipsorum 
intelligibilium”). In both cases, however, one is actus of the other insofar as agent, and not 
as intrinsically perfecting the other: but because the perfection received does not belong 
originally to the recipient, it makes sense to call the cause “act” of it, to underline the 
potentiality of the recipient. This latter is exactly the point of the article: because the 
essence of the soul is in potency, it cannot be known by itself, but by its operation. 
If the previous reflections seem complicated, it should be granted that it is difficult 
to call the agent intellect “act of the intelligible” in any other sense. That the agent intellect 




intelligible content is not something that needs to be made, but it is ready-made in the 
thing itself as its nature). For this reason, the agent intellect cannot be the act of the 
intelligible as its formal content. That the agent intellect cannot be confounded with the 
intelligible mode of being of each species, may be concluded from the fact that an agent 
cause is not identified with its effect; if the agent intellect is responsible for the mode of 
being of the object specifically as agent of this mode of being, then agent intellect and 
mode of being of the object are not the same thing. For this reason, the agent intellect 
cannot be act of the intelligible as its intelligible mode of being. This can be taken from the 
following two texts as well. 
In 79, 4 ad 3, the role of agent object is denied the agent intellect: the latter is not 
the (agent) object, but the faculty making that object in act. Both sense and intelligence are 
shown to be actualized by their respective objects in act:  
If the relation of the active intellect to the passive were that of the active object to a 
power, as, for instance, of the visible in act to the sight; it would follow that we 
could understand all things instantly, since the active intellect is that which makes all 
things (in act). But now the active intellect is not an object, rather is it that whereby 
the objects are made to be in act…562 
The role of the object as agent (here movens) and its distinction from the agent 
intellect are present again in 79, 7, c.: “Nevertheless there is a distinction between the 
power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect: because as regards the same 
                                                     
562 79, 4 ad 3: “Dicendum quod, si intellectus agens compararetur ad intellectum possibilem 
ut obiectum agens ad potentiam, sicut visibile in actu ad visum; sequeretur quod statim omnia 
intelligeremus, cum intellectus agens sit quo est omnia facere. Nunc autem non se habet ut 





object, the active power which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the 
passive power, which is moved by the object existing in act.”563 
Clearly, the agent intellect is not act of the intelligible as intrinsic perfection of the 
intelligible in any sense: neither as its content, nor as its mode of being. 
The interpretation being proposed is the following. The principle by which (the 
nature of) the real thing is intelligible in act is the agent intellect. Now, this does not mean 
that the agent intellect communicates intelligibility as universal content, but that it is the 
principle of intelligibility as a mode of being. In other words, the agent intellect is not an 
objective act of the material of sensibility, but an agent principle of the intelligibility of the 
abstracted species. That is why, in 87, 1, c., that which actualizes the possible intellect 
directly, as a form of it, is the (already) intelligible species, not the agent intellect. The agent 
intellect as act is not perfective of the possible intellect in itself, but of the abstracted 
species and, then, not insofar as it gives them objective intelligibility, but insofar as it gives 
them intelligibility as a mode of being. 
The expression “actus intelligibilium” recurs in the response to Objection Two. St. 
Thomas is here explaining why the human intellect is not in act in the realm of the 
intelligible things: “… not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to 
intelligible things—as is the passive intellect—or is the act of intelligible things abstracted 
                                                     
563 79, 7, c.: “Diversificatur tamen potentia intellectus agentis, et intellectus possibilis, quia 
respectu eiusdem obiecti, aliud principium oportet esse potentiam activam, quae facit obiectum 





from the phantasms—as is the active intellect.”564 Therefore, the agent intellect (though 
actus intelligibilium) is not a reason for the human intellect to be intelligible in act, because 
it is the reason for the nature of corporeal things to be intelligible in act. It is not a light that 
is seen in the corporeal things, but rather a light that allows the corporeal things to be seen. 
It is not an act in the objective sense (intelligible), but in an agent sense (making intelligible); 
that is, if the agent intellect were intelligible in an objective sense, it would allow the 
intellect to be known by itself, which is what Aquinas is here denying. The agent intellect 
perfects the phantasm by making it intelligible in act: in this sense it is its act. It is also act 
because every active potency is active insofar as it is able to communicate a perfection and 
this, in turn, implies a certain perfection (nothing can give what it does not have).  
Though the following text refers to the act of the possible intellect, it is helpful to 
see what St. Thomas thinks about all of these things. The act of the intellect is not the 
perfection that is understood: 
The intelligent act of the human intellect is not the act and perfection of the 
material nature understood, as if the nature of the material thing and intelligent act 
could be understood by one act; just as a thing and its perfection are understood by 
one act. Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct from the 
act whereby it understands that it understands a stone; and so on.565 
Granted that it is not the possible intellect, it would be really difficult to suggest that 
this “actus et perfectio naturae intellectae materialis” is the agent intellect because, for 
                                                     
564 87, 1 ad 2: “Non autem intellectus humanus, qui vel est omnino in potentia respectu 
intelligibilium, sicut intellectus possibilis; vel est actus intelligibilium quae abstrahuntur a 
phantasmatibus, sicut intellectus agens.” 
565 87, 3 ad 2: “Dicendum quod ipsum intelligere humanum non est actus et perfectio 
naturae intellectae materialis, ut sic possit uno actu intelligi natura rei materialis et ipsum 
intelligere, sicut uno actu intelligitur res cum sua perfectione. Unde alius est actus quo intellectus 
intelligit lapidem, et alius est actus quo intelligit se intelligere lapidem, et sic deinde.” The edition of 




Aquinas, it means “natura rei materialis” and “lapidem.” As has been shown previously, the 
object of the possible intellect is the universal nature of the corporeal thing. 
In the following section of 88, 1, c., Aquinas is explaining Averroes’ doctrine about 
the union of the separate agent intellect with the human intellect. For Averroes, the agent 
intellect is like a form of the things that are understood: 
For since we understand by means of both the active intellect and intelligible objects 
[…] it is clear that the active intellect must be compared to the objects understood, 
either as the principal agent is to the instrument, or as form to matter. For an action 
is ascribed to two principles in one of these two ways; to a principal agent and to an 
instrument, as cutting to the workman and the saw; to a form and its subject, as 
heating to heat and fire. In both these ways the active intellect can be compared to 
the intelligible object as perfection is to the perfectible, and as act is to 
potentiality.566 
Note the smooth transition from agent and instrument to act and potency. Aquinas 
rejects the overall doctrine, but he does not seem to reject this use of the term “act”, as will 
be seen. The partial argument concludes that, supposing knowing to be receptive, and 
because what is received is received with its perfection, both the intellectual object and the 
intellectual light are received in the possible intellect, as the perfect thing with its 
perfection. “Now a subject [receives what is perfect and] its perfection at one and the same 
time, as the reception of what is actually visible synchronizes with the reception of light in 
                                                     
566 88, 1, c.: “Cum enim nos intelligamus per intellectum agentem et per intelligibilia 
speculata […] necesse est quod intellectus agens comparetur ad intellecta speculata vel sicut agens 
principale ad instrumenta, vel sicut forma ad materiam. His enim duobus modis attribuitur actio 
aliqua duobus principiis, principali quidem agenti et instrumento, sicut sectio artifici et serrae; 
formae autem et subiecto, sicut calefactio calori et igni. Sed utroque modo intellectus agens 





the eye. Therefore the passive intellect receives the intelligible object and the active 
intellect together.”567 
This is the way, for Averroes, in which the human intellect is able to unite itself in 
some way to the separate agent intellect and so, through it, understand the other separate 
substances, thus attaining beatitude. Here, the point of interest, however, is what Aquinas 
says about this union of the agent intellect with the possible intellect, i.e., how he qualifies 
it. Is the agent intellect a perfection of the object insofar as it (the agent intellect) is seen? Is 
it received objectively? 
It would seem that, even for Averroes, this union of the separate agent intellect and 
the human intellect does not so much allow the human intellect to know the agent intellect 
(as object), but rather allows the human intellect to know what is known by the agent 
intellect (and because of this, in the end, to know the agent intellect itself). In any case, it is 
clear that for Aquinas the agent intellect is not what is known because, in this life, both the 
agent intellect and the possible intellect are referred to the material things. Also, in this 
article, the agent intellect as light is not the object, but a principle of the understanding of 
the object. 
Secondly, […] because in the above explanation, the active intellect, supposing it to 
be a separate substance, would not be joined to us in its substance, but only in its 
light, as participated in things understood; and [this being conjoined] would not 
extend to the other acts of the active intellect so as to enable us to understand 
immaterial substances; just as when we see colors set off by the sun, we are not 
                                                     
567 88, 1, c.: “Simul autem recipitur in aliquo perfectum et perfectio; sicut visibile in actu et 






united to the substance of the sun so as to act like the sun, but its light only is united 
to us, that we may see the colors.568 
For Aquinas, in the hypothesis of a separate agent intellect, something similar to 
what happens in ocular vision would be the case. The sun is also a separate light. The 
colours are “illuminatos” as the light of the agent intellect “is participated” by the 
intellectual objects (“intellectis speculativis”).569 But St. Thomas also says that the light, in 
both cases, is united to us (“unietur nobis” for the intellect, “nobis unitur” for ocular vision). 
So, is the light act of the object or act of the faculty? In both cases, Aquinas understands the 
light as something united to the faculty in order to know other things, and participated in 
some way in the objects in order to know the objects themselves. So, even accepting that 
the light is somehow act of the objects, he does not take it here as an objective perfection. 
The agent intellect and the possible intellect, as principles of understanding, are 
referred only to material things by their mode of action in this life. At the end of the corpus, 
Aquinas says clearly that the agent intellect is referred to the material things as active, as 
making them intelligible.  
As was shown above, the active intellect is not a separate substance; but a faculty of 
the soul, extending itself actively to the same objects to which the passive intellect 
                                                     
568 88, 1, c.: “Secundo quia, secundum modum praedictum, intellectus agens, si est 
substantia separata, non unietur [www.corpusthomisticum.org has: “uniretur”] nobis secundum 
suam substantiam; sed solum lumen eius, secundum quod participatur in intellectis speculativis; et 
non quantum ad alias actiones intellectus agentis, ut possimus per hoc intelligere substantias 
immateriales. Sicut dum videmus colores illuminatos a sole, non unitur nobis substantia solis, ut 
possimus actiones solis agere; sed solum nobis unitur lumen solis ad visionem colorum.” 
569 The edition of www.corpusthomisticum.org has “speculatis.” The Ottawa edition has 
“speculativis” which gives the possibility of reading “speculative intellects” as well. It would not 
affect dramatically the meaning of the text, but this alternative reading seems less accurate, 
because this participation seems to be the “counter balance” of the “illuminatos” referred to the 
colours. In other words, Aquinas means here that what participates the light is the object, not the 





extends receptively; because, as is stated,570 the passive intellect is ‘all things 
potentially,’ and the active intellect is ‘all things in act.’ Therefore both intellects, 
according to the present state of life, extend to material things only, which are made 
actually intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in the passive intellect. 
Hence in the present state of life we cannot understand separate immaterial 
substances in themselves, either by the passive or by the active intellect.571 
That which is made intelligible is also that which is received: “materialia sola.”572 St. 
Thomas is talking about the res intellecta; we do not understand separate substances but 
material things (= naturas corporum). In other words, he does not mean that what is 
received in the human intellect is the phantasm in its particularity (materialiter), but that 
the (real) proportionate object of the human intellect is not the separate substances in 
themselves (this is the point of the article), but the material things (materialia). What he 
says is that what is made intelligible by the agent intellect is the material things themselves, 
and these same material things (i.e., their nature), in an intelligible mode of being, are what 
is received in the possible intellect. St. Thomas is referring here to what he has said 
previously,573 and he is not talking any longer about “act” but about “making intelligible” 
the material things. 
It seems clear that the agent intellect as actus intelligibilium does not mean for St. 
Thomas that the agent intellect is something that is understood, but rather that it is a 
                                                     
570 De Anima iii, 5. 
571 88, 1, c.: “Sexto, quia supra ostensum est quod intellectus agens non est substantia 
separata, sed virtus quaedam animae, ad eadem active se extendens, ad quae se extendit intellectus 
possibilis receptive, quia, ut dicitur in III De Anima, intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri, 
intellectus agens quo est omnia facere. Uterque ergo intellectus se extendit, secundum statum 
praesentis vitae, ad materialia sola; quae intellectus agens facit intelligibilia actu, et recipiuntur in 
intellectu possibili. Unde secundum statum praesentis vitae, neque per intellectum possibilem, 
neque per intellectum agentem, possumus intelligere substantias immateriales secundum seipsas.” 
572 This is also the sense of “omnia facere” and “omnia fieri”, at least in this context. 




principle of understanding other things. Can it be said to be a formal principle? St. Thomas 
says actus, but actus is an analogous notion. Aquinas would say that the light of the sun is 
the act of the colours insofar as it makes them visible. It is in the colours, but making them 
visible, not making itself visible. The reason we know there is no light is that we cannot see 
anything: “Turn the light on, please!” The light does not modify the colours, but makes 
them visible; the light is not the colour, it is not what is seen, but that by which we see. 
These, of course, are not scientific claims, but the example St. Thomas uses to enable us to 
understand things which depend on principles. The point is that the light is not the object of 
vision, as the agent intellect is not the object of understanding. The agent intellect is act as 
making intelligible in its mode of being the universal nature of corporeal things, and not as 
providing intelligibility as content. The light does not constitute the known in its 
universality, but makes this universality visible to the eye of intelligence.574 
                                                     
574 Cf. In I Sent d.3, q.4, a.5, c.: “According to the philosophers, there is another way to 
understand that the human soul understands always itself, insofar as everything that is understood 
must be illuminated by the agent intellect and received in the possible intellect. Hence, just as in 
every colour is seen the corporeal light, so in every intelligible is seen the light of the agent intellect: 
not, however, as object, but as a means by which knowing happens.” (my trans.) [Alio tamen modo, 
secundum philosophos, intelligitur quod anima semper se intelligit, eo quod omne quod intelligitur, 
non intelligitur nisi illustratum lumine intellectus agentis, et receptum in intellectu possibili. Unde 
sicut in omni colore videtur lumen corporale, ita in omni intelligibili videtur lumen intellectus 
agentis; non tamen in ratione objecti sed in ratione medii cognoscendi.]; De Ver 14, 8, ad 4: “In 
some sense light is the object of sight and in another sense not. For, since light is seen by our sight 
only if through reflection or in some other way it is united to a body having a surface, it is not called 
the essential object of sight. This is, rather, color, which is always in a body having a surface. 
However, in so far as nothing can be seen except by reason of light, light itself is said to be the first 
visible thing…” [Lumen quodammodo est obiectum visus et quodammodo non. In quantum enim lux 
non videtur nostris visibus nisi per hoc quod ad aliquod corpus terminatum, per reflexionem, vel alio 
modo coniungitur, dicitur non esse per se visus obiectum, sed magis color, qui semper est in corpore 





Therefore, if what is meant is “act” as “active principle”, insofar as the active 
principle in a sense participates its own perfection, or what is meant is “formal principle” in 
the same sense, then the agent intellect can—in a Thomistic sense also—be called “act” and 
“formal principle” of the object of knowing, insofar as it contributes intelligibility as a mode 
of being. Aquinas himself uses this expression, and he appears to do so in the sense 
explained. But, if by formal principle what is meant is that the intelligible content of 
knowing is contributed to the material of sensibility by the agent intellect, then what is 
being said is no longer about Aquinas’ notion of agent intellect.575 
Two groups of texts have been examined; namely, some texts which seem to 
suggest a formal a priori in human understanding, as is required in a Kantian epistemology; 
and a few other texts which could be interpreted as saying that the agent intellect is a 
formal a priori of intellectual knowing as performative. There is not enough evidence in any 
of them to support the claim that Aquinas considers the agent intellect a formal a priori, in 
the sense of contributing intelligibility as content. The following texts should help to show 
more clearly that, for Aquinas, the agent intellect is that which provides intelligibility as a 
mode of being and is, therefore, a metaphysical a priori of intellectual knowing as receptive 
of objective content. 
                                                     
575 Here is an interesting text from Zagal Arreguín, in which the author expresses very well 
what is meant here by a metaphysical a priori, and by the agent intellect as act of the intelligible: 
“What makes it therefore in act with respect to inteligible objects is the fact that it is an active 
immaterial force able to assimilate other things to itself, i.e., immaterialize them. In this way it 
renders actually intelligible something that was only potentially intelligible: like light, which without 




2) The Agent Intellect as a Metaphysical A Priori 
Although much has already been anticipated, and much of what will here be said 
depends on the previous reflections, it is time to address more directly the characterization 
of the agent intellect as a metaphysical, not a formal, a priori of intellectual knowing. 
Introductory remarks are offered to begin with, followed by an examination of the texts. 
The agent intellect, for Aquinas, is a metaphysical a priori of intellectual knowing as 
receptive of objective content. By this is meant that the agent intellect is responsible not for 
the intelligible content, nor for the universal object, but for the intelligible mode of being of 
the universal content. The object of understanding is something real outside the mind, but 
in its real mode of being is not “available” to our intellectual faculty. To this object the agent 
intellect gives the intelligible mode of being in act by “separating” the real nature from the 
individual conditions of matter.  
This separation is nothing other than a making visible of the specific perfection by 
divesting it from the particular realization in this individual (doctrine of participation); it 
should not be understood as a separation in reality, i.e., a separation of the content in its 
existence.576 The universal content is abstracted (= made visible) by the agent intellect but it 
is understood (= seen) in the phantasm, i.e., it is “read – into” the particular.577 The 
separation of the agent intellect is not a separation of the content, but a making visible of 
the universal content of the phantasm; and although it implies the production of a separate 
species (the impressa), its content is read into the phantasm (= conversio ad phantasmata 
                                                     
576 Cf. 85, 1 ad 1; In III De Anima 6, 261-271. 
577 This is related again to the issue of the distinction between abstraction as act of the 




as modus intelligendi). The agent intellect separates the nature in its mode of being, but in 
such a way that the nature itself may be seen in the phantasm (by the possible intellect). 
The nature is seen in a separate mode of being, but not as separate from the phantasm. 
What is seen is the quidditas of the phantasm. The content is distinct indeed, not insofar as 
it exists or could exist separately from the sensible content, but insofar as it is a common 
perfection that is not identified with its particular realization in the matter. Matter is a sign 
of limitation, which implies the limitation of a perfection; a perfection of itself does not say 
limitation; therefore the perfection that is limited is different from its limitation, and can be 
considered without reference to its limitation (i.e., in itself or “absolutely”). 
Which texts support this interpretation of the agent intellect? In subsection 2.1, 
following, is the textus princeps578 which will be re-examined now mindful of our previous 
path; then, in 2.2, are other texts helpful in stressing that the agent intellect cannot be 
interpreted as a formal a priori, but solely as a metaphysical a priori; finally, in 2.3, are texts 
helpful in understanding the sense in which Aquinas sees the agent intellect as a light, 
which will be studied in connection with the interpretation at hand. 
2.1. The textus princeps 
In 79, 3, the problem is whether or not there is a need to postulate an agent intellect 
in the human soul. A comparison with Plato clarifies the point: 
According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for an active intellect in order to 
make things actually intelligible; but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to 
the intellect, as will be explained farther on. For Plato supposed that the forms of 
natural things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that they are 
                                                     





intelligible: since a thing is actually intelligible from the very fact that it is 
immaterial.579 
It is evident that the role of the agent intellect is to make (the object) intelligible in 
act; it is also evident that, for Aquinas, the object of human understanding for both Plato 
and Aristotle is the form (nature, species) of corporeal things. St. Thomas will not here 
(again) show the reasons for his disagreement with Plato. The important point is now that, 
because Plato considers the object of human understanding as separate from matter in its 
real mode of being, that object is – for Plato – already intelligible in act and, therefore, no 
need of an agent intellect in the sense mentioned previously (as making intelligible in act) 
arises for him. This is the reason for the clarification “sed forte ad praebendum” etc.: the 
need of an agent intellect as making intelligible in act makes no sense in the system of 
Plato, because the object of human understanding in its real being is already separate from 
matter and, therefore, already intelligible in act. 
Aristotle’s position is clearly stated: “But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of 
natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually 
intelligible; it follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand 
are not actually intelligible.”580 The object of human understanding for both philosophers, 
at least here for Aquinas, is the same: the forms of the corporeal things. The principle for 
resolving the question is exactly the same: something is intelligible in act only if it is 
                                                     
579 79, 3, c.: “Secundum opinionem Platonis, nulla necessitas erat ponere intellectum 
agentem ad faciendum intelligibilia in actu; sed forte ad praebendum lumen intelligibile intelligenti, 
ut infra dicetur. Posuit enim Plato formas rerum naturalium sine materia subsistere, et per 
consequens eas intelligibiles esse, quia ex hoc est aliquid intelligibile actu, quod est immateriale.” 
580 79, 3, c.: “Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine 
materia; formae autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae 




separate from matter. The difference between the two philosophers cannot be more clearly 
established: the respective modes of being of the object of human understanding differ 
because, whereas for Plato it is intelligible in act, for Aristotle it is imbedded in the matter 
and, therefore, not intelligible in act. 
Aquinas continues: “Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by 
something in act; as the senses [are] made actual by what is actually sensible.”581 Here “ens 
actu” is the intelligible in act, as the comparison with the senses makes clear, and also the 
context: St. Thomas has just said that the natures which are the object of our understanding 
are not intelligible in act. What he is saying now is this: we understand the natures of things, 
but they are not intelligible in act; now, if understanding is to happen (as the passage of the 
intellect from potency to act), those natures need to be intelligible in act. Therefore, he 
concludes that the condition of possibility of human understanding is a faculty making 
intelligible in act the proportionate object of human understanding: “We must therefore 
assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by 
abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active 
intellect.”582 
The agent intellect, therefore, is a metaphysical a priori insofar as it is an efficiency 
previous to knowing itself, affecting the mode of being (not the content) of the object of 
human understanding. It is a priori, not insofar as it is an arbitrary invention previous to the 
                                                     
581 79, 3, c.: “Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut 
sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu.” 
582 79, 3, c.: “Oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret 
intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. Et haec est 




analysis of the fact of human knowing, but precisely insofar is it explains the Thomistic fact 
of human understanding as it happens. If we do understand the nature of corporeal things 
but these natures are not, in their subsistence, intelligible in act, there must be something 
which explains the fact that we understand them. This is the necessity and the role of the 
agent intellect for Aquinas. 
2.2. Not a Formal but a Metaphysical A Priori 
Other texts can help us to confirm and to qualify this interpretation: first (2.2.a), 
those suggesting that the agent intellect is not a formal a priori; second (2.2.b), those 
referring the origin of the intelligible content to experience; finally (2.2.c), texts from other 
works and authors portraying the agent intellect as a metaphysical a priori. 
2.2.a. Not a Formal A Priori 
In the following, the agent intellect is not a formal a priori: 
If the relation of the active intellect to the passive were that of the active object to a 
power, as, for instance, of the visible in act to the sight; it would follow that we 
could understand all things instantly, since the active intellect is that which makes all 
things (in act). But now the active intellect is not an object, rather is it that whereby 
the objects are made to be in act…583 
                                                     
583 79, 4 ad 3: “Si intellectus agens compararetur ad intellectum possibilem ut obiectum 
agens ad potentiam, sicut visibile in actu ad visum; sequeretur quod statim omnia intelligeremus, 
cum intellectus agens sit quo est omnia facere. Nunc autem non se habet ut obiectum, sed ut 
faciens obiecta in actu…” Let me also give the partial translation of Stump (cf. 256-257, her square 
brackets): “If the active intellect were related to the possible intellect as an active object is related 
to a power ... , it would follow that we would immediately understand all things ... But, as it is, the 
active intellect is related not as an [active] object, but rather as what actualizes [cognitive] objects.” 
Cf. In III De Anima 4, 147-162. The following text is not speaking directly of the agent intellect but 
may be helpful, In III De Anima 1, 170-180: “The early philosophers’ [said] that intellect must be 
compounded of all things if it can know all things. But if it knew all things, as containing them all in 
itself already, it would be an ever-actual intellect, and never merely in potency…” [Dicebant enim 
eum ad hoc quod cognosceret omnia, esse compositum ex omnibus. Si autem esset cognoscitivus 




This is an important text. First, the agent intellect is denied a formal objectivity; that 
is, the agent intellect in no way is what is understood (it is not the intelligible as that which 
actualizes the faculty of understanding). However, the reason for which it cannot be the 
intelligible object is even more important: the agent intellect is that by which everything is 
made (intelligible). If this capacity, or rather virtuality, of making everything intelligible were 
to be understood in a formal sense, or objectively, the formal content of every act of 
understanding would be already included in the agent intellect, and so we would 
understand everything immediately. Instead, the agent intellect is not to be understood as 
object (thus formally perfecting the faculty) but, rather, as metaphysically perfecting the 
object (insofar as the agent intellect makes it intelligible in act). For Aquinas, to be the 
object of understanding and to make this object intelligible are two different things. 
A similar text is 88, 3 ad 1. Here again the agent intellect is not the object of 
knowing, but its principle. This text could be related to the previous one, in the sense that 
Aquinas denies that the virtuality of the agent intellect (here as a participation of the First 
Truth) is something objective. If, in the previous text, it is denied that we know everything 
(which would be the case if the agent intellect were the object of understanding), here it is 
denied that God is the first object of knowing, which could be the case if the light by which 
we know everything were itself known. St. Thomas points out also that, in human 
understanding, the light as principle of understanding is not God Himself but a perfection 
participated from God. 
We see and judge of all things in the light of the first truth, forasmuch as the light 
itself of our mind, whether natural or gratuitous, is nothing else than [a certain] 




intellect is not the object it understands [but that by means of which it understands], 
much less can it be said that God is the first object known by our intellect.584 
That the agent intellect is a metaphysical a priori, insofar as it is previous to knowing 
itself, could be taken from the following passage as well: “Nevertheless there is a distinction 
between the power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect: because as regards 
the same object, the active power which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from 
the passive power, which is moved by the object existing in act.”585 
Although in the following texts intellectus stands for the possible intellect, it is still 
relevant for the present purposes that the perfection of the object of human understanding 
is not the intellectual operation itself, but the nature of the corporeal thing. This is related 
to the characterization of human understanding not as performative of the object but as 
receptive: 
The intelligent act of the human intellect is not the act and perfection of the 
material nature understood, as if the nature of the material thing and intelligent act 
could be understood by one act; just as a thing and its perfection are understood by 
one act. Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct from the 
act whereby it understands that it understands a stone; and so on.586  
                                                     
584 88, 3 ad 1: “In luce primae veritatis omnia intelligimus et iudicamus, inquantum ipsum 
lumen intellectus nostri, sive naturale sive gratuitum, nihil aliud est quam quaedam impressio 
veritatis primae, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum ipsum lumen intellectus nostri non se habeat ad 
intellectum nostrum sicut quod intelligitur, sed sicut quo intelligitur; multo minus Deus est id quod 
primo a nostro intellectu intelligitur.” It seems clear that this lumen is the agent intellect. Cf. De 
Spirit. Creat. a. 10 ad 1, and S.Th. I, 54, 4. 
585 79, 7, c.: “Diversificatur tamen potentia intellectus agentis, et intellectus possibilis, quia 
respectu eiusdem obiecti, aliud principium oportet esse potentiam activam, quae facit obiectum 
esse in actu; et aliud potentiam passivam, quae movetur ab obiecto in actu existente.” 
586 87, 3 ad 2: “Dicendum quod ipsum intelligere humanum non est actus et perfectio 
naturae intellectae materialis, ut sic possit uno actu intelligi natura rei materialis et ipsum 
intelligere, sicut uno actu intelligitur res cum sua perfectione. Unde alius est actus quo intellectus 





“Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect consists in its own operation: for this is 
not an act tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work 
accomplished, as building is the perfection of the thing built; but it remains in the 
agent as its perfection and act, as is said [in] Metaph. ix.”587 
Clearly, for Aquinas, it is not the object that has to be (objectively) perfected by the 
intellectual operation, but it is the intellect that is perfected by the object. The action of the 
agent intellect, therefore, must be conceived as perfecting the object in another way 
(metaphysically, that is to say, in its mode of being) and this activity must be placed 
previous to understanding itself (with a priority of nature, not only temporal). The text of 
76, 2 ad 4 points us in the same direction: because the object of understanding has an 
autonomous existence, the action of the agent intellect has nothing to do with its content 
but with its mode of being: “… whereas the nature of the thing understood is indeed 
outside the soul, but the mode according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode 
according to which it is understood.”588 
That the agent intellect is not a formal a priori, as origin of the intelligible content, 
relates to Aquinas’ rejecting the identification between the agent intellect and the habit of 
first principles.589 
                                                     
587 87, 3, c.: “Ultima autem perfectio intellectus est eius operatio, non enim est sicut actio 
tendens in alterum, quae sit perfectio operati, sicut aedificatio aedificati; sed manet in operante ut 
perfectio et actus eius, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys..” 
588 76, 2 ad 4: “… [N]atura autem rei quae intelligitur, est quidem extra animam, sed non 
habet illum modum essendi extra animam, secundum quem intelligitur.” 





2.2.b. The Origin of the Intelligible Content 
The following text590 is important because it shows clearly the difference between 
the agent intellect as a metaphysical a priori (and principium quo) and the a posteriority of 
the species, and so, of the object of human understanding. One can read between the lines 
many historical issues related to the importance of St. Augustine in the scholarly milieu of 
the time, but these need not distract from the immediate purpose. The question is whether 
we know everything in rationibus aeternis. St. Thomas gives an affirmative answer, but first 
clarifies what it means in this case to know “in” something. In this case, it does not mean to 
know in rationibus aeternis as in an object of vision (as whoever looks at a mirror can see in 
the mirror all that is there reflected). This it could mean for Plato, according to whom we 
participate objectively in the eternal ideas in the present state of life. St. Thomas wants to 
propose instead a subjective participation: the participation of the light by which the objects 
are seen. “Secondly, one thing is said to be known in another as in a principle of knowledge: 
thus we might say that we see in the sun what we see by the sun.”591 The shift from “in” to 
“per” from the beginning is significant; that is, “in” can embrace several meanings, but “per” 
is more restricted. “And thus we must needs say that the human soul knows all things in the 
eternal types, since by participation of these types we know all things.”592 This second 
precision is crucial. St. Thomas has already said that the eternal ideas are one with the 
divine essence and, therefore, just as they cannot be the direct object of vision in this life, 
                                                     
590 84, 5, c.. 
591 84, 5, c.: “Alio modo dicitur aliquid cognosci in aliquo sicut in cognitionis principio; sicut si 
dicamus quod in sole videntur ea quae videntur per solem.” 
592 84, 5, c.: “Et sic necesse est dicere quod anima humana omnia cognoscat in rationibus 




neither are they directly the principle by which we see. We possess a participation of the 
uncreated light, and it is only in that sense that we know by the divine light: “For the 
intellectual light itself which is in us, is nothing else than a participated likeness of the 
uncreated light, in which are contained the eternal types.”593 
This mention of the fact that the divine light contains the eternal ideas may lead one 
to think that the participated light would also contain, at least in some way, the ideas of all 
things. Two things actually prevent us from misreading Aquinas. The first is to remember 
that, for him, intellectual life is realized in creation by degrees, the least of which is the 
human soul. The soul participates only a “power” to understand, which is in potency of all 
of the intelligible objects, and a “light” which is also in potency of making intelligible the 
nature of corporeal things. We participate [from] the intelligence of God insofar as we have 
the capacity to know, but we actually know nothing “by nature,” i.e., from the beginning. 
The second thing making it more difficult to misread St. Thomas is simply the rest of the 
passage, where he clearly says that, besides this light as participation of the eternal ideas, 
we need intelligible species coming from the things themselves:  
Whence it is written [in Psalm 4], ‘Many say: Who showeth us good things?’ which 
question the Psalmist answers, ‘The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon 
us,’ as though he were to say: By the seal594 of the Divine light in us, all things are 
made known to us. But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible 
species, which are derived from things, are required in order for us to have 
knowledge of material things; therefore this same knowledge is not due merely to a 
                                                     
593 84, 5, c.: “Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale quod est in nobis, nihil est aliud quam 
quaedam participata similitudo luminis increati, in quo continentur rationes aeternae.” 
594 The word “sigillationem” here stands for participation, in the sense of a created effect 
from God in the human soul (“in nobis”). By this light, all things are shown to us, insofar as the light 





participation of the eternal types, as the Platonists held, maintaining that the mere 
participation of ideas sufficed for knowledge.595 
It is clear, then, that the participation in the divine ideas, here and for Aquinas, is on 
the part of the agent intellect and not on the part of the intelligible species. Of course, the 
species themselves, insofar as they come from the things, which are in turn participations of 
the divine ideas by creation, [the species] could also be considered “participations” of the 
eternal ideas.596 But this participation is not “direct,” so to speak, as it is direct in the case of 
the agent intellect (at least insofar as we receive it from God in creation). That is why 
Aquinas says “non per solam participationem rationum aeternarum,” that is to say, not by 
means of the agent intellect alone, because we need the intelligible species also. 
Finally, it may not be out of place to remark that Aquinas considers the agent 
intellect to be distinct from the intelligible species, the agent intellect coming from God and 
the intelligible species coming from the things themselves. It is most significant because 
that which comes from the things is not just the phantasm, as the material of sensibility to 
be informed, but the intelligible species. Therefore, some intelligible aspect comes from the 
things themselves. Which aspect? It is the objective aspect and, therefore, what here has 
been called the intelligible content as opposed to the intelligible mode of being. This must 
be so because the purpose of Aquinas in the article is to show that we do not participate 
                                                     
595 84, 5, c.: “Unde in Psalmo IV, dicitur, multi dicunt, quis ostendit nobis bona? Cui 
quaestioni Psalmista respondet, dicens, signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine. Quasi 
dicat, per ipsam sigillationem divini luminis in nobis, omnia demonstrantur. Quia tamen praeter 
lumen intellectuale in nobis, exiguntur species intelligibiles a rebus acceptae, ad scientiam de rebus 
materialibus habendam; ideo non per solam participationem rationum aeternarum de rebus 
materialibus notitiam habemus, sicut Platonici posuerunt quod sola idearum participatio sufficit ad 
scientiam habendam.” 




from God the object of understanding, but a light that is principle of understanding the 
objects. In order to know, then, it is not enough to have light, but we need the things that 
are seen. These things, of course, imply the completed action of the agent intellect, not 
however in order to be themselves, but in order to be seen. The intelligibility of the species, 
as a mode of being, does come from the agent intellect, and not from the things 
themselves; but what is intelligible comes from the things, and in that sense, the intelligible 
species come from the things themselves.  
This interpretation seems confirmed by the following text from the previous article: 
“The intelligible species which are participated by our intellect are reduced, as to their first 
cause, to a first principle which is by its essence intelligible—namely, God. But they proceed 
from that principle by means of the sensible forms and material things, from which we 
gather knowledge, as Dionysius says.”597 Aquinas is here trying to deny that we receive 
intelligible species from the separate substances. Again, what is at stake is a certain 
objective participation in knowing. But, this time Aquinas’ concern is to show that, if we can 
speak of a certain participation from God regarding the content of knowing, this 
participation is “indirect,” through the forms of the natural things from which we receive 
                                                     
597 84, 4 ad 1: “Species intelligibiles quas participat noster intellectus, reducuntur sicut in 
primam causam in aliquod principium per suam essentiam intelligibile, scilicet in Deum. Sed ab illo 
principio procedunt mediantibus formis rerum sensibilium et materialium, a quibus scientiam 
colligimus, ut Dionysius dicit.” Another text with the same reference to Dionysius is 76, 5, c.: “Now 
the intellectual soul, as we have seen above […] in the order of nature, holds the lowest place 
among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as 
the angels are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses, as 
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii).” [Anima autem intellectiva, sicut supra habitum est, secundum 
naturae ordinem, infimum gradum in substantiis intellectualibus tenet; intantum quod non habet 
naturaliter sibi inditam notitiam veritatis, sicut Angeli, sed oportet quod eam colligat ex rebus 





science directly. In other words, what we know is not what is presented to us by the 
separate substances, but the nature of corporeal things: our faculty cannot know naturally 
by infused species which exceed its intelligible power. Our faculty can be perfected only by 
the intelligible perfection of material things, by their form, which in its real mode of being is 
poor in intelligible content and common to many.598 This perfection is what we can see 
thanks to the poor light of the agent intellect. Therefore, the poor intelligibility bestowed by 
the creative wisdom of God on material creatures is participated by our possible intellect, 
thanks to an intellectual light (the agent intellect) participated from the Divine Light. The 
participated light comes from God, but the perfection of the object as known comes not 
directly from God, but from the material things. By the impression of His light (our own 
participated light), God allows us to see the intelligibility He bestowed on material creatures 
insofar as it is in them, and not insofar as it is in His divine ideas. In the end, the intellectual 
content of our knowing can come from the material things because, for Aquinas, there is 
something intelligible in the material things insofar as, in their natural perfections, they 
participate of the creative wisdom of God. This is why there is no need of a formal a priori 
for Aquinas. 
A final text regarding the origin of the intelligible content is 76, 2, c. St. Thomas is 
trying to confute the opinion of those who postulate only one separate intellect for all 
human beings. Here, he is dealing particularly with the Commentator, who suggests that the 
                                                     
598 About the degrees of cognitive power and the proportion between cognitive power and 
object, cf. 85, 1, c.; about the degrees in intellectual power, 76, 5, c. (see previous footnote) and 55, 
2, c.; about the division in the intellectual realm as a consequence of the lower status in the scale of 




reason we ascribe to different subjects the intelligence of the same thing (a stone, in the 
example) is the numerical diversity of phantasms. But this diversity, for Aquinas, does not 
imply a numerical distinction of intellectual operations. The diversity of phantasms does not 
prevent our intelligence from understanding with one operation (and therefore with one 
intelligible species) the one nature of stone, because the phantasms are “of the same 
species.” What is interesting for the present purposes is this: the reason that the intelligible 
species is one is that the phantasms are of the same species (i.e., all of them are phantasms 
of stones, they all possess the same nature) and therefore, from all of them, we can abstract 
only one intelligible species by which we know the one nature of stone. Again, the 
intelligible content comes from the corporeal things themselves as they are represented by 
the phantasm of sensibility: 
But the phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the intelligible 
species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. Now in one intellect, from 
different phantasms of the same species, only one intelligible species is abstracted; 
as appears in one man, in whom there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet 
from all of them only one intelligible species of a stone is abstracted; by which the 
intellect of that one man, by one operation, understands the nature of a stone, 
notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms.599 
That the origin of the intelligible content comes from experience and is the nature 
subsisting in sensible things is a doctrine that can be found in both earlier and later works of 
                                                     
599 76, 2, c.: “Sed ipsum phantasma non est forma intellectus possibilis, sed species 
intelligibilis quae a phantasmatibus abstrahitur. In uno autem intellectu a phantasmatibus diversis 
eiusdem speciei non abstrahitur nisi una species intelligibilis. Sicut in uno homine apparet, in quo 
possunt esse diversa phantasmata lapidis, et tamen ab omnibus eis abstrahitur una species 
intelligibilis lapidis, per quam intellectus unius hominis operatione una intelligit naturam lapidis, non 




Aquinas. We will begin with the earlier texts, and quote in footnote some corresponding 
later texts.  
The following text also helps us to understand that the forms we know go from the 
mind of God to our minds through the things themselves, in such a way that they impress 
their forms in us: 
That statement of Algazel is to be understood of our knowledge, which is acquired 
by the [things impressing their likenesses] upon our souls. The opposite is true of 
God’s cognition, for it is from His intellect that forms flow into creatures. Our 
knowledge is the impressing of things in our souls; but the forms of things are [a 
certain] impressing of the divine knowledge in things.600 
The “active” role of the things themselves in intellectual knowing is clear in the 
following text also. This “activity” regards the content of knowing, insofar as the things 
themselves “provide” intelligence with the perfection of their forms. Only in the case of 
artifacts do the things themselves “receive” their formal perfection from intelligence.  
Now, this form, which is other than the intellect, is sometimes the cause of the thing 
whose likeness it is. We have an evident example of this in the practical intellect, 
whose form is the cause of the thing done. But sometimes this form is the effect of 
the thing, as is clearly the case with our speculative intellect when it receives its 
knowledge from things.601 Therefore, whenever an intellect knows a thing through a 
                                                     
600 De Ver. 2, 1 ad 6: “Verbum illud Algazelis intelligendum est de scientia nostra, quae in 
nobis acquiritur per hoc quod res imprimunt similitudines suas in animas nostras; sed in cognitione 
Dei est e converso, quia ab eius intellectu effluunt formae in omnes creaturas; unde sicut scientia in 
nobis est sigillatio rerum in animabus nostris, ita e converso formae rerum non sunt nisi quaedam 
sigillatio divinae scientiae in rebus.” 
601 Cf. Q.D. De Anima, a.2, ad 15: “It is natural to the human soul to apprehend intelligible 
truth in a manner inferior to that proper to superior spiritual substances, namely, by [receiving it] 
from sensible things…” [Iste modus cognoscendi est naturalis animae, ut percipiat intelligibilem 
veritatem infra modum quo percipiunt spirituales substantiae superiores, accipiendo scilicet eam ex 
sensibilibus…]; Summa I, 51, 1 in Lambert, 85: “It belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, 
because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual substances, not having the 
fulness of knowledge in its own nature, but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily 





likeness which is not the essence of the knower, then the intellect is perfected by 
something other than itself; but if that likeness should happen to be the cause of the 
thing, in that case the intellect will be perfected only by the likeness, and not at all 
by the thing whose likeness it is. For example, a house is not the perfection of the 
artistic conception, but rather the contrary. On the other hand, if the likeness is 
caused by the thing, then the perfection of the intellect will be, as it were, the thing 
in an active sense, but its likeness in a formal sense.602 
St. Thomas parallels senses and intelligence regarding the origin of the content. This 
suggests also that the difference in the content (sensible and intelligible) does not mean a 
difference in the receptivity of knowing. Both faculties receive their content from the things 
themselves: “What is understood or sensed moves the sense or intellect only [insofar as] 
the sense knowledge or intellectual knowledge is received from things. Divine cognition is 
                                                     
genere intellectualium substantiarum, non habens in sua natura plenitudinem scientiae, sed 
acquirens eam per sensus corporeos a sensibilibus rebus.] 
602 De Ver. 2, 3, ad 1: “Haec autem forma, quae est aliud ab intellectu, quandoque quidem 
comparatur ad rem cuius est similitudo, ut causa eius: sicut patet in intellectu practico, cuius forma 
est causa rei operatae; quandoque autem est effectus rei, sicut patet in intellectu nostro speculativo 
accipiente cognitionem a rebus. Quandocumque ergo intellectus cognoscit rem aliquam per 
similitudinem quae non est intelligentis essentia, tunc intellectus perficitur aliquo alio a se; sed si illa 
similitudo sit causa rei, perficietur tantum similitudine, et nullo modo re cuius est similitudo, sicut 
domus non est perfectio artis, sed magis e converso. Si autem sit effectus rei: tunc res etiam erit 
quodammodo perfectio intellectus active scilicet, similitudo vero eius formaliter.” Cf. In Met. 7, lect. 
6, 1404-1405: “And [Aristotle] does this because the form present in the matter of things made by 
art proceeds from the form present in the mind. In the case of natural things, however, the opposite 
is true. Now the form present in the mind differs from the one present in matter; for in matter the 
forms of contraries are different and opposed, but in the mind contraries have in a sense the same 
form. And this is true because forms present in matter exist for the sake of the being of the things 
informed, but forms present in the mind exist according to the mode of what is knowable or 
intelligible.” [Et hoc ideo, quia a forma quae est in anima nostra, procedit forma quae est in materia 
in artificialibus; in naturalibus autem e contrario. Haec autem forma quae est in anima, differt a 
forma, quae est in materia. Nam contrariorum formae in materia sunt diversae et contrariae, in 
anima autem est quodammodo una species contrariorum. Et hoc ideo, quia formae in materia sunt 
propter esse rerum formatarum: formae autem in anima sunt secundum modum cognoscibilem et 
intelligibilem.] The form in the thing itself is the source of the form in the mind, as in the text of De 





not of this kind; hence, the argument does not follow.”603 The difference in the mode of 
being (already studied) is that which allows St. Thomas to speak simultaneously of this 
reception of content and of its origin in the sensible experience. That is to say, what is in the 
intellect was previously in the senses, not insofar as the same phantasm has a different 
mode of being, but insofar as the different intelligible content subsisted in the sensible 
thing with a different mode of being: 
That axiom is to be understood as applying only to our intellect, which receives its 
knowledge from things. For a thing is led by gradual steps from its own material 
conditions to the immateriality of the intellect through the mediation of the 
immateriality of sense. Consequently, whatever is in our intellect must have 
previously been in the senses. This, however, does not take place in the divine 
intellect.604 
Another passage from De Veritate tells us clearly that the intelligible species comes 
from the things themselves regarding the content, not regarding its mode of being in the 
mind: “The forms in our intellects, however, are received from things. Hence, they do not 
excel things, and are, as it were, equal to them as far as representation goes, even though 
                                                     
603 De Ver. 2, 3, ad 14: “Intelligibile et sensibile non movent sensum vel intellectum nisi 
secundum quod cognitio sensitiva vel intellectiva a rebus accipitur; non est autem talis divina 
cognitio; et ideo ratio non procedit.” Cf. ad 15. 
604 De Ver. 2, 3, ad 19: “Verbum illud est intelligendum de intellectu nostro, qui a rebus 
scientiam accipit; gradatim enim res a sua materialitate ad immaterialitatem intellectus deducitur, 
scilicet mediante immaterialitate sensus; et ideo oportet ut quod est in intellectu nostro, prius in 
sensu fuerit; quod in intellectu divino locum non habet.” Cf. De Ver 8, 6, c. in Lambert, 83: “Similarly, 
our possible intellect can understand nothing before it is brought into act by an intelligible form. 
Only then can it understand that thing to which this form belongs. Moreover, it can understand 
itself only by means of an intelligible form that actually exists in itself.” [Ita intellectus possibilis 
noster nihil potest intelligere antequam perficiatur forma intelligibili in actu: tunc enim intelligit rem 
cuius est illa forma; nec potest se intelligere nisi per formam intelligibilem actu in se existentem.] In 
this text “form” stands for the content of intellectual knowing: in its intelligible mode of being (“in 
actu”) and in its real being (“rem cuius est illa forma”). What perfects the potency is the form of the 





they may excel them in mode of being because their [being] is immaterial.”605 As already 
shown, every intellectual content comes from experience, including the first principles and 
first notions: “… from which it follows that the principle of cognition of the aforementioned 
principles is in the senses and the memory, as the Philosopher demonstrates towards the 
end of Posteriorum…”606 (my trans.) 
2.2.c. A Metaphysical A Priori 
The following texts confirm our interpretation of the Summa with similar or more 
clear statements from other works of Aquinas. The focus now is on the characterization of 
the agent intellect as productive of an intelligible mode of being of the universal content.  
But the action of the agent intellect does not make intelligible those things which 
are of themselves intelligible, such as the essences of the angels, but things which of 
                                                     
605 De Ver. 8, 10 ad 3 in Lambert, 98: “Sed formae intellectus nostri accipiuntur ex rebus; 
unde non sunt superexcedentes rebus sed quasi adequatae quantum ad repraesentationem, licet 
sint excedentes quantum ad modum essendi in quantum habent esse immateriale.” Regarding the 
content, the same idea of “adequacy” between the thing and the mind can be seen in the following 
passage, In Met. 10, lect. 2, 1957: “Therefore [science and sense] are called measures figuratively, 
because in reality they are measured rather than measure. For it is not because we perceive or 
know a thing that it is so in reality; but it is because it is so in reality that we have a true knowledge 
or perception of it, as is said in Book IX […] Thus it follows that in perceiving and knowing something 
we measure our knowledge by means of the things which exist outside the mind.” [Sic igitur per 
hanc similitudinem dicuntur mensurae, quia secundum rei veritatem magis mensurantur quam 
mensurent. Non enim quia nos aliquid sentimus aut scimus, ideo sic est in rerum natura. Sed quia sic 
est in rerum natura, ideo vero aliquid scimus, aut sentimus, ut dicitur nono Metaphysicorum. Et sic 
accidit nobis, quod in sentiendo et sciendo mensuramur per res quae extra nos sunt.] The notion of 
“measure” also implies a certain formal identity and in both passages the role of pattern is fulfilled 
by the forms in the things themselves. 
606 In Boet. De Trin. 6, 4, c.: “… unde principium cognitionis praedictorum principiorum est ex 
sensu et memoria, ut patet per Philosophum in fine Posteriorum…” Cf. Q.D. De Anima, a.5, c.: 
“Indeed, some men thought that the agent intellect does not differ from our habitus of 
indemonstrable principles. But this cannot be the case, because we certainly know indemonstrable 
principles by abstracting them from singulars, as the Philosopher teaches in the Posterior Analytics.” 
[Quidam vero crediderunt intellectum agentem non esse aliud quam habitum principiorum 
indemonstrabilium in nobis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia etiam ipsa principia indemonstrabilia 





themselves are potentially intelligible, such as the essence of material things, which 
are received through sense and imagination…607 
If St. Thomas’ reference to “essences” is taken as a reference to the content, and 
their subsistence as either intelligible in act or in potency as a reference to their mode of 
being, then in this text the agent intellect is to be interpreted as a metaphysical a priori, 
insofar as it produces the intelligible mode of being of the essence of the material thing.  
The following passage may be confusing if “formal” and “material” are not properly 
understood: “The intelligible species has that which is formal in it, through which it is 
actually intelligible, from the agent intellect, which is a higher power than the possible 
intellect, although that which is material in it is abstracted from phantasms.”608 “What is 
material” should be understood as the universal content of the intelligible species, since it is 
“abstracted” from the phantasm. What is formal in the species is its immaterial (and so 
“superior”) mode of being, and this is what the species receives from the agent intellect.609 
                                                     
607 De Ver. 18, 5, c. in Sellés, EIA, 247: “Actione autem intellectus agentis non fiunt 
intelligibilia ea quae sunt de seipsis intelligibilia, cuiusmodi sunt essentiae angelorum, sed ea quae 
sunt de seipsis in potentia intelligibilia, qualia sunt essentiae rerum materialium, quae per sensum et 
imaginationem capiuntur…” 
608 De Ver. 18, 8, ad 3 in Sellés, EIA, 248: “Species intelligibilis id quod in ea formale est, per 
quod est intelligibilis actu, habet ab intellectu agente, qui est potentia superior intellectu possibili; 
quamvis id quod in ea materiale est, a phantasmatibus abstrahatur.” The whole response revisits 
other points referred to previously, and confirms even more our reading. 
609 Cf. De Ver 20, 2 ad 5: “For the agent intellect needs no habit for its activity, because it 
does not receive anything from intelligible things, but gives its own form to them by making them 
actually intelligible. The possible intellect, however, has just the opposite relation to intelligible 
things.” [Quod enim intellectus agens habitu non indigeat ad suam operationem, ex hoc contingit 
quod intellectus agens nihil recipit ab intelligibilibus, sed magis formam suam eis tribuit, faciendo ea 





The following passages come from the Contra Gentiles. The agent intellect is the 
cause of the immaterial condition (= mode of being) of the species, which enables the 
intelligible species to represent the universal (= content): 
The intellect’s understanding of the generic or specific nature apart from the 
individuating principles is due to the condition of the intelligible species received 
into it, for the species is immaterialized by the agent intellect through being 
abstracted from matter and material conditions whereby a particular thing is 
individuated. Consequently, the sensitive powers are unable to know universals; 
they cannot receive an immaterial form, since whatever is received by them is 
always received in a corporeal organ.610 
The following text is one of the most explicit regarding the agent intellect as a 
metaphysical a priori: 
That which exists in the soul, however, differs from what is found in natural agents. 
For in the latter, one thing is in potentiality to something according to the same 
manner of being as that of its actual presence in something else; the matter of air is 
in potentiality to the form of water in the same way as it is in water. That is why 
natural bodies, which have matter in common, are mutually active and passive in 
the same order. On the other hand, the intellective soul is not in potentiality to the 
[species] of things in the phantasms, according to the mode of their presence 
therein, but according as they are raised to a higher level by abstraction from 
material individuating conditions, thus being made actually intelligible. The action of 
                                                     
610 CG II, 75, par. 8: “Quod autem intelligat intellectus naturam generis vel speciei 
denudatam a principiis individuantibus, contingit ex conditione speciei intelligibilis in ipso receptae, 
quae est immaterialis effecta per intellectum agentem, utpote abstracta a materia et conditionibus 
materiae, quibus aliquid individuatur. Et ideo potentiae sensitivae non possunt cognoscere 
universalia: quia non possunt recipere formam immaterialem, cum recipiant semper in organo 
corporali.” Cf. CG II, 76, par. 3: “The purpose for which the agent intellect renders the species 
actually intelligible is not that they may serve as means of understanding on its part, especially as a 
separate substance, because the agent intellect is not in a state of potentiality; this purpose, on the 
contrary, is that the possible intellect may understand by those species which the agent intellect has 
made actually intelligible. Thus, the function of the agent intellect in regard to the intelligible species 
is simply to render them fit vehicles for the possible intellect’s understanding. Now, the agent 
intellect makes them to be such as it is itself; for every agent produces its like.” [Intellectus agens 
non facit species intelligibiles actu ut ipse per eas intelligat, maxime sicut substantia separata, cum 
non sit in potentia: sed ut per eas intelligat intellectus possibilis. Non igitur facit eas nisi tales quales 
competunt intellectui possibili ad intelligendum. Tales autem facit eas qualis est ipse: nam omne 





the agent intellect on the phantasm, therefore, precedes the reception by the 
possible intellect, so that operational primacy here is ascribed not to the phantasms, 
but to the agent intellect. And for this reason Aristotle says that the agent intellect is 
related to the possible intellect as art to its matter.611 
The possible intellect is in potency of these “similitudines rerum quae sunt in 
phantasmatibus” but not with the mode of being they have in the phantasms: 
“similitudines” should here be translated as “species” rather than as “representation”, 
because “species” better indicates the content insofar as it is represented. In that way, this 
represented content belongs to the thing itself in one mode of being, but it is not received 
by the possible intellect with that same mode of being. In any case, it is clear that the agent 
intellect is responsible for the abstracted mode of being of something that is present in the 
phantasm with a different mode of being. Moreover, the fact that this action of the agent 
intellect precedes the reception by the possible intellect makes the agent intellect a 
metaphysical condition of possibility of the act of understanding. 
There is another very explicit text in the commentary to the De Anima:  
And from this point of view the agent intellect is not in act. For if the agent intellect 
as such included the definite forms of all intelligible objects, the potential intellect 
would not depend upon phantasms; it would be actualised simply and solely by the 
agent intellect; and the latter’s relation to intelligible objects would not be that of a 
maker to something made, as the Philosopher here says; for it would simply be 
identical with them. What makes it therefore in act with respect to intelligible 
                                                     
611 CG II, 77, par. 3: “Differt tamen hoc quod invenitur in anima, ab eo quod invenitur in 
agentibus naturalibus. Quia ibi unum est in potentia ad aliquid secundum eundem modum quo in 
altero actu invenitur: nam materia aeris est in potentia ad formam aquae eo modo quo est in aqua. 
Et ideo corpora naturalia, quae communicant in materia, eodem ordine agunt et patiuntur ad 
invicem. Anima autem intellectiva non est in potentia ad similitudines rerum quae sunt in 
phantasmatibus per modum illum quo sunt ibi: sed secundum quod illae similitudines elevantur ad 
aliquid altius, ut scilicet sint abstractae a conditionibus individuantibus materialibus, ex quo fiunt 
intelligibiles actu. Et ideo actio intellectus agentis in phantasmate praecedit receptionem intellectus 
possibilis. Et sic principalitas actionis non attribuitur phantasmatibus, sed intellectui agenti. Propter 





objects is the fact that it is an active immaterial force able to assimilate other things 
to itself, i.e.. to immaterialise them. In this way it renders the potentially intelligible 
actually so (like light which, without containing particular colours, actually brings 
colours into act).612 
The text denies that the agent intellect is active regarding the content (Aquinas says 
previously that the possible intellect is in potency precisely in that regard), and affirms 
instead that its activity is a certain metaphysical causality, a “faciens sibi simile”, a 
participation of its own mode of being (immaterial) to the intelligible in potency. The 
example of light is used to underline the fact that the agent intellect does not produce the 
content, even if it produces the intelligible in act. Also, the word “intelligible” seems to be 
used in both the sense of content (“determinationum omnium intelligibilium” is exactly 
what the agent intellect does not have, and therefore what the agent intellect cannot 
produce) and in the sense of mode of being (“alia sibi similia facere, scilicet immaterialia […] 
facit intelligibilia actu”). The two senses are distinguished, in order to avoid confusion: the 
agent intellect activates intelligibility in one sense, but not in the other sense (the content 
comes from the phantasms).613 Finally, it would be a mistake simply to consider the agent 
                                                     
612 In III De Anima 4, 147-162: “Quantum autem ad hoc, intellectus agens non est in actu: si 
enim intellectus agens haberet in se determinationem omnium intelligibilium, non indigeret 
intellectus possibilis fantasmatibus, sed per solum intellectum agentem reduceretur in actum 
omnium intelligibilium; et sic non compararetur ad intelligibilia ut faciens ad factum, ut Philosophus 
hic dicit, sed ut existens ipsa intelligibilia. Comparatur igitur ut actus respectu intelligibilium, 
inquantum est quaedam virtus immaterialis activa potens alia sibi similia facere, scilicet 
immaterialia, et per hunc modum, ea quae sunt intelligibilia in potencia, facit intelligibilia actu: sic 
enim et lumen facit colores in actu, non quod ipsum habeat in se determinationem omnium 
colorum.” 
613 Cf. Q.D. De Anima, a. 5, c.: “Therefore potentiality with respect to phantasms must be 
found within our soul so far as these phantasms are representative of determinate things. This 
belongs to the possible intellect which is, by its very nature, in potency to all intelligible objects, but 
is actuated by [determinatur ad] this or that object through species abstracted from phantasms. Our 





intellect as a natural-real efficient cause and nothing else, even if the text may give that 
impression. This “making immaterial” is not simply the natural bestowing of a power, nor 
the physical communication of a perfection, but precisely the abstraction of the content 
from the phantasm.614 
It is in this sense that the following text of the Q.D. De Anima orients us: “The 
intellect gives universality to the forms known inasmuch as it abstracts them from material 
individuating conditions. Consequently it is not necessary that the intellect be universal, but 
that it be immaterial.”615 “To give universality” in this text means the same as “to make 
intelligible” in other texts. St. Thomas is responding to an objection that portrays very 
simply the problem of the universals: 
A universal form does not acquire its universality from the thing existing outside the 
soul, because all forms existing in such things are individuated. Thus, if the forms in 
the intellect are universal, they must acquire this universality from the intellective 
                                                     
from material individuating conditions. This belongs to the agent intellect, so that it is, as it were, a 
power participated from the superior substance, God.” [Est ergo in anima nostra invenire 
potentialitatem respectu phantasmatum, secundum quod sunt repraesentativa determinatarum 
rerum. Et hoc pertinet ad intellectum possibilem, qui, quantum est de se, est in potentia ad omnia 
intelligibilia; sed determinatur ad hoc vel aliud per species a phantasmatibus abstractas. Est etiam in 
anima invenire quamdam virtutem activam immaterialem, quae ipsa phantasmata a materialibus 
conditionibus abstrahit; et hoc pertinet ad intellectum agentem, ut intellectus agens sit quasi 
quaedam virtus participata ex aliqua substantia superiori, scilicet Deo.] 
614 Cf. Q. De Anima, a.6, ad 5 in Lambert, 88: “In like manner, the action of the agent 
intellect is not of the same mode as the action of natural forms, for the action of the agent intellect 
consists in abstracting forms from matter, whereas the action of natural agents consists in 
impressing forms on matter.” [Et similiter actio intellectus agentis, non est eiusdem modi cum 
actione formarum naturalium. Nam actio intellectus agentis consistit in abstrahendo a materia, actio 
vero agentium naturalium in imprimendo formas in materia.] 
615 Q.D. De Anima, a.2 ad 6: “Intellectus dat formis intellectis universalitatem, in quantum 
abstrahit eas a principiis materialibus individuantibus; unde non oportet quod intellectus sit 





soul. Consequently the intellective soul is not an individuated form, and therefore is 
not united to the body so far as its [being] is concerned.616 
The objector confuses universality with intelligibility as a mode of being. St. Thomas 
would grant that the universal cannot be intelligible in act as it is in the things themselves 
and so, if it is actually intelligible, this must be by the action of the soul. What he corrects is 
the sense in which the soul makes “universal” or intelligible in act, that is by making 
immaterial, by abstracting from matter what is in matter under individual conditions. As he 
says in other instances, what makes something intelligible in act is not the fact that it is 
universal (a content abstracted from individuals), but the fact that it is immaterial, which is 
a mode of being.617 The agent intellect does not make the content, but the abstraction of 
the content; it makes “immaterial.” Therefore, it does not need to be universal, but 
immaterial.618 
                                                     
616 Q.D. De Anima, a.2 ob. 6: “Forma universalis non habet quod sit intellectiva a re quae est 
extra animam; quia omnes formae quae sunt in rebus extra animam, sunt individuatae. Si igitur 
formae intellectus sint universales, oportet quod hoc habeant ab anima intellectiva. Non ergo anima 
intellectiva est forma individuata; et ita non unitur corpori secundum esse.” 
617 Cf. Q.D. De Anima, a.2, ad 5: “The human soul is an individuated form and so also is its 
power which is called the possible intellect, as well as the intelligible forms which are received in the 
possible intellect. But this does not prevent these forms from being actually [understood], for a 
thing is actually [understood] because it is immaterial, not because it is universal. Indeed, the 
universal is intelligible because it is abstracted from material individuating conditions.” [Anima 
humana est quaedam forma individuata; et similiter potentia eius quae dicitur intellectus possibilis, 
et formae intelligibiles in eo receptae. Sed hoc non prohibet eas esse intellectas in actu: ex hoc enim 
aliquid est intellectum in actu quod est immateriale, non autem ex hoc quod est universale; sed 
magis universale habet quod sit intelligibile per hoc quod est abstractum a principiis materialibus 
individuantibus.] 
618 Cf. De Spirit. Creat., a.10, ad 6: “It must be said that this very fact that the light of the 
agent intellect is not an act of any corporeal organ through which it acts is sufficient for its being 
able to separate intelligible species from phantasms; since the separateness of intelligible species, 
which are received in the possible intellect, is not greater than the separateness of the agent 
intellect.” [Hoc ipsum quod lumen intellectus agentis non est actus alicuius organi corporei per quod 
operetur, sufficit ad hoc quod possit separare species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus; cum separatio 





2.3. The Comparison of the Agent Intellect with Light 
The agent intellect is like a light. What does this mean for Aquinas? The first 
important text to keep in mind is 79, 3 ad 2. Aquinas is aware that the role of light in the 
sensible realm is subject to differing opinions, but he knows in what definite sense he is 
using it (as a metaphor) regarding intellectual knowing: 
There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For some say that light is required 
for sight, in order to make colors actually visible. And according to this the active 
intellect is required for understanding, in like manner and for the same reason as 
light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is required for sight[,] 
not for the colors to become actually visible; but in order that the medium may 
become actually luminous, as the Commentator says on De Anima ii. And according 
to this, Aristotle's comparison of the active intellect to light is verified in this, that as 
it is required for understanding, so is light required for seeing; but not for the same 
reason.619 
That is to say, whatever opinion one may hold about the effect of light is of no 
consequence to Aquinas. The fact is, the agent intellect is required so that the nature of 
corporeal things is made intelligible in act. The metaphor is more helpful to us if we 
understand sensible light in the same way; the necessity and the role of the agent intellect, 
however, do not depend on the metaphor, but on the principles exposed in the corpus: 
because the possible intellect must be actualized by an intelligible in act, and the object of 
                                                     
intellectus agentis.] St. Thomas’ point is to show that the effect is proportionate to the cause, and all 
he says refers to the mode of being of the content, not to the content. The content, in fact, is not 
separate from the things themselves (cf. 85, 1 ad 1), but the abstracted species is. 
619 79, 3 ad 2: “Circa effectum luminis est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt quod lumen 
requiritur ad visum, ut faciat colores actu visibiles. Et secundum hoc, similiter requiritur, et propter 
idem, intellectus agens ad intelligendum, propter quod lumen ad videndum. Secundum alios vero, 
lumen requiritur ad videndum, non propter colores, ut fiant actu visibiles; sed ut medium fiat actu 
lucidum, ut Commentator dicit in II De Anima. Et secundum hoc, similitudo qua Aristoteles assimilat 
intellectum agentem lumini, attenditur quantum ad hoc, quod sicut hoc est necessarium ad 
videndum, ita illud ad intelligendum; sed non propter idem.” Cf. In II De Anima 14, 356 ff.; In III De 





understanding is not intelligible in act in its natural mode of being, there must be an agent 
power that makes it intelligible in act.620 
A more obscure text is 85, 1 ad 4. What is interesting about this passage is that 
Aquinas speaks of two actions of the agent intellect: one he calls “illumination”, an action of 
the agent intellect upon the phantasm, an action of which he does not speak anywhere else 
in the treatise; and the other he calls “abstraction,” referring to the usual efficiency of the 
agent intellect as making the intelligible in act: 
Not only does the active intellect throw light on the phantasm: it does more; by its 
own power it abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm. It throws light on 
the phantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its 
conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power of the active intellect the 
phantasms are made […] fit for the abstraction therefrom of intelligible intentions. 
Furthermore, the active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the 
phantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are able [to take 
into our consideration the specific nature without the conditions of individuality, 
since the image of that specific nature] informs the passive intellect.621 
Notice Aquinas’ freedom in his use of words but, at the same time, his precision in 
conveying what he means. The fact that he is now using “illumination” for something that is 
not abstraction does not mean that he cannot use “illumination” or “light” to signify the 
                                                     
620 Cory (cf. Averroes, 11-12) distinguishes basically two theories of light (L1 and L2). 
Averroes interprets the role of light as not actualizing the visible object itself (L1), but as making the 
medium able to receive the influence of the colour (L2). Averroes attributes this theory to Aristotle. 
About St. Thomas she says: “Although later in life he discarded the L1 Theory of physical light in 
favor of L2, he continued to insist that L1 provides the appropriate model for the agent intellect’s 
abstractive function; see QDDA, 4, ad 4; ST, I, 79, 3, ad 2” (Cory, Averroes, 42). 
621 85, 1 ad 4: “Phantasmata et illuminantur ab intellectu agente; et iterum ab eis, per 
virtutem intellectus agentis, species intelligibiles abstrahuntur. Illuminantur quidem, quia, sicut pars 
sensitiva ex coniunctione ad intellectivam efficitur virtuosior, ita phantasmata ex virtute intellectus 
agentis redduntur habilia ut ab eis intentiones intelligibiles abstrahantur. Abstrahit autem intellectus 
agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum per virtutem intellectus agentis accipere 
possumus in nostra consideratione naturas specierum sine individualibus conditionibus, secundum 





agent intellect insofar as it abstracts.622 But here there is a reason for using the word 
“illumination,” and this is what is important.  
Objection Four plays with the “material” meaning of the two words that are usually 
related to the action of the agent intellect: abstraction and light. Whereas light seems to be 
something active, in the sense of a certain influence on what is illuminated (we see the 
effect of the light on the object), the word abstraction, though active as well, seems rather 
to be a kind of “taking from” its object. Therefore, if the agent intellect “illuminates,” it does 
not “take from.” 
The objection gives Aquinas the opportunity to round off his Epistemology. The issue 
is not a secondary one: is the phantasm intelligible in potency? It is easy to admit that 
something material is not intelligible in act, but this is not the same as saying that it is 
intelligible in potency. If the agent intellect makes the phantasm intelligible in act, it is 
because the phantasm is already intelligible in potency. Now, to be intelligible in potency is 
to “actually” possess a potentiality of becoming intelligible in act. Does the phantasm have 
this potentiality? 
It would not be out of place initially to clarify in what sense the phantasm is said to 
be “intelligible in potency”: it is in potency in the same sense that it will be in act, because 
we are talking about potency and act of the same thing. Therefore, if to be intelligible in act 
means—for the object of understanding—acquiring a new mode of being, this is also the 
                                                     
622 This he does, for example, in 79, 3 ad 2 (quoted above) and 79, 4, c. Cf. De Spirit. Creat., 
a.10, ad 4: “… but yet it actually possesses an immaterial light which has the power of abstracting 
those things which are able to be abstracted in potency.” [… sed tamen actu habet lumen 




kind of potentiality we are talking about. It is a potentiality that regards the modus rei 
intellectae, and not the object itself as such (res intellecta). In fact, the object as such is in 
act, not in potency: the nature of the corporeal thing is the specific perfection of the 
corporeal thing, that which makes it to be what it is, a formal perfection received in the 
matter and actualizing the matter. 
We have said also that to possess the potentiality of becoming intelligible in act is 
not the same as not to be intelligible in act. An example may clarify the point. It may be said 
that, in a certain sense, a table is “in potency” of becoming a man. But if a table will become 
a man, first it must suffer the action of many agents before finally becoming something that 
is in proximate potency of becoming a man. In the realm of nature, not everything comes 
from every thing, but there is an order in the processes of things. A table is not a man (in 
act), but this does not simply imply that it is in potency of becoming a man. 
In a similar way, if something in intellectual knowing comes from the object (the 
universal content in an intelligible mode of being), the object must be able to contribute to 
this effect, at least under the influence of an agent power. 
Now the phantasm (which represents the object) as a material thing cannot produce 
more than natural effects (the first mode of being of De Ver. 2, 2). If an intentional effect 
(second mode of being) is to come from the phantasm, that ability cannot be produced by 
its natural principles because cause and effect must be proportionate. This is why Aquinas 




must be an intentional influence on the material things in order to explain how sensible 
knowing may come from them.623 
Here, it appears that Aquinas is trying to explain how the intelligible species624 may 
come from the phantasm under the abstractive influence (second action) of the agent 
intellect. The phantasm is made able, by a certain intentional causality of the agent intellect 
called here “illumination,” to be subject to the agent intellect’s abstractive activity, by which 
the phantasm’s nature becomes intelligible in act. In other words, by this illumination, the 
phantasm is made intelligible in potency; whereas, by abstraction, the phantasm is made 
                                                     
623 A notion of claritas, as a property of the natural form which functions as the condition of 
possibility of the form’s perception (as proposed by Kevin E. O’Reilly, Aesthetic Perception: A 
Thomistic Perspective [Portland: Four Courts Press, 2007], 24ff.) would not replace, in my view, the 
Thomistic theory of the celestial bodies, although if it is understood in a certain sense, it could be 
taken as a complementary notion. O’Reilly understands claritas as an objective property that is 
actualized only by the actualization of subjectivity (“[aesthetic] visio in actu est claritas in actu”) and 
he relates his claim to the Aristotelian identity (i.e., intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu) 
interpreted as an identity between subject and object (an interpretation I consider foreign to 
Aquinas, as I have argued in Chapter 3). Now, if the principle of actualization of a content-property 
of the object is on the side of the subject, O’Reilly is proposing what I am rejecting, which is a formal 
a priori in perception, as formally constitutive of the object of knowing. In other words, if claritas is 
what is known by the aesthetic visio, and receives its actuality from visio itself, it means that it is 
only potentially in the form itself, and actual in the subject’s activity. Understood in this sense, 
therefore, the notion of claritas cannot replace the Thomistic theory of celestial bodies because it 
begins from principles foreign to St. Thomas (in my interpretation). In other words, if we say that the 
object is not actual independently from the activity of the subject (cf. 25), but we do not distinguish 
the object from its mode of being, we are giving to the subject a responsibility over the content that 
the subject does not have in Aquinas. In my view, because in knowing there is always a distinction 
between the object in itself and in its knowable mode of being, a cause for that knowable mode of 
being is always needed, both at the level of sensible and intelligible knowing. Now, O’Reilly 
mentions that “clarity is […] a property of form, for all form participates in the divine clarity” (24). If 
we understand this property as a participation on God’s knowability, a participation that, in the 
Thomistic system, could very well arrive at material things through the mediation of other creatures, 
then I do not see a tension with the Thomistic theory of celestial bodies, but I see, rather, the core 
of it. This knowability, in the intellectual realm, is related to what we have called the intelligible 
mode of being and, in our interpretation, the activity of the agent intellect is related to this mode of 
being. 





intelligible in act. And, because both actions of the agent intellect regard the modus rei 
intellectae, it cannot be said that the intelligible content comes from any of these actions. 
Rather, the intelligible content (res intellecta) is able to be rendered intelligible (modus r. i.) 
by the action of the agent intellect. 
Aquinas could have ascribed this type of causality to a separate substance, as he 
ascribed to the celestial bodies the intentional causality of the material things. But he did 
not want to multiply causes without necessity. There is already in the human being an 
active intellective power which is a participation of the divine light and so, for Aquinas, this 
power is the cause of this potentiality in the phantasm.625 
The action of light is sometimes related to the verb resultare as opposed to 
transmutatio: “The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of 
transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance; thus one thing results naturally from 
another, as color from light.”626 The action of light does not produce the colours (as in a 
transmutatio where one thing causes the other) but, rather, makes the colours visible. In 
the following text, resultare is again opposed to transmutatio: “As the power of the soul 
flows from the essence, not by a transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance, and is 
simultaneous with the soul, so is it the case with one power as regards another.”627 
                                                     
625 Cromp (cf. 188) does not seem to consider this distinction relevant in the text of Aquinas. 
626 77, 6 ad 3: “Emanatio propriorum accidentium a subiecto non est per aliquam 
transmutationem; sed per aliquam naturalem resultationem, sicut ex uno naturaliter aliud resultat, 
ut ex luce color.” 
627 77, 7 ad 1: “Sicut potentia animae ab essentia fluit, non per transmutationem, sed per 






Resultare is a way of “being-originated,” different from physical alteration and not implying 
time of itself. St. Thomas uses resultare for the agent intellect in the following text: 
This is done by the power of the active intellect which by turning towards the 
phantasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which represents, as to 
its specific conditions only, the thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the 
intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm…628 
We may say that this is one of the texts in which Aquinas seems to speak of 
abstraction as an “illumination.” But what is clear is that, by using “resultat,” he is 
suggesting that the action of the agent intellect is not productive of the object, but lets the 
object be seen. The metaphor of light and the use of resultare seem also to discourage an 
understanding of the agent intellect as a formal a priori. 
The metaphor of light is used clearly for the agent intellect in some texts (cf. 84, 5, 
c.; 88, 3 ad 1). But this does not prevent St. Thomas from using it to signify the separate 
intellects (especially the divine intellect). The intellectual light in God is simple, but the 
more distant from its first source, the more divided will we find this light: 
Every intellectual substance possesses intellective power by the influence of the 
Divine light, which is one and simple in its first principle, and the farther off 
intellectual creatures are from the first principle so much the more is the light 
divided and diversified, as is the case with lines radiating from the centre of a 
circle.629 
                                                     
628 85, 1 ad 3: “Sed virtute intellectus agentis resultat quaedam similitudo in intellectu 
possibili ex conversione intellectus agentis supra phantasmata, quae quidem est repraesentativa 
eorum quorum sunt phantasmata, solum quantum ad naturam speciei. Et per hunc modum dicitur 
abstrahi species intelligibilis a phantasmatibus…” 
629 89, 1, c.: “In omnibus enim substantiis intellectualibus invenitur virtus intellectiva per 
influentiam divini luminis. Quod quidem in primo principio est unum et simplex; et quanto magis 
creaturae intellectuales distant a primo principio, tanto magis dividitur illud lumen et diversificatur, 





The divine intelligence is also called “light” in relationship to the knowledge of the 
separate soul, when there is no abstraction: “But the soul when separated understands 
singulars by species derived from the Divine light, which is indifferent to what is near or 
distant. Hence knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered by local distance.”630 The 
divine intelligence is called light because it makes possible the act of understanding, not 
insofar as it physically moves the faculty to understand, but insofar as it bestows an agent 
object, the intelligible in act. It is what the agent intellect does in this life, insofar as it 
produces the agent object, the intelligible in act, by means of abstraction from the 
phantasm. The difference is that God does not make intelligible something that is not (i.e., 
in its mode of being), but makes the intelligible itself (the intelligible species with its 
content) as a participation of its own truth. God certainly makes the object visible, not 
though as the object is in itself, but as it is in God Himself. That is why the content of the 
infused species is “intensive” and not proportionate to the human intellect. 
There are, as it were, three intelligibilities: intelligible power, intelligible object and 
intelligible mode of being of the object (the separation from matter that allows it to be 
understood). In God, the three things are one and the same. In the angel, the proportionate 
object is already in an intelligible mode of being. In human beings, this is not the case; here, 
the object is not “light” (intelligibility as mode of being) but needs to be “illumined.” This is 
the need for and the nature of the agent intellect. 
*** 
                                                     
630 89, 7, c.: “Intelligit autem anima separata singularia per influxum specierum ex divino 
lumine, quod quidem lumen aequaliter se habet ad propinquum et distans. Unde distantia localis 




A text from the Contra Gentiles631 can serve as a summary of many of the concepts 
that form the core of our argument. For Aquinas, it is not difficult to see how an agent 
intellect and a possible intellect may coexist in one soul: 
For nothing prevents one thing from being in one respect potential in relation to 
some other thing, and actual in another respect, as we observe in things of nature; 
air is actually damp and potentially dry, and the reverse is true of earth. Now, this 
same interrelationship obtains between the intellective soul and the phantasms.632 
That is to say, the phantasm is in act of something of which the soul is potency, and 
the soul is in act of something different of which the phantasm is potency: “For the 
intellective soul has something actual to which the phantasm is potential, and is potential to 
something present actually in the phantasm.”633 What are these different things? Aquinas 
begins by examining the actuality and the potentiality with regards to the soul: 
“[S]ince the substance of the human soul is possessed of immateriality, and, as is 
clear from what has been said, it therefore has an intellectual nature—every 
immaterial substance being of this kind. But this does not mean that the soul is now 
[determinately] likened to this or that thing, as it must be in order to know this or 
that thing determinately; for all knowledge is brought about by the likeness of the 
thing known being present in the knower. Thus, the intellectual soul itself remains 
potential with respect to the determinate likenesses of things that can be known by 
us, namely, the natures of sensible things. It is the phantasms which present these 
determinate natures [of sensible things] to us .634 
                                                     
631 II, 77, par. 2; Cf. 79, 4 ad 4. 
632 CG II, 77, par. 2: “Nihil enim prohibet hoc respectu illius esse secundum quid in potentia 
et secundum aliud in actu, sicut in rebus naturalibus videmus: aer enim est actu humidus et potentia 
siccus, terra autem e converso. Haec autem comparatio invenitur esse inter animam intellectivam et 
phantasmata.” 
633 CG II, 77, par. 2: “Habet enim anima intellectiva aliquid in actu ad quod phantasma est in 
potentia: et ad aliquid est in potentia quod in phantasmatibus actu invenitur.” 
634 CG II, 77, par. 2: “Habet enim substantia animae humanae immaterialitatem, et, sicut ex 
dictis patet, ex hoc habet naturam intellectualem: quia omnis substantia immaterialis est huiusmodi. 
Ex hoc autem nondum habet quod assimiletur huic vel illi rei determinate, quod requiritur ad hoc 
quod anima nostra hanc vel illam rem determinate cognoscat: omnis enim cognitio fit secundum 





The soul is in act of being immaterial (it possesses immateriality), but is in potency of 
determinate species of its object. Species is here the content as represented, and not simply 
the species as a means; this is because the species as a means is act in the same sense as 
the soul is act (immateriality), and here Aquinas is trying to show that potentiality and 
actuality are referred to different things. The soul is in potency of something which will 
perfect it in a way different from the way in which the soul is already perfect. The soul is in 
potency of receiving the perfection of the thing, not of being immaterial; but the 
determinate species of the thing (here, the phantasm), though it possesses the perfection of 
the thing, is in potency of being immaterial, as Aquinas says: 
But these phantasms have not yet acquired intelligible actuality, since they are 
likenesses of sensible things even as to material conditions, which are the individual 
properties, and, moreover, the phantasms exist in material organs. Consequently, 
they are not actually intelligible. They are, however, potentially intelligible, since in 
the individual man whose likeness the phantasms reflect it is possible to [conceive] 
the universal nature stripped of all individuating conditions. And so, the phantasms 
have intelligibility potentially, while being actually determinate as likenesses of 
things. In the intellective soul the opposite was the case.635 
In what better way could Aquinas have said that the content of which the soul is in 
potency is in act in some sense, and yet is in potency in another sense (which is exactly the 
point of the paragraph)? The word “determinatio” seems to be a means to express this 
                                                     
determinatas similitudines rerum cognoscibilium a nobis, quae sunt naturae rerum sensibilium. Et 
has quidem determinatas naturas rerum sensibilium praesentant nobis phantasmata.” Cf. Q.D. De 
Anima, a.5, ob. 6 et ad 6. 
635 CG II, 77, par. 2: “Quae [i.e. phantasmata] tamen nondum pervenerunt ad esse 
intelligibile: cum sint similitudines rerum sensibilium etiam secundum conditiones materiales, quae 
sunt proprietates individuales, et sunt etiam in organis materialibus. Non igitur sunt intelligibilia 
actu. Et tamen, quia in hoc homine cuius similitudinem repraesentant phantasmata, est accipere 
naturam universalem denudatam ab omnibus conditionibus individuantibus, sunt intelligibilia in 
potentia. Sic igitur habent intelligibilitatem in potentia, determinationem autem similitudinis rerum 





“potential actuality” or “actual potentiality” of the nature in the concrete substance. 
Aquinas’ point cannot be simply that the phantasm is in act of representing the thing in its 
particularity. This is because the soul is not in potency of that actuality, but in potency of 
the universal nature which is actually present in the thing itself (as is most clear in the 
passage just quoted),636 but not in the mode of being which will make it knowable. That is 
why the agent intellect and the possible intellect are not only distinct faculties in the same 
soul, insofar as their activites regard different potentialities (as is evident in the conclusion 
of the paragraph), but the work of one requires the work of the other as a condition of 
possibility. Aquinas concludes: “Hence, there is in that soul an active power vis-à-vis the 
phantasms, making them actually intelligible; and this power is called the agent intellect; 
while there is also in the soul a power that is in potentiality to the determinate likenesses of 
sensible things; and this power is the possible intellect.”637 These “determinatas 
similitudines rerum sensibilium” are not the phantasms, but the abstracted species insofar 
as they represent the sensible things in their nature. And “faciens ea intelligibilia actu” 
implies the immaterialization of the universal nature, and so the contribution of a mode of 
being (“denudatam”) to it. 
                                                     
636 Note in particular how the phantasms are said to be “similitudines rerum sensibilium 
etiam secundum conditiones materiales.” This implies that the nature is also in some way 
represented in the phantasm. This is not surprising if we admit that, for Aquinas, the nature is 
present in the particular thing: if the universal nature can be present in the particular thing, it can 
also be present in the representation of that particular thing, in some way. That is why Aquinas says 
that “Whatever is in our intellect must have previously been in the senses.” [Oportet ut quod est in 
intellectu nostro, prius in sensu fuerit.] (De Ver 2, 3, ad 19). 
637 CG II, 77, par. 2: “Est igitur in anima intellectiva virtus activa in phantasmata, faciens ea 
intelligibilia actu: et haec potentia animae vocatur intellectus agens. Est etiam in ea virtus quae est 






With this ends the explanation of the texts supporting the proposed interpretation 
of the agent intellect in St. Thomas as a metaphysical a priori. As can be seen, this 
explanation depends heavily on the previous reflections. If we distinguish, with Aquinas, 
between intelligible as res intellecta and as modus rei intellectae (Chapter 2) and we then 
understand the passivity of human understanding as a reception of the intelligible as 
content (Chapter 3), it becomes possible to understand the efficiency of the agent intellect 
as relating to the mode of being of the content and, therefore, to understand the agent 





We conclude this dissertation by offering a brief summary of the topic, the main 
contributions, limits and future lines of research. 
1. Summary 
Focusing on the treatise on human being in the Summa Theologiae, I have 
substantiated my interpretation of Aquinas’ agent intellect as a metaphysical a priori. The 
mention of a metaphysical a priori refers by contrast to a formal a priori, a crucial notion in 
Modern Philosophy. 
In Aquinas, the meaning of things (their nature or intelligibility) is not determined by 
the agent intellect, but resides in the things themselves. The agent intellect gives the 
common nature an intelligible mode of being, so that the specific perfection of things may 
become somehow the perfection of our intelligence. Intelligence (i.e., the possible intellect) 
receives the perfection-content of things; it is in this sense that the possible intellect is in 
potency before knowing. The perfection-content receives an intelligible mode of being; it is 
in that sense that the agent intellect perfects the object of knowing. The agent intellect 
gives to the specific natures of sensible things the ability to act as agent objects; the agent 
intellect does not provide their content. The agent intellect is thus, for Aquinas, not a formal 
but a metaphysical a priori of human understanding. A Kantian formal a priori, instead, is 
source of intelligible content and constitutive of the known.  
By making Aquinas dialogue with Kant, I have intended to point out the radical 




Aquinas’ agent intellect as a formal a priori. This was required for my interpretation of 
Aquinas in order to distinguish it clearly from other interpretations that may consider the 
agent intellect as fulfilling the role of a Kantian transcendental. That is why I thought it 
important to bring forth the tension between Aquinas and Kant, and to take that tension to 
its root: the differing Kantian and Thomistic “facts,” which work as their respective points of 
departure and require, as conditions of possibility, their respective a priori elements. 
The dialogue with Kant was also helpful in connecting Aquinas’ thought with 
meaningful reflection for today since, despite their differing approaches, I suggest seeing 
both thinkers (Kant and St. Thomas) as facing the same question: the tension between 
content of experience and universal knowing. This is my reason for having placed the 
doctrine of the agent intellect in its natural context, the problem of the universals. 
It should be clear that my point was not so much to offer an overall interpretation of 
Kant (about whose contributions future conversations ought to happen), as it was to try to 
“catch” Kant’s approach to the problem of the universals at the very beginning and to show, 
thus, the tension with St. Thomas’s approach. This approach, in my view, is Kant’s legacy to 
Modern Philosophy, and it is precisely here that the relevant distinction between Aquinas 
and Kant is located, particularly in reference to Aquinas’ doctrine of the agent intellect. 
2. Contributions 
My main contribution, rather than being the particular characterization of the agent 
intellect (a view that can actually be found in other authors as well) is, instead, the 
argument produced to support this characterization. This argument is related to the 




dissertation. Chapter 1 establishes the fact which requires for Aquinas an agent intellect, 
and it gives us two very important principles: one is the object of human understanding (the 
universal nature) as present in the things themselves, and the other that it is not in the 
things themselves with a mode of being that makes it available to the intellectual eye. 
These two principles lead us to the main point of Chapter 2, namely the distinction between 
the intelligible object and its intelligible mode of being. Now, because knowing is receptive 
of the intelligible object (Chapter 3), which is present in the things themselves (Chapter 1), 
the agent intellect is active, not of the intelligible content, but of its abstracted or intelligible 
mode of being (Chapter 4). 
Another contribution is showing the connection between the interpretation of the 
Aristotelian identity in Aquinas (cf. Chapter 3) and the distinction between res intellecta and 
modus rei intellectae (Chapter 2). The not unusual misunderstanding of the Aristotelian 
identity in Aquinas (as if it were an identity between subject and object) is related to the 
lack of distinction between the aforementioned two meanings of intelligible. It is an 
important point, in my view, because some authors may stumble in this misunderstanding 
of the Aristotelian identity in Aquinas and then think that for Aquinas, as for Kant, the 
content-perfection of the known is the act of the knower. What I propose is that the 
objective aspect of the Aristotelian identity (intellectum in actu) cannot be taken as simply 
the content, but that it actually refers to the representation of the content, and so to the 




3. Limits and Future Lines of Research 
Some of the limitations of this dissertation have to do with its methodology, and 
have already been mentioned in the Introduction, or in the previous points of this 
conclusion.  
On another note, it is always challenging to express one’s own view to scholars who 
come from different interpretations and/or philosophical backgrounds. One of the ways I 
thought important to overcome this difficulty was to focus not so much on the definition of 
terms, as on the definition of the problems and the approaches. 
On the one hand, the specificity of a topic can make it difficult to find relevant 
scholarly work addressing the issue as directly as needed. On the other hand, many more 
general works on Aquinas’ Epistemology and other more particular studies treat many of 
the points I have made in dealing with my precise topic, and they have not been expressly 
referenced. I have softened this silence by engaging a few more relevant authors, but I look 
forward to engaging other views, particularly in Transcendental Thomism.  
In the main, this investigation has allowed me to better work out my own position 
and, I hope, has made it understandable; further engagement in a broader and constructive 
dialogue could certainly foster a better understanding of Aquinas. In particular, my silence 
regarding interpretations of Aquinas in Transcendental Thomism is due mainly to the 
impossibility of adequately engaging in the interpretation of several authors at the same 
time. My interpretation of St. Thomas could be taken as preparation for establishing a more 




A detailed study of the rest of the Summa, with regards to the outcomes of this 
dissertation, could prove of the greatest relevance for assessing my interpretation on 
several points, particularly the treatise on the Trinity (for example, the notion of verbum), 
the references to other “lights” in intellectual knowing (such as the lumen gloriae and faith), 
other explicit references to the agent intellect, the human knowledge of Christ, and a long 
et cetera. Not to mention the study of those same topics in the rest of Aquinas’ works. 
These findings could also help us to read such texts in a new light. 
For example, in the text in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 34, a.1 ad 3, the distinction 
between res intellecta and modus rei intellectae, and the consequent distinction between 
species and object, may help us to better understand the distinction between the two 
aspects of the Verbum in the Holy Trinity: one aspect according to which the Verbum is 
absolutely the same as regards the whole Trinity (the whole Trinity is said through the 
Verbum, the whole Trinity is understood by the Three Divine Persons in the one Verbum) 
and another aspect in which the Verbum is distinct (only one Verbum is said by the one 
Father). What is understood is not only the Species, but the whole Trinity in the Species 
because, for St. Thomas, species and object are two different notions. In the case of the 
Trinity, there is actually an absolute complete identity between intellectus and intellectum 
(= object), but not between intellectum and Verbum (insofar as the Verbum and also the 
other persons of the Trinity and other creatures are what is understood).  
The Verbum in the Trinity would be that which we have called species expressa as 
regards human understanding—that is, the subjective modification of the human intellect 




Himself, already intelligible in act, and the content of this species is simply the divine 
essence. There is an absolute identity between intellect and thing understood, because God 
is pure intellect and understands Himself by Himself (by Himself as species impressa: God is 
intelligible by Himself; He does not need an agent intellect). But He understands Himself by 
means of a Verbum as species expressa, which proceeds from the Father and whose content 
is the whole Divinity.  
Now if, as we have suggested, the act of the human intellect (as verbum) proceeds 
from the intellect itself (as faculty in potency) by the agency of an intelligible in act (the 
species impressa), it is more clear how the notion of verbum is most fitting to speak of 
distinction in the Trinity: the notion of verbum, in fact, contains procession of origin (which 
in the Trinity is the only way to distinctions) and allows identity of substance (insofar as the 
verbum’s content can be the very self, in those who do not have matter and are already 
intelligible in act, and insofar as the verbum has no other being than the being of the 
intellect itself).638 
It would be interesting to study the relationship of the supernatural lights to the 
agent intellect. In fact, faith does not seem to make intelligible (“visible”) its proper object: 
faith makes us judge about things which are not evident. The metaphor of light, then, 
acquires a new significance, as that which allows us to judge with certainty about 
something. A study of the function of the agent intellect in human judgment and of the 
possibility of referring to certain “objects” of knowing—such as the first principles—as 
                                                     
638 This latter is that which we have considered the Thomistic interpretation of the 




“light” becomes necessary. Moreover, the “light” metaphor may also suffer adjustments in 
its use for the lumen gloriae, since this light does not affect so much the object (the Divine 
Essence) as the human subject itself. It is light, it seems, as that which allows us to see, not 
though as affecting the object (as in intellectual human knowing) nor the medium (as in 
sensible vision) but, rather, as affecting the potency itself. 
Regarding the human knowledge of Christ, our findings can help us better 
understand how, for St. Thomas, there can be in Christ a distinct knowing of everything 
from His conception and, at the same time, a progression in His knowing. The divine 
essence and the infused species are “intelligibles” in act which as such are agent objects, 
respectively, of Christ’s science of vision and infused science. Science is here the particular 
reference of His possible intellect to the objects by the agency of an intelligible in act and, 
therefore, a reference to the object represented in the species, to the object through the 
species (impressa). The aforementioned species are in Jesus since the moment of His 
conception, but not so the species impressae resulting from the action of the agent intellect 
on the phantasms. These latter species provoke a new reference of the possible intellect 
(because, even if a species regards an object that Jesus already knows with another science, 
the species itself, in its subjective mode of being, is different—as a numerically different 
species impressa), and therefore there is a new science (acquired knowledge), which is 
progressive due to the temporal succession of experience and the consequent succession of 
new phantasms, species impressae and expressae. It really seems as if the distinction of 
species impressa and expressa, though not explicit in Aquinas, is very helpful in 




as two different images, but as two different moments of the same content, as available 
initially and as “embraced” later. The species expressa is thus a reference to the impressa in 
its content (or: to the content of the impressa), a reference “produced” by the presence of 
the impressa to the faculty. 
The significance of the questions of knowing and being in Theology can never be 
overemphasized, at least from a Thomistic point of view. From the first article of the 
Summa, Aquinas distinguishes between what can be known by the light of reason and what 
is beyond its reach. Human being has been given an end which surpasses the light of reason 
and, therefore, a different knowledge must be added to the one obtained by purely natural 
means. In other words, the different kind of being of the object requires a different kind of 
knowing: this is the reason for a Sacred Doctrine. Finite reason can know finite being, and 
can realize that there is an infinite being which is the cause. Finite reason can “see” that 
there must be an infinite being, can “see” that infinite being is not like other beings, but 
cannot see this infinite being—and finite reason remains outside the castle—hoping that 
someone will lower the drawbridge towards happiness. However, it is always the same 
human being who is called to enter the castle and, therefore, human natural powers are not 
left outside, but invited in, where a new light—the light of the castle—will allow human 
intelligence to see the King. This notion of knowing as encounter may prove very helpful in 
understanding Aquinas’ approach to both philosophical and theological questions. 
One question that could be addressed further is the more precise understanding of 
the action of the agent intellect. In fact, my characterization of the agent intellect as an a 




produces the intelligible mode of being as “bestowing” or “adding” something physical to 
the object. Although, in Aquinas, it does seem that the agent intellect bestows something 
real on the phantasm itself (the “first action” of the agent intellect in 85,1 ad 4), the 
abstractive (second) action properly speaking seems, rather, to be an “extraction” of the 
content. In other words, it seems that the action of the agent intellect should be 
understood more as a “dematerialization” (efficient in taking from) than as a 
“spiritualization” (efficient in providing perfection), although both are correct in a sense. On 
the one hand, I think it is more a dematerialization because the spirituality of the content is 
nothing other than its being separated from its individual conditions in the matter. On the 
other hand, it can still be said to be a “spiritualization” because the content in its state of 
abstraction “subsists” spiritually, participating in some way the mode of being of the agent 
intellect.  
What is most important, however, is to understand the methodological problem; 
that is,  although we do need material “parables” to understand our capacity for 
understanding, we must transcend them; and the action of the agent intellect is one of 
those instances in which the use of images and even words seems to disappoint us the 
most. This “making intelligible” seems to be a certain “letting [a content] be seen” by the 
separation of the content from its individual conditions in the matter. Now, this separation 
is not physical, because content and individual conditions are not physically separated in 
the sensible thing. The separation comes about by an elevation of that content to a 




the phantasm, and this is why St. Thomas makes a distinction between the two actions of 
the agent intellect. 
My focus on the simple apprehension allowed me to say very little about judgment. 
An explicit consideration of judgment in Aquinas in connection with my reflections on the 
role of the agent intellect could prove very fruitful in order to refine our findings and offer a 
more complete view of human understanding. 
Because mine was an effort of interpretation, the questions of judgment need still to 
be addressed. Are the epistemological principles referred here to Aquinas still relevant 
today? Would they make any sense in a modern Epistemology? I think a very fruitful line of 
investigation could be the study of the notion of alterity as a basic original condition of the 
object in human knowing. The notions of encounter, remedy, subjective original 
imperfection, etc., should be conjoined to a serious phenomenological analysis of human 
knowing. My emphasis on alterity is related to the view that the contribution of subjectivity 
is (essentially and originally) not related to the content, but to its mode of being. Our 
subjective storage of experience or personal history will certainly and greatly influence later 
perceptions, and this can be taken as a cognitive fact. But is this fact original? Is it not based 
precisely on more original facts? And what are the conditions of possibility of those original 
facts, and of the very development of experience? The work of Cornelio Fabro, deeply 
imbued in both the Phenomenology of Perception and the Metaphysics of Knowledge, can 
be a helpful tool for research in this direction.
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Epilogue: Knowing after Kant 
 
We are meant to know; we are so by nature.  
The perfection of the known,  
however, is not expected as a friend we already know,  
but as the food we do not have.  
 
We do need food, and this is the transcendental orientation of a potency to its particular 
object. This need, however, does not perfect itself in any way, but rather calls for the 
perfection of another. Food perfects the hungry stomach, but hunger will not transform a 
stone into bread.  
 
The image of food, however, cannot be taken much further, because it is just an image, and 
knowing is different from that, more than that. The hungry stomach will actually transform 
the food into something belonging to the body. The knower, instead, will not eat his or her 
visitors, but will welcome them as they are. The known stays home as a visitor, always 
different, always interesting, always other. 
 
For Aquinas, as I read him, there is meaning in the things themselves and he is, in this sense, 
different from Kant. If St. Thomas is right, there is a need to face again the more original 
questions of Epistemology, namely the problem of the universals and the very 
characterization of knowing. There is a need to get away from skeptical biases and 
unfruitful dialectics. The alternative to Kant is not a going back to the things themselves 
which leaves the subject, so to speak, staring speechless at a world of objects. An 
Epistemology sensitive to the psychological development of the human subject, the 
(Thomistic) fact of knowing in its metaphysical essence, and the conditions of possibility for 
both is, in my view, the way forward to a more helpful philosophical account of human 
knowing. 
 
Otherwise, by dissolving the meaning of things in our dealings with them,  
we risk losing also the meaning of our own existence.  
The existential void is the emptiness of a soul who did not welcome things as  
they are—with their own caprices and beauty—a soul who thus remained alone  
in the self-made prison of his or her own world of ideas and values.  
Then, when the door to the world is closed, the path to Heaven cannot be found. 
God is hidden behind the trees, behind the beauties He made.  
It is only by encountering others that we can hear about God.639 
 
It is good for neither man nor woman to be alone.  
Let humanity, then, be open to the adventure of knowing.
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Appendix: Other Authors, Excursus, Latin Texts and Translations 
 
Note 1: Other Relevant Authors (Introduction) 
According to John Haldane,640 St. Thomas uses the Aristotelian text to explain his (Aquinas’) 
theory. Aristotle’s concern is more metaphysical in that the agent intellect explains, for him, 
the intellectual faculty’s passage from potency to act. Aquinas’ concern is more 
gnoseological in that Aquinas is trying to explain the fact that we know by means of 
universal concepts. In other words, for Haldane, St. Thomas is making sense of the problem 
of the universals, whereas Aristotle is concerned with the fact that we know after not 
having known. 
Again, according to Haldane, the way St. Thomas uses the Aristotelian agent intellect to fit 
his purposes is by making it a formal a priori. In the Avicennian Platonism, the universal 
forms would seem to come from a certain illumination from above. But Aquinas reacts 
against this Epistemology: 
 
[Aquinas] maintains that the actuality of the agent intellect consists in the universal 
content of its acts, and it is this which confers generality upon the thoughts (species 
expressa) of the passive mind. Without the work of the former no concepts would 
be available; and without these cognition could not take place, for the sensuous 
presentation of the environment could not be ordered.641 
Haldane’s suggestion is that, for Aquinas, the agent intellect is active regarding the 
universality as content and, in this way, Aquinas subscribes to a theory of a formal a priori. 
For Haldane, the Thomistic alternative to Platonism (forms coming from above) is the forms 
coming from inside, because they cannot come from experience.  
Finally, I would like to suggest that the epistemological and metaphysical concerns, as 
Haldane conceives them, need not be seen as opposing each other in Aristotle and Aquinas. 
Rather, it is in order to explain both the fact of the universal actuality of the content and the 
                                                     





possible intellect’s consequent passage from potency to act that the agent intellect is called 
to the scene. In other words, the possible intellect would not pass from potency to act if 
there were not an intelligible in act, and the nature of the sensible thing would not be 
intelligible in act if there were not an agent intellect. The point of departure is that we know 
those natures after not having known them. 
Wayne Hankey’s642 point is to establish the continuity between natural and supernatural 
knowledge by means of a doctrine of the agent intellect as a formal a priori. Because the 
agent intellect is already a certain participation in the content of the divine light (implicit 
knowledge of the transcendental notions), it is not so difficult to understand how grace can 
elevate this potency to a knowing of God that is explicit. This would also be the reason for a 
more “positive” knowledge of God by faith (as opposed to an emphasis on the via negativa). 
In his understanding of the agent intellect in Aquinas as a formal a priori, i.e., as providing 
intelligible content to sense experience, Hankey refers extensively to Smit,643 with whom he 
agrees,644 and confirms his own interpretation with some of St. Thomas’ texts which are 
discussed in the body of the thesis. 
R.E. Houser,645 in his study on the metaphor of light among the Greeks, ascribes to the 
agent intellect in St. Thomas not just its distinction from the possible intellect but its 
separation from the subject. In his understanding of Aquinas, Houser seems also to 
confound the light of the agent intellect with the light of grace.646 Finally, Houser suggests 
that the efficient causality of the agent intellect is not a formal cause and does not add 
content, because light must be transparent.647 However, Houser does not indicate in what 
                                                     
642 Cf. Wayne J. Hankey, “Participatio Divini Luminis, Aquinas' Doctrine of the Agent Intellect: 
Our Capacity for Contemplation,” Dionysius 22 (2004): 149-178. 
643 Cf. 163, 162 and passim. 
644 Cf. 173. 
645 Cf. R. E. Houser, “Philosophical Development through Metaphor: Light among the 
Greeks,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 64 (1990): 75-85. 
646 Cf. 83-85. 





way, then, light produces intelligibility in things that are only potentially intelligible and 
cannot exist as universal, unchanging and necessary.648 In other words, despite the fact that 
he would arguably reject the consideration of the agent intellect as a formal a priori, Houser 
does not distinguish between intelligibility as content and as mode of being. 
Note 2: On Cory’s Interpretation (Footnote 205)  
This seems to be Cory’s interpretation. Abstraction for Aquinas would be “the object’s 
[read: “the phantasm’s”] causing its intelligible likeness in the intellect by the power of the 
agent intellect”;649 “Quasi formed by this immaterializing power, images are intelligible 
merely in the sense that they can perform the proper act of actually intelligible entities, 
without being intelligible entities.”650 For her, the agent object is the sensible image under 
the influence of the agent intellect, not though as instrumental but as secondary cause; she 
proposes that the relationship between agent intellect and phantasm is similar to the 
relationship between universal and particular cause. Basically, for Cory, the agent intellect 
causes the intelligible mode of being of the phantasm, not an intelligible species different 
from it, nor the intelligible mode of being of an intelligible content (the latter, as I propose). 
Note 3: The Mediation of the Phantasm (Footnote 238)  
It is not possible to treat thoroughly the mediation of the phantasm in intellectual knowing, 
but certain principles may orient the reader to understand my position. What I propose is, 
basically, that the content of the phantasm is out there, but not in the same mode of being 
as it is in the phantasm. Related to this, I propose also that the phantasm is for intelligence 
the particular itself, insofar as its content is real (we do not know the phantasm, but the 
thing itself through its phantasm). I acknowledge the fact that the phantasm is composed of 
elements from memory and imagination; this fact, however, gives the phantasm more 
objectivity, and not less, because this “subjective” composition represents what is out there 
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more accurately than a representation of only the present features of a particular thing. The 
subjective activity of composition is natural, and here applies the principle that nature does 
not fail in what is proper. That this subjective activity, though natural, is not arbitrary but 
based on the data of experience themselves, as well as many other problems connected 
with perception, cannot be treated here, but cf. Fabro, Percezione e Pensiero. That which is 
most important, in my view, is to distinguish the content of the phantasm from the mode of 
being in which this real content is present in the faculty. In this cognitive mode of being the 
content is not out there, but what is known is the content itself, and abstraction happens 
with regard to the content. 
Note 4: The Stability in Material Things (Footnote 248) 
Cf. In Boet. De Trin. 5, 2, ob. 6 et ad 6:  
Not every object of natural philosophy is subject to movement […] The soul and the 
other natural forms, even if they do not move in themselves, they do move with 
regards to something else, and besides this, they are perfections of mobile things: it 
is in this sense that they fall under the consideration of natural philosophy.651  
That the forms are moved per accidens imply that they are in what is moved (cf. corpus). 
Democritus had also denied stability to material things:  
He took intellect to be, not the faculty for knowing truth and understanding 
intelligible objects, but a mere sense-faculty. Only the sensible, he thought, could be 
known, since only the sensible existed. And because the latter is continually 
changing there could be no [determinate] truth about anything.652 
See in the same context: “Aristotle, however, proceeded along another way. For first he 
showed in many ways that there is something stable in sensible things.”653 
                                                     
651 In Boet. De Trin. 5, 2, ob. 6 et ad 6: “Non omnia, de quibus est physica, sunt in motu […] 
anima et aliae formae naturales, quamvis non moveantur per se, moventur tamen per accidens, et 
insuper sunt perfectiones rerum mobilium, et secundum hoc cadunt in consideratione naturalis.” 
652 In I De Anima 3, 198-205: “[Ipse] non utebatur intellectu qui est circa veritatem, idest 
virtute intellectiva qua anima intelligit intelligibilia, sed solum vi sensitiva, et quod nichil 
cognosceretur nisi sensibile, cum nichil poneret in rerum natura nisi sensibile; unde cum sensibilia 
sint in continuo motu et fluxu, opinatus est nullam veritatem determinatam esse in rebus.” 
653 De Spirit. Creat., a.10, ad 8: “Aristoteles autem per aliam viam processit. Primo enim, 





Note 5: The Reason for Calling the Species or Form ratio (Footnote 267)  
The reason for calling the species or form ratio654 can be taken from the following text:  
And form, which is also termed the intelligible structure because the intelligible 
structure of the species is derived from it, is called substance […] inasmuch as it is 
something actual, and […] inasmuch as it is separable from matter in thought but not 
in reality […] And although the composite is separable in an absolute sense, yet 
some of the other things which are called substances are separable in thought and 
some are not. For a form is separable in thought because it can be understood 
without understanding individuating sensible matter; but matter cannot be 
understood without understanding form, since it is apprehended only inasmuch as it 
is in potentiality to form.655 
Note 6: The Error of the Natural Philosophers (Footnote 293) 
In 84, 2 c., the same error is attributed to the Natural Philosophers. See also: 
Like, they said, must be known by like. If then the soul is to know all things it must 
contain a likeness of all things according to their natural mode of being. They could 
not distinguish between the mode of existence that a thing has in the mind or the 
eye or the imagination from that which it has in itself.656 
“They expressed this by saying that the reason why the soul knew all things was that 
all things entered into its composition, and that the soul possessed the likeness of all 
things according to the mode of existence, i.e. a corporeal one, which things have in 
themselves outside it.”657 
Note 7: Text of Q.D. De Anima, a.3, ad 8 (Footnote 298) 
                                                     
654 Cf. also In Met. 12, lect. 10, 2595. 
655 In Met. 8, lect. 1, 1687: “Forma vero, quae et ratio nominatur, quia ex ipsa sumitur ratio 
speciei, dicitur substantia quasi ens aliquid actu, et quasi ens separabile secundum rationem a 
materia, licet non secundum rem […] Et licet compositum sit separabile simpliciter, tamen 
secundum rationem, aliorum quae dicuntur substantiae, quaedam sunt separabilia, et quaedam 
non. Forma enim est separabilis ratione, quia potest intelligi sine materia sensibili individuante; 
materia vero non potest intelligi sine intellectu formae, cum non apprehendatur nisi ut ens in 
potentia ad formam.” 
656 In I De Anima 4, 19-36: “Dicebant enim quod oportebat simile simili cognosci; unde si 
anima cognoscat omnia, oportet, quod habeat similitudinem omnium in se secundum esse naturale, 
sicut ipsi ponebant. Nescierunt enim distinguere illum modum, quo res est in intellectu, seu in oculo, 
vel imaginatione, et quo res est in seipsa.” 
657 In I De Anima 12, 10-15: “Dicebant animam, ad hoc quod omnia cognosceret, esse 
compositam ex omnibus; et quod similitudo rerum omnium esset in anima secundum proprium 




According to the Platonists the reason why something is understood as a one-in-
many [i.e., universally], is not to be attributed to the intellect, but to the thing. They 
argue that, because our intellect knows a thing as a one-in-many, it would 
apparently be empty of any real content unless there were one real (thing) shared 
by many individuals. For in that case the intellect would have in itself nothing 
corresponding to (…) reality. Hence the Platonists felt obliged to posit Ideas, by 
participation in which both natural things are given their specific nature, and our 
intellects made cognizant of universals. But according to Aristotle, the fact that the 
intellect understands a one-in-many in abstraction from individuating principles, is 
to be attributed to the intellect itself. And though nothing abstract exists in reality, 
the intellect is not void of any real content, nor is it misrepresentative of things as 
they are; because, of those things which necessarily exist together, one can be truly 
understood or named without another being understood or named. But it cannot be 
truly understood or said of things existing together, that one exists without the 
other. Thus whatever exists in an individual which pertains to the nature of its 
species, and in respect of which it is like other things, can be known and spoken of 
truly without taking into consideration its individuating principles, which distinguish 
it from all other individuals [of the same species].658 (Parenthesis mine, square 
brackets translator’s. Latin follows here) 
Secundum Platonicos causa huius quod intelligitur unum in multis, non est ex parte 
intellectus, sed ex parte rei. Cum enim intellectus noster intelligat aliquid unum in 
multis; nisi aliqua res esset una participata a multis, videretur quod intellectus esset 
vanus, non habens aliquid respondens sibi in re. Unde coacti sunt ponere ideas, per 
quarum participationem et res naturales speciem sortiuntur, et intellectus nostri 
fiunt universalia intelligentes. Sed secundum sententiam Aristotelis hoc est ab 
intellectu, scilicet quod intelligat unum in multis per abstractionem a principiis 
individuantibus. Nec tamen intellectus est vanus aut falsus, licet non sit aliquid 
abstractum in rerum natura. Quia eorum quae sunt simul, unum potest vere intelligi 
aut nominari, absque hoc quod intelligatur vel nominetur alterum; licet non possit 
vere intelligi vel dici, quod eorum quae sunt simul, unum sit sine altero. Sic igitur 
vere potest considerari et dici id quod est in aliquo individuo, de natura speciei, in 
quo simile est cum aliis, absque eo quod considerentur in eo principia individuantia, 
secundum quae distinguitur ab omnibus aliis. 
Note 8: Text of Q.D. De Anima, a.2, ad 5 (Footnote 324) 
The human soul is an individuated form and so also is its power which is called the 
possible intellect, as well as the intelligible forms which are received in the possible 
intellect. But this does not prevent these forms from being actually (understood), for 
a thing is actually (understood) because it is immaterial, not because it is universal. 
                                                     





Indeed, the universal is intelligible because it is abstracted from material 
individuating conditions.659 
Note 9: The Figure of “Food” (Footnote 348) 
An image somewhat similar to that of “remedy” is the figure of “food”:  
We ought, therefore, to reach conclusions about objects before activities for the 
same reason as leads us to define activities before potencies. The ‘objects’ in 
question are [like food to the vegetative faculty, both the sensible object with 
respect to the sense, and the intelligible object with respect to the intellect.]660  
Clear also is the similarity between sense and intellect in that regard.661 The reference to 
food in the text above, however, could also be interpreted as simply a comparison between 
the relationships of each object (food, the sensible and the intelligible) to its correspondent 
faculty. 
Note 10: The Same Interpretation of the Aristotelian Identity in other Texts (Footnote 
375) 
The same interpretation can be seen clearly in other texts and works of Aquinas, for 
example in CG II, 98, par. 14-19; Ibid., 99, par. 5-7, especially:  
But since the intellect in perfect act is the thing understood in act, someone may 
think that a separate substance does not understand material things; for it would 
seem incongruous that a material thing should be the perfection of a separate 
substance. Rightly considered, however, it is according to its likeness present in the 
intellect that the thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands it; 
for it is not the stone existing outside the soul that is a perfection of our possible 
intellect. Now, the likeness of the material thing is in the intellect of a separate 
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potentia eius quae dicitur intellectus possibilis, et formae intelligibiles in eo receptae. Sed hoc non 
prohibet eas esse intellectas in actu: ex hoc enim aliquid est intellectum in actu quod est 
immateriale, non autem ex hoc quod est universale; sed magis universale habet quod sit intelligibile 
per hoc quod est abstractum a principiis materialibus individuantibus.” 
660 In II De Anima 6, 156-161: “Unde et prius oportebit determinare de obiectis quam de 
actibus, propter eamdem causam, propter quam et de actibus prius determinatur quam de 
potentiis. Obiecta autem sunt sicut alimentum respectu vegetativi, et sensibile respectu sensus, et 
intelligibile respectu intellectus.” 





substance immaterially, according to the latter’s mode, not according to that of a 
material substance. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying that this likeness is a 
perfection of the separate substance’s intellect, as its proper form.662 (Latin follows 
here). 
Cum autem intellectus in actu perfecto sit intellectum in actu, potest alicui videri 
quod substantia separata non intelligat res materiales: inconveniens enim videtur 
quod res materialis sit perfectio substantiae separatae. Sed si recte consideretur, res 
intellecta est perfectio intelligentis secundum suam similitudinem quam habet in 
intellectu: non enim lapis qui est extra animam, est perfectio intellectus possibilis 
nostri. Similitudo autem rei materialis in intellectu substantiae separatae est 
immaterialiter, secundum modum substantiae separatae, non secundum modum 
substantiae materialis. Unde non est inconveniens si haec similitudo dicatur esse 
perfectio intellectus substantiae separatae, sicut propria forma eius. 
Cf. also In III De anima 7, 37-48:  
He says that if the soul is indeed all things, it must be either simply identical with all 
things or a formal likeness of all things. The former view was that of Empedocles who 
made out that we, being earth, know earth, and being water we know water, and so 
on. But obviously the soul is not simply identical with the things it knows; for not 
stone itself, but its formal likeness exists in the soul. And this enables us to see how 
intellect in act is what it understands (in act); the form of the object is the form of 
the mind in act.663 
Finally, cf. Summa I, 14, 2. 
Note 11: Other Studied Texts in Support of our Interpretation of the Aristotelian Identity, 
from In Metaphysicorum (Footnote 381) 
In In Met. 12, lect. 11, 2617, the objection to the doctrine that God knows his own 
intelligence is a wrong transposition of what happens in human understanding to the 
divine: to know the other seems to be first, and to know oneself is derivative. Therefore, if 
the object of God’s understanding were God himself, his knowing would not be the utmost. 
                                                     
662 CG II, 99, par. 6-7. 
663 In III De anima 7, 37-48: “Et dicit, quod si anima est omnia, necesse est quod sit, vel ipsae 
res scibiles et sensibiles, sicut Empedocles posuit quod terra terram cognoscimus, et aqua aquam, et 
sic de aliis; aut sit species ipsorum. Non autem anima est ipsa res, sicut illi posuerunt, quia lapis non 
est in anima, sed species lapidis. Et per hunc modum dicitur intellectus in actu esse ipsum 





The answer is simply that in the separate substances the intellect in act and what is 
understood are not different, and therefore in God they are the same.664 What is relevant 
for our purposes is that the Aristotelian identity, which for Aquinas applies to every 
intellect, implies identity with the object in itself in some cases, but is always an identity 
with the object in its intelligible mode of being.665 
The following text can help us to see that, in understanding, there is identity in one sense 
and alterity in another sense. “In the case of the speculative sciences it is evident that the 
concept, which defines the thing itself, is the thing understood and the science or 
knowledge of that thing. For an intellect has knowledge by reason of the fact that it 
possesses the concept of a thing.”666 This is what we have called the alternative expression 
of the Aristotelian identity: the intellect is one with the thing in its abstracted mode of being 
(the act of the intellect is the rationem rei, not the thing itself in its natural being). The text 
continues: 
Therefore, since in the case of all those things which do not have matter the intellect 
when actually understanding does not differ from the thing understood, then in the 
case of the first substance, which is separate from matter in the highest degree, the 
act of understanding and the thing understood are evidently the same in the highest 
degree. Hence there is just one act of understanding pertaining to the thing 
                                                     
664 Cf. In Met. 12, lect. 11, 2620. 
665 Cf. Q.D. De Anima, a.5, ad 1: “For after Aristotle had determined the role of the possible 
and agent intellect, he had to determine the role of the intellect-in-act. He first distinguishes it in 
relation to the possible intellect, because the possible intellect and the thing known are not one and 
the same. However, the intellect or science-in-act is the same as the thing actually known. Aristotle 
had said the same thing about sense, namely, that sense and what is potentially sensible differ from 
each other, but that sense and what is actually sensed are one and the same.” [Nam postquam 
Aristoteles determinavit de intellectu possibili et agente, necessarium fuit ut determinaret de 
intellectu in actu, cuius primo differentiam ostendit ad intellectum possibilem. Nam intellectus 
possibilis et res quae intelligitur, non sunt idem; sed intellectus sive scientia in actu est idem rei 
scitae in actu, sicut et de sensu idem dixerat, quod sensus et sensibile in potentia differunt, sed 
sensus et sensibile in actu sunt unum et idem.]; De Spirit. Creat., a.10, ad 3: “The intellect in potency 
is not the thing that is understood in potency, but the intellect in act, or knowledge in act, is the 
thing that is understood or known in act.” [… intellectus in potentia non est intellectum in potentia; 
sed intellectus in actu, sive scientia in actu, est res intellecta vel scita in actu.] 
666 In Met. 12, lect. 11, 2620: “In speculativis vero scientiis manifestum est, quod ipsa ratio 
definitiva rei est res scita, et est ipsa scientia sive intelligentia. Per hoc enim est sciens intellectus, 





understood; that is, the act of understanding the thing understood is not distinct 
from that of understanding the act of understanding.667 
The clarification “in his quaecumque materiam non habent” comes because the objection 
points out the original alterity of the object in human understanding. St. Thomas does not 
challenge the objection in that sense, but clarifies that it does not apply to the divine. The 
text at least suggests that there can be alterity regarding the object, although there is 
always identity in a different sense. 
Note 12: The Distinction between Species and Object (Footnote 383) 
Other texts show this distinction between species and object:668 
Averroes’ second argument fails because it does not distinguish between that by 
which one understands and that which is understood. The species received into the 
possible intellect is not that which is understood; for, since all arts and sciences have 
to do with things understood, it would follow that all sciences are about species 
existing in the possible intellect. And this is patently false.669 
But in order that there be one thing understood, there must be a likeness of one and 
the same thing; and this is possible if the intelligible species are numerically distinct. 
For there is no reason why there should not be several different images of one thing; 
it is thus that one man is seen by several.670 
Consequently we must understand that, although the intelligible species received in 
the possible intellect are individuated inasmuch as they exist in the possible 
intellect, still the universal, which is conceived by abstraction from individuating 
                                                     
667 In Met. 12, lect. 11, 2620: “Cum igitur intellectus in actu et intellectum non sit alterum, in 
his quaecumque materiam non habent, manifestum est quod in substantia prima, quae maxime 
remota est a materia, maxime idem est intelligere et intellectum. Et sic una est intelligentia intellecti 
tantum, et non est aliud intelligentia intellecti, et aliud intelligentia intelligentiae.” 
668 Cf. for example De Ver 2, 3, ad 2 (difference in divine knowing between what he knows 
and the means by which he knows), ad 3 and ad 10. 
669 CG II, 75, par. 7: “Secunda vero ratio ipsius deficit, ex hoc quod non distinguit inter id quo 
intelligitur, et id quod intelligitur. Species enim recepta in intellectu possibili non habet se ut quod 
intelligitur. Cum enim de his quae intelliguntur sint omnes artes et scientiae, sequeretur quod 
omnes scientiae essent de speciebus existentibus in intellectu possibili. Quod patet esse falsum.” 
670 CG II, 75, par. 9: “Sed oportet, ad hoc quod sit unum intellectum, quod sit unius et 
eiusdem similitudo. Et hoc est possibile si species intelligibiles sint numero diversae: nihil enim 






principles, is known in these species inasmuch as they are immaterial. For universals 
with which the sciences are concerned, are what are known (through intelligible 
species) and not the intelligible species themselves.671 (Translator’s parentheses) 
The intelligible species through which the intellect understands formally, is present 
in the possible intellect of this and of that particular man, and for this reason it 
follows that there are many possible intellects. Nevertheless the quiddity (quod) 
known through such a species is one, if we consider this quiddity in relation to the 
thing known; because the universal which is understood by both of these men is the 
same in all the things (of which it is the universal representation).672 (Translator’s 
parentheses) 
We must say that the thing which is understood is not related to the possible 
intellect as an intelligible species whereby the possible intellect is actuated, but that 
species is as a formal principle whereby the intellect understands […] And hence the 
species which makes seeing possible is not as a thing which is seen, but as that 
whereby the object is seen. And the same is true of the possible intellect […] 
Accordingly, a thing that is understood by two intellects is in a way one and the 
same thing, and in a way it is many things: because on the part of the object which is 
known it is one and the same thing; but on the part of the knowledge itself it is two 
different things.673 
Note 13: The “Double Being” of the Species (Footnote 389) 
This “double being” of the species, i.e., its real being as subjective modification and its 
“representative” being, can be seen in other texts: 
                                                     
671 Q.D. De Anima, a.2, ad 5: “Quamvis species receptae in intellectu possibili sint 
individuatae ex illa parte qua inhaerent intellectui possibili; tamen in eis, in quantum sunt 
immateriales, cognoscitur universale quod concipitur per abstractionem a principiis individuantibus. 
Universalia enim, de quibus sunt scientiae, sunt quae cognoscuntur per species intelligibiles, non 
ipsae species intelligibiles.” 
672 Q.D. De Anima, a.3, ad 7: “Licet species intelligibilis qua intellectus formaliter intelligit, sit 
in intellectu possibili istius et illius hominis, ex quo intellectus possibiles sunt plures; id tamen quod 
intelligitur per huiusmodi species est unum, si consideremus habito respectu ad rem intellectam; 
quia universale quod intelligitur ab utroque, est idem in omnibus.” 
673 De Spirit. Creat., a.9, ad 6: “Oportet dicere quod res intellecta non se habet ad 
intellectum possibilem ut species intelligibilis, qua intellectus possibilis sit actu; sed illa species se 
habet ut principium formale quo intellectus intelligit […] Unde species visibilis non se habet ut quod 
videtur, sed ut quo videtur. Et simile est de intellectu possibili […] Res igitur intellecta a duobus 
intellectibus est quodammodo una et eadem, et quodammodo multae: quia ex parte rei quae 
cognoscitur est una et eadem, ex parte vero ipsius cognitionis est alia et alia.” Cf. De Spirit. Creat., 





There are two ways of considering the mutual likeness between two things. First, we 
can consider them inasmuch as they agree in a common nature. Such a likeness 
between the knower and the known is not required; indeed, we sometimes see that 
the smaller the likeness, the sharper the cognition. For example, there is less 
resemblance between the intellectual likeness of a stone and the stone than there is 
between the sense likeness and the stone, for the intellectual likeness is farther 
removed from matter; yet the intellect knows more profoundly than sense. 
Secondly, the likeness between two things can be considered from the point of view 
of representation. Such a likeness of the knower to the thing known is necessary.674 
(Latin follows here) 
Similitudo aliquorum duorum ad invicem potest dupliciter attendi. Uno modo 
secundum convenientiam in natura; et talis similitudo non requiritur inter 
cognoscens et cognitum; immo videmus quandoque quod, quanto talis similitudo 
est minor, tanto cognitio est perspicacior; sicut minor est similitudo similitudinis 
quae est in intellectu ad lapidem, quam illius quae est in sensu, cum sit magis a 
materia remota; et tamen intellectus perspicacius cognoscit quam sensus. Alio modo 
quantum ad repraesentationem; et haec similitudo requiritur cognoscentis ad 
cognitum. 
Therefore, these notions thus abstracted can be considered in two ways. The first 
one is to consider them in themselves. In this way, they are considered without 
movement and designated matter: this is found in the aforementioned notions only 
with regard to the being that they have in the intellect. The other way is to consider 
them with regard to the things of which they are notions, things that certainly subsist 
in matter and movement. And in this way these notions are principles of knowledge 
of those things, because every thing is known by means of its form. Thus, by means 
of these notions, immobile and considered without particular matter, we have 
knowledge (in natural science) of mobile and material things which exist outside the 
soul.675 
                                                     
674 De Ver 2, 3, ad 9. 
675 In Boet. De Trin. 5, 2, c.: “Possunt ergo huiusmodi rationes sic abstractae considerari 
dupliciter. Uno modo secundum se, et sic considerantur sine motu et materia signata, et hoc non 
invenitur in eis nisi secundum esse quod habent in intellectu. Alio modo secundum quod 
comparantur ad res, quarum sunt rationes; quae quidem res sunt in materia et motu. Et sic sunt 
principia cognoscendi illa, quia omnis res cognoscitur per suam formam. Et ita per huiusmodi 
rationes immobiles et sine materia particulari consideratas habetur cognitio in scientia naturali de 





“However, it might be said that inasmuch as intelligible forms inhere in the soul they are 
individuated; but as the likenesses of things they are universals representing things 
according to their common nature and not according to their individuating principles.” 676 
Note 14: Intentional Identity without quodammodo (Footnote 407) 
For an interesting text in which St. Thomas speaks about this intentional identity without 
quodammodo, see the following:  
And the mind in act is its object; for precisely [as] the object is or is not material, [in 
the same way it is] perceived by the mind. And just because Plato overlooked this 
process of abstraction he was forced to conceive of mathematical objects and 
specific natures as existing in separation from matter; whereas Aristotle was able to 
explain that process by the agent intellect.677 
The italics of the Leonine edition indicate the terms of Aristotle that Aquinas quotes. The 
context makes clear that this is not an explanation of the “Aristotelian identity,” but of the 
objectivity of knowing, insofar as what we conceive corresponds to the things themselves. 
Lambert says: “Human abstracted concepts are identical in content to things in the real 
physical order and in that respect are never more than the equal of things; their superiority 
lies exclusively in their function as ‘re-presentation’ of those things in an immaterial 
mode.”678 
Note 15:  Apprehension in 83, 4, c. (Footnote 420) 
In 83, 4, c., the original apprehensive quality of the intellect is opposed to the tensive (as 
“tending towards”) aspect of the will. We quote only the beginning of the corpus:  
                                                     
676 Q.D. De Anima, a.2, ob.7: “Sed dicebat quod formae intelligibiles ex illa parte qua 
inhaerent animae, sunt individuatae; sed ex illa parte qua sunt rerum similitudines, sunt universales, 
repraesentantes res secundum naturam communem, et non secundum principia individuantia.” 
677 In III De Anima 6, 297-305: “Et omnino intellectus in actu est res intellectae, quia sicut res 
in sui ratione habent materiam vel non habent, sic ab intellectu percipiuntur. Et quia hunc modum 
abstractionis Plato non consideravit, coactus fuit ponere mathematica et species separatas, loco 
cuius ad praedictam abstractionem faciendam Aristoteles posuit intellectum agentem.” 





The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we 
have said above. Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have 
intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and 
free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their 
relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of ‘understanding’ implies 
the simple acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first 
principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. But to ‘reason,’ 
properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: 
wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from 
the principles.679 
Note how “potentias appetitivas” are distinguished from “potentiis apprehensivis,” and the 
description of intelligere (here the first operation of the intelligence) is described as  
“simplicem acceptionem alicuius rei.” Significantly, even the movement of ratio from the 
principles to the conclusions is ascribed to the “intellectual apprehension”: “ex parte 
apprehensionis intellectivae se habent intellectus et ratio.” 
Note 16: Understanding as an Activity (Footnote 449) 
There is a tendency of every potency to its proper object, a sort of “transcendental 
orientation,” to which Aquinas refers as “natural appetite.” This is no more than the 
metaphysical tendency that, as every form, the faculties of the soul have to their own 
perfections. It is comparable to the tendency of every being to be what it is, and it is not 
enough to make these faculties “active” or “tendential” potencies. For Aquinas the 
appetitive potencies are necessary in the human soul680 and are not to be confounded with 
the natural appetite: 
Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to 
something. Wherefore each power desires by the natural appetite that object which 
                                                     
679 83, 4, c.: “Respondeo dicendum quod potentias appetitivas oportet esse proportionatas 
potentiis apprehensivis, ut supra dictum est. Sicut autem ex parte apprehensionis intellectivae se 
habent intellectus et ratio, ita ex parte appetitus intellectivi se habent voluntas et liberum arbitrium, 
quod nihil aliud est quam vis electiva. Et hoc patet ex habitudine obiectorum et actuum. Nam 
intelligere importat simplicem acceptionem alicuius rei, unde intelligi dicuntur proprie principia, 
quae sine collatione per seipsa cognoscuntur. Ratiocinari autem proprie est devenire ex uno in 
cognitionem alterius, unde proprie de conclusionibus ratiocinamur, quae ex principiis innotescunt.” 





is suitable to itself. Above which natural appetite is the animal appetite, which 
follows the apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to this 
or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing; but simply as suitable to 
the animal.681 
Note 17: Knowing as Receptive (Footnote 454) 
Aquinas has characterized knowing (and particularly understanding) as receptive in other 
works as well: “Our possible intellect can understand nothing before it is brought into act by 
a […] form [intelligible in act.]”682; “… [T]he intellect is passive to the intelligible…”683; “Our 
possible intellect is merely in potency in the realm of the intelligible; it is actualised through 
an idea drawn from sensible images.”684 (my trans.); the species “is impressed”685 on the 
possible intellect. Knowing is “apprehensive”686, “receptive”687; “perceptive”688; 
“accipere.”689 
Note 18: The Comparison between Intellect and Senses (Footnote 477) 
                                                     
681 80, 1 ad 3: “Dicendum quod unaquaeque potentia animae est quaedam forma seu 
natura, et habet naturalem inclinationem in aliquid. Unde unaquaeque appetit obiectum sibi 
conveniens naturali appetitu. Supra quem est appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem, quo 
appetitur aliquid non ea ratione qua est conveniens ad actum huius vel illius potentiae, utpote visio 
ad videndum et auditio ad audiendum; sed quia est conveniens simpliciter animali.” 
682 Cf. De Ver 8, 6 in Lambert, 83: “Intellectus possibilis noster nihil potest intelligere 
antequam perficiatur forma intelligibili in actu.” 
683 CG II, 76, par. 15: “… [I]ntellectus patitur ab intelligibili…” 
684 In II De Anima 6, 173-190: “Intellectus noster possibilis est in potentia tantum in ordine 
intelligibilium: fit autem actu per formam a phantasmatibus abstractam.” 
685 De Spirit. Creat., a.10, ad 17. Cf. In Met. 9, lect.8, 1864-1865. 
686 Cf. In Boet. De Trin. 6, 2, c.. 
687 Cf. In I Sent d.3, q.4, a.5, c.; In III De Anima 1, 131-139; De Spirit. Creat., a.9, c.; Q.D. De 
Anima, a.4, ad 8: “The activity of the possible intellect consists in receiving intelligibles, whereas that 
of the agent intellect consists in abstracting them.” [Actus intellectus possibilis est recipere 
intelligibilia; actio autem intellectus agentis est abstrahere intelligibilia.] and ad 9; a.5, c.; a.13, c.. 
688 Cf. In III De Anima 4, 100-104: “Moreover, just as the potential intellect’s function of 
receiving intelligible objects is attributed to the individual man as its subject, so also is the work of 
the agent intellect, the abstracting of such objects from matter.” [Videmus etiam, quod sicut 
operatio intellectus possibilis, quae est percipere intelligibile, attribuitur homini, ita et operatio 
intellectus agentis, quae est abstrahere intelligibilia.]; Q.D. De Anima, a.2, ad 15. 





The comparison between intellect and senses can be seen in other works of Aquinas. In In 
Boet. De Trin. 6, 2, c., for example, both imply an apprehensive moment. In the Contra 
Gentiles:  
Consequently, in the act of understanding, the intelligible species received into the 
possible intellect functions as the thing by which one understands, and not as that 
which is understood, even as the species of color in the eye is not that which is seen, 
but that by which we see. And that which is understood is the very intelligible 
essence of things existing outside the soul, just as things outside the soul are seen by 
corporeal sight.690 
In In III De Anima 1, 56 ff., both are passive and receptive, precisely in the context of the 
distinction of the faculties; In III De Anima 2, 264-279 is similar to the text quoted of Contra 
Gentiles; in In III De Anima 10, 20-27 both imply a certain “apparition” and knowing in the 
absence of the things known, for which some of the names proper to each faculty may 
sometimes be used interchangeably; in In III De Anima 5, 233-238 intellect and sight are not 
deceived in their proper objects, quod quid est and colour. “For it is evident that the act of 
intellection has its origin in the possible intellect as the first principle whereby we 
understand, just as the operation of sensing has its origin in a sentient power.”691 Note how 
in this last text the act of understanding is characterized as a certain “coming out,” and so 
allegedly as active, but only in the same way that the act of the senses could be 
characterized as active. St. Thomas is simply talking about the spontaneity of knowing, in 
the sense that “we know”: knowing is an act of the subject. In In Met. 11, lect. 7, 2253 both 
are operations that remain in the agent. “Now as the sense is directly informed by the 
likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. 
Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the sense about 
                                                     
690 CG II, 75, par. 7: “Habet se igitur species intelligibilis recepta in intellectu possibili in 
intelligendo sicut id quo intelligitur, non sicut id quod intelligitur: sicut et species coloris in oculo non 
est id quod videtur, sed id quo videmus. Id vero quod intelligitur, est ipsa ratio rerum existentium 
extra animam: sicut et res extra animam existentes visu corporali videntur.” 
691 Q.D. De Anima, a.3, c.: “Manifestum est enim quod haec operatio, quae est intelligere, 
egreditur ab intellectu possibili sicut a primo principio, per quod intelligimus; sicut haec operatio 





its proper object.”692 Stump compares them in the role of the species (“Like sensible species 
and phantasms, the intelligible species are immaterial forms that are means of cognition 
and similitudes of things outside the mind”)693 and on page 263 she provides other texts of 
Aquinas in which the similarities between intellect and sense can be seen. 
Note 19: The distinction between agent intellect and possible intellect (Footnote 495) 
The distinction between agent intellect and possible intellect is present in other works of 
Aquinas. “Neither do I say that these two potencies, namely the agent intellect and the 
possible intellect, are actually one and the same potency differently named according to 
different operations; in fact, whenever different actions are reduced to contrary principles, 
it is impossible to reduce those actions to the same potency.”694 (my trans.) “Now, the 
possible intellect is compared to the agent intellect as its proper patient or recipient, 
because the agent intellect is related to it as art to its matter.”695 
Note, in this last text, that the possible intellect “receives” the agent intellect as active 
cause, not as its own act or form: otherwise the comparison would be not with the art, but 
with the form of the artefact. This is what St. Thomas interpreted in the Aristotelian text. 
“For the agent intellect stands in the same relation to the intelligible species received into 
the possible intellect as art to the artificial forms which it produces in matter, as the 
                                                     
692 Summa I, 17, 3 (in Stump, 233 note 90): “Sicut autem sensus informatur directe 
similitudine propriorum sensibilium, ita intellectus informatur similitudine quidditatis rei. Unde circa 
quod quid est intellectus non decipitur: sicut neque sensus circa sensibilia propria.” 
693 Stump, 262. 
694 In II Sent d.17, q.2, a.1, c.: “Nec iterum dico, haec duo, scilicet intellectum agentem et 
possibilem, esse unam potentiam diversimode nominatam secundum diversas operationes; quia 
quaecumque actiones reducuntur in contraria principia, impossibile est eas reducere in eamdem 
potentiam.”  
695 CG II, 76, par. 2: “Intellectus autem possibilis comparatur ad agentem ut proprium 






example used by Aristotle in De anima III […] makes clear.”696 Cory quotes an interesting 
text of Averroes from his Long Commentary to De Anima, where the Commentator 
prospects the limits of the analogy of art, pointing out that the agent intellect is not the 
absolute origin of the content, because in that case the phantasms would not be 
required.697 
More Aquinas’ texts for the distinction could be quoted.698 Sellés699 states that for Aquinas 
the action of the agent intellect precedes the reception of the possible intellect, quoting CG 
II, 77, n. 3. Stump speaks of a distinction of parts in the intellect: “Aquinas thinks of the 
intellect as divided into an active part and a passive part. The active part, generally called 
‘the agent intellect’, abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms and deposits 
them in the passive part of the intellect, which is generally called ‘the potential intellect’ or 
‘the possible intellect.’”700 
Note 20: On the two Opinions as to the Effect of Light (Footnote 619) 
“There are two opinions as to the effect of light…”701 
Hence, following [Aristotle’s] opinion, I say that light is necessary for seeing, not 
because of colour, in that it actualises colours (which some say are in only potency so 
long as they are in darkness), but because of the transparent medium which light 
renders actual, as the text states.702 
                                                     
696 CG II, 76, par. 18: “Comparatur enim intellectus agens ad species intelligibiles receptas in 
intellectu possibili, sicut ars ad formas artificiales quae per artem ponuntur in materia: ut patet ex 
exemplo Aristotelis in III De Anima [cap. V, 1; 430 a].” 
697 Cf. Averroes, LCDA, III, 18 in Cory, Averroes, 25. 
698 Cf. CG II, 76, par. 15; Q.D. De Anima, a.4, ad 8 et ad 9; a.5, c.: “Therefore there must exist 
within us a formal principle through which we receive intelligible species, and one whereby we 
abstract them. These principles are called the possible and the agent intellect respectively.” 
[Oportet igitur esse in nobis aliquod principium formale quo recipiamus intelligibilia, et aliud quo 
abstrahamus ea. Et huiusmodi principia nominantur intellectus possibilis et agens.]; In III De Anima 
4, 1-7; 100-104; De Spirit. Creat., a.10, c.. 
699 Cf. Sellés, EIA, 251. 
700 Cf. Stump, 264. 
701 79, 3 ad 2. 
702 In II De Anima 14, 356 ff.: “Unde secundum sententiam Aristotelis dicendum est, quod 





In In III De Anima 4, 43-53 the light does not make in act as the agent intellect makes in act. 
Cf. also the following: 
For this reason others offer a different and more acceptable explanation, namely, 
that light is necessary for sight inasmuch as it perfects the medium […] Consequently 
the comparison between light and the agent intellect does not hold in all respects, 
because the agent intellect is necessary for this reason, that it may make the 
potentially intelligible to be actually intelligible. Aristotle pointed this out in the De 
anima, (Book III) when he said that the agent intellect is like light in some respects.703 
Note 21: “Philosophical Translation” of the Second Last Paragraph of the Epilogue 
Otherwise, by dissolving the meaning of things in our dealings with them, we risk 
losing also the meaning of our own existence. The existential void is the emptiness of 
a soul who did not welcome things as they are—with their own caprices and 
beauty—a soul who thus remained alone in the self-made prison of his or her own 
world of ideas and values. Then, when the door to the world is closed, the path to 
Heaven cannot be found. God is hidden behind the trees, behind the beauties He 
made. It is only by encountering others that we can hear about God. 
This “philosophical translation” does not intend to convey the same meaning as the 
previous images, but does intend to help in the understanding of some of the principles on 
which those images depend. An image may sometimes convey more than one idea, and can 
sometimes help in the understanding of deeper ideas than can mere philosophical 
expression. The use of images serves also as a scholarly device, insofar as it can help the 
reader to form the right phantasm in order to understand. At the same time, the limitation 
of an image may come from the impossibility of its adapting perfectly to the meaning it tries 
to convey, and/or from a lack of art in the one who creates the image. 
At the beginning of this paragraph, I imply that a Kantian formal a priori tends to “dissolve 
the meaning of things in our dealings with them,” insofar as the meaning passes from being 
                                                     
quidam, tantum dicunt esse in potentia, cum sunt in tenebris; sed ex parte diaphani, inquantum 
facit ipsum esse in actu, ut in litera dicitur.” 
703 Q.D. De Anima, a.4, ad 4: “Et ideo alii aliter dicunt, et melius, quod lumen necessarium 
est ad videndum in quantum perficit diaphanum […] Comparatio ergo luminis ad intellectum 
agentem non est quantum ad omnia; cum intellectus agens ad hoc sit necessarius ut faciat 
intelligibilia in potentia esse intelligibilia actu. Et hoc significavit Aristoteles in III De Anima, cum 




something in the things themselves (Thomistic prospective) to being something bestowed 
on things by the subject’s activity (Kantian prospective). 
By “existential void” I mean the lack of meaning in human existence, insofar as the subject 
finds no reason, no purpose, no answer in life and, thus, faces despair. The subject realizes 
that, if everything depends on him or her, then everything participates the subject’s 
contingency, imperfection and finitude, and thus falls into nothing. There is no hope of 
perfection (= happiness), because the one who acknowledges one’s own need and desire 
for perfection, finds oneself as being the perfection of everything else.  
This existential void is produced, in my view, by the attitude of rejecting things as having a 
meaning in themselves (“not welcoming things as they are”). It is similar to what happens 
when one, instead of listening to the other person, is always trying to hear only what one 
wants to hear. When the subject does not accept the limit that a thing brings with itself, 
when the subject does not welcome something as “other,” but tries to see his or her own 
utility in that thing, the subject remains alone, having things to deal with but nothing to 
receive. 
The attitude of “humility” or “welcoming,” instead, is that which opens the door to a 
meaningful world. But once this door is open, the limits of things and their being-there-
before-us inspires the search for a cause. Participated being is by necessity a caused being. 
A meaningful, independent world presents itself as a mystery, as a big question. This is why 
it is said that “when the door to the world is closed, the path to Heaven cannot be found.” 
“Heaven” can here be understood as ultimate meaning, happiness or God Himself. When 
the door to the world is open, we may find the path towards God, because the human way 
to arrive at the knowledge of God is ascending towards Him by means of the knowledge of 
creatures.  
That is why I say “God is hidden behind the trees.” The image “behind the trees” can mean 
several things. First of all, God is not “within” the trees but “behind” them, insofar as God is 




is, rather, to be considered “beyond” creation. The distinction between God and creatures, 
however, is not spatial (“here is the world and there is God”); God is everywhere. Instead, 
the distinction between God and creatures is metaphysical. God is actual fullness of 
perfection, a pure act including intensively and simply (without differentiation) all of the 
perfection of being, whereas each creature is limited, possessing a specific perfection and a 
limited corresponding act of being. God is everywhere, therefore, insofar as God causes 
each gram of being in the universe. In this way, “behind the trees” points to the distinction 
between God and creatures, the essential “otherness” of God.704 
“Behind the trees” is also a figure of a kind of play between God and human beings. The 
purpose of God in creation is to be found by human beings who rejoice in finding God as 
those who win a game. Human beings are supposed to look for God. God is hidden because 
God wants human beings to look for Him, not because God does not want to be found. God 
wants to be found, and God wants to be found in such a way that those who find Him may 
be happy with their own “cleverness.” God, however, can be found only by those who get 
out of themselves, and recognize their needs. In a sense, it is only by accepting the 
limitation imposed on us by the things themselves (“welcoming things as they are”), and by 
accepting our own limitation and need (“going out to play the game”), that we open 
ourselves to the unlimited happiness of finding God. 
“It is only by encountering others that we can hear about God.” This last line means what 
has already been said regarding the necessity of ascending to God by means of creatures. 
The reason I say “hear” is because by means of creatures we cannot “see” God, but we can 
certainly “hear” God in His created effects; the effects make us realize that there is a cause, 
in the same way as the sound of the bell makes us realize that someone is at the door. 
                                                     
704 This position is different from considering God an a priori of human understanding, for 
two reasons: first, because we find God not by reflecting on ourselves and our mode of knowing, but 
by reflecting on the limits of creatures; and second, because we cannot know ourselves before 
knowing creatures in themselves. We do not deny that the knowledge of ourselves be crucial or 





This line can also mean that only by encountering those who preach the Gospel  can we 
hear about God, insofar as “No one has ever seen God; the only Son, who is in the bosom of 
the Father, he has made him known.”705 That is, the natural knowledge of God is obtained 
by encountering creatures and reasoning from them; the supernatural knowledge of God is 
obtained by encountering the divine messengers and welcoming their message. 
Note 22: The Complete Text of Fabro in NMP 272-273 
Certainly God, who is the ‘ipsum intelligere subsistens’, is the intelligible sun of the 
spirits and the first cause of every truth; but, as in the sensible realm it is not 
necessary that the eye sees its objects turning directly to the sun, but it is enough 
that they be seen insofar as they are rendered evident by the light derived from the 
sun – likewise, in the created intelligible realm, it is enough, and even fitting, that the 
creature sees its objects insofar as they are rendered evident by a light participated 
from the divine sun.706 This light is for man the agent intellect, which Aristotle has 
said to be in noi [Greek] ‘like the light’707 and which St. Thomas describes always as 
the highest participation and the inmost seal (in the natural order) of the divinity in 
us. The agent intellect is principle productive [fattivo] of the intelligible and this 
intelligible that708 comes to us not by direct participation from God, but through a 
complex process of abstraction accomplished by the participated light, the agent 
intellect, in the realm of the concrete and diffuse participations of the sensible 
world: ‘The intelligible species which are participated by our intellect are reduced, as 
to their first cause, to a first principle which is by its essence intelligible—namely, 
God. But they proceed from that principle by means of the sensible forms and 
material things, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says.’”709 
Note 23: Text of In III De Anima 1, 170-180 (Footnote 520) 
The early philosophers’ principle [was] that intellect must be compounded of all 
things if it can know all things. But if it knew all things, as containing them all in itself 
already, it would be an ever-actual intellect, and never merely in potency. In the 
                                                     
705 John 1:18. 
706 De Veritate, q. XVIII, a. 1. 
707 De Anima, Gamma, 5, 430, a. 15. 
708 This word should probably be omitted in the original. 
709 Fabro, Cornelio, La Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione secondo San Tommaso d’Aquino, 
in Cornelio Fabro: Opere Complete, vol. 3 (Segni: EDIVI, 2005), 272-273. The text which Fabro quotes 
from Aquinas is 84, 4 ad 1: “Species intelligibiles quas participat noster intellectus, reducuntur, sicut 
in primam causam, in aliquod principium per suam essentiam intelligibile, scilicet in Deum. Sed ab 
illo principio procedunt mediantibus formis rerum sensibilium et materialium a quibus scientiam 





same way he has remarked already of the senses, that if they were intrinsically made 
up of the objects they perceive, their perceptions would not presuppose any exterior 
sensible objects.710 
Note 24: The Intellect as “tabula rasa” in Other Works (Footnote 521) 
“The intellect is in potency to all intelligible forms having none actually, just as prime matter 
is in potency to all sensible forms having none actually.”711 The objection is not challenged 
in that regard. See also the following: 
It would follow that the possible intellect would not receive any species that are 
abstracted from our phantasms, if one intellect belongs to all those who are and who 
have been. Because, now that many men who knew many things have already gone 
before us, it would follow that with respect to all those things which they knew the 
possible intellect would be in act and not in potency to receive them, because 
nothing receives what it already has.712 
                                                     
710 In III De Anima 1, 170-180: “Dicebant [antiqui] enim eum [i.e. intellectus animae] ad hoc 
quod cognosceret omnia, esse compositum ex omnibus. Si autem esset cognoscitivus omnium quia 
haberet in se omnia, esset semper intellectus in actu et nunquam in potentia: sicut supra dixit de 
sensu, quod si esset compositus ex sensibilibus, non indigeret sensibilibus exterioribus ad 
sentiendum.” 
711 Q.D. De Anima, a.2, ob. 17: “Intellectus est in potentia ad omnes formas intelligibiles, 
nullam earum habens in actu; sicut materia prima est in potentia ad omnes formas sensibiles, et 
nullam earum habet in actu.” 
712 De Spirit. Creat., a.9, c.: “Sequeretur quod intellectus possibilis non reciperet aliquas 
species a phantasmatibus nostris abstractas, si sit unus intellectus possibilis omnium qui sunt et qui 
fuerunt. Quia iam cum multi homines praecesserint multa intelligentes, sequeretur quod respectu 
omnium illorum quae illi sciverunt, sit in actu et non sit in potentia ad recipiendum; quia nihil recipit 
quod iam habet.” 
